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Abstract 
In 2001, Thailand introduced the Universal Coverage of Health Care Policy (UC) very 
rapidly after the new government came to power. The policy aims to entitle all citizens 
to health care and includes health system reforms to achieve equity, efficiency, and 
accountability. The overall question this thesis asks is how did this policy come about, 
and how likely is it that the policy will achieve its goals? 
Literature suggests that understanding the policy process is as important as assessing the 
content of particular policies when judging policy outcomes. By using an analytical 
framework to explore four elements: context, actors, process, and content, this thesis 
aims to generate general understanding of the UC policy process, and to use this 
analysis to assess implementation. It starts by addressing how and why universal 
coverage, which had long been discussed in Thailand, got on to the policy agenda in 
2001, and then explores how the policy was formulated nationally. It goes on to look at 
implementation in one province, examining the inter-relationships between provincial, 
district and community facilities. Data were gathered from key informant interviews, 
document and media analysis, and group discussion with villagers. 
The analysis suggests that Thailand's democratization, created new actors in health 
policymaking processes which had long been under control of ' bureaucrats and 
professionals. The 1997 Constitution encouraged a more pluralistic political system. 
Universal access to health was advocated by a group of non-government organizations 
who pushed to get UC through legislation and announced their campaign a few months 
before the 2001 election. NGO interest was paralleled by a political party campaign, 
announced in 2000 by the Thai-Rak Thai Party, and implemented as UC when the Party 
came to power. UC was picked up because it was seen as legitimate, feasible under the 
existing infrastructure and government budget, and also congruent with the reform 
intention of the political party. Once it became the government in 2001, an important 
factor in early policy formulation was the extent to which national research provided 
evidence to support the policy. The research community was tightly-knit and 
concentrated in medical-related professions. One member of this policy community 
played an important role as a policy entrepreneur. This policy community continued to 
support evidence for debates in policy-making during both policy formulation and 
implementation. The implementation process was a top-down process; however, there 
were some spaces for street level bureaucrats to adapt decisions to fit their context. 
Implementation started through the extension of insurance coverage in four phases 
under the execution of the Ministry of Public Health. Private providers were only 
minimally involved in these formulation and implementation phases. The UC policy in 
2001-2 was characterised by clear policy goals, limited participation, strong institutional 
capacity, and very rapid implementation - all factors which anticipated success of the 
policy. However, the complex technical features of the policy and the big change in 
system reform were a brake on success. One of the implementation problems was the 
mobilization of human resources, especially where bureaucrats were resistant to change. 
It seems that the implementation of the UC policy in Thailand reflected both managerial 
as well as political problems. Given the findings of this study, policy monitoring should 
pay attention to political as well as technical assessments. 
2 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ 
2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................... 
3 
TABLE OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................. 
7 
TABLE OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................... 
8 
TABLE OF BOXES ................................................................................................................................... 
8 
LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 
3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... 
10 
CHAPTER 1- THAILAND'S RADICAL UNIVERSAL COVERAGE POLICY .............................. 
11 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
......................................................................................................................... 
11 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR UNIVERSAL COVERAGE ................................................................................... 
12 
1.2.1 Why universal coverage is important ................................................................................... 
12 
1.2.2 Issues on system designs ...................................................................................................... 
14 
1.3 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM ................................................................................... 
17 
1.3.1 The rise of health care reform .............................................................................................. 
17 
1.3.2 Reform issues in developing countries ................................................................................. 
18 
1.3.3 Summary 
.............................................................................................................................. 
21 
1.4 THAI HEALTH SYSTEM AND CONTEXT BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE UC SCHEME........... 22 
1.4.1 Health care delivery and financing system .......................................................................... 
22 
1.4.2 Problems of access to health care ........................................................................................ 
23 
1.4.3 Context: social, political and economic ............................................................................... 
25 
1.4.4 Coexisting reform policies before 2001 ............................................................................... 
27 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE 2001 UNIVERSAL COVERAGE POLICY (UC) ................................................ 
28 
1.6 QUESTIONS REGARDING UC POLICY ......................................................................................... 
30 
CHAPTER 2- RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODS ........................................................ 31 
2.1 FRAMEWORK OF POLICY ANALYSIS: A REVIEW .......................................................................... 
31 
2.1.1 Policy as process .................................................................................................................. 
33 
2.1.2 Political interests in decision-making process and policy change ....................................... 
37 
2.1.3 Actor-oriented policy explanation ........................................................................................ 
39 
2.1.4 Context explaining policy change ........................................................................................ 
42 
2.2 ORGANISED FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTIGATING HEALTH POLICY PROCESSES ............................. 
43 
2.2.1 Policy content ....................................................................................................................... 
43 
3 
2.2.2 Policy context ....................................................................................................................... 
44 
2.2.3 Policy actors ........................................................................................................................ 
44 
2.2.4 Policy processes ................................................................................................................... 
45 
2.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS ..................................................................................... 
48 
2.3.1 Main objective ...................................................................................................................... 
48 
2.3.2 Specific objectives ................................................................................................................ 
48 
2.3.3 Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 
50 
2.3.4 Data collection at National level ......................................................................................... 
55 
2.3.5 Data collection at provincial level ....................................................................................... 
35 
2.3.6 Scope of the study ................................................................................................................. 
56 
2.3.7 Limitations of the study ........................................................................................................ 
56 
2.3.8 Reliability and validity assurance ........................................................................................ 
57 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 
57 
CHAPTER 3- AGENDA SETTING PROCESS .................................................................................. 
58 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
......................................................................................................................... 
58 
3.2 AGENDA SETTING IN THE THAI RAK THAI PARTY (TRTP) ........................................................ 
58 
3.3 FLOATING THE UC AGENDA AMONGST BUREAUCRATS ............................................................. 
64 
3.4 ROLES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ........................................................................................................... 
67 
3.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE AGENDA SETTING PROCESS: CONTENT, CONTEXT, ACTORS, AND 
PROCESS ................................................................................................................................................. 
69 
3.5.1 Policy content: legitimacy, radical, and popular ................................................................. 
69 
3.5.2 Policy context ....................................................................................................................... 
70 
3.5.3 Policy actors ........................................................................................................................ 
71 
3.5.4 Agenda setting process ......................................................................................................... 
73 
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 
74 
CHAPTER 4- POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS ....................................................................... 76 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
......................................................................................................................... 
76 
4.2 INTENT IN POLICY ...................................................................................................................... 
76 
4.2.1 Policy goals ..............................................................................:........................................... 
78 
4.2.2 System design to achieve the goals ...................................................................................... 
78 
4.2.3 Organisation and management design ................................................................................. 
79 
4.3 POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS OF THE 30 BAHT SCHEME ....................................................... 
81 
4.3.1 Actual system features .......................................................................................................... 
81 
4.3.2 Actors and their interactions in the policy formulation process .......................................... 
83 
4.3.3 Context of the decision-making process ............................................................................. 
101 
4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 
103 
CHAPTER 5- POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: NATIONAL LEVEL ........................................... 
105 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
.................... . 
105 
.................................................................................................. 
4 
5.2 UC IMPLEMENTATION: CENTRAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CHANGES .......................................... 
105 
5.2.1 Policy executions to achieve universal coverage ............................................................... 
105 
5.2.2 Implementation of health care reform ................................................................................ 
117 
5.2.3 Summary: gaps between policy intent and implementation in reality ................................ 
124 
5.3 ACTORS: THEIR ROLES, POSITION AND POWER IN THE UC IMPLEMENTATION .......................... 
125 
5.3.1 The government sector ....................................................................................................... 
126 
5.3.2 Non-governmental and private sector ................................................................................ 
128 
5.3.3 Professional councils ......................................................................................................... 
129 
5.3.4 Consumer representatives and committees ........................................................................ 
129 
5.3.5 International Donor Community ........................................................................................ 
130 
5.4 ASSESSMENT OF CHANGE MANAGEMENT ................................................................................ 
130 
5.4.1 Change management at national level: action outside the MoPH ..................................... 
130 
5.4.2 Managing change in the MoPH. " changing organisational culture ................................... 
131 
5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 133 
CHAPTE R6- IMPLEMENTATION: PROVINCIAL ARRANGEMENTS ................................... 
134 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
....................................................................................................................... 
134 
6.2 PROFILE OF SARABURI PROVINCE ........................................................................................... 
134 
6.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UC POLICY IN SARABURI PROVINCE .............................................. 
138 
6.3.1 Organisation and implementing management ................................................................... 
138 
6.3.2 Policy communication and perceptions of the implementers ............................................. 
143 
6.3.3 Saraburi insurance system and decision-making process .................................................. 
148 
6.3.4 Enrolment and insurance coverage ................................................................................... 
1 55 
6.3.5 Impact of the policy on implementers and their responses ................................................ 
157 
6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 
163 
CHAPTER 7- IMPLEMENTATION: OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ............................... 
165 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
....................................................................................................................... 
165 
7.2 RESPONDING TO THE 30 BAHT SCHEME: PERCEPTIONS OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND HEALTH 
WORKERS INVOLVED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION .................................................................................... 
165 
7.2.1 Separating the role of regulation from service provision .................................................. 
167 
7.2.2 Changes of budgetary system and provider payment mechanisms .................................... 
169 
7.2.3 Expanding the range of services offrontier providers ....................................................... 
170 
7.2.4 Provider network and referral system ................................................................................ 
172 
7.3 VILLAGERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE 30 BAHT SCHEME .............................................................. 
174 
7.3.1 Who gained and who lost ................................................................................................... 175 
7.3.2 Participation and communication ...................................................................................... 
179 
7.3.3 Enrolment ........................................................................................................................... 180 
7.3.4 Service delivery system ...................................................................................................... 
181 
7.4 PERFORMANCE IN REFORM IMPLEMENTATION AND CAPACITY STRENGTHENING STRATEGIES. 184 
7.4.1 Increasing accountability and responsiveness ................................................................... 
184 
5 
7.4.2 Increasing equity in health care access and management of budget reallocation ............. 185 
7.4.3 Expanding the range of services in primary care provision .............................................. 
186 
7.4.4 Strengthening the provider network and referral system ................................................... 
187 
7.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 
188 
CHAPTER 8- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................ 
190 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
....................................................................................................................... 
190 
8.2 UC POLICY DESIGN AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLICY .................................................... 
191 
8.2.1 Ideology ............................................................................................................................. 
191 
8.2.2 System design: technical aspects ....................................................................................... 
193 
8.2.3 Policy design: factors influencing the outcome of implementation .................................... 
195 
8.3 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS FACILITATING OR DELAYING UC POLICY ........................................... 
196 
8.3.1 Situational factors 
.............................................................................................................. 
196 
8.3.2 Structural factors ............................................................................................................... 
198 
8.3.3 Cultural and environmental factors ................................................................................... 
199 
8.4 ACTORS: POSITIONS AND CAPACITIES TO INFLUENCE THE POLICY ........................................... 
199 
8.5 POLICY AS PROCESS ................................................................................................................ 
202 
8.6 IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR REFORM IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................ 
203 
8.6.1 Policy characteristics ......................................................................................................... 
203 
8.6.2 Strategies in the policy implementation ............................................................................. 
204 
8.6.3 Staff capacity and ability to shape the outcomes ............................................................... 
209 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
........................................................................................................................... 
210 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................... 213 
APPENDIXES: ....................................................................................................................................... 224 
APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS ............................................................................................ 
224 
APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW SCHEDULES .................................................................................................... 
230 
APPENDIX 3 OBSERVATION CODING FORM ........................................................................................... 
237 
APPENDIX 4 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ..................................................................................................... 
238 
APPENDIX 5 ANALYSIS OF POLICY COMMUNITY REGARDING UC IN THAILAND ................................... 
241 
APPENDIX 6 QUANTITATIVE DATA OF SARABURI ................................................................................. 
251 
6 
Table of Tables 
Table 1.1 Annual hospital admission rate per capita by insurance coverage, 1996 ....................... 
24 
Table 1.2 Chronological events in the policy formulation and implementation of the 30 Baht 
Scheme and the National Health Security Act ....................................................................... 
29 
Table 2.1 Policy characteristics and situations which anticipate the success of implementation.. 47 
Table 2.2 Analytical framework of factors important to policy process ........................................ 
48 
Table 4.1 Participation in policy communications and decision-making of the 30 Baht Scheme 
design, January - May 2001 .................................................................................................. 77 
Table 4.2 Functional features of health financing system, Thailand, years 2000 and 2002 .......... 82 
Table 4.3 Actors involved in committees of the Universal Coverage of Health Care Policy........ 86 
Table 5.1 Populations covered by the UC Policy in the transition phases until September 2002 117 
Table 5.2 Number of health facilities and registered population by type of providers in 2002... 118 
Table 5.3 Health System Expenditure & Financing in Thailand, 2001-2002 (Millions Baht) .... 121 
Table 5.4 Possible financial patterns of MoPH hospitals after the 30 Baht Scheme 
implementation 
..................................................................................................................... 122 
Table 6.1. General Information on Saraburi Province ................................................................. 
135 
Table 6.2 Health resources per 10,000 population in 1999 .......................................................... 
135 
Table 6.3 Distribution of health resources in Saraburi Province, June 2001 ............................... 137 
Table 6.4 Matrix organisation in transition to the new PHO structure ........................................ 141 
Table 6.5 Four models of financing and payment systems in Saraburi, 2001 to 2002 ................ 153 
Table 7.1 General information and descriptions of providers in four districts in Saraburi .......... 167 
Table 7.2 Participants in the focus group interviews in four districts in Saraburi, 3-10 April 2002175 
Table 8.1 Dominant actors in policy networks in different stages of policy processes: UC policy, 
Thailand ............................................................................................................................... 200 
Table 8.2 UC policy characteristics ............................................................................................. 204 
Table AS List of participants in four workshops, in 1986,1993,1996, and 1998 and Committee 
members in the HSRI's taskforce on Universal Coverage (2000-1) .................................... 241 
Table A6.1 Saraburi proposal for additional budget from the Contingency Fund, December 
2001 ...................................................................................................................................... 251 
Table A6.2 Health insurance coverage in Saraburi: before and after the UC Scheme 
implementation 
..................................................................................................................... 251 
Table A6.3 Estimations of the required budget for public providers based on 6 months expected 
revenues and expenses in fiscal year 2002 (October 2001 to March 2002) ......................... 252 
Table A6.4 Unit costs of provider networks in Saraburi during October 2001 to March 2002... 253 
Table A6.5 The Hospital networks' revenues (or loss) from the referral system and the nurse- 
doctor ratio ........................................................................................................................... 253 
7 
Table of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework for policy analysis of the UC policy in Thailand .................... 
43 
Figure 4.1 The proposed system under UC Policy during the transitional period ......................... 
80 
Figure 4.2 Organisations involved in the policy formulation and implementation process of the 
UC policy in fiscal year 2002 ................................................................................................ 
85 
Figure 4.3 Policy style of the Universal Coverage of Health Care Policy during 2001-2002 ....... 88 
Figure 5.1 Budget allocation of the 30 Baht Scheme in phase I .................................................. 
107 
Figure 5.2 Budget allocation of the 30 Baht Scheme in phases II and III .................................... 
108 
Figure 5.3 Organisation and management in phase I ................................................................... 
113 
Figure 5.5 Organisation and management in phase III ................................................................ 
114 
Figure 5.6 Organisation and management in Bangkok ................................................................ 
114 
Figure 5.7 Organisation and management structure intended in the National Health Security Act 
(2002) ................................................................................................................................... 
115 
Figure 5.8 Organisation structure of the MoPH before reform (September 2002) ...................... 
123 
Figure 5.9 The new organisation structure of the MoPH after reform (October 2002) ............... 
124 
Figure 6.1 The slogan of the Saraburi .......................................................................................... 
134 
Figure 6.2 Illness and hospital utilisation rates in Saraburi Province in 1996, rank out of 75 
provinces from lowest to highest rates ................................................................................. 
136 
Figure 6.3 Organisation and management structure in Saraburi, 2001-2002 ............................... 
139 
Figure 6.4 Communications in implementing the UC policy: Saraburi ....................................... 
143 
Figure 6.5 The distribution of the primary care units in Saraburi, March 2002 .......................... 
150 
Figure 6.6 Health Insurance Coverage in Saraburi: Before and After the UC Scheme 
Implementation .................................................................................................................... 
156 
Figure 6.7 Expenses of the community hospitals in Saraburi in 2002 ......................................... 
158 
Figure 8.1 Timeline of the UC policy implementation and the enactment of the national Health 
Security Act ......................................................................................................................... 
192 
Table of Boxes 
Box 1.1 Policy declaration to parliament by the Thaksin Shinawatra government on 26 February 
2001 ................................................................................................ 28 
Box 3.1. Health Policies of the Thai Rak Thai Party announced on 26 March 2000 ............ 61 
Lists of Abbreviations 
APB Area Purchaser Board 
BOB Bureau of the Budget 
BHCN Bureau of Health Care Network 
BHPP Bureau of Health Policy and Planning 
BMA Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
CSMBS Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme 
CUP Contracting Unit for Primary Care 
DRG Diagnostic Related Group 
EU Commission of the European Union 
HIO Health Insurance Office, Ministry of Public Health 
HIV/AIDS patients Human immunodeficiency virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome patients 
HSRI Health Systems Research Institute 
HCRO Health Care Reform Office 
LSHTM London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
MWS Medical Welfare Scheme 
MoPH Ministry of Public Health 
NGO Non-Government Organisation 
NESDB National Economics and Social Development Board 
NHSB National Health Security Board 
NHSO National Health Security Office 
OPD Outpatient Department 
PCMO Provincial Chief Medical Officer 
PCU Primary Care Unit 
PHO Provincial Health Office 
SHI Social Health Insurance 
SIP Social Investment Project 
SSO Social Security Office 
SSS Social Security Scheme 
TDRI Thailand Development Research Institute 
TRTP Thai Rak Thai Party 
UC Universal Coverage of Health Care or Universal Coverage 
VHCS Voluntary Health Card Scheme 
WB World Bank 
WCS Workmen Compensation Scheme 
WHO World Health Organization 
9 
Acknowledgements 
Various people and organisations have contributed in different ways towards the 
completion of this thesis. I would like to thank Dr Viroj Tangcharoensathien, the 
director of the International Health Policy Program, Thailand (of which I am a fellow), 
who gives his time to grooming Thai researchers in health systems and policy research. 
A two-year apprenticeship with Dr Tangcharoensathien before doing this PhD provided 
me an insight into policy-making in the Thai health system. 
To complete this thesis, my particular gratitude goes to Professor Gill Walt, my 
supervisor, who made a variety of invaluable contributions. Her guidance introduced 
me to a fascinating approach, policy analysis, which broadened my attitude in viewing 
the world. I benefited greatly from discussions with her and completed this thesis 
under her constant encouragement and moral support. 
Members of the advisory committees, Professor David Leon and Dr Kara Hanson, 
provided moral support in the initial stage. Members of the upgrading committee, 
Professor Anne Mills, Dr Carolyn Stephens and Dr Jeff Collin, provided useful insights 
into the complex issues being addressed in the research design. I also received support 
from many people who read and commented on drafts of the research design and 
sections of the thesis, or provided valuable intellectual and moral support. They 
included Dr Viroj Tangcharoensathien, Dr Suwit Wiboonpoiprasert, Dr Saowakhon 
Ratanavijitrasilpa, Dr Amphon Jindawatana, Dr Samrit Srithamrongsawat, Dr Jongkol 
Lerdtiendumrong, Mr Torsak Buranaruangroj, Dr Pongsadhorn Pokpermdee, and Dr 
Watcharee Chokejindachai. I am singularly thankful to Dr Wiboonpolprasert for 
promptly reading several drafts of the thesis and making meticulous comments. 
My special thanks go to Tamsin Kelk for editing the document and suggesting ways to 
improve the document. I thank my other PhD colleagues and staff in the LSHTM who 
have all been supportive in this endeavour. My thanks also to my assistants in the 
fieldwork, Khun Kamonporn Boonsiri, Khun Raweewan Sirisomboon and in the IHPP, 
Khun Rojarek Leksomboon, Khun Suwanna Mukem, and Khun Ta. 
The thesis would have been rather sterile if I had not received the insights from many 
key informants (too many to name here but listed in Appendix 4). I am especially 
indebted to Dr Sanguan Nitayaraumphong who trusted me and provided insightful 
information for this thesis. 
This work was supported by the World Health Organization, the International Health 
Policy Program, Ministry of Public Health, Thailand, and the Health Systems Research 
Institute. I am indebted to my colleagues at the IHPP and Khon Kaen Provincial Health 
Office, who covered for me during my study leave. Finally, my greatest debt of 
gratitude is owed to my mother, sisters and brothers who always take care of me and 
provided support and understanding. 
10 
CHAPTER 1- UNIVERSAL COVERAGE POLICY 
Chapter 1- Thailand's radical Universal Coverage policy 
1.1 Introduction 
The drive to public sector reform from the 1980s pushed health reform policies on to 
international and national agendas. While reforms in the areas of financing and health service 
delivery systems focused largely on cost containment, pro-market terms and reducing the role of 
the state, some countries sought ways to exercise the state's role to ensure their citizens' rights 
to health care. Thailand is among those who have pursued and achieved universal coverage 
(UC) in this reform era. 
In 2001, Thailand introduced the UC policy very rapidly after the new Thai Rak Thai Party 
(TRTP) government came to power. The policy aims to entitle all citizens to health care access 
and includes health system reform to achieve equity, efficiency, quality, and accountability. 
The government established a subsidized health scheme known as the `30 Baht Scheme' to pool 
and expand two existing schemes. Its features included predominantly tax-based financing with 
a minimal co-payment of 30 Baht per medical visit and a comprehensive benefit package 
covering both prevention and curative care. The scheme covered about 80% of the population, 
excluding only those in the formal sector who were covered by the Social Security Scheme and 
the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme. At the same time, the government reformed its 
health-financing system. The UC policy shifted resources to primary care through a contracting 
process and incorporated private provider collaboration. The overall question this thesis asks is 
how did this policy come about, and how likely is it that the policy will achieve its goals? 
The literature suggests that understanding the policy process is as important as assessing the 
content of particular policies when judging policy outcomes (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Walt 
and Gilson 1994). Policy process studies suggest that political factors are as important as 
technical factors and can make a policy fail if neglected by policy-makers (Walt 1994). 
Analyzing political dimensions, policy research scholars have looked at the experience of health 
care reform in many Western industrialized countries (Flood 2000), yet there are few studies in 
developing countries. There is little knowledge of what factors are important in the policy 
process in developing countries and how these factors influence the decision-making and the 
system change in such countries. Therefore, this thesis tries to provide some answers to these 
questions by looking at the policy process of Thailand's UC policy. 
By using a policy analytical framework, the aims of this thesis are threefold. The first is to 
generate general understanding of the UC policy process; to answer how and why the UC issue 
got on to the policy agenda, and how the policy was formulated and implemented. The second 
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is to explore how the process influenced the design of the policy and how far the design affected 
implementation. Finally, it aims to assess implementation and the extent to which the policy is 
likely to achieve its goal. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. This chapter introduces the rationale for universal 
coverage, and includes a review of the literature relating to, both health care reforms and the 
Thai context. Research questions are proposed at the end of this chapter. 
The next chapter provides the analytical framework of policy analysis and the research methods 
used. The results are presented in the next five chapters as narrative policy analysis. Chapter 3 
describes the agenda setting process; Chapter 4 explains the policy formulation process. 
Chapters 5 and 6 describe the implementation process at central level and provincial level 
respectively. Chapter 7 presents the operational level responses including perspectives from 
villagers. Synthesizing from all results, Chapter 8 discusses the findings and provides the 
conclusion and recommendations 
1.2 Rationale for universal coverage 
Under different health systems in different countries, varying shares of the population are 
provided with adequate access to health services and protection from financial consequences of 
illness. In particular, some countries ensure universal access to health care while others do not 
(Abel-Smith 1994). The accepted notion of universal coverage is that it is able to enhance the 
equity of the health service system (Mills 1998; Veugelers and Yip 2003). However, whether 
countries introduce UC is dependent on national values, the political influence of different 
actors, and economies (Abel-Smith 1994; Green 1999; Navarro 1989). The differences in 
system designs to achieve universal coverage are also important to the extent of guaranteeing 
equitable and sustainable health care systems. 
1.2.1 Why universal coverage is important 
The term `Universal coverage (UC)' can be defined as `a situation where the whole population 
of a country has access to good quality services (core health services) according to needs and 
preference, regardless of income level, social status or residency' (Nitayarumphong 1998). 
Where UC is introduced in the health system, it can protect citizens from the financial 
consequences of health care and ensure all citizens access to health care (Mills 1998). 
Underlying the concept of UC is the ethical principle that access to health care is a right of 
citizens that should not depend on individual income or wealth (Green 1999; Mills and Ranson 
2001). A definition of equitable health care is the extent of equal access to the available care for 
equal need (Mooney 1983; Wagstaff 1993a). This could be provided basically by law; however, 
other considerations should be taken in practice to promote greater equity. These include the 
12 
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extent to which resources are allocated in relation to social and health needs, the geographic 
distribution of services, the quality of care (Whitehead 1992), and the efficiency of health 
services (Kutzin 1998). Universal access to health care can be seen as a primary criterion of the 
quality of the health service system (Mera 2002). 
Where UC has been disregarded, access to health care was seen as similar to access to other 
goods and services, and dependent on an individual's success in gaining or inheriting income 
(Green 1999; Mills and Ranson 2001). As a result, the state's role was confined to the 
regulation of the health care market and the provision of public health measures. Thus, means- 
tested programs, for example, were provided to protect the poor who were unable to afford 
health care. However, many argue that market failure in health favours a state role in collective 
financing arrangements (Mills and Ranson 2001). For example, those who are not protected by 
the public welfare scheme and have ill health might not be able to afford risk-adjusted private 
insurance premiums. This is evident by the large number of Americans who are uninsured, 
being either unwilling to pay or unable to pay for private insurance (Hsiao 1992). There are 
also doubts about the effectiveness of the means-test procedure. In Thailand, the means-tested 
medical welfare scheme before UC was not effective in covering the targeted persons (who 
were poor) in the scheme (Na Ranong and Na Ranong 2002b). A survey in 2000 found that 
only 16% of the poor had Medical Welfare Scheme cards and only 28% of cardholders (of 
which the cards were for the poor) were actually poor (Bureau of Health Policy and Planning 
2000). 
The development of collective financing in many countries started from voluntary and 
compulsory insurance and included the self-employed in the later stages. In many cases, the 
state' collective financing systems were established to respond to public demand, and the state's 
actions were facilitated by the political and economic changes and the strength of the working 
class (Navarro 1989). For example, in Germany where compulsory insurance was first 
introduced in 1883, the aim was, on one hand, to benefit the working class, and on the other, to 
contain socialist and revolutionary pressure by creating new loyalty among workers to their 
employer and to the State. In Britain, the compulsory health insurance policy of 1911 aimed to 
win popularity with the working class (Abel-Smith 1994). In South Korea, the social health 
insurance policy aimed to seek legitimacy of the military government during the political 
transition to democracy (Moon 1998). In Taiwan (1995), the government implemented 
universal coverage by law under the increasing challenge of the opposition democratic party 
who had long advocated the establishment of universal national health insurance. This policy 
also reflected rising public demand for better health care during economic growth (Cheng 2003). 
It is clear from the above examples that universal coverage is seen by many as a legitimate state 
responsibility and is likely to be supported by the public. 
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1.2.2 Issues on system designs 
There are at least two prototypes of the financing system for medical care that countries have 
developed as mechanisms to achieve universal coverage. The first is the social insurance 
arrangement (the Bismarck model), and the second is the tax based system (the Beveridge 
model) (Mills and Ranson 2001). The terms `universal coverage of health care' 
(Nitayarumphong 1998) and `universal health insurance coverage' (Meyer, Silow-Carroll, and 
Sardegna 1991; Saltman 1992) are sometimes used interchangeably. Which a country uses is a 
political choice (Abel-Smith 1994). 
From 1920 onwards, many countries developed their system to extend their citizens' rights to 
health care to the point of universal coverage. These countries include, for example, Hungary 
(1920), New Zealand (1938), Soviet Union (1938), Britain (1948), Japan (1960s), Scandinavian 
countries (1960s), Canada (1970s), Italy (1980s), Portugal (1980s), Brazil (1980s), and Spain 
(1980s) (Abel-Smith 1994; Preker 1998). South Korea followed in 1989 (Moon 1998), Taiwan 
in 1995 (Cheng 2003), and recently Thailand in 2001 (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2002b), and the 
Philippines plan UC for 2010 (Tan 1998). 
Some of the countries above developed collective financing systems incrementally extending 
coverage with various kinds of funds to cover the self-employed. Four main ways have been 
used. The first was to lower the cost of insurance to affordable levels for everyone, and provide 
highly subsidized public hospitals, such as in the Scandinavian countries. The second was to 
make other funds to subsidise those excluded from the compulsory insurance (low income self- 
employed), such as in the Germany (Abel-Smith 1994). The third was to pass legislation to 
establish a single compulsory health insurance scheme to include the self-employed and the 
poor with differential subsidisation from the government, as in Taiwan (Cheng 2003). The 
fourth alternative was to pass legislation to entitle the whole population to benefits, and turn the 
system to one of government-financed services for all, such as in the UK. 
Looking at financing system design, Kutzin (1998) suggests that the overall objective should be 
`achieving universal coverage with effective health care risk protection at the least cost' (Kutzin, 
1998: 29). This relates to three main elements: (1) institutional arrangement (sources of funds, 
allocation of funds and associated institutional arrangements for health care); (2) broad health 
system support functions; and (3) the benefit package (Kutzin 1998). As the policy design 
affects the equity and the sustainability of the financing system, the section below discusses the 
debatable issues of policy design for the developing countries to achieve universal coverage. 
In many developing countries, health care has already been predominately publicly financed and 
provided (Zwi and Mills 1995). Therefore, the challenge for policy-makers in developing 
countries is not just to ensure access to a good quality of health services, but also to redesign 
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and reform their health financing and service delivery systems to guarantee sustainability. The 
highly debated issues in system designs for developing countries include the pace of reform, 
source of finance, regulation of the whole system (promoting proactive purchasers), number of 
organisations involved, and provider payment system (Nitayarumphong 1998). 
1.2.2.1 Pace of reform: big bang versus incremental change 
It is possible to achieve universal coverage by a fast-track approach, but it needs major reforms 
and legislative changes, strong political will and government efforts. However, the `big bang' 
approach might have negative consequences. An example is Taiwan. In Taiwan, the National 
Health Insurance merged all ten existing schemes in 1995. Though the National Health 
Insurance followed a half-decade of planning, it was implemented rapidly, just two months after 
the establishment of the Bureau of National Health Insurance. This hasty inauguration led to 
chaos and confusion (Cheng 2003). 
To avoid inadequate planning of the implementation, incremental changes have been suggested 
for low and middle-income countries (Carrin, De Grave, and Deville, 1999 quoted in 
Baminghausen and Sauerborn, 2002). A good historical example is the incremental 
development of the social health insurance in Germany. This involved three transition phases: 
from informal to more formal, from voluntary to compulsory, and from small to larger schemes. 
Whether this incremental development can be adapted to low and middle income countries may 
be highly contingent on the context (Barnighausen and Sauerborn 2002). 
1.2.2.2 Source of finance: insurance premium collection or general tax revenue 
There are many ways of funding health care. Two main methods are insurance premium 
collection and tax-revenue subsidization. The social health insurance (SHI) arrangement is a 
risk-sharing system in which money is collected from individuals as a percentage of income and 
as such is seen as equitable and to provide greater consistency of funding. However, it can be 
regressive depending on the level of the contribution ceiling and the exemption for the low- 
income groups; i. e. the lower the ceiling of contribution and the amount of exemption, the more 
regressive the system (Mills and Ranson 2001). Financing by tax revenues is dependent on the 
government's revenues and political priority. The degree to which a tax-based system is 
equitable depends on the progressivity of the tax system and the allocation of health care 
resources (Green 1999). 
The income-based premium collection (in SHI) relies on the formal employment economy; thus, 
it has limited potential for countries where a large percentage of the population is outside the 
formal employment sector. Thus, several sources of finance may be used to finance insurance 
schemes for different population groups. However, this can create duplication of the household 
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contribution and might be perceived as unfair. This issue has been discussed in the case of 
South Africa (McIntyre, Doherty, and Gilson 2003). 
1.2.2.3 Regulation: purchaser/provider split 
In many developing countries, governments have a major role in service provision and have a 
separate function in purchasing roles. The emphasis on the purchasing role has arisen due to the 
increasing power of managers to balance the power of providers in order to force providers to 
operate in the interest of public and technical efficiency (Mills and Ranson 2001). However, the 
fact that organizations and individuals have to fulfil both purchasing roles and provider roles 
can be a cause of conflict. Thus, it can be suggested to those countries that institutional reform 
should be introduced to split purchasers from providers (Cassels 1995). However, whether this 
can happen is subject to the relative power between the old authority (providers) and the 
increasingly powerful managers (including politicians). 
1.2.2.4 Single fund or multiple funds 
Another debate is on whether there should be a single purchaser or multiple purchasers. For 
private insurance, it is justified to promote competition among each other for clients. However, 
it is questionable for tax and social insurance funded health systems whether competition leads 
to positive consequences. If the insured can choose between competing purchasers, the `cream- 
skimming effect'- the phenomenon where purchasers avoid enrolling high risk people - might 
occur (Mills and Ranson 2001). If each insured is compulsorily registered to a scheme, the 
duplicating administration of the multiple schemes might be considered inefficient and might 
produce inequity in service provision, as has happened in Korea (Nitayarumphong 1998). 
In many countries, multiple schemes existed before universal coverage and there may be 
resistance to merging all schemes to one single scheme. To turn multiple schemes into a single 
scheme system requires much effort from government and wider political support. 
1.2.2.5 Provider payment: closed end payment versus fee for-service 
There are several ways to pay providers (Mills and Ranson 2001). For primary care, individual 
providers can be paid by salary, fee-for-service, or capitation. Payment by salary is seen to be 
inefficient as the amount of money is unrelated to workloads. Fee-for-service payment 
encourages providers to provide more services and expensive investigations, and thus increases 
the cost of the scheme (Kwon 2003; Rachel Lu and Hsiao 2003). It can be adjusted by a fixed 
overall budget to lower the fee per item when the volume of services increases as in Germany 
(Barnighausen and Sauerborn 2002). Capitation payment involves a fixed payment per year per 
16 
CHAPTER 1- UNIVERSAL COVERAGE POLICY 
person. This payment method has cost-containment ability. It supports continuity of care and 
can encourage doctors to minimize the volume of services. 
For hospital care, the payment methods are a fixed annual budget, itemized bill, daily rate, 
average cost per patient, case adjusted for diagnosis, and contracts by type or volume of services. 
(For the comparison of these payment methods and their incentives to providers see Mills and 
Ranson, 2001: 545). Each method has advantages and disadvantages, and often a mix of 
methods is found in practice (Mills and Ranson 2001). 
In summary, achieving universal access involves several elements in system design. Which 
choice countries choose depends on the context in which it introduced. The next section 
explores the context of international health care reform, which partly influences decision- 
making in developing countries. 
1.3 International health care reform 
Health care reform was introduced in an uncertain policy environment, with considerable 
conflict in values about health care. It was part of a trend of public sector reform, and was 
dominated by donors and financial institutions such as the World Bank during the 1980s 
economic crisis and indebted status of developing countries. Many reforms attempted to 
increase the efficiency of the public sector, limit the role of state, and increase competition by 
increasing private role in health care provisions (Walt 1998). 
Where health care access did not achieve universal coverage, it is questionable whether 
governments reduced the state's roles following the worldwide reform trend or converted the 
reform direction to one of expanding the state's role in financing and service provision. This 
section discusses this point by reviewing the driving forces behind the rise of health care reform, 
and the reform issues in developing countries. 
1.3.1 The rise of health care reform 
The evolution of state involvement in the provision of health services has varied between 
countries based on each country's history (Abel-Smith 1994). Collective financing for health 
care services was developed gradually, initially to alleviate the crisis of medical funding and 
later to share risks from the expense of medical expenditure. The extent to which the state has 
played roles in service provision and collective financing varies between countries, being less in 
the countries in which health care has been dominated by the free market, for example the 
United States (Abel-Smith 1994; Mills and Ranson 2001). 
The development of the welfare state, especially in the liberal democracies of Western Europe, 
increased the role of state in health care provision and in ensuring universal access. This growth 
was directly related to the strength of the working class and economic instruments (Navarro 
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1989). However, from the 1980s, there were more debates about the roles of state (Mackintosh 
1992). Neo-liberal critiques' led to a huge shift in the whole social sector questioning, raising 
doubts about welfare states, and in the health sector, cost escalation and monopoly providers 
who limited opportunities for the market to exercise customers' choice. The concerns over 
public spending and questions of the legitimacy and role of government created a trend to 
improve public sector performance, notably in the term `new public management' 2, which 
brought reforms in the general public sector and to the health sectors. 
Various forces around the world caused many countries to search for answers to the question: 
how should a nation structure its health care system (Flood 2000; Frenk 1994; Hsiao 1992; 
Saltman and Figueras 1997; Segall 2000; Walt and Gilson 1994). "Health care reform came at a 
time of considerable financial constraints - world economic recession, indebtedness among 
many low-income countries, and rapidly became part of a wider program of economic and 
structural reforms sought by the World Bank and other donors in many low- and middle-income 
countries" (Walt 2001: 684). Inside the health sector, concerns were expressed over the high 
spending on health care services, the inefficiency of the service delivery system, and the 
reducing of health care access and quality. For example, the United States and the Netherlands 
rapidly escalating health expenditures and the lack of universal coverage forced the desire for 
reform (Zwi and Mills 1995), and South Korea faced rapidly increasing health expenditure from 
a rapid expansion of the health insurance coverage during 1980-1989 (Lee 2003). 
Ideas about reform policies were disseminated worldwide. Policy conditions focused on ways 
of reducing the role of the state, by, for example, encouraging the private sector (including 
NGOs) to undertake services previously provided by governments, and mobilizing additional 
domestic resources. Aid policies were also linked to notions of "good governance", democracy, 
and the growth of civil society (Walt 2001). 
1.3.2 Reform issues in developing countries 
In developing countries, economic crisis and countries' health and health sector problems were 
the underlying roots of health care reform, but the reform approaches were partly imported from 
other countries. The progress in reform in industrialised countries (OECD 1992) called to some 
developing countries to reform their health systems along the reform trend of the developed 
1 Neoliberal critiques promote the ideas of economic liberalisation, privatisation, competition reform, labour market 
deregulation, reduced government spending, and lower taxation by arguing the problems of interest group capture of 
the welfare state, labour market regulation, and welfare dependency (Mendes 2003). 
2 New Public Management is a point of view about organisational design in the public sector that usually involves: 
management styles to improve employee performance; breaking up the command and control of public sector into 
decentralised corporatised units; and separating public funding from delivery of services (Ferlie, Ashburner, and 
Pettigrew 1996; Segall 2000). Also see Hood C. 1991. A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 
69,3-19. 
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world, particularly to encourage competition. The World Bank and bilateral donors had 
dominant roles in exporting the health care reform theories recommended in the 1993 World 
Development Report. The components of reform proposals in developing countries were; (1) 
reorganizing national ministries of health and improving the performance of civil service, (2) 
organisational heterogeneity and decentralisation, (3) improving the functioning of national 
ministries of health, (4) broadening health financing options, (5) introducing managed 
competition3 and (6) working with private sector (Cassels 1995; Collins and Green 1999; Zwi 
and Mills 1995). 
1.3.2.1 Reorganizing and improving the performance of national ministries of health 
This issue involves organizational restructuring, improving human/financial resource 
management, reducing staff numbers, and strengthening the functions of ministries of health. 
Restructuring plans have been made in a number of developing countries but many met delays 
in implementation or are unimplemented. For example, Uganda carried out a comprehensive 
restructuring of the Ministry of Health in 1995. It changed the function from the ministry for 
health services to the ministry for health policy development. The size of the civil service was 
supposed to decrease but it increased, as a result of strong bureaucratic pressure and resistance 
to decentralization. However, the reform was in progress again after 1997 due to strong 
political pressure from the President with support from donors (Jeppsson, Osterngren, and 
Hagstrom 2003). Colombia was also interested in transforming its ministries of health but there 
was strong resistance. As of 1998, there was no actual implementation (Bossert et al. 1998). 
In Zambia, the political change in 1991 opened an opportunity to reconstruct the Ministry of 
Health (Gilson et al. 2003). The reform decided to transform health staff to become employees 
of Federation of Health Boards (1996) and to decentralise service provision management to 
District Health Boards and Hospital Management Boards (Cassels 1995). However, the reform 
was undertaken from 1993 to 1998 without achieving its goals because of opposition mainly 
from big hospitals and the political uncertainty, including a coup attempt in 1997 (Blas and 
Limbabbala 2001). 
In Cambodia, reconstruction consisted of gradual infrastructure development and capacity- 
building especially to monitor and evaluate the implementation of new health systems, 
operationalising district health systems, and extending and monitoring health care financing 
schemes (Phua and Chew 2002). The post-conflict environment might partly force the country 
3 Managed competition is a term of health care management, which is a blending of the competitive and regulatory 
strategies. It involves the ways a sponsor manages the market for competing health plans, establishes equitable rules, 
creates price-elastic demand, and avoids uncompensated risk selection (Enthoven 1993). 
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to reconstruct its health system. In Central Asia including Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, reforms focused on primary health care as the 
mechanism aiming to strengthen primary care, hospitals, and the financing system (Rose 1999). 
1.3.2.2 Organizational and management changes and decentralisation 
Reforms included such policies as the separation of funding and service provision functions, 
privatisation, and decentralising responsibility for the management and/or provision of health 
care to local government or to agencies within the health sector (Zwi and Mills 1995). This 
includes establishing self-governing hospitals or autonomous district boards. 
Decentralization was used as a strategy to strengthen health care at district level to improve 
access in health care in, for example, Kenya (Oyaya and Rifkin 2003) and Malaysia (Merican 
and Yon 2002). 
However, decentralization had also had negative effects. For example, the Philippines radically 
changed its health system with the devolution of health services to local government, but this 
had a detrimental effect on health system performance, with only primary care structures at 
community levels remaining strong. The country has passed a law to establish a national health 
insurance system and the Health Insurance Corporation, but could not develop many of its 
operating structures to support the implementation of the universal coverage policy mandated 
since 1995. In contrast, Vietnam's experience, with its policy centralised under a state-run 
social insurance system and only operational functions decentralised, has been seen as positive 
(Phua and Chew 2002). 
1.3.2.3 Broadening health financing options 
This issue includes the introduction of user fees, community finance, voucher systems, social 
insurance schemes, and private insurance. 
Reform attempts have focused on the generation of private sources for healthcare finance to 
supplement tax-based finance and improve the quality of care. Most African governments 
accepted cost recovery income for health care and had introduced user fees for health services 
or medicines from the 1980s (Leighton and Wouters 1995). User fee implementation was 
strongly debated, especially around its impact on equity and the access of the poorest. Adverse 
impacts were seen in Kenya and Zimbabwe (Zwi and Mills 1995). In 1996 South Africa 
removed user fees for pregnant women, nursing mothers and children under six (Gilson et al. 
2003). However, an experiment with user fees in the contract management reform in Cambodia 
gave a positive impact (Soeters and Griffith 2003). 
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Compulsory health insurance exists in many countries of Latin America, and has been 
introduced across Asia and Eastern Europe in recent years, for example in the Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Laos (Phua and Chew 2002), and Bulgaria (Pavlova, Groot, and Merode 
2000). However, it has been resisted in some countries. In South Africa, concerns about 
whether it will achieve equity and financial sustainability objectives have delayed progress 
(Gilson et al. 2003; McIntyre, Doherty, and Gilson 2003). Similar reluctance can also be seen 
in many Caribbean countries; despite which, the national health insurance law has been passed 
(Huff-Rousselle, Lalta, and Fiedler 1998). 
1.3.2.4 Introducing managed competition and working with the private sector 
This issue involves promoting competition between providers of clinical care and/or support 
services through single or multiple purchasers. It also includes establishing systems for 
regulating, contracting with or franchising providers in the private sector including NGOs and 
for-profit organizations. Examples are in Chile, India, and Malaysia. 
Chilean health reform has occurred since the 1920s. It introduced the National Health Fund in 
1979, followed in 1981 by additional major reforms which decentralized the operational 
authority of the primary health facilities to municipal governments and created private insurance 
companies. With the transition of the government from military to Democratic government, 
reform policies shifted in the 1990s to strengthen the mixed public-private market of health 
services to meet the expectations of the public. This increased competition at primary level by 
allowing alternative providers from the private non-for-profit sector to provide services (Jara 
and Bossert 1995). 
In India, reforms have highlighted the current and potential role of non-government health care 
providers; however, problems related to quality of care and the financial burden of unregulated 
fee-for-service medicine were common (Berman 1998). 
In Malaysia, the government policy adopted privatisation but faced opposition. Thus, the 
privatisation exercise has covered only non-medical services and drug distribution. Plans for 
corporatisation of public hospitals are under development (Merican and Yon 2002; Phua and 
Chew 2002). 
1.3.3 Summary 
In summary, the reforms of health financing and decentralization were at the top of the policy 
agenda in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s. The nature of reforms varied, due to the 
diverse contexts of developing countries (Segall 2000). Though the reform initiatives existed, 
the implementation in practice was difficult due to much resistance. The countries where the 
basic management improvements were necessary still continued to strengthen their 
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infrastructure and the Ministry of Health's functioning. This principle improvement should not 
be ignored as it is essential for further development (Mills 1997). Some countries where health 
services have not reached universal coverage are still looking for ways to increase access in 
health services (Mera 2002). Ultimately, whatever donors had recommended, the reform 
measures and goals (whether equity or efficiency) had been balanced by the actors driving the 
reform process in the particular context (Zwi and Mills 1995). Much depends on whether the 
local actors are strong or weak. Using the experience of the decentralisation reforms in 
Caribbean countries, Mills et at (2002) concluded that the difference in the nature and the 
timing of such reforms depended on political and economic factors, the attitude of the public 
service unions and the medical profession, and external financial supporters (Mills et at. 2002). 
1.4 Thai health system and context before the introduction of the 
UC Scheme 
In Thailand, Universal Coverage has long been a concern among academics and researchers 
particularly in the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). The vision to achieve universal coverage 
was announced in the Health Financing Conference in 1993 which was held by the MoPH and 
the World Bank (Nitayarumphong 1993). At that time, 50% of the population had insurance 
coverage, and the proportion of population with health insurance protection has gradually 
increased since then. There are many insurance schemes that have been developed 
independently at different times. However, until 2000, the system could not ensure universal 
access of health care to all. Whilst the new Constitution promulgated on 11 October 1997 
mandated the issue of equity in health care as a right of Thai citizens, and UC was one of the 
goals in the 8`h National Social and Economic Development Plan (1997) (Wibulpolprasert 2002), 
there was insufficient interest among policy-makers to implement UC. 
1.4.1 Health care delivery and financing system 
In Thailand, the MoPH has held both a service delivery role and financing management role. 
The MoPH invested in the infrastructure of health units to every district and sub-district, and 
hospitals and health centres were gradually built up in all areas of the country during 1981-1991. 
The `Decade of Health Centre Development' policy (1986 to 1996) aimed to establish health 
centres in all sub-districts (Tambons) in rural areas. Consequently, by 2000 there were few 
geographic barriers to health care access. 
Alongside the infrastructural development, the health-financing system also expanded. 
Before UC, there were four main public health insurance schemes, covering four major 
population groups. They were the Medical Welfare Scheme - MWS (1975), Civil Servant 
Medical Benefit Scheme - CSMBS (1978), Social Security Scheme - SSS (1991), and Voluntary 
Health Card Scheme - VHCS (1983). The first Social Security Act was promulgated in 1954, 
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but it was not implemented because of resistance from insurance companies and enterprises 
including state enterprises (Chantaravitul 1985). Though government managed the four schemes, 
administration was fragmented and the schemes could not cover the total population. In 2000, 
only 69% of the total population was insured: 37% by MWS for the poor, the elderly, children 
under 12 and the disabled; 11% by CSMBS for civil servants and families; 9% by SSS for 
private sector employees; and 12% by VHCS for the general population, especially in rural 
areas (Siamwalla 2001). Thirty-one percent of the population was excluded. 
1.4.2 Problems of access to health care 
Many Thais had experience of unaffordable health care. Siamwala et al (2001) reviewed these 
problems. They found the problems were serious in regard to both the number of people and 
severity of specific cases. A survey by ABAC-KSC International Poll (2000) found 43.8% of 
the sample population experienced high health care costs or unaffordable costs. Of that group 
62.5% were in debt and 16.6% asked for exemption. Another study of catastrophic payment in 
public hospitals at Songkhla Province (Sujariyakul and Chongsuwiwatwong 1999) found many 
factors relating to unaffordable health care costs. These factors were education, occupation and 
income levels of the households' heads or the breadwinners. Where level of education, 
occupation or income was low, the households were likely to be unable to pay health care costs 
when their members got ill. In some cases, people were denied treatment because of lack of 
insurance coverage, and in most cases, they reported disease complications and physical 
handicaps caused by delayed treatment (Siamwalla 2001). 
In 1997, Pannarunothai and Mills reported health inequity in health financing in Thailand for 
the first time and they suggested that the poor are more likely to pay out-of-pocket fees than are 
the rich (Pannarunothai and Mills 1997). They reported an inequitable pattern of out-of-pocket 
health expenditure by income quintile and per capita. For underprivileged groups, the cost of 
health care formed a high proportion relative to their household income when compared to the 
privileged groups. This phenomenon is supported by other studies showing the regressivity of 
health financing systems to income4 by income quintile group (Makinen 2000), and Kakwani 
index5 (Pannarunothai 2000a). Pannarunothai et al (2000) found that out-of-pocket household 
payment is the most regressive system followed by indirect tax financing (Pannarunothai et al., 
2000 quoted in Pannarunothai, 2000). Hence, the regressive financing system is a problem, and 
many conclude that a more desirable financing system is payment according to ability to pay 
(Wagstaff 1993b). Household health expenditure is a major source of health finance in 
The regressive health care financing system refers to the extent to which payments for health care fall as a 
proportion of a person's income as his or her income rises (Van Doorslaer 1993). 
5 Kakwani index is based on the extent to which a tax system departs from proportionality (Wagstaff 1993b). 
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Thailand. It was 44% of total health expenditure in 1994, but decreased to 41 and 33% of total 
health expenditure in 1996 and 1998 respectively (Pongpanich 2001). The reduction of 
household out-of-pocket payment with substitution by other progressive sources, thus, reflects 
the less regressive nature of the total health financing system (Pannarunothai 2000a). 
Health care utilisation is affected by insurance coverage. Tangcharoensathien et al (2001) 
described utilisation and characteristics of the uninsured derived from several sources. Hospital 
admission rates of the uninsured were lower when compared to those who had insurance 
coverage, no matter what the scheme (see Table 1.1). The privately insured were the highest 
users of hospital inpatient care (1.5 times per year), three times higher than the uninsured (0.04 
times per year), followed by those insured under other schemes. 
Table 1.1 Annual hospital admission rate per capita by insurance coverage, 1996 
Admission rate 
Uninsured 0.04 
Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS) 0.10 
Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) 0.08 
State enterprise 0.06 
Social Security Scheme (SSS) 0.05 
Volunta Health Card Scheme (VHCS) 0.08 
Private insurance 0.15 
Total 0.06 
source: National statistic Vttice 1996 cited in Tangcharoensathien et at 2001. 
Under-utilisation is a problem among the uninsured and poor. One study found that the poor 
had inadequate access to antenatal care, and it was more common in urban areas than rural areas 
(Wongkongkathep 1999). The Provincial Health Survey (1996) provides characteristics of the 
uninsured by income, education and occupation. Twenty-eight percent of the poorest 
households (monthly household income less than 2,000 baht), who should have been covered by 
the Health Welfare Scheme, were actually uninsured. Uninsured rates were highest amongst 
taxi drivers and merchants. 
Pannarunothai and Renburge (1998), analysing Thai data from the 1986 Health and Welfare 
Survey, measured equality in access to health care by concentration index6 from the point of 
view of horizontal equity (equal medical care received on equal health need). They found that 
when adjusting for the same level of illness, the rich had a higher health care utilisation rate than 
the poor. Another study using data from the 1991 Health and Welfare Survey (National 
Statistic Office, 1991) also confirmed that the percentage of those seeking care attending a 
hospital was higher in the rich quintile than the poor quintiles (Makinen 2000). 
6 Concentration index for illness rate (or health care utilisation) is the twice of area between a curve which plots the 
cumulative proportion of illness rate (or utilisation of health care) against a curve which plots the cumulative 
proportion of population (Pannarunothai et al., 2000). 
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In summary, there were many problems of access to health care in Thailand. These were 
unaffordable payments by households, inequity in financing from out-of-pocket payment, the 
large number of uninsured people, and inequity in access to health care. These were the 
reasons why many called for health care reform and universal access as a means to improve the 
quality of the health system. 
1.4.3 Context: social, political and economic 
Thailand is a democratic, constitutional monarchy with a King as the Head of State. The 
population is estimated at 62 million of whom 35% are urban. It has never been colonised. In 
recent years Thai economy has grown at an average of 7.8% annually and Thailand is classified 
as a lower-middle-income country (Wibulpolprasert 2002). The development of the political 
system and the economy has highly influenced the policy decision-making. Recent important 
events were the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution and the 1997 economic crisis. 
The Thai political system was transformed from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy 
in 1932. In reality, it was a military dictatorship and underwent a transition to democratic rule 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Three main groups had dominated the policy elite, namely 
aristocrats, bureaucrats and military soldiers, while businessmen were their financial support. 
After the fall of the military in 1973, business-based politicians increased their political power 
through the parliamentary system (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). The early period was 
described as a `bureaucratic polity' (Bowornwathana 2000) where power fluctuated between the 
elected government and the military, and the lack of democratic control allowed bureaucrats to 
hold the balance of policy decision-making (Green 2000). The latter period has seen the rise of 
`business politics' in which corporate elites search for both capital and political authority 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). 
The close relationship between politicians and self-interest has led to vote-buying and electoral 
corruption (Callahan and Mccargo, 1996 quoted in Green, 2000). Such problems as power 
abuse for self-benefit, corruption, and a lack of political ethics led to the political reform 
movement during the 1990s (Wibulpolprasert 2002). Corruption scandals in 1991 led to a 
takeover by the military in order to clean up the regime, with support from the middle class. 
However, the middle class quickly became sensitive to the fact that their prosperity depended on 
the modem economy, and support for the military takeover did not last because of the impact of 
the coup on the modem economy. The middle class took to the streets in demonstrations during 
the event that came to be known as `Bloody May' (Nelson 2001a), and overthrew the military 
regime in May 1992 (Phongpaichit and Baker 2001 a). This event was followed by a political 
reform movement to fully democratize the country. 
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The government in 1995 appointed a committee to consider political reform and this led to the 
process of constitution drafting, public hearings, and the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution 
which was accelerated by the economic crisis in July 1997. The 1997 Constitution, called the 
`People's Constitution', reduced the King's parliamentary control over the appointment of the 
senate; created direct election to the senate; and increased the political parties' power over the 
parliament by adding the election of MPs on a party-list basis. The election rules also changed 
to combat vote buying and other irregularities. The duty for inspecting political parties was 
transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to an independent election commission 
(Wibulpolprasert 2002). 
The 1997 Constitution also increased civilian power in policy decision-making by eliminating 
the bureaucracy's monopoly over public policy formulation in favour of public participation. 
For example, civilians are eligible to propose laws regarding human rights. This led to a 
subsequent movement within civil society to propose new health laws. 
The right of citizens to access health care and of free care for the poor was addressed in the 
1991 constitution. The 1997 constitution confirmed the right by adding the principal of equity 
in health care access together with confirmation of the role of both private and public sectors in 
providing health services (Section 52 of the Constitution) (Council of State of Thailand 2003). 
The access to health services for all was also put in the five-year 8`h Socio-economic 
Development Plan (1997-2001), but there was no action plan because of the economic downturn 
and a lack of political support. 
Thailand's economy has developed from agrarian economy to industrial base economy (Green 
2000). It grew rapidly after 1985 as Thailand opened up the market and welcomed foreign 
investment (Phongpaichit and Baker 1998). The economic growth period also increased 
demands for health care and private hospitals grew with the market support policy of the Bureau 
of Investment (Pitayarangsarit, Wibulpolprasert, and Tangcharoensathien 2000). However, in 
1997, the Thai economy faced a crisis and economic contraction by 10.5% in 1998 (National 
Economic and Social Development Board 2002). Major determinants of the economic crisis 
included short-term foreign debts, private sector investments in non-productive businesses (in 
particular, in the real estate sector, automobile industries, petrochemical industries and private 
hospitals), weak production structures and foreign capital dependence, liberalized monetary 
policy without an effective monitoring and inspection system, and inefficiency of public sector 
management (Wibulpolprasert 2002). To maintain overall economic stability, Thailand adopted 
a managed float currency exchange system on 2 July 1997 and requested financial and technical 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund on 14 August 1997 (Wibulpolprasert 2002). 
The economic crisis had major social implications of unemployment, under employment, 
household income contraction, changing expenditure patterns, and child abandonment. The 
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crisis increased poverty incidence by I million, of whom 54% were the ultra-poor7. Household 
health expenditure reduced by 24% in real terms. Institutional care was forfeited, especially in 
poorer households, and replaced by self-medication. Private hospitals were clearly surplus to 
need and fell into debt (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2000). 
Following the crisis, Thailand began to implement deep reform of the financial sector, corporate 
governance, a secured lending regime, and competition policy to strengthen the incentives for 
owners of banks and firms to move towards their competitive frontiers. The flexibility of the 
Thai economy facilitated a quick recovery of economic growth and the numbers in poverty 
began to fall. After contracting by 10.5% in 1998, Thailand's economy grew 4.4% in 1999 and 
4.6% in 2000 - and stayed positive 1.9% in 2001 (National Economic and Social Development 
Board 2002), in spite of the global slowdown (The World Bank 2003; Wibulpolprasert 2002). 
In response to the crisis and to international reform trend, many reforms in the public sector 
were implemented before 2001, including those recommended by donors. 
1.4.4 Coexisting reform policies before 2001 
Thailand has followed the ideology of neo-liberal approaches by opening its doors to 
international finance, opening its capital accounts, and promoting free market including 
deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation (Phongpaichit and Baker 2000). For example, the 
master plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform Program was approved by the Royal Thai 
Government Cabinet on September 1,1998 (The Royal Thai Government 1998) and several 
private enterprises have been privatized including those in the telecommunication sector, for 
instance. During the Chaun Leekphai administration (1998-2000), there were many Acts 
introducing reforms in different sectors. The Devolution Act 1999 set a strong pace to devolve 
MoPH services, such as health centre's, district and provincial hospital services, to local elected 
government by 2004. The MoPH will play a decreasing role in direct service provisions but 
maintain its role in financing, policy direction, monitoring and evaluation. Within the health 
sector, there were current reforms in other health themes such as the strengthening of the 
National Essential Drug Lists, the payment reform of the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme, 
the introduction of the efficient use of drugs and supplies, and the transformation of public 
hospitals into autonomous hospitals. 
In 2000, there was a health sector reform movement which used three strategies: generation and 
management of knowledge, involvement of civil society, and advocating for politicians' support. 
This movement was coordinated by the Office of Health Systems Reform funded by the Health 
7 Ultra poor is defined as those with incomes below 80 percent of the poverty line and the poverty line in Thailand 
since 1998 was based on food consumption basket which varies according to age and sex (Rodriguez 1999). By 1998, 
the average poverty line for Thailand was at Thai Baht 878 per month per person equivalent to US 73 cents per day 
(The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board 1999). 
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Systems Research Institute under the National Health Systems Research Committee. This 
movement was to get the involvement of the whole society in the development of a knowledge- 
based national health bill during 2000-2003, aiming to reform the whole health sector including 
health care. The goal of universal coverage of health care was a component of that draft bill. 
These coexisting reforms partly influenced the readiness for the implementation of the 2001 UC 
policy. 
1.5 Overview of the 2001 Universal Coverage Policy (UC) 
The landslide victory in the 2001 general election of the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRTP) was 
extremely important as it was the first fought on policies rather than on patronage (Phongpaichit 
2001; Siamwalla 2002). The Party leader, Thaksin Shinawatra, became the Prime Minister of 
Thailand and, at a press conference on 6 January, Election Day, announced his intention to 
implement policies to which the Party was committed, that the party was entrusted with setting 
up the government, and the party's policies ought to be the government's policies: "If the Party 
cannot keep its promise, it would betray the electorate's trust 8" (Shinawatra 2001). Since UC 
had been part of the TRTP's manifesto since 26 March 2000, and was promoted during the 
political campaign under the slogan `Sam sib baht rak sa thuk rok' [30 Baht treats all diseases], 
the `30 Baht' policy became the government's policy after the election. 
The government's policy declarations on health financing and health service delivery systems 
are presented in Box I. I. The first was one of nine government priority policies: the Universal 
Coverage of Health Care Policy. The second was health systems reform under the social sector 
policy: declaring the intention to legislate for the National Health Security Act. 
Box 1.1 Policy declaration to parliament by the Thaksin Shinawatra government on 26 February 
2001 
The Universal Coverage of Health Care Policy was one of nine high priority policies. The Universal Coverage of 
Health Care Policy aims to `reduce the national health expenditures and household health expenditures with 30 Baht 
out-of-pocket per episode and provide accessible and equitable quality health services'. 
Health policy under Social Sector Policy aims to implement the health systems reform by establishing a National 
Health Security Fund through the legislation of the National Health Security Act. 
Source: Policy declaration to the narliament by the Thaksin Shinawatra government on 26 February 2001. 
http: //www. thaigov. go. th/index-eng. htm 
The provision of the Thaksin administration's health policy regarding health financing and 
health services in February 2001 can be summarized as follows. 
0 All Thai residents are entitled to accessible and equitable health services. 
8 Translated from the Thairatch Newspaper, 7 January 2001, page 1. 
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" The policy aims to reduce national health expenditure and household expenditure by establishment of a 
collective tax-based financing system and paying providers according to the number of registered 
population under a new health scheme for people outside formal employment. Under this scheme, 
households pay only a nominal contribution of 30 Baht per visit to a medical service. 
0 The 30 Baht Scheme will provide the choice for people to register with a health care provider from either 
public or private sector. 
" The government will guarantee a quality of health services which can be accessible geographically. 
" The government intends to reform the health financing system by establishing the National Health Security 
Fund through legislation. The Fund is expected to harmonize benefits, costs, and management between 
several existing schemes that will lead to an equitable health care system. 
In sum, Thailand chose to generate a large subsidised scheme which separated the purchaser 
role from the MoPH and to control cost with the methods of closed-end payment. The system is 
expected to have dual funds under a single system in the future. However, the policy was 
implemented rapidly from April 2001 under MoPH execution, with four progressive steps to 
expand insurance coverage. Table 1.2 shows the chronological events in the policy formulation 
and implementation during 2001-2002. Under the 30 Baht Scheme, health registration covered 
the whole country in April 2002, and that was before the legislation of the National Health 
Security Act (November 2002). This led to the country having high insurance coverage under 
three different management schemes. In 2002, the reform was still in a transition period with 
the development of the 30 Baht Scheme in its infancy in respect to the resource allocation 
formula, strengthening of primary care, and choice of providers. 
Table 1.2 Chronological events in the policy formulation and implementation of the 30 Baht 
Scheme and the National Health Security Act 
Periods Events of Thailand regarding Universal Coverage policy 
January 2001 Election of the Thaksin government 
February 2001 Policy declaration in parliament on 26-27 February 2001: 
official announcement of UC policy -'the 30 Baht Scheme' 
March 2001 Consultation meeting chaired by PM 
April 2001 Implementation of first phase of UC in 6 provinces: 
extension of the Medical Welfare Scheme to cover uninsured 
May 2001 Guidelines for implementation published 
June-October 2001 Phase II. Private collaboration: 
expansion to 15 provinces with the collaboration of private 
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Periods Events of Thailand regarding Universal Coverage policy 
providers and university hospitals 
October 2001 Phase III. Nationwide implementation: 
expansion of coverage to all provinces except the inner 
Bangkok districts started from January 2002 
April 2002 Phase IV. Achieving universal coverage: 
expanding coverage to the whole country including the inner 
Bangkok districts and achieved universal coverage 
November 2001 - 2002 Parliamentary process of the National Health Security Act 
1.6 Questions regarding UC policy 
The 2001 UC policy ensures that all citizens have equal access to health care without financing 
barriers. While UC may decrease the severity of inequities, it may also raise new problems for 
the health system. These include cost escalation of the government budget, cream skimming by 
private hospitals, poorer quality and longer waiting time in public hospitals, and helping those 
of higher income more than lower income families. Thus system design is important but so is 
the implementation of the new policy, which may be changed by any of the participants at any 
step of the policy process. 
Questions regarding the Thai UC policy include: what are the driving forces to this policy 
change? Why did this political party select Universal Coverage as the Party's health policy at 
this particular time? Academics and researchers had long been working on alternative solutions 
to the problem of access to health services, one of which was UC to health care. Why was it 
possible to introduce UC in 2001, when it had not been possible earlier? Why UC was accepted 
politically, promoted and implemented so rapidly is not clear. Understanding how UC was 
introduced will help to answer questions about implementation, and whether it will be 
successful and reach its goal. Only an in-depth policy study can understand the process of 
change. 
The next chapter presents the framework of analysis, elaborated from a literature review of 
policy analysis, and specifies study objectives. It then goes on to describe the methods of data 
collection. 
30 
CHAPTER 2- RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODS 
Chapter 2- Research Framework and Methods 
This chapter develops a policy analysis framework through a review of different disciplines 
relating to policy, to help explain the UC policy process. It goes on to specify the study 
objectives and research questions. Finally, it explains study methods used. 
2.1 Framework of policy analysis: a review 
In analysing public policy, frameworks are needed to organise ideas and concepts. This section 
starts with the description of policy analysis using the different views of policy scholars. It goes 
on to discuss why policy analysis is useful to understand a policy and in which other aspects it 
can be useful. Then it reviews how policy analysis is performed by discussing several 
approaches from different disciplines, and finally, it identifies approaches used in this study. 
The main argument of this section is that policy is not just an outcome of a rational process; it 
involves the interaction of actors who are influenced by the social, political, economic, and 
historical context in which policy is shaped and implemented; therefore, it needs a combination 
of concepts and tools to understand its process (Sutton 1999; Walt 1994), which is similar to the 
political economy approach9. 
Policy scholars have different views on policy (Hill 1997; John 1998). It can be defined as 
many things from content (Hammer and Berman 1995) to a broad course of action (Barker 
1996). While a traditional model of policy views policy as a rational process or based on 
causal-effect relationship, there are more explicit acknowledgements of the importance of the 
social, political, economic and historical context in which policy is shaped and implemented 
(Dunn 1994; Grindle and Thomas 1991; Keeley and Scoones 1999; Mooij and Vos 2003; Walt 
1994; Walt and Gilson 1994). The traditional idea perceived policy as a product of a linear 
process; once it is decided, it is implemented accordingly and the implementation is dealt with 
by the management in the organization. This idea is based on a positivist view of the world, 
which searches for links between cause and effect. However, many authors argue that any form 
of absolute rationality is not realized in most policy-making settings (Dunn 1994). They 
suggest that policy-making is complex and involves a political process in which potent actors 
influence others in the making of policy (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Walt 1994), it involves 
interest groups, policy communities or networks, not just particular responsible persons within 
9 Political economy approach offers tools with multidisciplines for understanding the interrelationships between 
political and economic institutions and processes, including the ways the government manages the allocation of 
resources and the economic system, and the behaviour of people affects the form of government and the kinds of laws 
and policies that get made (Drazen 2001; Johnson 2000). 
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the government (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Kingdon 1995), and the policy is shaped through 
formulation and implementation (Gordon, Lewis, and Young 1977). 
The approach to explore public policy - policy analysis - integrates and contextualizes models 
and research from several disciplines (Parsons 1995). It has been said that policy analysis "is an 
applied sub-field whose content cannot be determined by disciplinary boundaries but by 
whatever appears appropriate to the circumstances of the time and the nature of the problem" 
(Wildavsky, 1978: 15 quoted in Parsons 1995). The uncertainties of circumstances move the 
focus from policy description to the dimension of policy which acknowledges the courses of 
actions (process) and the context in shaping policy. This kind of analysis offers useful views 
into why and how policies came about, are formulated and implemented, and succeed or fail 
(Mooij and Vos 2003). Moreover, it is not limited to the analysis of policy10 (i. e. to understand 
policy determination and policy content), but it is able to evaluate implementation, so its results 
can inform future policy development. It also can be "a tool to help influence policy outcomes" 
(Walt, 1998: 379). 
Several disciplines provide useful approaches to policy analysis including political science, 
sociology, anthropology, and management (Minogue 1983; Sutton 1999). Sutton (1999) 
reviews the main interest (often shared) in these disciplines: 
" Political scientists are interested in what policy-making is. Various models have been 
developed to explain the decision-making process and identify diffusion of power in policy- 
making. 
" Sociologists are interested in policy networks and policy communities to understand the role 
of interest groups in the policy process. Looking at policy networks can identify the 
dominant groups in policy-making and understand why policy is shaped in particular ways. 
Networks can be identified as corporatist, state-directed, collaborative and pluralist. 
" Anthropologists focus on development discourses which explore a phenomenon through 
ideas, concepts and categories given to the phenomenon. Discourse analysis" provides a 
tool to understand and break down the perspectives in policy development. 
10 Gordon et al (1977) define the varieties of policy analysis as analysis of policy, policy monitoring and evaluation, 
and analysis for policy. The analysis of policy includes: (1) analysis of policy determination, which is concerned 
with how policy is made, why, when and for whom, and (2) analysis of policy content which involves a description of 
a particular policy and how it is different in relation to other earlier policies. Policy monitoring and evaluation 
examines how policies have performed against policy goals and the impact of the policy. Analysis for policy 
includes policy advocacy and information for policy. Policy advocacy involves research and arguments, which is 
intended to influence the policy agenda. Information for policy is a form of analysis, which is intended to feed into 
policy-making activities (Gordon, Lewis, and Young 1977). 
11 Discourse analysis is an approach to analysing qualitative data that focuses on talk and texts as social practices and 
on the resourses that are drawn on to enable those practices (Potter 1996). 
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" Management literature focuses on the complexity of implementation including organisation 
management, barriers to change, the skills required to manage change, and the importance 
of power and influence, for instance. 
Contemporary approaches in policy analysis have combined several single disciplines and 
developed new theories or models to help explain policy process, which include four main 
themes: policy as process, political interests in the decision-making process, actor oriented 
approaches, and context concerns. Several review papers mention discourse analysis as an 
emerging tool among policy analysts (Keeley and Scoones 1999; Mooij and Vos 2003; Sutton 
1999). Theories are discussed below under the four main themes in order to decide which are 
useful to help explain the UC policy. 
2.1.1 Policy as process 
Policy is complex and includes many courses of action. In explaining policy, several theories 
use metaphors to help explain how the process occurs. These include the stages heuristic, 
multiple-streams, punctuated-equilibrium, and interactive models. 
The stages approach was originally defined by Lasswell (1951) in order to improve the quality 
of the use of information by government. The approach views the policy-making process as 
composed of a series of steps or sequences. Process in this approach usually begins with 
agenda-setting and concludes with policy evaluation and termination (deLeon 1999). The 
stages metaphor has been criticised for mistaking each stage as linear and giving a sense of a 
top-down process (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993 cited in deLeon, 1999). 
The multiple-streams framework by Kingdon (1984) focuses explicitly on differences between 
dynamic and static policy elements, giving an idea of how policy emerges once three 
independent factors come together (Kingdon 1995). This framework does not divide process 
into stages but it pays attention largely to agenda setting. 
The punctuated-equilibrium framework by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) describes how events 
can result in policy change - that policies may remain relatively stable for long periods, and 
then, because of a particular event, undergo change. They call this process `punctuated 
equilibria'. This framework explains both stability and change; however, it emphasises only 
issue definition and agenda setting (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 1999). 
The interactive model by Grindle and Thomas (1991) focuses on the uncertainty of policy 
change through the process of decision and implementation, and the way in which interested 
parties can exercise pressure for change at different points. These interests are those who are 
affected positively or negatively by the change of policy, including high level bureaucrats and 
managers in the implementation process (Grindle and Thomas 1991). The term `interactive' 
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gives a clear hint of how the policy process performs, and is also a feature of the multiple 
streams and the punctuated equilibrium framework. 
Though the stages approach is contested, it is still widely used as a heuristic device to explain 
the whole range of public policy processes. This thesis will use four common stages as a 
framework to identify courses of action: (1) problem identification and issue recognition 
(agenda setting), (2) policy formulation, (3) policy implementation, and (4) policy evaluation. 
However, it recognised that the relationship of each stage is not in sequence as linear but rather 
it is interactive (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Walt 1994; White 1997). The multiple streams 
framework will be used to help explain the agenda setting and policy formulation process. The 
interactive model will be used to help explain the implementation process. 
2.1.1.1 Kingdon's multiple streams model 
Kingdon (1995) suggests the agenda setting process is composed of three separate and distinct 
streams: problems, policies and politics. He defined the word `agenda' as "the list of subjects or 
problems to which governmental officials and people outside of government closely associated 
with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time" (Kingdon 1995: 3). 
The problem stream 
The problem stream is a condition which policy-makers perceive as a problem or something 
they think they should act on. It is composed of problems on which government policy-makers 
fix their attention, as opposed to those which they choose to ignore. Kingdon argues that there 
are three mechanisms which serve to bring problems to the attention of policy-makers: 
" Indicators: measurements which are used to assess the scale and change in problems. 
Government data and reports feed into government a picture of the problem and thus have a 
significant role in shaping governmental attitudes and positions; 
" Events: (i. e. focusing events) which serve to focus attention on problems: crises, disasters, 
personal experience and symbols; 
" Feedback: gives information on current performance and indicates a failure to meet goals or 
points towards unanticipated consequences. 
The policy stream 
The policy stream is the way of selecting amongst problems and alternative policy solutions. 
Kingdon conceptualises the policy stream in terms of a `primeval soup'. Ideas float around, 
confront one another and combine with one another in various ways (Kingdon 1995: 117). The 
soup changes in a process of natural selection, survival, demise and recombination. In this soup 
stream some ideas float to the top of the agenda and others fall to the bottom. Those concerned 
with problems and solutions are policy communities - health specialists, politicians, academics 
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and consultants. Some communities are fragmented and some are closed and tight-knit. The 
fragmentation of a policy system affects the stability of the agenda within that system. Policy 
entrepreneurs are important actors in the policy stream. The policy solution being promoted has 
to satisfy a number of criteria if it is to survive and get to the top of the agenda. A number of 
criteria are: 
" technical feasibility, 
" congruence with existing values, 
" anticipation of future constraints, and 
" public acceptability and politicians' receptivity. 
The end result of this struggle is a list of policy proposals, which constitute a set of alternatives 
to governing policies, and which may attract the attention of the policy-makers. 
The political stream 
The political stream operates quite independently from the other streams. It is composed of a 
number of elements: 
" National mood: public opinion, climate of opinion; 
" Organised political forces: parties, legislative politics, pressure groups; 
" Government: election results - change in personnel and jurisdiction; 
" Consensus building: bargaining, bandwagons and tipping12. 
These developments in the political stream can have a powerful effect on agendas, affecting 
which one becomes prominent. Politicians and policy specialists have different perceptions of 
national mood and the way they build consensus. 
These separate streams - problems, policies, and political streams - come together at certain 
times. This is likely to occur when a policy window opens either by problems gaining attention 
or political opportunities arising. Under such conditions a particular issue has the opportunity to 
push an alternative. If the window is lost, then the policy launch has to wait for another time 
when conditions and alignments are appropriate. Therefore, timing is important for agenda 
setting (Glasssman 1999; Kingdon 1995; Paul-Shaheen 1998). 
2.1.1.2 Interactive model ofpolicy implementation 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) present a contrast to the linear model of policy implementation. 
They argue that their model is particularly useful for analysing the process of implementation, 
12 Tipping is used by Thomas Schelling to describe the process of change in racial mix in neighbourhoods. It presents 
the idea of the increasing of the minority (or the idea of few people) to become the majority (or the common idea of 
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and offers tools for anticipating reactions to change, considering the possibility of sustaining a 
policy, and assessing the adequacy of resources. 
There are several views of the implementation process - put briefly, the top-down approach, the 
bottom-up approach, and the hybrid theory. The interactive model is in the third category, 
which argues that policy is not linear. The top-down model perceives the policy-making 
process as linear, normative and prescriptive, starting with the policy decision at central level. 
The government judges what ought to be done, gets officials to undertake what they are told, 
and keeps control over a sequence of stages in a system (Walt 1994; Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973 cited in Parsons 1995). Behind this idea is the belief that 'perfect implementation' is 
necessary to achieve the policy objectives. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) suggest ten 
preconditions necessary to achieve a policy's objectives13. 
But implementation in practice is difficult. Hogwood and Gunn's preconditions are not usually 
met. For example, it is difficult to eliminate the obstacles to implementation outside the control 
of the implementers, resources are seldom sufficient, and implementation always depends on 
other actors who are involved in execution of policy. Moreover, the precondition of perfect 
compliance is unacceptable and also unattainable in a pluralist democracy (Hogwood and Gunn 
1984). Therefore, the top-down approach has limitations. The opposite idea - the bottom-up 
model - sees the implementation process as involving negotiation and consensus building. 
These involve two contexts or environments: the management skills and cultures of the 
organisation, and the political environment. In this model, the policy formulation process may 
be altered by policy implementation (Parsons, 1995). There may be chances for lower level 
actors to take decisions. 
However, these two opposite models provide rather rigid approaches, understandable as linear 
either upwards or downwards. Many have the same view as Grindle and Thomas (1991) that 
the community). See Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 
pp. 99-102 
Ten preconditions suggested by Hogwood and Gun (1984) include: 
(1) The circumstances external to the agenda do not impose crippling constraints. 
(2) Adequate time and sufficient resources are available. 
(3) The required combination of resources is available. 
(4) Policy is based on a valid theory of cause and effect. 
(5) The relationship between cause and effect is direct. 
(6) Dependency relationships are minimal. 
(7) There is an understanding of, and agreement on, objectives. 
(8) Tasks are fully specified in correct sequence. 
(9) Communication and coordination must be perfect. 
(10) Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance. 
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policy making is interactive, with a continuous loop between formulation and implementation 
elements, and that political influence is as important at the implementation stage as at other 
stages (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Walt 1994; White 1997). For example, White's model, 
'interactive policy analysis', connects local officials or implementers to policy-makers in 
considering alternatives (White 1997). These frameworks support the 'interactive' idea for 
implementation. The interactive approach can better explain implementation because it links 
the top-down and the bottom-up approaches and allows for actions of the various actors at 
different stages. 
The interactive model of policy implementation suggested by Grindle and Thomas (1991) offers 
an assumption that a policy is set when it has reached a state of equilibrium. Efforts to alter 
existing policy may be resisted by those affected by the change. These reactions or responses 
move the decision and implementation to a new equilibrium. Thus nature, intensity, and 
location of those reactions all affect implementation. Moreover, they suggest that the 
characteristics of the policy have an important influence on the nature of the reaction. They 
group policy characteristics as the distribution of cost and benefit, technical complexity, 
administrative intensity, and its short- or long-term impact. From these policy characteristics, 
policy-makers and managers are able to anticipate where the reactions or responses to policy are 
likely to take place, in public arena and within bureaucracy. They suggest that the examination 
of the implementation activities needs to assess conflict, conflict resolution, and the 
development of strategic management capabilities. 
2.1.2 Political interests in decision-making process and policy change 
Many theories view decision-making in different political systems, which illuminate different 
actors who are prominent in policy-making. They are related to the views of how power is 
distributed in policy-making. Power is a highly contested concept, but put simply it has three 
dimensions: first, power can involve the ability to influence the making of decisions; second, it 
may be reflected in the capacity to shape the political agenda; and third, it may take the form of 
controlling people's thoughts by the manipulation of their needs and preferences (Lukes 1974). 
While power can be seen as negative (as in the third dimension), it can also be seen as positive. 
Two main ways of viewing decision-making power are the society-centered perspective and the 
state-centered perspective. The society-centered perspective argues that there are dispersions of 
power in society (i. e. civil society is important), while the state-centered argues that decision- 
making power is concentrated within state institutions. These perspectives are influenced by the 
political system (Grindle and Thomas 1991). 
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2.1.2.1 Society-centered perspectives 
Under this perspective, decisions are seen to depend on the relationships of power and 
competition among individuals, groups or classes in society. 
The structures of power are class, wealth, and knowledge, for example. There are at least five 
approaches of power relations in the political system: elitism, Marxism, pluralism, 
professionalism, and technocracy or public choice theories (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Parsons 
1995; Walt 1994). 
In Elitist models or Class models power is concentrated in the hands of a few groups and 
individuals, and that decision-making works to the advantage of these elites. This approach is 
close to the Marxist view. Marxists or instrumentalist approaches focus on decision-making in 
capitalist societies. The approaches are seen as a product of economic conflict, where the state 
plays a dominant role in safeguarding the long-term interests of a capitalist economy. Pluralist 
approaches suggest that different groups in society are able to compete to dominate decision- 
making and policy results from conflict, bargaining, and coalition. In the pluralists' view, the 
role of policy elites in the initiation, formulation, and implementation of change is limited as the 
activities of public officials are always determined by the way in which societal interests are 
expressed. In this view of society, the role of the media in highlighting the issues and political 
commitment becomes crucial. The Professionalist view is that professional elites have acquired 
power in decision-making and in the implementation of public policy in liberal democracies. 
Technocracy or Public choice ideas focus on bureaucratic power (the civil service) in decision- 
making processes. The idea is that the rationale and motivations of administrative agencies and 
government departments may result in policies which do not necessarily serve the public 
interest. 
2.1.2.2 State-centered perspectives 
The state-centered approach concentrates on the role of state in policy-making. Theories in this 
approach include rationality, bureaucratic politics, and state interest models. 
In the rational approach, theorists have a common belief in the improvement of decision- 
making through changing the relationship of the political process to knowledge and information 
(Parsons 1995). The idea basically derived from the idea of economic rationality in economic 
theory and the bureaucratic rationality in sociological theories of organization and industrial 
society (Max Weber 1864-1920). The approaches in line with this idea are the perfectly rational 
actor model, bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), the incremental model (Lindblom 1959), and 
mixed-scanning (Etzioni 1967) (also see Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 27-28: Walt, 1994: 46-52; 
Dunn, 1994: 275-282). 
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The perfectly rational model views decisions as products of a rational process in which actors 
assess all possible alternatives on the basis of full information, and then choose an optimal way 
to reach a stated goal. The concept of `bounded rationality' suggests that information seeking is 
costly and always incomplete; therefore, decision makers do not usually attempt to achieve 
optimal solutions but only find a solution that satisfies some basic criteria. The incremental 
model suggests that the uncertainty, conflict, and complexity affect decision-makers, so changes 
to policy are incremental over time. The mixed-scanning approach is suggested to overcome 
the unrealistic rational model and the limitations of the incremental model, which overlooks 
innovations. The model includes two levels of problem analysis: a broad examination and a 
detailed examination of some areas of problems. 
The bureaucratic politics approach pays attention to policy-makers, in particular the role of 
bureaucratic players shaping policy by their positions within government through negotiation, 
bargaining, and power in hierarchical system. 
State interest models view that state as having autonomy in making decisions in its own interest, 
for example, the maintenance of social peace and the national development. Thus, state action 
always benefits particular groups, for example, urban elites close to the seat of power. 
Looking at the political system in policy-making can provide understanding of why some actors 
dominate policy-making and implementation. It can be argued that whether it is the state or 
society that dominates policy-making at central and sub-government level will depend on how 
strong the state is in that area, and this will differ between areas. Given the theories of political 
interests, it will be useful to explore how UC policy-making was shaped and in which political 
context the UC policy was shaped and implemented. 
2.1.3 Actor-oriented policy explanation 
Actors can be viewed as individuals, organisations, and members of policy communities or 
policy networks. In the literature on actors, there are three themes: first, how decision-makers 
interact with other actors in the production, implementation, evaluation, and revision of public 
policies (Grindle and Thomas 1991); second, how the characteristics of policy networks affect 
the policy process (Marsh 1998; Rhodes 1997); third, how important particular individuals in 
policy process are (Grindle and Thomas 1989; Kingdon 1995; Walt and Gilson 1994). 
Many theories define actors in the policy process as elites. Policy elites are important as they 
are key actors in determining policy initiatives, choices, policy and organisation changes 
(Grindle and Thomas 1991). These decision-making elites make policy through at least four 
considerations: technical advice; bureaucratic implications; political stability and support; and 
international pressure. Technical advice is concerned with information, analyses, and options 
presented by technocrats, ministers, other high-level bureaucrats, and foreign advisers. The 
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impact of choices on bureaucratic interaction relates to individuals' concern about career 
objectives, budgets, compliance and responsiveness amongst ministers and other high-level 
bureaucrats, middle level bureaucrats, and international advisers. Political stability and support 
relates to political leadership, dominant economic elites, and leaders of class or interest groups. 
International pressure can influence aid, loans and trade relations. Grindle and Thomas (1991) 
suggest that there is space for manoeuvre by policy makers, which depends on the level of 
discretion of policy makers. Therefore, the perceptions, motivations, values, skills, and 
opportunities of decision-makers are important in shaping the policy process, including content, 
timing, sequences of reforms, and outcomes. These perceptions and motivations are framed by 
societal pressures and constraints, and historical, cultural, and international contexts (Grindle 
and Thomas 1991). 
Network analysis is based on the idea that a policy is framed within a context of relationships 
and dependencies. Interactions between policy makers and bureaucrats may be described by 
different policy styles (Richardson 1982). The two main dimensions of policy style are (1) an 
anticipatory or reactionary style, and (2) a consensus-seeking or impositional style. These four 
policy styles reflect the way policy actors interact. 
The notion of policy style is useful for comparing policy communities both within and between 
political systems and it offers an insight into the policy-making process (Parsons 1995). This 
study uses this approach to explain the interactions of policy maker and policy community. 
Network analysis is interested in the increasing participation of other actors outside the 
government (Marsh 1998; Parsons 1995; Rhodes 1997) and the degree to which the state is 
influenced by such networks (Smith 1993, cited in Hill, 1997). The term `network' is a 
metaphor to describe the relationship of participants in policy process (Peters 1998). Using 
Marsh and Rhodes's typology, it differentiates relationships between interest groups and 
government into three types: policy communities, policy networks and issue networks. The 
typology treats policy network as a generic term. Networks can vary along a continuum 
according to the closeness of the relationships within them. Policy community is at one end of 
the continuum. 
"A policy community has the following characteristics: it has a limited number of participants with some 
groups consciously excluded; there is frequent and high quality interaction between all members of the 
community on all matters related to the policy issues; its membership, values and policy outcomes persist 
overtime; there is consensus, with the ideology, values and broad policy preferences shared by all 
participants; all members of the policy community have resources so the relationships between them are 
exchange relationships; the basic interaction thus is one involving bargaining between members with 
resources; there is a balance of power, not necessarily one in which all members equally benefit but one in 
which all members see themselves as involved in a positive-sum game; the structure of the participating 
groups is hierarchical so leaders can guarantee the compliance of their members. This model is an ideal 
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type. The actual relationship between government and interests in any policy area can be compared to it, 
but no policy area is likely to conform exactly to it. " (Marsh 1998: 14) 
In contrast to the tightly-knit policy network is the issue network, which involves a large 
number of participants who come together to promote a particular issue. They are characterised 
by unequal power relationships, few resources, and less stability (Marsh 1998). Policy network 
analysis helps to understand the relationships amongst actors and this can link to the analysis of 
political setting to identify who are the important actors in policy process (Peters 1998). 
Two other types of policy networks which provide dynamism and predictive capacity are the 
advocacy coalition approach (Sabatier 1988; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993) and the 
epistemic community approach (Haas 1990; Adler and Haas 1992). The advocacy coalition 
approach views the behaviour of policy communities within networks as competing to pursue 
the change in rules based on each coalition's belief. The capacity of the coalitions depend on 
how much they increase knowledge of problem identification and determinants, and feed 
information back to change their perceptions of the probable impacts of the alternative policies 
and advocate policy brokers or policy makers (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). `Epistemic 
communities' are groups of technical experts or professionals who "share a commitment of 
common causal model and a common set of political values" (Haas, 1990: 41 cited in Parsons, 
1995: 173). The capacity of epistemic communities in getting their ideas adopted depends on 
the ability to bring the truth to be more persuasive to policy-makers and the ability to mobilise 
alliance with the dominant political coalition. This thesis will classify participants in policy- 
making by March and Rhodes's category to explore how their relationships affect the policy. 
Moving to focus on individuals (can be groups), there are many ways of describing individual 
actors, for example, as stakeholders (Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000), as 'hidden' or 'visible' 
actors (Kingdon 1995), as policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995), or as policy elites (Grindle and 
Thomas 1991). 
Stakeholders are defined as individuals or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or 
interests in a policy, past, present, or future (adapted from Clarkson 1995 cited in Brugha and 
Varvasovszky, 2000), and also refers to the influential actors in the decision-making process. 
Kingdon (1995) categorised actors in the policy process as 'visible' and 'hidden' participants. 
The visible participants are the Prime Minister, the Minister of MOPH, political parties, media 
and the public. The hidden participants are the civil servants or bureaucrats, researchers, and 
academics. The visible participants play prominent roles in agenda setting and the hidden 
participants play prominent roles in policy formulation/alternative policy selection. Kingdon 
also recognises a special group of actors as policy entrepreneurs, "people who are willing to 
invest resources of various kinds in hopes of a future return in the form of policies they favour" 
(Kingdon 1995: 143). They are crucial to the survival and success of an idea. They 'soften-up' 
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policy communities to gain acceptability for a policy. Paul-Shaheen (1998) also suggests that 
policy entrepreneurship is an essential condition for reform, as are interest group support, 
stakeholder commitment, and public support (Paul-Shaheen 1998). 
This study uses the general term 'actors' to refer to participants in the processes of agenda 
setting, policy formulation and implementation. However, the analysis has explained actors 
based on several concepts of 'hidden', 'visible', entrepreneur, and policy elites. Amongst policy 
actors are academics, researchers, ministers, high- and middle-level bureaucrats, managers and 
health providers. Amongst interest groups are NGOS, private health provider associations, 
private insurance companies etc. The public is composed of individuals, groups and the media. 
It is also useful to explore perceptions and motivation of policy makers and to link to context 
whether any factors were important in shaping their perceptions and actions. 
2.1.4 Context explaining policy change 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) suggest that perceptions, options and actions of policy makers are 
shaped by societal pressures and constraints, and historical, cultural, and international contexts. 
They group these contextual environments as crisis situations and `politics as usual'. For the 
first condition, a response by policy makers is likely to be strong pressure to reform, and the 
stakes for the government are likely to be high. If there is no perception of crisis, the policy- 
making is usually in the hands of middle-level decision-makers and change is likely to be 
incremental. 
The three streams approach of Kingdon (1995) also acknowledges the importance of context. 
When a focusing event draws attention to a particular issue, it opens the problem window. 
When political change or the political stream evolves to a point, it opens political window. At a 
critical time when three streams come together then a policy occurs. 
There are many ways to categorize contextual factors (Collins, Green, and Hunter 1999; 
Leichter 1979). Leichter (1979) suggests four factors which affect the policy process: 
" situational factors which are transient, impermanent or idiosyncratic conditions, such as 
one-off or unusual events including war and political instability or change in political 
leadership, 
" structural factors which are the relatively unchanging elements of the society and polity, 
such as economic structure, political system, technological structure and demographic 
structure, 
" cultural factors which are the value commitments of groups within communities or the 
society as a whole, such as language, the level of literacy, and values on issues such as 
religion, gender, participation and corruption, and 
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0 environmental factors which are factors outside the boundaries of a political system such as 
the role of transnational companies and international agreements and events. 
Grouping these factors by characteristic according to Leichter gives an idea of the contextual 
factor, whether it changes or is likely to be static. This provides power to explain a policy 
change. Therefore, this study used Leichter's categories to explain the UC policy. 
2.2 Organised framework for investigating health policy processes 
To organise several theories and ideas into a lens to investigate a health policy, this study uses a 
framework of policy analysis developed by Walt and Gilson (1994) because it provides a useful 
simple, heuristic device to explore the inter-relationship of different factors affecting policy. It 
is composed of four elements - content, context, actors, and processes, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
In its detail, it draws on some of the ideas from the theories above. In addition, a number of 
other concepts from the literature have been added to help explore the complexities of the policy 
process. These sources include Walt and Gilson (1994), Kingdon (1984), Grindle and Thomas 
(1991), Kutzin (1998), Collins (1999), Cleaves (1980), Hall (1975), and Sabatier (1986). 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework for policy analysis of the UC policy in Thailand 
Content of UC 
" Objectives 
" Designs: Institutional features 
and resource allocation 
mechanisms, Health system 
support functions, the benefit 
package 
Actors 
as individuals, 
networks 
Processes 
Context 
-Situational factors 
-Structural factors 
-Cultural factors 
-Environmental factors 
Agenda setting Policy formulation Implementation 
Decision-making consideration 
" Problem stream " Technical advice " Policy characteristics 
" Political steam -Bureaucratic implications, " Strategies of the 
" Policy stream -Political stability and support Implementation 
-International pressure 
2.2.1 Policy content 
Policy content can be explained as an outcome of a set of conditions including ideologies, 
history, economic conditions, political feasibility, and decision-making process (Walt and 
Gilson 1994). 
Policy content is what the policy aims to achieve and introduce to the system. Kutzin's 
framework, as mentioned in Chapter One, is useful for describing the content of universal 
coverage of health care policy. Content details should include three main elements: (1) sources 
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of funds, allocation of funds and associated institutional arrangements for health care; (2) 
broad 
health system support functions; and (3) the benefit package. The details in system design are 
important as they reflect government ideology and affect benefit distributions which can 
increase both support and resistance. 
For its importance to process, policy design will be investigated. Benefit distribution, the 
principle or concepts of the policy, and its feasibility may be important in the agenda setting 
process. The technical complexity of issues may limit the participation of professionals or 
bureaucrats in policy formulation and implementation. 
The concentration of cost and dispersion of benefit, technical complexity, its short- or long-term 
impact, the size of changes, facets of changes, and duration of changes will affect the ease of, 
and resistance to, policy implementation. 
2.2.2 Policy context 
The social, political, and economic context and other factors are important as preconditions of 
agenda setting, policy formulation and changes in health systems. This study looks at 
contextual factors which, according to Leichter (1979), include situational factors, structural 
factors, cultural factors, and environmental factors. The focus is on which conditions led to UC 
arriving on the political agenda, becoming government policy and being rapidly implemented. 
It also assesses the extent to which policy makers perceived the situation as a crisis and how this 
influenced the action of policy makers. 
2.23 Policy actors 
The influence of actors can change policy at any stage, depending on their position, power, and 
interests. This study looks at who played dominant roles and at which stages in Thailand's UC 
policy, and explains the interaction of actors, characteristics of actors and relationship of actors 
to other elements. Actors are viewed as individuals, policy communities, and networks. It also 
explores the power in decision-making, and whether the political context of UC policy was state 
dominated or society dominated. It uses network analysis to assess policy styles and types of 
policy network of the UC policy. Moreover, it observes the capacity and skills of policy 
analysts and explores whether policy-makers use them as instruments for decision-making. 
Regarding the implementation process, the study explores the participation of different actors. It 
assesses the bureaucratic performance of both managers and street level bureaucrats, 4. It also 
explores their perceptions and responses to the policy. 
14 The term 'street level bureaucrats' is coined by Michael Lipsky to describe the actors at the lowest end of the 
implementation chain, who implement policies at the point of contact with the policy's target population (Lipsky 
1993). 
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2.2.4 Policy processes 
This study focuses on three stages of policy process - agenda setting, policy formulation, and 
implementation - because it investigates the policy in the initial period and before outcomes can 
be evaluated. 
The three-stream approach of Kingdon is used to explain how the UC policy got onto the policy 
agenda. Consideration of the policy elites' decision making of Grindle and Thomas is used to 
explain the policy formulation process. In the implementation process, the frameworks looking 
at policy characteristics, strategies, and interactions amongst several elements are used to 
investigate whether this policy is likely to be implemented as the policy intended. 
2.2.4.1 Agenda setting 
The three-stream framework of Kingdon (1995) is useful to help explaining the Thai situation. 
There are also other models such as the Hall model (Walt 1994), which identifies three 
conditions - legitimacy, feasibility and support - and suggests that only when an issue is high in 
relation to all three conditions does it become an agenda item. Legitimacy refers to those issues 
with which governments feel they should be concerned and in which they have a right to 
intervene. The level of legitimacy is different among countries according to their normative 
values. Feasibility refers to the potential for implementing the policy. This potential is defined 
by accepted technical and theoretical knowledge, financial and other resources, availability of 
skilled personnel, capability of administrative structures and existence of necessary 
infrastructure. Support refers to public support or public trust in government. The support 
groups may be general public or important interest groups. If there is no support, it is difficult 
for government to implement a policy. If the issue has high legitimacy, high feasibility and 
high support, then it may come to the policy agenda and be implemented. 
This study uses the Kingdon model because the this model has more detail and is more nuanced 
than the Hall model, especially where the political stream is dominant and timing is important. 
2.2.4.2 Policy formulation process 
The Kingdon model can also help to highlight aspects of the policy formulation process, to 
show which actors have had dominant roles in content formation. The study focuses on the 
process by which the policy was designed and content decided. It analyses the interaction 
between policy-makers and policy communities or policy networks and assesses the extent to 
which policy-makers leaned on technical advice and other considerations such as bureaucratic 
constraints, political stability and support; and the international pressure. The prominence of a 
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particular factor may shift decisions in different ways. It can influence the decisions of policy 
makers in future policy development. 
2.2.4.3 Implementation process 
Implementation is often perceived as managerial or administrative (Walt 1994). It is judged by 
the extent to which objectives are achieved (Sabatier 1986 cited in Hongsamoot 2002). The 
process of implementation determines the nature and success of a policy initiative. However, 
there is evidence that outcomes frequently are quite different from policy intention (Grindle and 
Thomas 1991). This is shaped by implementers who respond according to the way they 
perceive the policy impacts on them. Therefore, strategies of implementation are important. 
The interactive model of implementation of Grindle and Thomas (1991) is useful to explore 
policy characteristics, conflict, conflict resolution, and the development of strategic 
management capabilities. Other authors such as Cleaves (1980), Sabatier (1986), and Leighton 
and Wouters (1995) also suggest looking at characteristics of policy implementation. 
Cleaves (1980) focuses on the characteristics of policy, arguing that certain characteristics make 
implementation easier (Cleaves 1980). These characteristics are: simple technical features, 
marginal change, implemented by one actor, clearly stated goals, one major objective, and short 
duration. Sabatier (1986) also suggests a set of six sufficient and necessary conditions for the 
effective implementation of policies (Sabatier, 1986 cited in Parsons, 1995). Leighton and 
Wouters (1995) report the obstacles to the implementation of health sector reform in Africa. 
They found that conflicting policy goals, political instability, weak institutional capacity, poor 
economic conditions, incomplete health sector development, and information constraints make 
implementation of reforms more difficult. 
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The various approaches described above support each other, so, synthesizing their similarities, 
this thesis builds an approach to analyse the implementation process. The following box is 
adapted from the sources above. 
Table 2.1 Policy characteristics and situations which anticipate the success of implementation 
Policy characteristics " complex / simple technical features 
" big / marginal change 
" extensive/ limited participation (implemented by one actor) 
" conflicting /clear policy goals 
" many / one major objective 
" long / short duration 
" legitimacy enhancing the compliance of both implementers and targets; 
" weak institutional capacity / skilful implementers 
" resistance / support of interest groups (public and bureaucrats) 
" good / poor communication and coordination 
Contextual factors " Situation factors 
" Structural factors 
" Cultural factors 
" Environmental factors 
Performance and capacity " Good / poor resources - number of doctors and nurses 
" Good / poor skills 
" Independencies / dependencies in management 
" Incentives / disincentives 
From the literature review it is clear that strategic implementation is essential, and it is useful to 
test which strategy the government has used. This list of strategies is suggested by Leighton 
and Wouters (1995): 
" Build consensus among policy elites, 
" Exercise and maintain Ministry of Health leadership of the effort, 
" Strengthen institutional capacity and personnel skills, 
" Adapt and update reforms to economic conditions, 
" Develop health organisational and financing infrastructure, 
" Collect, analyse, disseminate data and information. 
This study explores the characteristics of the UC policy and the implementation, whether it 
created resistance in bureaucrats or in the public arena. Then it explores the government's 
implementation strategies and discusses whether the policy is likely to be successful. Table 2.2 
summarises the details in the analytical framework used in this study. 
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Table 2.2 Analytical framework of factors important to policy process 
Agenda setting Policy formulation Implementation 
Process Processes of ideas meeting Processes of decision-making Processes of putting the 
policy elite of policy content ideas into action 
- Three streams: policy, problem, - How research and knowledge 
and olitical streams was used 
Content Characteristics of the issue Characteristics of the policy: Characteristics of the 
influencing the agenda selection: - Technical complexity policy: 
- Benefit distribution - Benefit distribution 
- Congruent to social values and - Size of changes 
the political party's concept - Facets of changes 
- Feasible - Duration of changes 
- Technical involvement 
Context Context support policy change: Contextual constraints: Context perceived as 
- Situational factors - political - Time constraints crisis or politics-as-usual 
transition and economic crisis - Health infrastructure and 
- Structural factors - economy resources 
- Cultural factors - commitment 
- Environmental factors 
Actors - Policy entrepreneurs - Policy styles and use of - Discretion level of 
- Government as agenda setter technical analysts implementers 
- Distribution of power between - Level of participation in the - Professional 
state, citizens, and technocrats different level of politics involvement 
- Level of participation in the issues - Bureaucratic 
different level of politics issues - Capacity and skill of policy performance incentive 
analysts and motivation 
- Institutional capacity 
- Political management 
skill of the government 
2.3 Research objectives and methods 
2.3.1 Main objective 
To analyse the policy process of the Universal Coverage Policy in three stages: agenda setting, 
policy formulation, and implementation 
2.3.2 Specific objectives 
1. To analyse the design and characteristics of the policy 
Research questions: What are the characteristics of UC policy in Thailand in terms of objectives, 
institutional arrangements and resource allocation mechanisms, health system support functions, 
and the benef it package? What aspects of the reform have been implemented in 2001-2002? 
2. To analyse the extent to which contextual factors facilitated or delayed the UC policy 
Research questions: What were contextual environments that facilitated or delayed the UC 
policy in each stage of the policy process? 
3. To explore the influence, roles and powers of particular actors in the UC policy 
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Research questions: Who was involved in the policy process at the agenda setting stage and at 
formulation stage? 
How far were decisions made by small policy elites? 
Did non-government actors (e. g. civil society) participate in the policy formulation? 
What role did the media play? 
Who supported / resisted / was involved? 
What were the policy styles? 
Who was involved in the policy implementation process? 
What are their positions, interests, and power on the policy, and the impact of the policy on 
them? 
4. To explain how and why the notion of UC came onto the policy agenda, and was formulated 
into policy 
Research questions: How did universal coverage policy get onto the policy agenda? How was 
the policy formulated? 
How far did the problem, political and policy streams influence the policy processes? 
5. To explore how the policy was executed / put into practice and analyse how far this policy is 
likely to be implemented as intended, by looking at characteristics of the UC policy, policy 
responses, and strategies 
Research questions: 
What methods of communication were used to transfer the policy from central to local levels? 
What parts of the policy have or have not been implemented? 
How did public and private providers negotiate their benefits? How did provinces negotiate 
with with MOPH? 
What were the characteristics of the UC policy? What obstacles and difficulties have the 
implementers encountered during implementation? 
What strategies did the MOPH use to overcome the obstacles? 
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2.3.3 Methodology 
2.3.3.1 Research process 
This study is based on qualitative research. After the research questions and objectives were 
defined, then key concepts suggesting possible explanations to explore were formulated as 
above. These concepts were derived from theory and experience from the literature, and helped 
to reformulate the specific research questions and to select methods of data collection as 
described in Appendix 1. The checklists for guided interview of each type of respondent are in 
Appendix 2. Data was collected at two levels: national and provincial. Most sources of data at 
national level provided understanding of the agenda setting process and policy formulation 
process, and implementation at national level. Information at provincial level explained largely 
the implementation process at local level and interaction with national level. Findings and 
interpretations were re-evaluated and reconfirmed whenever new information was accessed, by 
comparing the new information to the existing information. 
There are two polar approaches of the steps in theory building: deductive and inductive 
approaches. The deductive approach confines the topic of interest within the theories and 
hypotheses that a study can test whereas the inductive approach moves from specific 
observations to formulate some tentative hypotheses that a study can explore, and finally end up 
developing some general conclusions or theories (Trochim 2000). As the policy process of UC 
was complex and there was no single theory that could well explain the whole processes, this 
study used the inductive approach to decompose this complex phenomenon into its component 
elements and formulate the hypotheses from the investigations in order to explain the 
phenomenon, and finally developed some general conclusions. 
2.3.3.2 Case-study approach 
The case study is a way of doing social science research. It has advantages and disadvantages 
depending upon three conditions: the type of research question, the control an investigator has 
over actual events, and the focus on contemporary phenomenon (Yin 1994). The case study has 
the ability to answer `how and why' questions about a contemporary set of events over which 
the investigator has little control. However, this approach has several disadvantages. Firstly, it 
may allow biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions. Secondly, it 
has little basis for population generalisation although some of the conceptual findings can be 
generalisable. Thirdly, it is sometimes criticised as resulting in unnecessarily massive and 
unreadable document. Finally, there is little way of testing an investigator's ability to do good 
case studies (Yin 1994). 
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With the awareness of the advantages and the disadvantages of the case study above, the case- 
study approach was used in this study for two reasons. Firstly, the aims of this study were 
mainly to answer `how and why' the UC policy came about, and to explore policy-making 
process which is contemporary. This approach was able to focus on an important event which 
was distinctive, not diffused and which had a set of circumstances. Secondly, the case-study 
methodology allowed going in-depth to investigate the inter-relationship between actors, design, 
and context. 
To investigate intensively, two aspects were selected from two dimensions: the design content 
and the implementation unit. Six proxies of design content were selected to analyse the policy- 
making process. They are sources of finance, budget requirements for the program, methods of 
allocating resources to provinces, provider payment methods, primary care unit as a gatekeeper, 
and private provider collaboration. A province, Saraburi, was selected to investigate the 
implementation process. 
Though the investigation of the implementation process of only one province limited the degree 
of variation in terms of design, management and context, it provided adequate information of 
the whole cycle of the management of an implementation unit and is in greater depth than 
would have been possible if more provinces had been studied. The explanation of the 
implementation process is likely to be generalisable to other provinces because many of the 
issues will be common to other provinces. 
As this study uses several approaches to provide a detailed insightful and descriptive account of 
the policy process, it can be called `policy ethnography'. In Interpreting Qualitative Data 
Silverman (2001) uses `ethnography' to refer to a general approach to social science writing 
about particular groups. Such studies may record interactions between people - although not 
always through observation - but may also work with cultural artifacts like written texts. This 
contemporary definition encompasses a much broader range of work than the original 
ethnographic works in nineteenth-century when anthropologists traveled to observe the different 
pre-industrial cultures (Silverman 2001). Ethnography is also a tool used in policy research. A 
clear definition of `policy ethnography' is given by Beach (1999), who describes it as research 
about the processes of value dispute and material influence which underlie and invest the 
formation of policy discourses and which relate policy texts to practice. It does this by 
highlighting the process of mediation or re-contextualisation in policy making, including 
looking at the differences between intended policy and policy as implemented. This thesis thus 
can be called a policy ethnography as it looks at the processes of policymaking, the negotiation 
and mediation between different groups in that process, and the difficulties encompassed in 
implementing the policy as intended. 
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2.3.3.3 Methods of data collection and data analysis 
Qualitative methods were used to collect data because the study aimed to investigate the 
phenomenon of UC policy in detail and to describe the interactions of participants; qualitative 
methods help identify facts and perspectives of participants (Flick 1998; Silverman 2001). 
However, a single method was not sufficient. Interviews, for example, gave information only of 
interviewees' views; texts did not explain themselves but relied on the writers' interpretations. 
On the other hand, observations did not give the reasons underlying activities. Thus, a 
combination of methods in both primary research and secondary research helped fill the gaps in 
data collection and analysis to answer the research questions. Most of the data which the study 
collected were derived from the primary research. Primary data sources included key informant 
interviews, government proceedings, and newspapers. Primary data collection methods 
included observation, interview, text analysis (some analysis of media), and focus group 
discussion. Where the secondary data collection including quantitative data was available to 
complement the data from primary sources, it was collected and analysed. The secondary data 
sources, for example, included: 
" newspaper archives from the Matichon Newspaper's Library which provided the story 
of the phenomenon used for content analysis, and quantitative data of the news items 
used for a descriptive statistic analysis (frequency), 
" the MOPH's evaluation report on the first six month period of UC which provided the 
situation of the provinces' decisions on budget allocation and difficulties in policy 
implementation, 
" research reports by several research institutions on the first year evaluation of UC (Na 
Ranong and Na Ranong 2002a; Pannarunothai 2002) which provided the situation of the 
provinces' decisions on budget allocation, for example, 
" database of the Health Insurance Office which provided the number of health facilities 
and registered population under the UC scheme for a descriptive statistic analysis (for 
example, percentage), and 
" database of the Saraburi Provincial Health Office which provided financial information 
of providers in Saraburi and registered population under the UC scheme in the province 
for a descriptive statistic analysis (for example, ratio). 
Analysis was conducted iteratively during data collection. New information brought other 
questions giving more clarification of the phenomenon, and led to new questions. In analysis, 
frameworks described in previous sections were used. 
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Observation 
Observation gives information not only on what participants say but also what they do. This 
will fill the information gaps from interviews, which give information only of what the 
interviewee wants to say. Observation of MOPH meetings (the consultation meeting and/or the 
working group meeting) before interviewing took place helped to construct hypotheses and 
questions or checklists, increasing the reliability of research. Nine meetings about UC policy 
were observed at national level and five meetings at provincial level during fieldwork. To 
record observational data, the researcher used field notes. Broad descriptive categories were 
used as a framework of data recording (see an example of observation records in Appendix 3). 
Interviews 
This study used interviews to give narrative information (Grbich 1999) and explanations. 
Information from interviews provided the perspectives of respondents. In order to generate 
appropriate data from people who were involved in the policy, this study used the purposive 
sampling technique (Silverman 2001). Key informants were selected from two groups, actors at 
the national level and the provincial level. The sampling of key informants at the provincial 
level was bounded in a province, Saraburi. The typical case sampling (Green and Thorogood 
2004) was used in selecting Saraburi to gain the information-rich case for in-depth study and 
Saraburi was selected for three reasons: both private and public providers in the province joined 
the program, the province faced budget constraint and requested extra money from the 
Contingency Fund, and data and health personnel were accessible. As there were 13 district- 
health services provided by two provider networks, two districts were selected with convenience 
from the districts which had providers in the Saraburi Hospital networks, and two districts from 
the districts which had providers in the Phabudhabaht Hospital networks. 
For interview, the study started by selecting the visible actors who represented various groups 
involved in the policy process and followed on by using the 'snowball' sampling technique. 
New interviewees were included in the sampling until nothing new was being generated or the 
information came to the point called `saturation' (Green and Thorogood 2004). However, 
access to interviewees was not always easy. Despite the researcher using an institution's letter 
to introduce her position, a few key informants refused to be interviewed. Finally, the sampling 
stopped when the time ran out. Nevertheless, 47 out of 53 approached informants were 
interviewed: 23 at the national level and 24 at the provincial level (with 2 refusals and 4 no 
responses). Lists of interviewees are given in Appendix 4. 
The interview structure was a guided open-ended checklist of questions. The topic guide for 
interviews was developed from the research questions. It was improved iteratively all the time 
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it was used as the new answers created the new questions. However, the guide became stable 
after second or third times it was used with the same category of the key informants. 
Face-to-face interviews were performed at respondents' offices, taking about 40 minutes. Tape 
recording was used with permission. Information from different perspectives helped triangulate 
the data. Interviews were transcribed and some were followed up with a second face-to-face 
interview. This served to verify the information. 
Text analysis 
There are many approaches to textual investigations of different types of documents. 
Publication, records, minutes and official proceedings were relevant to the way organisations 
account for their activities. Public opinion polls were relevant to how the public support the 
policy. This study treated these texts as description, telling the story of what had happened. 
Two main sources of minutes and official proceeding were the Bureau of Health Policy and 
Planning and the Office of Health Care Reform which acted as secretary office of the UC policy 
in 2001-2. Other documents were from key informants and related organisations. 
For text analysis, inductive approach is useful for analysing complex data and massive 
documents through the development of summary themes or categories from the raw data 
(Thomas 2003). The categories or themes in this study were developed by both the research 
objectives (deductive) and multiple readings and interpretations of the raw data (inductive). The 
documents were read, analysed the linkage among them, and labelled for category by codes and 
short phrases of themes. Some categories were combined with other categories or splitted into 
several categories after revisions and refinements of category systems. Finally, report writing 
created 3-8 most important categories of findings in each issue or heading, and used detailed 
descriptions and quotations to illustrate the meaning of the categories developed. 
The other form of analysis used was media analysis. Content analysis was used to investigate 
the public's interest in UC. A set of categories (the health insurance and service is a sub- 
category of health sciences) was established and then the number of instances that fall into each 
category (Silverman 2001). Only one category, health insurance and services, was counted, for 
comparison to the total news items in the health sciences category. The number of health policy 
stories that appeared before and after the UC policy was launched was observed in 20 
newspapers IS during January 1999-December 2001, using the electronic database of the 
13 Lists of 20 newspapers included Bangkok post (Eng ), Banmuang, Dailinews, Khaosod, Krungthepthurakij, Loke- 
one-nee, Matichon, Naewnar, Phuchadkamraiwan, Phujadkardraisabda, Prachachard Thurakij, Saimratch, 
SiamThurakij, Telecom Journal, Thai Post, Thairatch, Thansethakij, The Nation (Eng), Wattajak, Wikroa-Bammuang 
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Matichon Newspaper Library. The results of quantitative analysis of the media are shown in 
Chapter 3. 
Focus group discussion 
Focus group discussion is useful to draw perceptions of individuals and communities. Focus 
group discussions were used to gain information from villagers because it allowed a view of the 
community and it saved time (Morgan 1997). Four focus groups were conducted in four 
tambons (sub-districts) with an average six persons per group. The study selected four tambons 
in four study districts to relate the story of the implementation of the `30 Baht Scheme' (as the 
UC policy was popularity known) in Saraburi. Potential differences between urban and rural 
areas were observed by selecting two tambons within municipalities and two tambons outside 
municipalities. Co-ordinators at health centres selected participants with two criteria: the 
participants had expressible opinions about the 30 Baht Scheme and were available on the 
appointment date. Four main points of key informants' perceptions were investigated during 
the discussions: 
1. Who gained and who lost from the 30 Baht Scheme, 
2. Participation and communication, 
3. Enrolment, and 
4. Service delivery system. 
The discussions took about an hour, and were all recorded with permission. A research assistant 
took notes, and transcribed the conversations. 
2.3.4 Data collection at National level 
The national level study included key informants from: 
" MOPH: the Health Care Reform Office, the health Insurance Office, the Health Systems 
Research Institute, senior officers of the Permanent Secretary's Office, the Deputy 
Permanent Secretary, the Deputy Minister of MOPH, 
" An academic from Narasuan University (little involvement from other universities), 
" NGO representative, 
" Political parties, 
" Three informants were not interviewed: Private Hospital Association, Rural Doctor Society, 
Provincial Hospital Association 
2.3.5 Data collection at provincial level 
At provincial level, Saraburi was selected as a study case. Key informants were from Provincial 
Health Offices, Provincial Hospital, private hospitals, public hospitals, District Health Office, 
and Health Centre. 
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Documents examined at provincial level included plans, minutes, guidelines, budget allocation 
plan, financial reports, law and regulation documents etc. Local newspapers were not included 
in the study because they were not archived. 
2.3.6 Scope of the study 
This study looks at the UC policy process in 3 stages, at agenda setting, policy formulation, and 
implementation. For the agenda setting and policy formulation process, information was traced 
back before 2001, focussing discussion on the way supporters of reform in the MoPH interacted 
with the political party that became the government. For the implementation process, the study 
focussed on the precise changes that were introduced by UC at the national and provincial levels 
during January 2001 to September 2002 (fiscal year 2001-2002). The study design was initiated 
in 2001 and the fieldwork was carried out from November 2001 to September 2002. Data 
analysis and thesis writing started alongside the data collection and were completed in March 
2004. 
2.3.7 Limitations of the study 
Deciding to investigate a contemporary policy has many advantages as the event is fresh, the 
public climate is observable, and documents are still available. However, information on the 
outcomes is limited. Therefore, the study cannot fully explain the outcomes of the policy 
process. 
As this type of research requires iterative analysis alongside data collection, a researcher 
undertaking all the interviews and doing all observations can control internal validation, but this 
takes time and could be biased. Some informants were excluded because they did not respond 
to the invitation letters or first follow-up calls. However, information about these informants 
was derived from other sources such as media, documents, and third persons. 
As this is mainly a single researcher study, the position of the researcher can be a source of bias 
for both the informants and the researcher. The fact that the researcher is a research fellow at 
the International Health Policy Program, MOPH, which supported research and knowledge for 
this policy, meant some informants assumed the researcher was not objective, and felt 
uncomfortable about expressing their opinions. Some refused to give an interview, which may 
have been for this reason. 
As the time was limited, only one province was selected. Evidence from other studies show that 
there are variations between provinces; therefore, any generalizations from this one province 
must be made cautiously. 
Another limitation is language. It was difficult to explain a story that occurred in Thailand 
using the English language. The research had to be collected, recorded in Thai, and then 
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translated into English. It was also not always easy to make direct translations. To avoid 
distortion, this thesis, in chapters three to seven, starts by telling the stories before jumping to 
the analysis. 
2.3.8 Reliability and validity assurance 
Comparing perspectives of key informants from interviews or different methods is a useful way 
of triangulation. This study used multiple methods, and sent data back to some respondents to 
validate the finding. As a single researcher, a uniform approach in collecting qualitative data 
was assumed, ensuring higher reliability and more internally valid cross-comparisons of data. 
The limitation of the single analyst is individual bias, which was tested by getting critical 
comments on data analysis throughout the study, from key policy-makers and academics in 
Thailand. Furthermore, the interim conclusion was presented to a support group to reveal 
unjustified assumptions. 
2.4 Chapter summary 
The main question this thesis asks is: how did the UC policy get onto the political agenda, and 
how was it formulated and implemented? To answer this question, a framework has been 
elaborated after a literature review of different policy approaches. As policy is complex, the 
framework chosen to organise the knowledge has been simplified, to include four interrelated 
elements: content, context, actors, and process (Walt and Gilson 1994). Literature suggests that 
policy is an interactive process including broad causes of interaction of several actors. The 
extent to which actors outside of the government are involved in the policy-making process 
depends on the political context which determines the distribution of power in policy-making. 
At different stages, different actors and different contexts are important in shaping policy. The 
policy characteristic and the strategies to execute the policy are important to the success of the 
policy. To understand the UC policy, and assess whether it is going to be sustained, needs 
exploration of all elements: content, actors, context, and process. 
In order to explain the phenomenon well, qualitative methodology was used. Qualitative 
methods used in this study included four main methods of data collection: observation, 
interview, text analysis, and focus group discussion. 
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Chapter 3- Agenda Setting Process 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the agenda setting process, aiming to answer how and why the UC 
policy became a priority on the government agenda. It also involves the policy formulation 
process before the government came to power. It begins with narration of the events in the Thai 
Rak Thai Party (TRTP), starting with the origin of the Party's health policy before its slogan 
became: `30 Baht treats all diseases'. The following sections explore the parallel role of 
bureaucrats and civil groups in promoting universal coverage. 
Two points in the policy officially declared in February 2001 (see Chapter 1) were different 
from the TRTP's first policy announced in March 2000. Firstly, the source of finance was 
changed so that general tax revenues replaced a 100 Baht monthly contribution that had been 
suggested in 2000. The scheme's financial input will therefore depend on the government 
budget. This avoided public reaction to the payment and gained popularity by prompt 
implementation; however, the cost was concentrated on bureaucrats, who were resistant to 
change. Secondly, the `30 Baht treats all diseases' policy came under the MoPH, while the 
policy in 2000 had intended to establish a National Health Security Office under the National 
Health Security Act to manage the national scheme, aiming to create collaboration between 
several ministries and split purchaser from providers. The scheme which was put forward in 
2001 had limited participation at the initial stage, and expanded to involve public hospitals in 
other ministries and private providers in the subsequent stages. However, the MoPH was able 
to provide resources for immediate implementation, although this had implications for 
regulation, because the MoPH plays both purchaser and provider roles (Interview K5). 
The next section describes the agenda setting process in the TRTP and how UC became a TRTP 
issue, why the Party chose it for the election campaign, and why the content in the policy 
announced in February 2001 was different from the Party's first campaign. 
3.2 Agenda setting in the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRTP) 
The political agenda setting process was explained by a TRTP member interviewed in June 
2002, who subsequently became the Deputy Health Minister. It has to be traced back to the 
time that the TRTP was set up in July 1998. According to this key informant, the leader of the 
Party - Mr. Thaksin Shinnawatra - originally intended to establish a new political party to fight 
for popular policies. In order to do so, the Party's leader had met several people from many 
sectors including businessmen, well-respected village leaders, and civil organisations. 
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In addition, the Party set up a taskforce to monitor government performance in mid 1999. This 
taskforce used to meet every Thursday. Four members of the taskforce were designated to be a 
health team. All were medical doctors, two of whom were subsequently appointed as the 
advisor of the Health Minister and as Deputy Health Minister. The first was the President of the 
Thai Medical Council before joining the TRTP as the shadow Health Minister. This health 
team was responsible for evaluating the performance of the then current government on health 
and formulating a health policy for the TRTP's election campaign. The current Health Minister 
was not in the health team - her interest was in transport, as she had previously been a Deputy 
Transport and Communication Minister (1994). 
While seeking a core health policy, in a taskforce meeting the party leader raised the issue of the 
inefficient utilisation of public and private health resources. The leader mentioned the case of 
Phayao Province to demonstrate the inefficient use of private hospitals. He told the meeting 
that when he visited Phayao province, the public hospital was crowded whereas the private 
hospital nearby was empty of patients. He said that situations like this should not happen, and 
then suggested to the health team that they address the question of collaboration between public 
and private facilities in the health care system to make the most efficient use of resources. 
The health team at that time had discussed issues such as human resource development and the 
idea establishing the national health council, but these ideas were fragmented and would not be 
able to initiate system change. The desirable policy was explained by using a metaphor; the 
policy should be like a drop of water, able to make ripples. After several discussions, the group 
still could not come to a conclusion. In order to help decide the core policy, which would 
address the party leader's policy question, a team member personally contacted a health 
reformist, who was a Class 10 MoPH advisory officer 16. 
The first meeting between the member of the TRTP and the reformist was in 1999 (Interview 5, 
20). The reformist was asked what his vision for public health was. Two issues were raised. 
The first issue was about health promotion. However, the then government had made some 
progress on this - the Health Promotion Office was already established as a public organization; 
the draft of the Health Promotion Bill was, at that time, in parliament. Therefore, this issue was 
not perceived as fresh for the policy agenda of new political party. The second issue was the 
universal coverage of health care (UC). At that time, only 69% of Thai people were covered by 
the health insurance system. The TRTP member's perception at that moment about UC was 
that "it was a good policy" and it was in line with the 1997 Constitution. However, he did not 
see how UC policy could be a crucial tool to initiate the health system reform as a whole and 
16 Class 10 is the second top rank of Thai civil servant hierarchy. Class 10 civil servants include several positions 
such as Deputy Permanent Secretary, Director General, and Advisor of Permanent Secretary. 
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how this policy could promote collaboration between public and private providers. The TRTP 
member requested the reformist to prepare details of UC policy development to present to the 
party's leader in the near future. 
Indeed, the Party leader had met this reformist and other senior health experts in some other 
meetings months before but the issue of UC had never been discussed (Interview K5, K22). 
Additional to that meeting, the Thai-Rak-Thai health team sought other sources of information 
and consulted the Party's economic team, one of whom subsequently became the Minister of 
Finance. The question was how to implement UC if the TRTP selected this issue as party 
policy. The initial information (subsequently published as a small 24-pages booklet) from the 
reformist (Nitayarumphong 2000) did not define the details of the institutional arrangement and 
system management, i. e. provider payment methods and level of capitation rate. It just gave a 
crude assessment of the budget requirement being between 80-100 billion Baht. However, the 
experience of the capitation payment of the Social Security Scheme (SSS) convinced the TRTP 
health team that the UC could be achieved with an appropriate capitation rate. At that time, the 
TRTP health team was not convinced that the government budget could afford the UC scheme, 
until a member of the TRTP health team proposed the 100 Baht per month contribution (1,200 
Baht per year). Additionally, it was suggested a nominal fee (of around 20 Baht) would be 
collected at the point of service to prevent the unnecessary use of services. The decision to ask 
for a monthly contribution of 100 Baht was abandoned over a ten-month period however. 
In December 1999, the health reformist was invited to present his idea to the TRTP leader in a 
small group meeting. Participants were some members of the TRTP health and economic teams. 
At that meeting, the party leader raised many questions which suggested to participants that the 
party leader understood very well what the implications would be if UC was introduced, and 
what problems and obstacles the Party needed to be aware of (Interview K5, K20). At the end 
of the meeting, the Party leader accepted UC as a Party policy priority, and let the team proceed 
with the policy formulation. The party leader observed that the public might not understand the 
phrase "universal coverage of health care"; therefore, he suggested using the phrase `20 Baht 
treats all diseases'. Disagreement on the payment level led finally to acceptance of a 30 Baht 
payment, and the TRTP campaign promise of `30 Baht treats all diseases'. 
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UC was announced by the TRTP as part of the national agenda at the first convention of the 
TRTP, held at the Thammasart University gymnasium for about 10,000 members of the Party 
on 26 March 2000. The Party leader announced 11 national agenda priorities including the 
suspension of debt for farmers, changes in education, and health. The Party addressed "the new 
profile of the public health services" [Prick Chom Bongarn Satharanasuk] (see details in Box 
3.1) although the term 'UC' did not appear. The first booklet on health issues - `the wall to 
which the poor have their backs' [Gampaeng Ping Lung Khong Khon Jon] - was disseminated 
in the convention. It described the universal coverage policy including the 30 Baht payment per 
episode plus a 100 Baht monthly contribution, the provider payment system, the provision of 
hospitals, and the use of public and private facilities, for example. 
Box 3.1 Health Policies of the Thai Rak Thai Party announced on 26 March 2000 
1. To provide health insurance for 62 million people according to need and households contribute according to 
ability to pay. 
2. To provide choices for people to register with a health care provider from both public and private sectors. 
The health care provider will receive an adequate budget according to the number of registered population 
in order to shift the health services authorities back to the citizens. 
3. To provide quality hospitals with geographic accessibility. 
4. To support health Promotion in children, adolescence, adults, and elderly as national priorities. 
5. To provide disease prevention by health education and universal coverage of vaccination. 
6. To integrate medical strategy, social strategy, and moral strategy to reduce the number of AIDS patients. 
7. To set the national accident prevention plan to educate people, encourage private and public collaboration, 
and prevent and cope with accidents. 
8. To use all types of mass communication to increase health knowledge and health skills of people. 
Source: TRIP (2000). The new profile of the public health services 
This booklet was followed by a much shorter disseminated paper - `19 questions about the 
national health insurance policy' [Sib Kao Kamtham Kamtob Kam Pra Kan 
Sukkaparphearngchart 30 Baht Tor Krang Raksa Dai Took Rok] - launched in July 2000. After 
that, the party set up a taskforce chaired by a TRTP member who subsequently became the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to translate the Party's policies into tangible policies. The health 
policy draft was based on the first booklet. At this time in October 2000, the 100 Baht 
contribution was removed. The `19 questions' paper was reduced to `17 questions about the 
national health insurance policy'. 
According to a TRTP member (Interview in June 2001), the Party cut the direct contribution of 
100 Baht from the Party's policy paper just a few months before the election for two reasons. 
Firstly, they thought that premium collecting would be complicated. Secondly, they reviewed 
literature from several sources and estimated that the budget for UC need would not be higher 
than 100 billion Baht, and that would be affordable through the government budget. Although 
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he did not say explicitly, it may also be that the Party anticipated this would be unpopular. He 
suggested that some candidates for Member of Parliament expressed concern about the 
explanation of the 100 Baht contribution. 
Three main sources of information on what UC might cost led to a change of mind. The first, a 
technical report by Management Sciences for Health and the Health Systems Research Institute 
(HSRI), supported by the Asian Development Bank, suggested a capitation rate of 1,040 Baht to 
achieve UC (Donaldson, Pannarunothai, and Tangcharoensathien 1999). The second source 
was the budget of the first autonomous hospital, Ban Phaew hospital. This hospital became a 
public organisation in October 1999 and received a budget of 782 Baht per capita per year 
(Pitayarangsarit et al. 2000). The third source was the rate of the SSS of about 1,400 Baht per 
year (1,200 Baht of capitation and 200 Baht of additional payment adjusted for high cost care). 
From these rates, the health team was able to estimate a crude budget need for about 60 million 
people in the range of 62-84 billion Baht. While the total government budget for health in 1999 
was already 70 billion Baht (including budget for MoPH, CSMBS, and SSS), UC would be 
achieved with a small additional budget. Within the estimated budget range, the taskforce 
anticipated that the UC policy was affordable and feasible. This idea was similar to that of a 
group of researchers (Nitayarumphong and Pannarunothai 1998) studying the feasibility of 
achieving UC by adding additional budget. But, in view of the calculated budget change, 
system reforms would be required. 
However, public notification of the deletion of the contribution issue lagged behind the change 
in Party policy (Interview K16) because the party did not change its statement on its WebPages, 
(Interview K20) and newspaper information in January 2001 still included the 100 Baht 
contribution (Wattajak Newspaper 2001). 
On Election Day, 6 January 2001, the exit polls showed the possibility that the TRTP would win 
a majority of seats in parliament, providing political stability and unity. Thus, it was felt that 
UC was highly likely to be implemented. When media representatives asked the TRTP leader 
what issue the new government would push, the party leader said "the suspension of debtfor 
farmers' for three years, the village revolving loan fund of a million Baht each, the Citizen Bank, 
and the `30 Baht treats all diseases" policy. 
After the election, the health reformist suggested to the Party leader that it would be best to 
gradually move towards UC, starting in October 2001 with a few provinces. Implementation of 
UC would then take three years to achieve. However, at the first workday of the new Health 
Minister, on 19 February 2001, the Permanent Secretary announced that UC would start on 1 
April 2001 in six pilot provinces with political support. 
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In the week before 26 February 2001, the government policy declaration day, a group of staff in 
TRTP preparing for policy declaration reviewed literature documents including recent academic 
papers from the Health Systems Research Institute (Siamwalla 2001) and Narasuan University 
(Pannarunothai 2000b). The Party then had much more detail and the confidence to raise UC as 
a high priority for urgent implementation. In the policy declaration, UC was one of the nine 
high priority policies (see Box 1.1 in section 1.5). 
UC agenda setting can be summarized in four points. Firstly, the TRTP had a proactive process 
to formulate its health policy. The Party had consulted widely; not only meetings with one 
particular reformist, but also the Party leader had met other senior health experts. This process 
exposed the party to considerable information on health problems and critical health issues. 
Secondly, information about UC had long existed, and had been discussed. The health reformist 
and other academics had studied UC issues; there were several national studies available to 
support information for the Party decision. 
Thirdly, UC was picked up by TRTP because it had three dominant characteristics: legitimacy, 
congruency, and feasibility. Access to health care is stated in the Constitution as a right of Thai 
citizens; therefore, government saw UC as a legitimate move. UC was seen as a potential 
precursor to reform the health care system, and that was congruent with the Party's intention to 
reform the public services. Last but not least, the policy was seen as feasible under the existing 
government budget. The TRTP's economic team, which included the Minister of Finance, 
agreed with its feasibility and supported the idea. This is similar to the Hall model (1975) 
which suggests that when an issue is high in relation to three conditions - legitimacy, feasibility, 
and support - it is more likely to become an agenda item. 
Fourthly, the policy content was changed in order to push the policy along. The monthly 
contribution was removed because the contribution collecting system was not available and it 
would take time to communicate with individuals. The MoPH was used as the management 
body of the scheme as it had staff capacity, organization, and experience; therefore, a new 
system could start up within a few months. These changes had some benefits. Rapid 
implementation can avoid organized resistance (Cleaves 1980); therefore, choosing the MoPH 
would ensure execution could proceed quickly. However, the rapid implementation might 
cause difficulties. Insufficient work on technical financing issues meant that there was over- 
optimism regarding the ability of the government budget to meet the costs of UC. While radical 
reform to amalgamate several schemes lagged behind the extension of health insurance 
coverage, the initial UC budget would be higher than the expected budget. Insufficient work on 
resource reallocation formula would delay the achievement of equitable resource allocation. 
These consequences will be discussed again under implementation in Chapter 5. 
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3.3 Floating the UC agenda amongst bureaucrats 
Protection against the risk of medical bills has long been a concern in Thailand, as had 
geographic barriers to health care access. Health centres at all tambons (sub-districts) had 
reduced problems of access, but health insurance coverage, while gradually increasing, still did 
not cover all Thais in 2000. Several public health insurance schemes had been established at 
different times to cover four major population groups: government employees, private sector 
employees, the poor and underprivileged, and the self-employed. Coverage rose to 69% of the 
population in 2000. Increased coverage of health insurance had led to UC being perceived as 
the next step to achieve a national health insurance. 
Health benefits for government employees have a long history. The government has paid for 
work-related injuries and illness as a fringe benefit for government employees since 1955 and 
this was extended to cover non-work related injuries and illness subsequently. In 1978 and 
1980, the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) was launched by Royal Decrees, 
paying medical bills for current civil servants, employees, pensioners and their dependents 
(Royal Decree for Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme. B. E. 2523.1980; Process to Propose a 
Bill by Electors Act 1999; Rojvanit 1993; Supachutikul 1996)). 
The idea of health insurance for private sector employees originated under the social security 
principle of the 1954 Social Security Act (Chantaravitul 1985). This Social Security Act was 
not implemented because of resistance from private insurance companies and enterprises 
including state enterprises. Chantaravitul (1985) discussed three reasons for this failure. First, 
the government did not undertake a situation analysis of the real need of workers on income 
security. Second, the first Social Security Act was too broad and did not define the workers' 
benefits. And lastly and most importantly, public communication of the value of social security 
was poor. In addition, there were inadequate health service facilities and personnel, and 
political instability (Tomornsak H, 1966 quoted in Supachutikul A, 1996). In spite of several 
attempts to implement the first Social Security Act, there was no decision from any government 
to start. The officials of the Labour Bureau and academics then shifted to an alternative, and 
successfully proposed the Workmen Compensation Fund in the second amendment of the 
Labour Law (1972). The Workmen Compensation Scheme (WCS) has been implemented since 
1973. This scheme collects moneys from employers to protect employees and pays medical bills 
for work-related injuries and illness, invalidity and death compensation, including cash benefit 
for sickness absences. The WCS coverage was gradually expanded from Bangkok to other 
provinces and finally covered the whole country by 1988 (Nitayarumphong 1993). Since the 
WCS does not cover non-work related illness, the Social Security Act was reconsidered after 
General Prem Tinsulanond came to power in 1980 and announced an explicit social security 
policy on May Day 1980 with support from the National Labour Union. The formulation 
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process was a long and political process until the Act was approved by parliament. Students, 
labour unions, and NGOs together pushed this act by sending letters to all political party leaders. 
The Social Security Scheme (SSS) was then implemented in 1991 under the 1990 Social 
Security Act. This scheme supplements the WCS by providing comprehensive health benefit 
coverage on the basis of a tripartite contribution. 
For people outside the formal working sector, fee exemption of health care for the poor came to 
be a major government policy for the first time in 1975, during the regime of Kuk-lit Pramote, 
and was administered by the MoPH. This scheme subsequently expanded coverage under the 
new name `Medical Welfare Scheme' (MWS) to cover the elderly, children, handicapped, 
veteran families, monks, religious fraternities, community leaders, and health volunteers 
(Nitayarumphong 2000). 
For the rest of the population, a community-financing project was established in 1983 and 
subsequently became the national voluntary health insurance project. At the beginning, the 
MoPH started this community-financing project as a pilot research project named `Mother and 
Child Health Development Fund' to promote community health care. This project was then 
rapidly expanded under the name of the `Health Card Project' to cover all districts in 1986 with 
government support, evidenced by the policy declaration on 27 August 1986 and also in the 
Sixth National Health Development Plan (1987-1991). In addition, the health card project was 
expected amongst academics, both in universities and the MoPH, to be expanded to achieve 
universal coverage (Boonyuen and Singhkaew 1986). However, the health card project did not 
continue expanding because of political instability and limited support from Permanent 
Secretaries in the MoPH. In addition, the project had community management problems and 
needed reform to improve the quality of management. After the pilot projects during 1984-1993, 
supported by the German Aid Agency, GTZ, the Health Card project was transformed into the 
Voluntary Health Card Scheme (VHCS) with an insurance basis at the national level, and 
gradually expanded coverage for the self-employed (Keeranund 1993). Since health insurance 
coverage had been increasing, UC was seen as a logical next step, provided a feasible policy 
could be designed. 
UC was discussed again in 1993. That year, the National Economics and Social Development 
Board (NESDB) together with the MoPH and the World Bank (WB) held a national workshop, 
`Health Financing in Thailand', in Petchaburi Province, Thailand. There were 47 participants, 
mostly Thais, from universities, the MoPH, the NESDB, the SSO, HSRI, Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI), the Private Hospital Association, and the Nation 
Newspaper. Five participants were from international organisations (see list of participants in 
Appendix 5). Universal coverage was discussed at the workshop but there was no consensus on 
how to achieve it. For example, one group in the workshop focused on the process of reform 
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with incremental changes within 12 years coordinated by the National Health Security 
Coordinating Body. Another group wanted to set the National Health Security Purchasing 
Cooperative as a single fund manager for a major reform. 
In January 1996, an international workshop on `Health Care Reform: At the Frontier of 
Research and Policy Decisions' was held in Nakornrajsima Province Thailand, supported by the 
Commission of the European Union (EU) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) through 
the MoPH in cooperation with HSRI. There were 52 participants including 23 Thai participants 
(see participant lists in Appendix 5). In that workshop, the paper `Thailand at the Crossroads: 
Challenges for Health Care Reform' (1996) discussed UC and raised the question of how to 
achieve it (Nitayarumphong and Pannarunothai 1997). In addition, the paper raised other 
aspects of the Thai health system, i. e. the health financing system and health delivery system, 
which needed to be reformed to achieve an equitable and efficient health system. This 
workshop highlighted the important contribution of research at all stages of the health care 
reform process and the necessity of involving civil society (Nitayarumphong 1997). 
On 15-17 March 1998, Thailand held another international workshop `Achieving Universal 
Coverage of Health Care: Experiences from Middle and Upper Income Countries' in Bangkok. 
This workshop was supported by the EU through the Thailand Health Care Reform Project, the 
MoPH in co-operation with the Institute of Tropical Medicine (Antwerp), the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), and Edinburgh University. There were 64 
participants, 31 from Thailand and 33 from other countries and international agencies (see the 
list of participants in Appendix 5). UC was discussed thoroughly in the workshop, but Thai 
participants were unable to reach a consensus on how to achieve universal coverage, with 
disagreements especially on the timing. 
The policy of achieving UC had thus been raised as an issue several times since 1996. The first 
draft of the National Health Security Act was from inside the MoPH, headed by the health 
reformist (the same person who met the TRTP member). This draft proceeded through the 
normal bureaucratic process and was submitted to the cabinet and consulted by several 
ministries, and then sent back to the MoPH for consideration. However, the MoPH officials, 
including the Permanent Secretary (PS) of the MoPH at that time, did not support the draft and 
delayed its consideration (Interview K5). In parallel, a second draft was presented via the 
parliamentary process by a health commission of which the reformist was a member. The 
health commission approved the draft, but did not actively push it for Parliamentary adoption 
(Jongudomsuk 2002), and Parliament was dissolved before the first draft returned to Parliament. 
The PS was reluctant to approve the draft because the administrative authority for the budget for 
health care would shift to an autonomous commission. The MoPH bureaucrats in the Health 
Insurance Office, who were responsible for reading the draft, also did not support the Bill 
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because they anticipated insecurity in their careers from the office transformation (Interview K5, 
K10). 
UC was floated again in the 1997 Constitution and the 8`h National Health Plan (1997-2001). 
The Constitution confirms the value of health care in Thai society, stating that health care is a 
right of Thai citizens. In addition, the 8`h Plan aimed to achieve UC; however, due to the 
economic crisis in 1997 and a lack of political support, there was no definite implementation 
plan in the MoPH. 
However, health-financing reform was still a major focus of attention amongst researchers in the 
MoPH. The Health Systems Research Institute (HSRI), an autonomous institution regulated by 
the Ministry of Health, collaborated with the Comptroller General's Department, Ministry of 
Finance to develop the method of provider payment in the Civil Servant Medical Benefit 
Scheme (CSMBS). The HSRI established a taskforce, including experts from universities and 
MoPH, to design the more desirable health financing system in Thailand and propose CSMBS 
reform. The HSRI intended that the CSMBS reform would be used as a pilot study for health 
financing reform of the whole health system with step-by-step changes. The CSMBS reform 
would start to develop the payment system using case-mix information (Diagnostic Related 
Groups weights - DRGs). The proposal for CSMBS reform was accepted by the Comptroller 
General's Department to test the new provider payment system in the fiscal year 2001. After 
finishing that proposal, the HSRI taskforce was re-appointed to design alternative models of the 
management system for achieving the universal coverage of health care. The HSRI released the 
proposal on Universal Coverage in March 2001 just after it had been declared policy by the new 
government. The process of that taskforce working facilitated understanding amongst experts 
and the details of the paper were helpful in the policy formulation process and implementation. 
For example, the paper suggested a set of concrete objectives for UC including equity, 
efficiency, choice, and good health. These objectives became guidelines for the current UC 
policy. The paper also discussed strengths and weaknesses of three alternatives to achieve UC: 
expansion of existing systems, a single system, and dual systems. It also suggested organisation 
and management arrangements including preparation plans for each alternative. 
3.4 Roles of civil society 
Interest groups changed their previous roles from external lobbying from the outside to being a 
part of the political process. NGOs and civil society groups were explicitly involved in the civil 
movement to support and propose the draft of the National Health Security Bill, while 
professional associations were not explicitly involved at this agenda setting stage (some 
members of the medical council were part of the TRTP agenda setting process). However, they 
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both were brought into the next stage of policy formulation as members of Health Commissions. 
The media had shown public interest in UC especially after the election. 
The 1997 Constitution motivated civil groups to participate in the policy agenda setting, as the 
Constitution enhanced Thai law to allow 50,000 electors to propose a Bill regarding citizen 
rights and role of state (Process to Propose a Bill by Electors Act 1999). A group of civil 
society networks led by Jon Ungphakorn, a leader of the NGO 'People Living with AIDS 
network', with the support of more than 50,000 people, proposed a draft of the National Health 
Security Bill with technical support of health reformists. Mr. Jon, who subsequently became a 
senator by election, brought up the idea of UC among NGOs after meeting with the health 
reformist in 2000 (who failed to push the draft bill by the bureaucratic process and disseminated 
the idea of UC in a small booklet). Eleven NGO networks formed a united front to announce 
their intention to support UC in October 2000 in the campaign named `Klong karn ronnarong 
pur luk pra gun sukkhaparb tuanna' [Campaign Project for Universal Coverage] (NanUdon 
2002). They were: consumer networks, children protection networks, handicap networks, 
People Living with AIDS network, labour network, elderly network, women network, 
alternative agriculture network, Southern Village Bank network, the Urban Community Welfare 
Fund, and the poor network. Their standpoints were equitable benefits for all groups of 
population, increasing people's participation in health management, and consumer protection. 
Their draft was submitted to the president of parliament in March 2001. While the parliament 
was auditing the list of 50,000 supporters, the government had completed its draft Bill. In 
November 2001, the government draft was submitted to parliament for consideration. Although 
the parliamentary process aborted the people's draft, five members of the NGO network were 
designated as members of the parliament commission for the National Health Security Bill of 
the House of Representatives, and three members to the Senate. The TRTP government 
facilitated and supported the Bill until the National Health Security Act was launched on 18 
November 2002; just a year after the Bill was submitted to parliament. 
Investigated in the Matichon Library Database, news items from 20 newspapers in Thailand 
over the period 1999-2001 illustrate how public interest in health and health insurance changed. 
The number of news items per year just related to health insurance increased from 42 and 53 in 
1999 and 2000, to 433 in 2001. This was a dramatic increase when compared to the total 
number of news items under Medical Science & Public Health of which the number of news 
items were 893,912, and 1,203 respectively. From January 2001, health insurance received a 
great deal of coverage and public interest, which peaked in March 2001 and remained at a high 
level. Interest in UC was clearly visible in October 2000 when NGOs (led by Mr. Jon and 
consumer groups) declared their support. Many public opinion surveys after government came 
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to power confirmed the policy's popularity (SuanDusit Polls 2001a; SuanDusit Polls 2001b; 
SuanDusit Polls 2001c). 
In sum, UC had long been discussed in Thailand before the TRTP selected it as its priority. 
Although it was part of the 8`h National Development Plan (1997-2001), it had not met political 
support and had been obstructed by the downturn in the economic situation. MoPH officers 
played both `bureaucratic' roles and `reformist' roles. The reformists were policy entrepreneurs, 
advocating UC through MoPH functions, social movements, and political processes. 
Bureaucratic roles were conservative, and led to stalemate in change. While democratization 
opened opportunities for people to participate in the policy process, reformists supported 
information for civil movement to raise the UC issue in the public's interest. Civil groups 
played pivotal roles in proposing a law in line with the TRTP's UC policy and subsequently 
integrated themselves in the political process to support UC as members of Health Commissions 
with the support of senators. These several factors facilitated the conditions for the UC issue 
becoming part of the government's agenda. The next section discusses factors influencing in 
the agenda setting process, explained by a framework of four elements: content, context, actors 
and process. 
3.5 Factors influencing the agenda setting process: content, context, 
actors, and process 
The characteristics of UC - legitimacy, feasibility, and congruence with the political party's 
policy - were important factors in its reaching the political agenda. Using the policy triangle 
framework, we can explain this by looking at four interrelated elements: content, context, actors, 
and process. 
3.5.1 Policy content: legitimacy, radical, and popular 
The content of UC reflects existing health problems, society's values, and government ideology. 
This policy was justified as it responded to problems in health care access, which were 
mentioned in Chapter One. These problems were suppressed under bureaucracy. It is clear that 
the trigger, which served to bring the problems to the attention of the TRTP, was the economic 
crisis which emphasised the suffering of people caused by medical expense. UC is in line with 
Thais' value that `Health is a human right', which is in the 1997 Constitution. Therefore, the 
policy is supported by Thai people and consequently has political support. With the people's 
support, UC policy was able to bring about radical change in the Thai health system. 
UC resulted in radical changes. Two major system changes resulted from the 2001 UC policy. 
Firstly, it extended health access eligibility to all Thais, with a tax-financed system in effect 
from April 2001, and consequently public hospitals received a controlled per-capita budget. 
Secondly, it increased participation, equity, and efficiency in health financing administration 
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through a structural change - the establishment of a single national body, the National Health 
Security Office, which will enforce the system three years after the National Health Security 
Act was launched (November 2002). It should be noted that UC did not affect the physician 
payment system. 
The UC content was dominated by the TRTP favouring popularity. The UC concept suggested 
by reformists originated in principles of equity and solidarity, i. e. protecting all households but 
with households paying according to ability to pay. It was accepted that the benefit is 
distributed to all beneficiaries, but that those who could pay should bear the cost. While the 
government agreed that all Thais, regardless of economic status, were entitled as beneficiaries, it 
did not dare to collect money from households. Its decision was both political and technical. 
Firstly, government could start the implementation immediately and argue that the government 
budget would be enough to finance the scheme, thus gaining popularity. Secondly, it was not 
clear how the monthly contribution would be collected, and the Party had evidence from many 
sources that the cost could be met from general taxation. Initially, the TRTP's health team 
expected to take advantage of the health reform by amalgamating the administration of two 
other schemes, Social Security Scheme and Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme, into the 
National Health Security Scheme. UC would then have been achieved with a small additional 
budget. However, the amalgamation was difficult in reality. It is clear that the TRTP 
dominated the agenda and also the content. This differs to Kingdon's suggestion (1995: 4) that 
presidents can dominate the policy agenda but they have much less control over the alternatives 
that members of Congress consider. 
Monthly contribution was likely to be contested as the costs would have been borne by a large 
group of the population, and this dispersion of costs is an indication that the policy would 
generate reaction in the public arena (Grindle and Thomas 1991). In citizens' favour, 
government chose to burden the government budget, where the cost concentrated on public 
hospitals so that government was able to limit the budget. This was likely to create reaction in 
the bureaucratic arena. However, the government immediately created visible benefits resulting 
in public support, which was the countervailing force to opposition arising among the 
bureaucrats. 
It can be concluded that UC was chosen because it was expected to be a popular, vote-winning 
policy. 
3.5.2 Policy context 
Several contextual factors affected UC agenda setting. Structural and cultural factors played a 
part but the situational factors were more crucial to create changes. The situational factors 
included the general election and economic crisis. The general election created political space 
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for change. At that time, Thai people demanded a new government as they had suffered from 
the economic recession. After the economic crisis in 1997, many government measures helped 
big business to recover. Rural farmers who also were affected from the economic recession felt 
that government should help rural people too. They protested increasingly during the then 
government. The TRTP offered many policies to relieve the poor (e. g. suspension of debt for 
farmers and village revolving loan fund) which gained support from rural people (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 2001b). Political change opens a window of opportunity for any new policy 
including reforms (Gilson et al. 2003), and in this case, UC was picked up. 
3.5.3 Policy actors 
There were a small number of important actors involved in identifying and facilitating UC. 
They were the Prime Minister and his team, health reformists in the MoPH, research institutions, 
and NGOs. The Prime Minister was the agenda setter while others looked for and supported 
information for his decision. There was a close linkage between the TRTP doctors and their 
peers in the MoPH. They had attended the same schools and some used to work together in the 
same office. The reformists not only had close link with politicians, but they also had links with 
NGOs and civil groups. 
According to Kingdon (1995), the Prime Minister was a visible actor. His staff, health, 
reformists, and other researchers were hidden actors. The following sections summarize their 
characteristics and power in setting health policy. 
The Prime Minister 
Major reform policies in the Thai health sector had not been seriously addressed at the political 
level (Green 2000) until the Thaksin Regime came to power. Thaksin Shinawatra was a 
billionaire businessman from a near-monopoly in the telecommunications industry. He entered 
politics for the first time in 1994, and clearly, needed political power for commercial survival 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2001b). In 1998, he formed a new political party under the new 
constitution (1997) and reached his political dream in 2001 when 339 MPs (out of 500) from 
five out of seven parties voted for him to be the twenty-third prime minister of Thailand, with 
his party, the Thai Rak Thai Party [Thais love Thais], winning the majority of seats (248 seats) 
(Nelson 2001 b). Two main reasons Thaksin was chosen by the electorate in January 2001 were 
that the middle class assumed he would be competent to run the Thai economy amidst 
globalization, and his electoral campaign appealed to rural voters on a platform of measures to 
spread wealth and help local economies (Phongpaichit and Baker 2001b). Universal coverage 
or `cheap health care' was one among other popular policies - suspension of debt for farmers 
and village revolving loan fund. In contrast to other party leaders, he opened opportunities for 
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rural society to express its opinion and make its demands by simply asking what the rural 
people wanted and putting it on the platform. 
Thailand has transformed from absolute monarchy to democracy. The power in policy decision 
making has shifted from aristocrats, bureaucrats, and military soldiers to business-based 
politicians (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). The polity became pluralist. The election of 
Thaksin increased the business-based politician's power, but while his origin is from the 
metropolitan business elite, his platform also benefited provincial and small businesses and rural 
people who are the majority voters. 
Many observers have asked whether UC is such a popular policy that it will guarantee the Prime 
Minister's premiership, to the end of his term and extend it (Pongpaichit 2001; Siamwala 2001). 
Will it generate real long-term benefit to all people, especially rural people? This thesis will 
discuss this further when we explore the policy content and its implementation. 
Thaksin is rich and brought his entrepreneurial experience from business to lead the government. 
His rise led to a decline in the power of bureaucracy in health decision-making. To gain 
popularity, he suggested UC implementation as a priority which led to health system changes at 
the cost of bureaucrats in public hospitals and the MoPH's headquarters. This Prime Minister, 
therefore, appears to be a powerful change agent. 
Bureaucrats 
When professionals and bureaucrats are in unison, there is a less chance for major health reform. 
The Thai MoPH had long had the sole responsibility for writing acts and making decisions on 
public health. Its bureaucrats are dominated by medical doctors. UC, rational-based policy 
change was suppressed to maintain the bureaucrats' power over public health through the 
centralized hierarchical structure. 
However, a few reformist bureaucrats played autonomous roles in health service and financing 
research, and formed a strong body of national researchers who had long studied problems and 
alternatives in the health sector. They had close relationships and strong capacity. Many 
graduated from the same medical school and most of them were trained in health policy and 
financing, and had attended post-graduate universities abroad. In 2000, a number of researchers 
were commissioned by the Health Systems Research Institute (HSRI), an autonomous research 
institution under an executive board chaired by the Health Minister, to suggest alternatives to 
achieve UC. All alternatives suggested that UC would change the health financial structure and 
change the role of the MoPH in the control of the budget for health services. This role would be 
partially transferred to consumers' hands, administered under a board which reported directly to 
either the Health Minister or the Prime Minister. 
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One particular health reformist played a central role as a `policy entrepreneur' by pursuing UC 
for a long time and when he met the TRTP leader, he took advantage of the subsequent 
discussions to promote UC. 
The policy, which generates costs to bureaucrats, would be expected to face strong reaction in 
implementation (Grindle and Thomas, 1991); therefore, we may anticipate seeing resistance in 
UC implementation (see in the implementation chapter). UC policy reflected a decline in the 
power of the bureaucracy, not just because of the rise in business politicians' power but because 
of the greater participation of civil society organisations. 
Civil groups 
The 1997 Constitution has increased civilian power in policy decision-making. Firstly, state 
control over the appointment of the upper house was replaced by direct elections of Senators 
representing civil society. Many non-governmental organization representatives were elected as 
senators and voted in parliament for the public interest. Secondly, the constitution eliminates 
the bureaucracy's monopoly over public policy formulation in favour of public participation. 
Moreover, civilians are eligible to propose a law regarding human rights. Thirdly, it transfers 
the bureaucracy's role of election administration to an independent election commission. 
Visible voices for civil society in Thailand include non-government organizations (NGOs). 
The development of NGOs started in the 1970s. The prototype was Munnithi Burana 
Chonnabot Haeng Prathet Thai [the Thailand Rural Reconstruction Foundation] founded by Dr 
Puey Ungphakorn in 1969. The foundation stood for development which benefits the rural 
people (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). Over the 30 years of social and economic changes, and 
with networks of about 300 organizations, Thai NGOs have extended their interests to many 
aspects of social development including health, human rights, urban and rural development and 
politics (Thai Fund Foundation and Development Support Consortium 2003). 
In the UC case, voices in support came from a communication network of those interested in 
UC who received information from reformist bureaucrats, not from independent technocrats as 
in other social movements. 
3.5.4 Agenda setting process 
Kingdon (1995) suggests that the processes by which agenda setting items come into 
prominence are composed of three separate streams - problems, politics and policies - and it is 
only when these three streams come together that an issue has a high probability of reaching the 
top of the decision agenda (Kingdon 1995). 
As mentioned above, problems in health care access were well documented. Details on inequity 
in access to health care and inequity in health financing were available through a number of 
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different indicators. Some indicators were reported regularly by government institutions, for 
example, utilisation rates and patterns, and resource distribution (National Statistic Office, 
several years). Some indicators were not found in the routine reports, but were available in ad 
hoc studies, for example, issues about catastrophic illness payments (Sujariyakul and 
Chongsuwiwatwong 1999). However, it appears that regular reports played little role in shaping 
policy-makers' attitudes and position - they provided facts but did not suggest the need for 
change. However, academic studies and evaluations used primary or secondary data from these 
sources, and made recommendations for change. In this UC case, formal mechanisms did not 
play a key role, but the personal experience of the TRTP leader was one of the factors to bring 
attention to health service problems. Economic crisis led the problems of health care expense to 
become more severe. The TRTP actively went out to meet people at the grass roots to find out 
their concerns about health and then discussed these with health specialists. Therefore, the 
Party knew there was support for its UC policy. 
The political stream considers the interests of participants. It is composed of a number of 
elements: national mood, organised political forces, government change, and consensus building. 
The legislative process of the present constitution was widely participative. The constitution 
enacted in 1997 caused the new election in 2001 and changed the election system in many 
aspects; for example, the duty for inspecting political parties has been transferred from the 
Ministry of Interior to an independent election commission, as described in Chapter One. This 
forced political parties to find new ways to gain votes. The TRTP is the first party that 
registered after the new constitution was enacted. The Party competed with popular policies. 
TRTP manifestos deal with the problems of poverty, and the universal coverage policy was in 
the public interest and a popular policy. 
The policy stream is where selection amongst problems and alternative policy solutions occurs. 
Policy-makers use a number of criteria to judge whether a policy should be on the agenda. The 
UC was picked up as it has technical feasibility and congruence with the existing values of the 
TRTP and Thai public (as stated in the 1997 Constitution). The criteria also included the 
anticipation of future constraints which some research had suggested beforehand, although the 
full extent of financial constraints only became apparent during implementation. Moreover, UC 
had public and political acceptability. 
The window of opportunity for all three streams coming together was the election of 2001, 
when the TRTP won a majority. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter describes the agenda setting process and answers how the UC issue reached the 
TRTP, why the Party chose it for its election campaign, and why the content in the policy 
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announced in February 2001 was different from the Party's first campaign. It also describes the 
discussion and research on UC in Thai society before and parallel to UC policy development in 
TRTP. Finally, it discusses factors influencing the agenda setting process of the UC policy. 
There were three key themes emerging from this study. Firstly, political support was important 
to form the issue into a political agenda. UC had long been discussed in Thailand but never 
received sufficient support to reach the political agenda. Two important sets of actors changed 
this: the new Prime Minister and bureaucrats who played the reformist roles. The general 
election provided the opportunity for them to come together. An influential factor that drew 
attention to UC was the Prime Minister's personal experience. Secondly, a situational factor, 
economic crisis was important as a focusing event emphasizing the problems of health care and 
brought the issue to get attention from policy makers. The TRTP was proactive and widely 
consultative, although the final decision was made by the Party leader. UC was picked up for 
three reasons: legitimacy, congruence with the Party's principles, and feasibility. Moreover, 
problems were apparent and solutions had already been developed; therefore, UC was ready to 
occur, just waiting for the political window and this window was opened by the TRTP. Thirdly, 
while UC was perceived as a good policy, some characteristics suggested that there would be 
difficulties in its implementation, especially among MoPH bureaucrats. 
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Chapter 4- Policy Formulation Process 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the policy formulation process after the election once UC had been 
agreed. It explores how the UC policy was formulated and how the decision-making process 
shaped the policy content. As mentioned in Chapter 3, UC created two main themes of policy 
change in different processes. The rapid extension of insurance coverage in 2001 was 
implemented under MoPH regulation, while the structural change of the national health 
financing institution was implemented under parliamentary process (between November 2001 
and November 2002). The timing of the latter process was outside the scope of this study (see 
Table 1.2 in Chapter 1 and section 2.3.6 in Chapter 2); therefore, the focus of this chapter is the 
decision-making with regard to the system design of the 30 Baht Scheme, to achieve universal 
coverage. 
This chapter identifies actors and their relationships in the processes which generated the 
features of the 30 Baht Scheme. In addition, this chapter investigates six design issues of the 
UC policy that had most consequence on the health financing system and service delivery 
system. 
4.2 Intent in policy 
The intent of the UC policy is the benchmark for policy formulation and implementation. This 
section describes the design and implementation plan of UC, once it had been adopted by the 
new government and policy elites in March 2001. 
Policy formulation developed through several communications amongst specific policy 
networks. In the initial period, the discussion of the policy design was amongst a small number 
of high-level civil servants, and elected officials. Since the formulation process overlapped with 
the implementation process, participation in decision-making expanded to cover other actors. 
Table 4.1 illustrates the increase of participation in UC decision-making. 
Proposed by the Permanent Secretary (PS) for Health, the 30 Baht Scheme was implemented 
earlier than the initial plan, which intended to start a trial in October 2001, (Interview K20) and 
the pace was accelerated by private hospitals, Regional Health Offices and local politicians 
(interview K5, K7, K16). The PS took a leading role in responding to the government policy, 
consulted his officials and suggested starting the first trial phase of six provinces in April 2001 - 
earlier than the Thai-Rak-Thai Party expectation. His reasons were that these provinces had 
experienced the health financing reform, had developed a registration system and built staff 
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capacities on financial management under the `Social Investment Project', financed by a World 
Bank loan during 1999-2001. While academics thought this was too rapid (Ammar Siamwalla 
in several newspapers), the media had reported a positive `strong response to the pilot 30 Baht 
plan' (Khwankhom 2001). Private hospitals were also interested in the plan in joining the 
second trial in June, in the hope of recovering their financial status. Regional Health Offices 
and local politicians urged that the program be launched nationwide in October 2001, rather 
than go for gradual expansion. They argued that people in all provinces had equitable rights to 
entry to the 30 Baht Scheme (Interview K7). Other health providers under the Ministry of 
Defence also responded positively to the UC policy (Kaow Sod Newspaper 2001a). In contrast, 
university hospitals in Bangkok and health facilities of the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
(BMA) delayed joining the plan. University hospitals anticipated the budget would be lower 
than their costs (Thairath Newspaper 2001). The Governor of Bangkok was reluctant to support 
the Health Ministry, saying that the UC policy was not clear (Kaow Sod Newspaper 2001b; 
Matichon Newspaper 2001a). The extension of health registration covered the whole country 
by April 2002, and that was before the legislation of the National Health Security Act 
(November 2002). 
Table 4.1 Participation in policy communications and decision-making of the 30 Baht Scheme 
design, January - May 2001 
Periods and frequency Participants and frequency of meeting Issues of meetings 
January-February 2001, Seven high level MoPH staff, chaired To design the model and the pace of the 
every week 
_by 
the Health Permanent Secretary implementation 
2-4 March 2001 60 MoPH officials To seek opinions on system design chaired by 
the Health Permanent Secretary and to 
prepare the design details for the national 
workshop 
March-May 2001, twice a About 30 MoPH's headquarters' Alternative formulation and discussion on UC 
month officials (this group subsequently designs for implementation 
included university hospitals and 
functioned as the operational 
committee chaired by the Deputy 
Health Minister - September 2001 to 
August 2002) 
17 and 22 March 2001 111 members from eight ministries, Consultation with various stakeholders and 
providers both in public and private making decisions on several details 
sectors, and representatives of 
consumers, chaired by the PM (on 17 
March) and by the Health Minister 
(on 22 March) 
March-May 2001, on Ten working groups from several To develop the operational guidelines for the 
average twice per group stakeholders including those policy implementation 
participated in the 17 March meeting 
ouumu- uoin scvcrai minutes or Morrus meeting and Mom's ottlcial letters 
* from (Taskforce of the implementation of the Universal Coverage of Health Care 2001) 
The next sections describe the policy intent including policy goals, the insurance system design, 
and the organisation and management design. 
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4.2.1 Policy goals 
"The goal of the Universal Coverage of Health Care policy is to equally entitle Thai 
citizens to quality health care according to their needs, regardless of their 
socio-economic status. "(Ministry of Public Health 2002a) 
The explicit objective of the UC policy is to expand health insurance coverage to protect all 
Thais from the burden of health care. Additional principles - equitable health care and 
sustainable health care - were adopted by policy elites in March 2001. Thus, UC policy has 
three main objectives (Jongudomsuk 2002): 
  universal coverage, 
  single standard in terms of benefits and care, and 
 a sustainable system. 
The sustainable system was defined in terms of financial, institutional and policy sustainability. 
For financial sustainability, the effective system addressed both allocative and technical 
efficiency as well as adequacy and stability of budget. For institutional sustainability, the 
system included personnel preparation, and to ensure sufficiency of the additional resources. 
Lastly, for policy sustainability, legislation was needed to ensure the stability of the policy. 
4.2.2 System design to achieve the goals 
The main characteristics of the new system were designed by the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRTP) 
and additional details were proposed by MoPH civil servants. The system design was the result 
of several discussions (see in Table 4.1). 
To achieve the first goal, universal access, additional budget was required. The government 
decided to allocate more funds from general tax revenue as a main source of finance to insure 
population outside the formal employment sector. 
To achieve the second goal, the equity aspect, the promotion of the use of primary care and a 
single system was proposed. The promotion of the use of primary care required an 
improvement of the quality of services at primary care units. This improvement would facilitate 
equal access to good quality services. The merging of existing insurance schemes would ensure 
equitable health care by leading to a single standard of the benefit and payment methods. 
To achieve the third goal, a sustainable system, dividing the roles between purchasers and 
providers, and the decentralisation of the fund management to the Area Purchaser Board, were 
proposed to increase accountability of providers. The process of the Area Purchaser Board 
would provide participation in the regulatory role. This would balance the power in the health 
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care system to encourage quality. Hospital accreditation would be used for quality assurance. 
In order to achieve financial sustainability, the closed-end provider payment method" and the 
contracting model's were chosen. This would allow private providers to compete in the system. 
To increase allocative efficiency, population based budgeting was chosen to replace historical 
based budgeting. All these mechanisms supplemented each other to achieve the policy and 
sustain the system (Jongudomsuk 2002). 
The expected characteristics of the system under the UC policy decided in March 2001 can be 
summarised as follows (Ministry of Public Health 2002a): 
1) general tax-based finance with a user fee of 30 Baht per episode, 
2) promotion of the use of primary care, 
3) a single standard benefit package and payment method by merging of existing health 
insurance funds, 
4) purchaser-provider split with a contract model, 
5) decentralisation of fund management to the provinces and administration by the area 
purchaser board, 
6) quality assurance by use of accreditation, 
7) a closed-end provider payment method, and 
8) private health providers collaboration. 
4.2.3 Organisation and management design 
Dual management of public health insurance was chosen, although some may argue that the 
single management system is more desirable. For example, a single system can reduce the 
difference between benefits and care in the three main schemes, and single management can 
reduce the duplication of registration and benefit claims. However, there was no consensus on a 
single management system. Therefore, the proposed management system was a dual 
management system with formal sector employees coming under a managed scheme, informal 
sector employees under another management scheme. This is shown in Figure 4.1. 
17 The closed-end provider payment method involves several payment methods, which have budget ceilings, for 
example, capitation and case-mix weight payment under a ceiling budget. 
18 The contracting model involves relationships between providers and fundholders, which are based on commitment 
to provide services with an agreement payment. 
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Figure 4.1 The proposed system under UC Policy during the transitional period 
Information Health Care 
........... data ........................... . 
System and Data .... - Accreditation 
Clearing House Institute 
Health insurance 
for formal sector 
employment 
National Health 
Security Board 
I 
......................... 
PMC main 
contractor 
Source: MoPH's Workforce on the Universal Coverage of Health Care Model (2001) and 
Jongudomsuk (2002) 
A policy-making body, the National Health Security Board (NHSB), would be constituted to 
steer the design of the UC program, giving policy directions to the main scheme managers and 
ensuring a single standard of health care for all Thais in the future. For the health insurance for 
the formal sector employees, the current agencies (the Social Security Office, Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare, and the General Comptroller's Department, Ministry of Finance) 
would still administered the SSS and CSMBS respectively. In the long run, the CSMBS would 
be incorporated in the SSS. The National Health Security Office (NHSO) would be established 
as the secretariat for the NHSB and perform all supportive and coordination tasks. This NHSO 
would also manage the 30 Baht Scheme to cover people outside the formal employment sector. 
The Area Purchaser Board (APB) would be constituted in provinces to play the purchaser role 
by contracting with providers. This APB would coordinate all funds from the three main 
schemes and send data back and forth to the new-established Information System and Data 
Clearinghouse. Then, data and information would be transferred to the NHSB and the Health 
Care Accreditation Institute. All providers should be accredited by the Accreditation Institute. 
In practice, the National Health Security Board could not be established before the 
implementation in 2001. Therefore, the MoPH took over the execution of the 30 Baht Scheme 
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and left the SSS and the CSMBS operating independently. While the Area Purchaser Board 
was being developed, the Provincial Health Offices were responsible for managing contracts 
with providers. Some of the decisions made were different from the content decided in March 
2001. The actual system design for the implementation in October 2001 and the organization 
and management in 2001 are illustrated in the next section. 
4.3 Policy formulation process of the 30 Baht Scheme 
This section includes the actual system features, actors and their interaction in the policy 
formulation process, and the contextual factors related to the policy formation. 
4.3.1 Actual system features 
Regarding the health service and financing system, Kutzin's framework (1998) suggests looking 
at three main elements of the health financing functions: 1) institutional arrangement including 
source of finance, allocation institutions and methods, provider payment mechanisms, and 
providers; 2) broad health system support function including quality assurance; and 3) benefit 
packages and rules of access to care. Table 4.2 compares the health financing system in 2002 to 
the system before reform. The main features of change are summarized as follows: 
1. Multiple fragmented schemes were grouped into three main schemes, namely the Civil Servant 
Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), the Social Security Scheme (SSS), and the National Health 
Security Scheme (the 30 Baht Scheme). The latter scheme merged the Medical Welfare Scheme 
(MWS) and the Voluntary Health Card Scheme (VHCS) into the new scheme and expanded to cover 
all uninsured, but was still administered under the MoPH. 
2. The National Health Security Scheme (the 30 Baht Scheme) was similar to the old MWS in terms of 
tax-based financing and benefit packages. The government subsidized the 30 Baht Scheme through 
the government budget allocated to the MoPH. The benefit packages included preventive care, 
health promotion, and curative care, which also included accidental injuries and high cost care. A 
big difference was that this benefit package excluded renal dialysis for end-stage renal disease 
patients and anti-retroviral drug treatment for HIV/AIDS patients, while the MWS did not clearly 
address these points. Anti-retroviral drugs and HIV/AIDS patient treatments were added into the 
benefit package in October 2002. 
3. The major change was the pattern of provider payment, which shifted from a historically based 
budget to a per capita budget contracting with primary care. The capitation included staff salary, 
resulting in some resource reallocation amongst MoPH providers between provinces. The per capita 
budget was for all care in the package except accidental care and high cost care that could be 
additionally reimbursed from the Health Insurance Office, MoPH. Two choices of provider payment 
were suggested for provinces. The first was inclusive capitation paying directly to contracting 
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primary care networks. The second was to separate the inpatient care budget from the capitation to 
allocate by diagnostic relative group weight (DRG weight). 
4. The 30 Baht Scheme introduced primary care units as gatekeepers and the primary care services were 
mainly provided by the MoPH public facilities. Private hospitals had a small share of the population. 
Table 4.2 Functional features of health financing system, Thailand, years 2000 and 2002 
Pre-reform After the introduction of the 30 Baht Scheme (as 
Year 2000 of Fiscal year 2002. Oct 2001 to Sep 2002) 
1. Policy goal/ Gradual expansion of insurance coverage 
objectives . To reduce national health expenditure, 
reduce financial burden from health care and 
financial barrier to access to health care 
" financing reform-more equitable resource 
allocation on demand side basis 
" To improve efficiency of the provider 
payment 
" To strengthen primary care and promote 
rima care as a gate keeper 
2. Insurance CSMBS 11 % 
coverage SSS 9% " Universal coverage 
MWS 37% 
" Incorporate MWS, VHCS beneficiaries and VHCS 12% 
uninsured covered by the "30-Baht Scheme" Uninsured 31% (including private insured) 80% 
" CSMBS and SSS similar to before reform 
3. Source of 
finance " Tax revenue subsidize CSMBS, SSS, MWS, " Tax revenue subsidize CSMBS, SSS, `30 
and VHCS with different rates per capita Baht Scheme' at different rates 
" Employer & employee contributions in SSS " Employer & employee contributions in SSS 
" Individuals pay partially in CSMBS, SSS, " Individuals pay partially in CSMBS, SSS, 
MWS, and VHCS for extra care out of '30 Baht Scheme' for extra care out of 
benefit package. VHC holders pay 500 Baht benefit package. 
per household. 
" Uninsured and private insured pay full of 
hospital charge. 
4. Core 
package " CSMBS: curative care including physical " The 30 Baht Scheme: Comprehensive 
check up and amenity services package: curative care plus personal/ family 
" SSS: curative care 
preventive & promotion services 
" MWS and VHCS: curative care and health 
" CSMBS and SSS similar to before 2001 
promotion & disease prevention 
reform 
5. Allocation Multiple systems Multiple systems 
to purchasers 1. Gov. subsidy at actual expenses for CSMBS 1. CSMBS and SSS similar to before 2001 reform 
i. e. budget through the MOF (average 1,780 Baht per capita) 2.30 Baht Scheme: Per capita budget (1,202 
from Central 2. Tri-party contribution -employer, employee, Baht/capita in year 2002) level to and Gov. - each 1% of salary of private employee 
provincial for SSS through the Ministry of Labour and 
level Welfare (average each contribution 476 Baht per 
capita) 
3. Per capita for MWS through MoPH (average 
280 Baht per capita) 
4. Community rate per household for VHCS 
through MoPH (Gov. subsidy 1,000 Baht per 
capita, households pay 500 Baht per household) 
6. Allocating Ministry of Finance-CSMBS Ministry of Finance-CSMBS 
institutions Ministry of Labour-SSS Ministry of Labour-SSS 
(Purchasers) MoPH managing MWS and VHCS MoPH-Health Insurance Office - 30 Baht 
Scheme 
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Pre-reform After the introduction of the 30 Baht Scheme (as 
(Year 2000) of Fiscal year 2002 - Oct 2001 to Sep 2002) 
7. Provider 
payment " CSMBS-fee for services reimbursement " CSMBS and SSS similar to 
before reform 
mechanisms " SSS-per capita payment " `30 Baht Scheme' has 2 options: 
1. Inclusive capitation for OP, PP and IP care, or 
" MWS and VHCS-per capita formula under 2. capitation for OP& PP, and DRG weight for IP 
global budget 
Health 
rat registration e " 
CSMBS- no registration, " CSMBS and SSS similar to before reform 
a PMC " SSS - registration at hospital, " `30 Baht Scheme': registration at a primary 
medical care network (a hospital and a 
" MWS and VHCS: registration at a primary primary care unit-PCU) and must report at 
care network (a hospital and a health centre) pCU first 
9. Providers: 
private " CSMBS-public providers (private providers " CSMBS and 
SSS similar to before reform, 
providers are eligible only for emergency case) " `30 Baht Scheme' All public providers are 
" SSS- public and private providers eligible and private providers are eligible as 
managed collaboration (limit quota of 
" HWS and VHCS-only MoPH providers registered population) 
10. Quality Hospital accreditation mechanism (HA) was All hospitals were supposed to pass HA within 
assurance bein developed September 2002. 
As seen from the above, many policy details were formulated. The policy features are 
characterised as complicated, highly technical issues. The questions arising are: how research 
was used in design, were there alternatives, why were these choices made, and who had power 
to decide and shape policy content? This chapter explores the policy formulation process to 
answer these questions. In order to do so, the next sections look at actors and how they 
influenced the policy content. 
4.3.2 Actors and their interactions in the policy formulation process 
This section looks at actors at macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level. The macro-level 
emphasises how the state and policy elites were important, and looks at the government 
structures of policy execution. At the meso-level, the characteristics of the policy networks and 
policy styles are discussed. At the micro-level, this chapter looks at particular examples of how 
decisions were made. 
4.3.2.1 Policy elites and steering structure 
As with other public policies in the Thaksin government, the government played an important 
role in execution of UC policy. Decision-makers manoeuvred and influenced the content, 
timing, and sequence of reform initiatives, and their behaviour was influenced by their 
perceptions, values, skills, and opportunities to gain information (Grindle and Thomas 1991). 
This section explores the characteristics of the important individual elites and describes how 
they used 'policy space' for policy manoeuvre. 
Policy elites are decision-makers who are `formally charged with making authoritative decisions 
in government' (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 19). The policy elites of UC policy included the 
elected politicians and top civil servants. Elected politicians included the Prime Minister, the 
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Health Minister and Deputy, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, 
the Minister of Commerce, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of University Affairs. The 
top civil servants included the Permanent Secretary of the MoPH, the Secretary General of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board, the Director General of the Comptroller 
General Department, and the Secretary General of the Civil Service Commission. More details 
of these actors' positions are discussed in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.1). 
Three important politicians were the PM, the Health Minister, and the Deputy Health Minister. 
The PM has been characterised as the agenda setter (see in Chapter 3). The Health Minister was 
more the policy ambassador, who acted in a public relations role promoting the work and policy 
of the MoPH, and the Deputy Health Minister can be characterised as the policy selector. He 
saw himself as a health expert and enjoyed choosing from alternative policy options. These 
elected politicians played their roles complementarily. The background of these elected 
politicians was business. They had skills and experience of management, and pro market 
economy values. Hence, they supported the collaboration of the private sector in the 30 Baht 
Scheme. However, the over-riding value according to the Party's commitment was to ensure 
citizens' entitlement to health care. This was evident in the rapid government response to the 
TRTP's policies. 
The top civil servants were also important in influencing decisions on timing and sequence of 
the reform as mentioned earlier (section 4.2). It is clear that the Permanent Secretary (PS), with 
his decisive and authoritative manner, took a strong leadership role and pushed the 30 Baht 
Scheme in 2001. Given his short term (9 months), he might have desired to `make his mark' 
before he retired(Kingdon 1995). A subsequent change of PS changed the position of the 
MoPH civil servants, and led to a slowdown in financing reform. 
It is clear from above that state and policy elites took dominant roles in the formulation of the 
UC policy. However, the policy elites sought for information and consultation to help them 
make better decisions. To gain information and promote direct participation, several 
committees were established. The most important included the MoPH Operational Centre 
Committees, the Executive Committee, and the National Policy Committee. Moreover, several 
taskforces were appointed, which were important in shaping the policy design. The members of 
each taskforce included representatives from stakeholders related to each issue. 
The relationship of these organizations is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Within the MoPH, the 30 
Baht Scheme mainly involved five offices under the Permanent Secretary, including the Health 
Insurance Office, the Bureau of Health Policy and Planning, the Bureau of Health Care Network 
Development, the Inspector General Office and the Bureau of Health Registration. The other 
two technical supportive offices were the Health Care Reform Office (an EU-supported research 
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program) and the Health Systems Research Institute (an independent research funding 
institution). 
Figure 4.2 Organisations involved in the policy formulation and implementation process of the 
UC policy in fiscal year 2002 
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Individual actors in the committees divided into five main groups. including the PM and his 
staff, bureaucrats, academics, health professionals, and consumers. The elected officials and 
top-level civil servants can be grouped as policy elites. Bureaucrats were civil servants from 
several ministries. Academics and some health professionals can be grouped into the research 
communities, and other actors outside government sectors can be grouped as interest groups. 
Bureaucrats included high-level and middle-level civil servants. In the MoPH, bureaucrats also 
can be divided into administrators and providers, some of whom were reform supporters while 
others were change resisters. 
A comparison of the components of the Operational Committee, the Executive Committee and 
the National Policy Committee is shown in Table 4.3. The members of the Operational Centre 
Committee included most of the MoPH civil servants in the central MoPH's offices. In addition 
to the MoPH officials, the Executive Committee included the PM's staff, other ministry officials, 
insurance scheme holders, technical groups, health providers, and consumer groups. The 
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National Policy Committee was composed of the ministers and other mcmbcrs from the 
organisations in the Executive Committee and included the ministers who dealt with legislation 
and government budget allocation. 
Table 4.3 Actors involved in committees of the Universal Coverage of I Icalth Care Policy 
Groups Operation Centre Committee Executive Committee Natutul Poli y Comm*nce 
(33 members) (32 members) (32 members) 
Frequency of Every weeks from September Sleeting once in June 2002 Fine meeting in January 2%)02 
meeting 2001 to April 2002 and twice a ýcconJ meeting in March 2002 
month from May 2002 to Third meeting in May 2002 
August 2002 
Chairman Deputy Minister of Public Minister of Public 11ealth Prune Minister 
lealth 
Secretariat Dr. Sanguan Nitayarumphong Dr. Sanguan Nitayatumphong 71hc Permanent Secretary of 
! `foPIt MoPll the Minire of Public Health 
Prime n official of the Secretanat )cputy Prime Neuaster 
Minister's Offne of the Prime Minister linisterof the Pctmo Minister 
staff Office and an official 
tinister ofiu%tice 
rho Sarrtsry General of the 
Council of State of Thailand 
The Secretary General or the 
National Eccutunnic and S. tcisl 
Development RaW 
W Director of the Itwcau of 
die Budget 
Atop)l: policy tinistcr of Public I tealth ty Minister of Public tuüctef of Public IIalth 
makers, (Advisor of the committee) I lealth Icpwy AMimucr of Public 
managers, The Permanent Secretary of the 'rorcssor Arun Phaorwwasihe I lealth 
and providers ministry of Public I lealth minister's advisor 'tofctww Anºn Phao. awas 
is Director Generals of The Permanent Secretary of the suicºate Profe nr Chusak 
Departments Ministry of Public I Icalth Sirinil 
ix Deputy Permanent and staff 
Secretaries Two Deputy Permanent 
Two health Supervisors Secretaries 
The Director of the Health The Director of the I lealth 
Policy and Planning Bureau Insurance 001ce 
The Director of the I lealth 
Insurance Office 
The Director of the office of the 
I lalth Provider Network 
Development 
Other the Director General of 1 imstcr of I" mance 
bureaucrats comptroller General's Permanent Secretary of the 
(other Department Ministry of ifinance 
insurance The Director General of the lintºtet of Commerce 
scheme Insurance Department linister or Liebem and Social 
holders) The Secretary Genual of the Welfare 
Social Security Office 
Academic The Director of the I Icalth he Director of the I Icalth 
group Systems Research Institute Systems Research Insittutc 
and staff 'rofcs Prawasc Warr 
Professor Prawasc Wase 'rorctux AmtnarSiamwala 
'rofcssor Arne Walayasaewc 'mfcssnr Charus Su sanasla 
'roressor Wichan Panich 
1r. Wutthipong Pongsuwan 
rofessor Ammar Siamwale 
rofe scor Charts Suwanwela 
I lalth The Director of the he Director of the Department ! tram of Umrcrsity Affair 
professionals autonomous hospital Bans of Local Adminisration (inistcr of Interior 
and providers Praew of three faculties of 'mident of the Private I lospital University hoe itals medicine Aswlatäm 
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Groups Operation Centre Committee 
(33 members) 
Executive Committee 
(32 members) 
National Policy Committee 
(32 members) 
Other non-MoPH public he Director of the Royal Thai Professor Phirom 
hospitals Army Medical Department Kamolratanakul 
Private hospitals The Deputy Governor of 
Bangkok (public health) 
The President of the Private 
Hospital Association 
Me President of the Local 
Administration Association 
The President of the Sub-district 
Administration Association 
Consumers The Secretary General of the he Secretary General of the 
and Consumer Protection Office of the Civil Service 
beneficiaries Foundation Commission 
The head of a campaign project The president of the Consumer 
to support the goal of the Protection Foundation 
universal coverage of health Senator John Ung-phakom 
care Senator Sophon Suphapong 
r. Phirot Ningsanon 
s. Saree On -somwan 
Source: (Ministry of Public Health 2001a), (National Policy Committee of the Universal 
Coverage of Health Care Policy 2001b), and (Office of the Prime Minister 2001) 
The important taskforces were the groups that were involved in the development of the 
implementation guidelines (Ministry of Public Health 2001b). They included ten technical 
taskforces which were informally established and gradually expanded participation. The issues 
they were responsible for were: 
1) benefit package and financial management, 
2) quality of health services, 
3) health registration system and information technology management, 
4) public relations and complaint receiving, 
5) provider relations and complaint receiving, 
6) health infrastructure and organisation reform, 
7) regulation, and purchasing system development, 
8) human resource development, 
9) knowledge building for system development, and 
10) drafting the Health Insurance Act and public hearing. 
After the establishment of the National Health Security Board, the Board (2003) also appointed 
seven technical taskforces to advise on these issues. 
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As seen from the above, the policy space had opened for the interplay of several actors, both 
inside and outside the government. They formed policy networks or communities. The next 
section will discuss the characteristics of the policy networks and the policy style. 
4.3.2.2 Policy networks and policy style 
Policy networks can be seen as a generic name for interaction between different groups, inside 
and/or outside government (Hill 1997; Marsh 1998), while issue networks involve loose 
relationships between members, and policy communities involve close relationships (Marsh 
1998). 
In the UC case, the government established several issue networks (as several working groups) 
and policy communities essentially. The issue networks typically had a large number of 
participants, fluctuating interaction and access for the various members, and were essentially for 
policy consultation. In contrast, the Operating Centre Committee (War Room) was 
characterised as a tightly knit policy community, involved regular meetings and negotiation and 
bargaining. However, participants were limited to managers and health professionals (health 
providers), and excluded academics and consumers. 
In looking at policy style, this thesis used Richardson's four-dimensional model to describe 
networks and dimensions made. Richardson suggests there are at least four policy styles: 1) 
plan and consult with the policy community, 2) fire-fighting, 3) planning and rationality, and 4) 
reacting to problems when necessary (see Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3 Policy style of the Universal Coverage of Health Care Policy during 2001-2002 
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The analysis of UC policy suggests that there were different policy styles at different stages of 
the process of policy formulation. For example, in the trial phase the policy elites (the 
Permanent Secretary with support by the Health Ministry) imposed implementation of the first 
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trial phase and reacted to problems. During that time, the policy elites planned for, and sought 
participation and consensus for, the nationwide implementation. They asked the Health 
Insurance Committees to seek agreement and appointed ten technical taskforces to design policy 
content. They tried to anticipate problems and plan beforehand. However, they had only six 
months for this period. When the nationwide implementation started, the decision-making 
approach turned from a "think-and-do" approach to a "do-and-correct" approach, according to 
one economist (Siamwalla 2002). In order to resolve emerging problems from the nationwide 
implementation, the MoPH established a decision-making body - the UC Operation Centre 
(Ministry of Public Health 2001a). This was referred to as the "War Room". The War Room, 
led by the Deputy Public Health Minister, acted as the fire-fighters within the MoPH, while 
another committee - the Executive Committee led by the Public Health Minister - coordinated 
other sectors including other ministries and private sectors (National Policy Committee of the 
Universal Coverage of Health Care Policy 2001b); (National Policy Committee of the Universal 
Coverage of Health Care Policy 2001a). Both committees worked under the guidance of the 
National Policy Committee led by the PM (Office of the Prime Minister 2001). 
Before nationwide implementation (October 2001), the UC policy style was plan-and-consult 
(in quadrant 1). It became fire-fighting (in quadrant 2) after the nationwide implementation (see 
Figure 4.3) as operational problems arose and the War Room had to resolve problems every 
week. It could be anticipated that the implementation in the fiscal year 2003 would be more in 
the style of planning and seeking consensus again, as the seven technical committees had been 
appointed to give technical advice to the National Policy Committee (National Policy 
Committee of the Universal Coverage of Health Care Policy 2001c). In fact, subsequent 
Permanent Secretaries (fiscal years 2002 and 2003) did not move the reform forwards. 
Therefore, they did not take into account the technical committees' advice. The MoPH 
successfully defended to retain the independent execution of the 30 Baht Scheme during 2003- 
2005 according to the National Health Security Act (2002). 
In sum, the policy style of the UC policy was dynamic, and varied at different stages. Policy 
elites played a dominant role in decision-making, but could not always impose their decisions. 
Policy content was also shaped by other actors, for example, policy communities and 
bureaucrats. This will be illustrated by the interaction amongst actors in the next section. 
4.3.2.3 Actors and potential power in influencing decision-making 
This section moves to micro-level analysis of how decisions were made. It investigates six 
issues which had the greatest effect on the financial and service delivery systems. The issues 
relating to the finance system were: 1) source of finance, 2) budget requirement for the program, 
3) allocation methods to provinces, and 4) provider payment methods. The other two issues 
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related to service delivery system were: 5) primary health care as a gatekeeper, and 6) private 
provider collaboration. Each of these is considered separately below. Each part of the policy 
had a different set of stakeholders, and they differed over-time. From this analysis it is 
suggested that there were four main factors that influenced the process: rational problem solving, 
impact on civil servants and bureaucrats, political stability and support, and external factors 
which included international influences. They are weighted to evaluate which factors were 
highly influential in decision-making. 
Source of finance 
Debates over the issue of whether the UC scheme should be financed mainly through general 
tax revenue occurred around three arguments. Firstly, would the government be able to afford 
UC? Secondly, if the program needed direct contribution, how would money be collected from 
self-employed households? Thirdly, would the government subsidise the rich more than the 
poor? 
Until 2001, Thailand had used a mixed financing system; contributions for employees in formal 
sectors and general tax for a welfare scheme for the poor. The 30 Baht Scheme extended the 
tax-finance scheme to cover all populations outside formal sector employment. 
Initially, the Thai-Rak-Thai Party stated that "households would be responsible for health 
expenses according to their ability to pay". It had indicated a flat rate contribution of 100 Baht 
per month per capita and patients would pay a user fee of 30 Baht at the point of service (Thai- 
Rak-Thai Party 2000). The amount of the contribution was more or less similar to the cost of 
the Social Security Scheme, which was about 1,400 Baht per capita per year, but the money was 
deducted as a percentage of salary at the point of payment, while the money collection from 
people outside formal sector employment was problematic. 
The Party decided to delete the flat rate contribution of 100 Baht per month per insured just a 
few months before the election following internal discussion within the Party, as mentioned in 
the Chapter 3. The reasons were that the collection of contributions was problematic and the 
contribution might be unacceptable to the public (Interview K20). The election campaign then 
became the "30 Baht treats all diseases" campaign, with the new UC scheme to be mostly 
financed by general tax revenue. 
The different policy communities took different positions on the issue of the source of finance. 
The academic community viewed the contribution as a more sustainable source of finance, if the 
Scheme did not totally depend on the government budget. However, there was no good 
suggestion from this group as to how to collect the monthly contribution based on household 
ability to pay. Past experience showed that the attempt of the Medical Welfare Scheme to 
estimate household income from the large informal labour sector (about 80% of the population) 
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was not successful. In addition, the method of money collection from self-employed 
households was difficult to manage. The only way that the government was able to collect 
money from households was by tax revenue, either direct income tax or indirect tax such as 
value added tax (VAT) and excise tax. Other researchers disagreed with expanding insurance 
coverage by using tax, because the tax system in Thailand was regressive. Another argument 
was that the government would not be able to afford the scheme given the economic crisis. The 
Health Systems Research Institution suggested that given the scarcity of resources, other social 
investment, which gave indirect health benefits, should be invested in first (Interview K17). For 
example, some researchers argued that road safety would save more lives than health services. 
Perhaps because they had so many different views, they had little power to influence the policy. 
Bureaucrats' feared that the UC program with tax-finance would become a burden on the 
government budget because the estimated expenditure would increase from 48 billion Baht in 
fiscal year 2002 to 52 billion Baht in fiscal year 2003. Then the increased budget would lead to 
increasing the public debt, which was high at about 56% of Gross Domestic Product (Thairat 
Newspaper 2001). The Director of the Bureau of Budget suggested the scheme should charge 
patients for private hospital room and board, additional treatments and services extra to the 
benefit package, and that hospitals should use this revenue to supplement the increased demand 
on the budget (the hospitals already practised in this way). Although, the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget disagreed with the increased budget for the UC program, his concerns were 
overlooked, although the Bureau of the Budget still controlled the growth rate of the UC budget. 
Opposition politicians opposed the tax-financed system, which they called a "welfare system", 
because it would create a burden on the government budget. The Deputy Leader of the 
Democrat Party urged the government many times to review this decision. He requested the 
government to accept that there was not enough money to run the program, and to seek another 
source either through extra tax or household contributions (Democrat Party 2002a). Another 
issue the opposition raised was inequity - arguing this project would use the government budget 
to help the rich (Democrat Party 2002b). However, opposition politicians had little power in 
Parliament. 
Some members of the National Policy Committee were also concerned about creating a 
"welfare system", in which tax-financing subsidized all citizens. At one meeting of the National 
Health Policy Committee, a lively debate was observed. The PM suggested that the desirable 
model should not be a "welfare system", emphasising that the rich should pay more. To avoid 
the term "welfare system", the Deputy Health Minister suggested the words "social safety net" 
which guaranteed that everybody was able to access health care. A committee member 
criticised the committee over its problem with the definitions, saying that the rich should pay 
more than the poor even in a welfare system (National Policy Committee of the Universal 
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Coverage of Health Care Policy 2002). An interview respondent criticised the politicians 
saying that they did not clearly understand their policy, and the philosophy behind the issue. 
Therefore, they could not pitch a flag and communicate to all academics and implementers to 
serve their intention (Interview K17). The committee finally decided the program should be 
financed mainly by general tax revenue and sought ways for the rich to pay more. 
From focus group discussion, villagers agreed that the scheme using government tax should 
protect all, not only the poor. However, some villagers regretted that the rich might have more 
opportunities to use public resources than the poor. Nevertheless, people did not express an 
opposite voice and the polls looking at government performance showed that the public 
supported the policy (3,6,12, and 15 months) (Manager Newspaper 2002; SuanDusit Polls 
2001 a; SuanDusit Polls 2001 b; SuanDusit Polls 2001 c). 
In brief, the major policy determinant on the issue of source of finance was the concern with 
avoiding public opposition. Tax finance was chosen because there was no better alternative. 
Then minor amendments were made in response to the elites' suggestions, such as seeking ways 
for the rich to pay more. Academics did not have power to change government commitment to 
taxation because of a lack of alternative suggestions. At the same time, opposition parties were 
not strong enough to change the government's decision. 
Budget requirement for the program 
The government claimed that the national general tax revenue was enough to finance health 
services for all on the basis of several studies (see in Chapter 3). However, it needed to 
mobilise and merge sources from other insurance schemes in order to avoid duplicated 
registration and to increase efficiency. 
There was resistance to merging funds with existing insurance schemes, particularly the SSS 
and the CSMBS. For example, the Ministry of Labour, which holds the SSS, protected 
employees' money by arguing that the money was a direct contribution for specific purposes for 
employees, with support from the Labour Union. The Civil Servants Commission explicitly 
protested on behalf of civil servants, who wanted to avoid the 30 Baht Scheme because they 
expected a lower quality of service as a consequence of merging. The Department of Insurance, 
Ministry of Commerce also insisted on holding on to the Traffic Accident Victims Protection 
Fund. Finally, only the internal MoPH budget was merged. Money available in the MoPH was 
about 35,966 million Baht. Then the question was, how much was the budget requirement for 
the UC Scheme. 
Research proposed three estimations of the cost per capita. The first was based on the budget 
per capita calculated for the first autonomous hospital (Pitayarangsarit et al. 2000) plus the unit 
cost of health centres (Pitayarangsarit, Kantamara, and Tangcharoensathien 2001) with the rate 
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of 900 Baht. Then the overall budget would be 40,500 million Baht (900 Baht x 45 million 
people). At this rate the system would need very little extra money to implement the program. 
This figure was criticized, however, as too specific - arising from a special type of hospital. 
The second estimate was derived by the working group (Siamwalla 2001) commissioned by the 
HSRI, which adopted a figure of 1,500 Baht from a comprehensive study (Pannarunothai 
2000b). However, the figure suggested was said to be an overestimation of the utilisation which 
did not consider the reality of government fiscal constraints (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2002a). 
As a result, the MoPH set up a study group to calculate the cost and ended up with a cost of 
1,202 Baht (Tangcharoensathien 2001). This third estimation was accepted as a figure for the 
2002 fiscal year budget. Nonetheless, the methodology behind this figure was criticized for not 
using age/sex adjusted illness rates and for not considering the cost at teaching hospitals 
(Pannarunothai 2001). 
To seek acceptance, all stakeholders were invited to participate in a working group for the 2003 
cost calculation. The calculation used updated databases and ended up with a higher rate of 
1,414 Baht (Prakongsai et al. 2002). At this time, the MoPH decision-makers referred to 
another piece of research which stated that people using the 30 Baht Scheme had a lower 
compliance rate of 85%19 (Pannarunothai et al. 2002), so they reduced the per capita rate 15% to 
a rate of 1,303 Baht. The consequences were monitored and it is still unclear whether the 
system will be sustained without decreasing the quality of services and given the lower 
compliance rate of the UC cardholders. 
In the 2003 calculation workshops, different actors expressed their different positions and 
influenced the calculation as described below: 
  The Bureau of Budget wanted to control and cut the budget. 
  The MoPH had conflicts of interest, acting as both purchaser and provider roles. They 
wanted the budget high enough to run the services. 
" Private providers sought an opportunity to mobilise more money for private providers. 
  University hospitals wanted the higher rate because their costs were higher than other 
hospitals' cost. 
  Academics and researchers tried very hard to keep their concepts based on evidence, 
which were all different because of different assumptions. 
19 An 85% compliance rate means that 85% of patients who were 30 Baht cardholders were using the 30 Baht 
Scheme and 15% chose to pay from their own pocket. 
93 
CHAPTER4 - POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS 
In summary, the government could not merge all insurance funds as it had intended because of 
resistance from several potential losers. Secondly, different actors influenced the decisions 
based on their interests and positions. Thirdly, this case shows how uncertainty of technical 
evidence created debate in decision-making. 
Allocating resources to provinces 
As the campaign promised, the new government decided to move the budget allocation method 
from a health service base to a population-based allocation. This change turned the resource 
allocation method of the MoPH from a supply-side basis to a demand-side basis. As noted in 
the literature, the previous budget for public hospitals depended on the number of beds, 
personnel, and high technology equipment, rather than the population within the hospitals' 
responsibility (Krilas 2000; Lao-ratanasai 1995). Therefore, this budget payment reform was a 
radical change. While there were disagreements, the Ministry of Public Health decided to use 
the flat rate of budget per capita to allocate money to provinces in the fiscal year 2002 (Ministry 
of Public Health 2001b). Three questions were raised. First, was the flat rate allocation method 
the ultimate model or a transitional model? Second, would the rate in the first year include 
salaries or not? Third, should the allocation criteria for general hospitals and regional hospitals 
be different from the allocation for community hospitals? Actors influencing these issues were 
senior health officers, academics, operational health officers, Permanent Secretaries, the Deputy 
Health Minister, the Rural Doctor Society, and the Provincial Hospital Society. 
The first question regarded the concept of the flat rate allocation method. Using an egalitarian 
concept (Wagstaff 1993b), a technical working group proposed a model which adjusted 
capitation to the different health needs. However, policy-makers rejected the proposal and 
decided to use flat rate capitation for allocating the fiscal year 2002 budget for two reasons 
(interview K5). First, the initial model did not respond to the policy-makers' concern about the 
risk to providers due to the size of the population - the technical working group had considered 
only the risk to providers due to the burden of diseases. Secondly, after the model was adjusted 
for the population size, it was too complicated to explain to providers and the public within the 
short period before the implementation. But the failure to adjust the capitation budget resulted 
in a real lack of money in several provinces. Though it was rectified by the Contingency Fund2° 
(Ministry of Public Health 2002b), budget constraints pressured the MoPH to shift the budget 
allocation method back to the supply-side basis allocation a year later and to maintain the 
unequal distribution of resources. The flat rate model was definitely just a transition model. A 
20 The Contingency Fund was established in the face of concerns about budgets not being sufficient, personnel 
concerns about salaries and security, and lack of clarity as to what system each province would choose. This was the 
way of the MoPH re-assuring provinces, but also ensuring that UC implementation stayed on track, and was not 
diverted or slowed down. However, this fund was available only in 2002 and did not continue in 2003. 
94 
CHAPTER4 - POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS 
working group proposed a new formula once for the 2003 fiscal year budget, but because of 
political pressure from bureaucrats (in big hospitals) to protect staff salaries, the new adjusted 
formula was not reconsidered. 
The second argument regarded the inclusion of salary in the 30 Baht Scheme budget. Senior 
health officers anticipated that the per capita budget which included salary would worry health 
professionals and health workers at health facilities. There were attempts to exclude salary from 
the program budget and let health civil servants enjoy permanent salaries. An alternative was 
that the program would reallocate only the material budgets in the initial stage. The material 
budget per capita would be on top of the salary budget. The advantage of this model was that 
the program would need less extra budget than the included-salary model and there would be 
reserve budget for motivating providers to improve efficiency by transforming to be 
autonomous hospitals, which would receive a high amount of inclusive capitation for efficiency 
improvement. The Director of the Rural Health Division and the Director of the Provincial 
Hospitals at that time rejected this alternative because of the difficulty of the dual system 
management between the full capitation system and the capitation plus salary system for the 
autonomous hospitals and other majority hospitals respectively (Interview K5, K16). To 
resolve the question, the Health Permanent Secretary at that time, with support from health 
economists and the Health Minister, decided to include salary costs in the program budget to 
accelerate the health financing system reform. There were few complaints, not strong, since the 
Health Permanent Secretary's leadership was strong and he had the support of the Health 
Minister. Indeed, most MoPH officers at health facilities in the study province reported the 
disagreement with the salary inclusion (Sirisomboon, Wongsathit, and Pitayarangsarit 2002). 
As civil servants, they had been secured of their positions for their whole working life. This 
form of budget made their salary dependent on hospital efficiency. Hospital inefficiency could 
result from management inefficiency or mal-distribution of health facilities. Many high-level 
MoPH officials argued that the majority of the inefficiency was due to the latter problem, which 
was out of the control of health providers; therefore the MoPH should protect them. In order to 
secure staff morale the MoPH decided to guarantee staff salaries in the health facilities 
(Ministry of Public Health 2001b). This operated by allocating an additional budget from the 
Contingency Fund to hospitals that were deficient. As a result, resistance to the salary inclusion 
decreased. However, the Contingency Fund was used only in 2002 and did not continued as the 
MoPH changed the budget allocation system to the capitation on top of the salary budget in 
fiscal year 2003. 
The third argument regarded the allocation criteria for general and regional hospitals, and 
whether it should be different from that of the community hospitals. The Provincial Hospital 
Society expressed their concerns to the next Permanent Secretary (October 2001 to September 
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2002). This Permanent Secretary suggested the budget for secondary and tertiary care should be 
separated from the capitation budget. He proposed to turn the budget system back to the 
previous supply-side based system. This caused a conflict between the Permanent Secretary and 
the Deputy Health Minister (Matichon Newspaper 2001b). The Deputy Minister did not favour 
the budget system being revised. In the Thai-Rak-Thai campaign, system responsiveness was 
an objective for allocation of funds. The campaign had said it would "shift the health services 
authorities back to the citizens" (Thai-Rak-Thai Party 2000). In fact, it was a strong intention of 
the government to use the method to achieve equitable resource allocation, in order to reform 
the whole health service system; i. e. financing system, manpower distribution, infrastructure 
distribution, and service delivery system. As this budget management reform benefited 
community hospitals, the Rural Doctor Society supported the reform direction (Botaphiboon 
2001). After the Deputy Health Minister moved to other Ministry (August 2002), the budget 
system was revised. 
In sum, with strong top political support, the MoPH decided to reform the budget management 
despite resisters within the MoPH. In this case, strong leadership and legitimacy of politicians 
were influential. 
Provider payment method: inclusive capitation versus exclusive capitation 
The MoPH ended up with two choices for provincial committees to choose from for purchasing 
services in the fiscal year 2002. The 
first choice was inclusive capitation based on experience 
with the Social Security Scheme. The rate covers disease prevention, health promotion and 
primary care to tertiary care. As a result, the 
burden would fall totally on contracting unit 
providers. The second choice was exclusive capitation, separated into two portions. 
The first portion was the capitation for disease prevention, health promotion and primary care 
by the contracting unit providers. The second portion, a collecting fund managed at the 
province, paid hospitals for 
inpatient care including secondary and tertiary care by the relative 
weight allocations under a global 
budget (weighted by Diagnostic Related Groups-DRGs). Both 
choices had advantages and 
disadvantages. 
The supporters of the inclusive capitation were senior health officers, private hospitals, 
community hospitals, and some academics. 
They had several reasons to support this method: 
low cost of administration (senior health officials); it was familiar and led to the expected 
hospitals' revenue (private providers); and anticipation of treatment cost-saving by emphasizing 
health promotion (community hospitals). Some academics agreed that this method would 
increase system efficiency because inclusive capitation allows the health manager to mobilize 
resources to the most cost-effective 
intervention, which would save on health service costs. 
However, some academics opposed this idea. They argued that the inclusive capitation payment 
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was a disincentive for providers to treat a severe case needing costly drugs and treatments. 
Second, community hospitals might delay referral of patients to higher level hospitals which 
could affect quality of care. In addition, some community hospitals, with a small population 
size, might not able to bear the cost of referring patients. These might lead to an unsustainable 
system. 
The exclusive capitation was the capitation payment plus case payment. Regional hospitals, 
general hospitals, some provincial chief officers, and some academics supported this choice 
because the case payment is an incentive to hospitals to admit a patient. However, an officer of 
the Health Insurance Office pointed out that the DRG system was still incomplete and might 
lead to unfair budget allocation. In this respect, some provinces had low confidence in it, 
though MoPH had used DRGs for allocating the high-cost care budget in the Medical Welfare 
Scheme since 1999. Furthermore, the case payment needs well-trained computer officers, but 
only some pilot provinces had trained their officers to use the computer software to allocate 
money to inpatient care. 
In conclusion, there was no consensus on which method suited the Thai health system because 
of little evidence available for a decision, so the MoPH passed this decision to provincial 
committees. The decision in provinces depended on the negotiation power of each stakeholder 
in the provinces. The number of provinces selecting each choice was nearly equal. This 
allowed supporters of both sides to debate the evidence in the next budget round for the fiscal 
year 2003. 
Service delivery system: primary care unit as a gatekeeper 
The UC policy indicated that people have to register with a provider in order to allocate the 
budget according to the registered population. The MoPH introduced a new model of the 
primary care unit (PCU) as a gatekeeper of the service delivery system to achieve the universal 
coverage of health care (Ministry of Public Health 2001b). In fact, the Thai-Rak-Thai Party 
policy did not mention the primary care unit as a register unit (Thai-Rak-Thai Party 2000) but 
the MoPH researchers sought an opportunity to develop the primary health care service and 
referral system, and the Health Minister became a strong supporter of the concept of the primary 
care unit. 
Though the MoPH has established health centres over the whole country, people's satisfaction 
with the services at health centres was low, evidenced by a large number of patients bypassing 
health centres to hospitals (Jongudomsuk 2002). The MoPH wanted to improve primary care 
services with a new model of the primary care unit. The new PCU model had a standard of 
service quality, which required a standard set of health personnel. This kind of PCU was 
expected to provide continuity of care and comprehensive care with a holistic approach to 
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people in a catchment area. It could be upgraded from a health centre located in a hospital or 
located in a new place. An area with a population up to 10,000 should have a PCU. Using 
PCUs, the health service delivery system would have a higher cost-effectiveness than using 
hospitals to deliver primary care. Many stakeholders agreed with the MoPH but some disagreed. 
Largely these were private hospitals, some public providers including general hospitals, regional 
hospitals, and health officers at community hospitals and health centres. 
The Private Hospital Association (2001) preferred contracting units to have at least 100 beds, 
similar to the SSS (Private Hospital Association 2001). However, elites in the MoPH wanted 
the health services to be accessible and not to be bound to big hospitals. Several new primary 
care models had been tried in many places, for example in Ayuthaya, Song Khla, and Khon 
Kaen provinces. Consequently, there was enough knowledge and development of the primary 
care models for implementation. Furthermore, the academics thought that the UC reform was 
the last opportunity to construct the primary care services in the provider-contract model. To do 
so, the service delivery system designers indicated that the smallest contracting unit was the 
PCU. Hospitals in both the private and public sectors were also allowed to be the contracting 
units but they had to provide primary care reaching the MoPH-standard of a PCU. Private 
providers tried to remove the gatekeeper regulation because they wanted to use the reputation of 
high technology hospitals to attract patients, but the MoPH was strict in enforcing the regulation. 
In general, public providers agreed with this aspect of the UC policy, and some general and 
regional hospitals thought that this was an opportunity to refer patients to a PCU, relieving 
hospitals' outpatient departments. Front line health officers agreed with the policy, because 
they wanted to strengthen the health promotion services rather than the curative health services. 
However, the existing situation was far from the PCU standard, for example in the number of 
doctors. Where the number of doctors was low, there was a low probability of allocating doctors 
to a PCU. On the other hand, where the number of doctors was high, most of the doctors were 
trained as specialists. Consequently, in both situations, providers could not fill positions in 
PCUs. The PCU standard was criticised as unrealistic. However, the designers argued that the 
spirit of the PCU was desirable and the system might take time to be achieved (Interview K11). 
Therefore, the program allowed many transitional models to develop in the primary care service; 
at least 3 models were suggested. 
In brief, researchers saw the UC policy as an opportunity to develop the primary care system 
after accumulating knowledge for several years. This issue was theoretically acceptable. 
However, the limitation of the existing resources, i. e. number of family doctors, and the rough 
implementation plan caused some concerns. 
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Private providers collaboration 
Initially, the MoPH planned to incorporate private providers after the health registration system 
covered the whole population, probably after October 2001; however, private providers were 
interested in joining the program from the beginning in April 2001 (Krungthep Thurakij 
Newspaper 2001). 
The concept of private collaboration was accepted amongst all because the collaboration would 
encourage competition amongst public and private providers and result in greater efficiency in 
the system. A reason supporting the delay of the private provider collaboration was that the 
quality assurance system was still underdeveloped (Director of Food and Drug Administration 
2001). The Health Minister declared on 26 February 2001 that the first phase of 
implementation would be to establish the registration system and arrange the allocation of the 
capitation budget. Then, the second phase would be to allow people to choose and register 
amongst public providers, and then only in the third phase would the private providers join. 
Private providers were not happy because the third phase might be delayed till fiscal year 2003. 
As a result, several attempts were made by private providers to influence this decision. On 16 
March 2001, the MoPH revised this, to allow private providers to join the 30 Baht Scheme 
earlier in October 2001. However, the private providers were still not happy. Ultimately, 
private providers were allowed to start 3 months earlier in the second trial in June 2001. Actors 
involved in this issue had different views. They were the private hospitals, the MoPH, the Rural 
Doctor Society, and the PM. 
The private providers wanted to join the 30 Baht Scheme as soon as possible. The private 
hospitals (many of which were under-utilized) were eager to join the program at the beginning 
because the size of the market of about 80 billion Baht interested them. They believed that the 
30 Baht Scheme would be similar to the Social Security Scheme -a major source of income. 
Furthermore, many private hospitals needed this money to improve their financial status 
(Prachachart Thurakij Newspaper 2001). They responded to the MoPH and the public via the 
media every time a decision was made to postpone their entry to the program (Krungthep 
Thurakij Newspaper 2001; Prachachart Thurakij Newspaper 2001; Private Hospital Association 
2001). 
The MoPH had the role of regulator as well as the role of provider. The MoPH agreed to delay 
the entry of the private providers because the scheme started rapidly and there was no 
preparation for a quality assurance system (Director of Food and Drug Administration 2001). 
As provider, the MoPH wanted to protect its hospitals' financial status because they anticipated 
the low competitive capacity of the public providers. In the end, although the private providers 
were allowed to join the scheme, the MoPH limited the population size for private providers and 
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prohibited the entry of new private providers established after 1 April 2001 to avoid new 
opportunistic investors (The first taskforce of the Universal Coverage of Health Care Scheme 
2001). 
o The Rural Doctor Society disagreed with the government's decision to allow the private sector 
to join as a main contractor. It suggested that the MoPH might allow private providers to be 
sub-contractors at the beginning, because public providers needed to improve their competitive 
capacities (Rural Doctor Society 2001). 
The PM explicitly suggested incorporating private resources in the public health scheme. 
Indeed, this suggestion was based on an original idea of this current health system reform. The 
Party supported the policy that could turn the unused resources to promote system efficiency. It 
was clear that the PM supported the private sector. 
In sum, this case clearly showed stakeholders influencing policy, especially the private sector. 
The MoPH as the program owner tried to protect public providers, whereas private providers 
influenced the policy through politicians and were strongly supported by government leaders. 
Analysis of potential factors in decision-making 
The six study cases of policy content show different networks of actors influencing decision- 
making processes. Positions and attempts of actors to influence the decision-making process in 
each issue changed depending on their policy involvement and the impact of the policy on them. 
All actors protect their interests. There was no single stakeholder having absolute power to 
dominate every decision, but each issue had a number of influential actors. Therefore, it is clear 
that there was a space for policy networks to contribute to the decision-making process. 
Grindle and Thomas (1989) suggest that decision-makers are frequently influenced by at least 
four criteria: "the technical advice they receive; the impact of their choices on bureaucratic 
interactions; the meaning of change for political stability and political support; and their 
relationships with international actors" (Grindle and Thomas, 1989: 223). It is clear that the 
issue of source of finance was decided mainly based on the political stability and support, 
whereas the decision on the primary care service followed the MoPH researchers' technical 
advice. The decisions on the budget requirement, the allocation methods of resources to 
provinces, and the provider payment methods were decided mainly based on the technical 
advice and also took consideration of the bureaucratic implications into account. The issue of 
private collaboration balanced considerations of the impact on public providers and the 
influence of private providers 
It seems that the decision-makers looked for technical evidence to justify their decisions; 
however, there was uncertainty about technical evidence. Other factors also affected final 
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decisions where policy elites sought acceptance from various networks and tried to avoid social 
and economic fallout. 
4.3.3 Context of the decision-making process 
In contrast to the agenda setting process, structural rather than situational factors highly 
influenced the policy formation process. Structural factors are defined as the `relatively 
unchanging elements of the society and polity' (Leichter, 1979: 39). These contexts included the 
existing health system and economic base. Also, the values and ideology of the public sector 
were important. External factors (international influence) were not evident. 
4.3.3.1 Health system structural development 
The existing structure of the health system, including infrastructure, the development of the 
insurance coverage, and human resources in the public health sector, provided the contextual 
feasibility, financial feasibility, and technical feasibility of the policy. The distribution of health 
infrastructures and health personnel provided the primary care services accessible for all rural 
people. The development of health insurance coverage (69% before 2001) provided an 
affordable additional budget to achieve universal coverage. 
4.3.3.2 Knowledge building 
The experience of the Social Security Scheme provided lessons for the capitation payment 
which effectively controlled health expenditure. Research knowledge in health systems has 
built up in the last decade, although there was considerable disagreement between researchers 
on what the evidence illustrated, i. e. a dynamic, lively, policy-learning environment. Several 
institutions carrying out research projects contributed to health sector reform, for example, 
  The Health Care Reform Office carried out Research and Development (R&D) on 
models of health care financing and primary care system. 
  The Center for Health Equity Monitoring, Narasuan University created the health 
equity index for Thailand and monitored the changes regarding equity in health. 
" The Health Systems Research Institute (HSRI) studied the CSMBS financing and 
proposed a reform strategy to the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The institution also 
appointed a taskforce to develop a proposal of the design of the universal coverage 
of health care which was useful in the UC policy formulation process. 
  The International Health Policy Program (IHPP), a capacity building program under 
collaboration between HSRI and MoPH, strengthens young researchers especially 
in health financing and economics. These human resources contributed to cost 
studies and produced a manual for analysis of hospital financial status and 
performances. 
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  The research communities and networks expanded with many more health policy 
and health system researchers. Amongst the research communities was the network 
of the rural doctor movement which was a crucial drive to the health sector reform 
(blase 1997). 
4.3.3.3 Economic base 
The development of the health service delivery system and private sector growth increased in 
capital investment in infrastructure and the distribution of health facilities in Thailand. This 
resulted from the economic growth of the last two decades before the economic crisis. The 
MoPH has established health centres in all sub-districts to decrease geographic barriers to health 
care access. Community hospitals (10-120 beds) were also established in more than 90% of the 
districts. This infrastructure is ready for people to access, but the system needs to go a step 
further to improve accessibility to quality services. 
The private health sector growth was a result of the rapid economic growth during 1988-1997. 
Government incentives through the mechanism of the Board of Investment (BOI), and access to 
low interest capital, coupled with increasing demand from rising urban incomes, led to a rapid 
growth of the private sector. After the economic crisis in 1997, the private hospitals were in a 
situation of 300% oversupply due to decreasing ability to pay. These resources were under 
utilised; therefore, this allowed the public scheme to use these existing resources to make the 
system more efficient. 
4.3.3.4 Ideology, public policy and public sector 
The state's ideologies have been mixed and the Thaksin government sought a middle stance to 
suit Thailand. In the context of democratic development, the new constitution in 1997 stated 
that access to health care is a right of the citizen. This government responded to the constitution 
with the health system reform of the UC policy. It differed from previous governments, which 
used incremental approaches and focused on the poor and underprivileged groups. The UC 
policy accepted the egalitarian approach at the level of equal access by reducing financial 
barriers to health care and promoting primary care units to reduce geographic barriers. 
This government used the general tax to fund the UC scheme, similar to models supporting a 
"welfare state" ideology. However, to avoid the word "welfare", the National Policy 
Committee used the term "social safety net" which the committee defined as aiming to protect 
the risk to the people from health expenditure. While this public scheme was funded by the 
general taxation, the scheme accepted the notion of competition within the concept of the "new 
public management", contracting to both public and private providers. At the same time, there 
was a space for the profit-making hospitals in the free market. Some are in the stock exchange, 
a consequence of the liberalization policy of the state during economic growth. 
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4.3.3.5 External factors 
External factors did not directly influence UC policy. In the policy formulation process, 
international agencies were hardly involved in UC policy. However, the World Bank's Social 
Investment Project loans in the period of the previous government partially influenced the 
design of the UC scheme. Another implicit factor, but most crucial for the sustainability of the 
reform policy, was the involvement of external institutions through the development of 
networks of personal and institutional links. The European Union funded the health care reform 
project under the Office of the Health Care Reform, and technical and research skills were 
strengthened through the training of Thais at schools in developed countries, for example, 
Antwerp University and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
4.4 Chapter summary 
The analysis of this chapter clearly shows how actors influenced the policy formulation, what 
considerations the policy elites used, and the context which limited and allowed opportunity to 
change the health system. 
State and policy elites took dominant roles in policy formulation. Many different actors formed 
different networks to influence policy at formulation stages. It was dynamic as policy networks 
changed and influential factors changed according to the technical issues involved. The 
approach (policy style) to decision-making also shifted during policy formulation, depending on 
stages of the processes. 
Policy networks involved in the UC policy formulation were tightly knit and can be described as 
policy communities - they played negotiation and bargaining roles in policy formulation. 
However, the participants were limited to health managers and health professionals (providers) 
and excluded consumers. Health policy research communities played significant roles in 
technical advice. The health policy research community in Thailand had strengthened 
considerably during the last decade (1992-2002), and played an important role as policy 
entrepreneurs in this reform. The development of several independent research institutions had 
created competition and complementarities which provided evidence for policy-makers and 
catalysed a rich discourse over different solutions. However, the uncertainty surrounding the 
technical evidence created policy debate and the extent to which research was used for making 
decisions still depended considerably on its quality, clarity, timing, and the extent it was 
responsive to policy-makers' concerns. 
The contextual factors clearly influenced the direction of decision-making. These included the 
health infrastructural system, knowledge building in the health system, economic base, ideology 
of the public sector, and external factors. 
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Though the decision to rely on tax-based finance was based on an anticipation of the financial 
feasibility, it would result in complications regarding sustainability. Immediate consequences 
were apparent in hospitals - as financial constraints - and in the low utilisation rate of the newly 
registered population. More consequences will be discussed in the implementation chapters. 
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Chapter 5- Policy implementation: National level 
5.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the implementation process is divided into three chapters. This chapter explores 
arrangements at national level. Chapter 6 looks at provincial arrangements, and provincial-to- 
district execution in one province, Saraburi. Finally, Chapter 7 explores local level 
implementation and villagers' perceptions. 
This chapter starts by analysing the arrangements at the central level and changes in health 
insurance coverage and other aspects of health care reform. This includes discussion on the gap 
between policy intent and the reality of implementation. It goes on to analyse actors' 
involvement, their position, interests, and perceptions of the content and process of reform, as 
well as the impact of the policy on them. Finally, the chapter explores change management 
strategies of the MoPH towards the UC policy and how it tried to overcome obstacles. 
5.2 UC implementation: central arrangements and changes 
UC implementation in 2001-2 included policy execution to achieve universal coverage and 
healthcare reform. The extension of health insurance coverage was rapid, within a year, with 
four phases: implementation in six provinces, in fifteen provinces, nationwide, and in Bangkok. 
The implementation of health care reform encompassed several aspects including: public- 
private mix, autonomous hospitals, primary medical care, hospital care, resource redistribution, 
manpower redistribution, payment methods for doctors, financing of the health care system, 
hospital financing, patients' rights, organisation of health care and decentralisation, and quality 
accreditation. While a radical shift of finance from big hospitals to primary care was introduced, 
other elements were underdeveloped. 
5.2.1 Policy executions to achieve universal coverage 
Phasing was a strategy in the UC implementation to build system capacity and readiness. There 
were at least two dimensions of phasing, extension of areas and level of complexity. The 
analysis below focuses on four aspects: objectives, insurance systems, organisation and 
management, and enrolment. 
5.2.1.1 Objectives 
Phase I. Extension of coverage in six pilot flagship provinces 
To start off the 30 Baht Scheme in April 2001, insurance coverage had expanded in six 
provinces (Payao, Pratumthani, Yasothon, Samuthsakorn, Nakornsawan, and Yala) which were 
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already involved in the Social Investment Project - SIP (see section 4.2). This involved 
relatively little change and implementation in this phase was quite smooth. 
Please II. Private providers collaboration 
The second phase of implementation, in 15 provinces in June 2001, aimed to include providers 
outside the MoPH. This phase also tested the new capitation budget mechanism, which 
included salaries. Its timing was influenced by private providers, and the number of provinces 
was influenced by the Health Inspector Generals (12 regional offices). Each Health Inspector 
General wanted at least one province in his control. Furthermore, there was pressure from local 
politicians, pushing their provinces for inclusion in this phase (Interview K7). 
Phase III. Nationwide implementation 
The nationwide implementation started in October 2001, the beginning of the fiscal year, and 
the best time for provinces to run a new system. The objective was to entitle all citizens to 
health insurance as well as to change the budgeting system to a full population basis. The 
timing to expand the scheme nationwide was influenced by bureaucrats (Interview K5) and 
local politicians (Interview K7) aiming for equal benefit distribution. 
Phase IV. Implementation in Bangkok Metropolitan area 
The objective of this phase (April 2002) was to complete total coverage. From October 2001, 
people in some outer districts of Bangkok had been entitled to the 30 Baht Scheme because the 
providers in these areas, mainly MoPH hospitals, were ready to respond to the scheme. In 
contrast, the hospitals in the inner districts of Bangkok, mainly university hospitals, needed to 
wait until April 2002. Moreover, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), 
responsible for local administration, refused to play the purchasing role for the 30 Baht Scheme 
in Bangkok. Therefore, the Medical Service Department of the MoPH became responsible for 
purchasing services and management in Bangkok. 
5.2.1.2 Design of insurance systems 
The insurance system features changed progressively during 2001-2002. The insurance system 
of the first phase of UC implementation was developed from the SIP financing model in the 
Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS), which allocated budgets to provinces according to the 
number of registered population and paid providers for inpatient care according to workload 
(Srithamrongsawat 2002). The benefit package was the same as that of the Voluntary Health 
Card Scheme (VHCS), including curative care and drugs on the National Essential Drugs list. 
Providers in this phase included only MoPH facilities, as in the MWS and the VHCS. A 
hospital and a health centre were identified to be gatekeepers for each beneficiary. 
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The budget for implementation in the first phase was limited to about 399.8 million Baht or 7.5 
USD millions (45 Baht/USD in April 2001) for all newly registered population. Ten percent of 
the total budget was allocated for change management and 5% for primary care network 
development. The rest was for health care services with a capitation rate of 477 Baht per year 
(or 238.5 Baht per 6 months - this rate excluded salary budget). From the total 477 Baht, 2.5 
and 1.25% was administered at the Central MoPH for high cost care and administration. Ten 
percent was administered at PHOs for referred and accident patients across provinces. From 
this 10%, less than 1% could be used for health promotion and disease prevention because 
government had already allocated budget for those purposes at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
The rest of the budget was divided into two parts: 45% and 55% for outpatient and inpatient 
care respectively (Figure 5.1). The budgets were allocated to providers according to the size of 
the registered population and the performance measured by the Diagnostic Relative Groups 
(DRGs) weights respectively. 
Additional budget 399 millions Bahl 
5% 10% 
P1mary care Change 
network management 
development 
pooled at 
pooled at 
MOPH 
MOP-I 
85% for personal health care (477 Bahl per capita) 
2.5% 1.25% 10 % 
High cost care Management Referred 
pýý pýý patients across 
1ý provinces 8 dentdental/ accidental/ 
emergency 
cases 
poled at FHOs 
87.25% allocate to 
providers 
45% 55% 
OP care IPcare 
allocated allocated 
by size of by 
population DRCs 
Figure 5.1 Budget allocation of the 30 Baht Scheme in phase I 
Source: Paper proceeding in the taskforce meeting for implementation in six provinces on 13 
March 2001 at MoPH 
In the second phase, the main differences from phase I were the amount of budget (budget for 
preventive care and health promotion was added) and the provider payment methods. The 
additional budget for four months implementation in 15 provinces was about four times higher 
than the first phase, 1,510 million Baht (34 USD millions), of which 1,100 million Baht came 
from the VHCS Revolving Fund (there was 1,237 million Baht left in 2001). It is clear that the 
reserved money of the VHCS made implementation in the second phase possible. The 
capitation rate in this phase was 1,202 Baht (27 USD) per year for a more comprehensive 
benefit package, which included curative care, disease prevention and health promotion care, 
and drugs in the National Essential Drugs list (Tangcharoensathien 2001). This cost was also 
used in the third phase (see the cost structure in Figure 5.2). The cost structure components 
were: 
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  Budget for curative care, composed of 574 Baht (61.5%) for outpatient care, 303 
Baht (32.4%) for inpatient care, 32 Baht (3.4%) for high cost care, and 25 Baht 
(2.7%) for accident and emergency patients, 
  175 Baht for disease prevention and health promotion, 
  93.4 Baht (10% of curative care) for capital replacement. 
Figure 5.2 Budget allocation of the 30 Baht Scheme in phases II and III 
1,202 Baht per capita 
r 
32 Baht (2.66%) 25 Baht(2.08%) : 
------------- --------------- 
93 Baht 
High cost care accidental/ (10 % of 
pooled at MOPti emergency cases across provinces 
curative care) 
Capital 
pooled at MOPH replacement 
pooled at MOPH 
1,052 Baht 
87.50% allocate to provinces 
175 Baht (16.6%) 574 Baht (54.6%) 303 Baht (28.8%) 
Disease preventive OP care IP care 
and health allocated by size of Two methods of 
promotion care population allocation: 
allocated by size of 1) capitation to 
population and main contractors, 
workloads 2) pooled at 
provinces and 
allocated by DRGs 
weights 
Source: Tangcharoensathien et al (2001) 
The budgets for public facilities to enrol new insured excluded budgets for salaries, capital 
replacement, and other high cost and accident care. The figure was about 262 Baht per capita 
per four months. The non-MoPH public hospitals received the same budget rate as the MoPH 
providers although they had already received a higher proportion of salary budgets, as a result of 
an argument about equal additional benefit (Health Insurance Revolving Fund Committee 2001). 
PHOs managed the 262-Baht budget by authorising the Provincial Insurance Committee to 
decide on the provider payment methods. The budget for outpatient care and promotion & 
preventive care was mostly allocated to providers according to the size of the registered 
population plus incentives measured by workload. There were two alternative provider 
payment methods for inpatient care: inclusive and exclusive capitation. In inclusive capitation, 
inpatient care was included in the capitation budget, as per outpatient and promotion & 
preventive care. In exclusive capitation, the budget for inpatient care was separated from the 
capitation budget, pooled at the PHOs and reallocated according to case-mix loads. Eight 
provinces selected exclusive capitation while seven provinces selected inclusive capitation (The 
evaluation committee of the UC implementation in the transition period in fifteen provinces 
2001). 
In the nationwide phase (phase III), there were a lot of changes. The MWS was merged with 
the 30 Baht Scheme but the beneficiaries of the MWS were exempted from the 30 Baht co- 
payment. No new VHCS card was issued in the fiscal year 2002, but a number of cardholders 
could still use the cards until September 2002. The CSMBS introduced a central information 
system of individual medical records in order to implement the provider payment with DRGs 
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weight in October 2001. The SSS increased its coverage to all employees in all firms that had at 
least one employee from 1 April 2002. 
The budget for the 30 Baht Scheme in fiscal year 2002 was about 47,000 million Baht (1,044 
USD million) for a total of 45 million people, including those who were covered by the MWS. 
This budget replaced all MoPH budgets for health services (about 33,400 million Baht in 2001). 
Thus, this was an increase of 40% in expenditure for health services; in reality, however, the 
expenditure was lower because the approved size of the registered population was less than the 
target for several months. 
The capitation rate was the same as phase II. The budget for capital replacement, high cost care, 
and accident and emergency care continued to be managed at central level. Private providers 
received a budget of about 1,052 Baht per capita per year (after deduction of 150 Baht for high 
cost care, emergency care, and capital investment to be managed at central level). For public 
facilities, salary budgets followed the health personnel according to the Government Salary Act; 
therefore, the capitation budget had to be subtracted from the salary budget before transferring 
the budget to PHOs. The subtraction in this phase was different from the second phase, because 
each province had to be responsible for its staff salaries. In other words, the population-based 
budget allocation in this phase included salaries in the allocation. Non-MoPH hospitals 
received the salary-excluded budget 578.6 Baht per capita per year (labour costs were 55% of 
total cost: 1,052 Baht). For MoPH facilities, PHOs managed the rest of the budget after 
subtracting the salary budget by authorising the Provincial Insurance Committee to decide on 
the provider payment methods. The Provincial Insurance Committee had to decide two main 
issues before transferring budget to providers; firstly, whether the salary subtraction should be 
at provincial or at Contracting Unit for Primary Care (CUP) level, and secondly, whether to 
choose the inclusive or exclusive capitation. The budget for outpatient care, promotion & 
prevention was mostly allocated to providers according to the size of the registered population, 
plus incentives measured by workloads. Forty provinces chose exclusive capitation while 28 
provinces chose the inclusive capitation and others chose a mixed system. Thirty-six provinces 
chose to subtract salaries at provincial level while 34 provinces chose the salary subtraction at 
CUP level and others chose a mixed system (Na Ranong and Na Ranong 2002a). 
The Primary Care Units (PCUs) were strengthened in this phase, to play a gatekeeper function. 
Any health facility that was overseen by a medical doctor providing primary medical care could 
be a PCU. The doctor to population ratio should be less than 10,000 head of population per 
doctor. Health centres were improved to play the PCU roles. People were requested to first 
contact PCUs in the registered provider network, and hospital services were only covered if 
referrals came from PCUs. 
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In the fourth phase, the insurance system in Bangkok was unique. Bangkok was divided into 14 
zones of provider networks according to tertiary hospital locations. Tertiary hospitals were 
invited to be chief providers in each zone. There were three university hospitals, four BMA 
hospitals, a police hospital, three hospitals of the Ministry of Defence (one is a teaching 
hospital), and three MoPH hospitals. Private hospitals and other public hospitals were main 
contractors responsible for population at an agreed-quota number. BMA health centres, health 
centres of the Signal Department, Ministry of Defence, and private clinics were subcontractors 
of those hospitals. On 1 April 2002, there were 128 PCUs, of which 92 PCUs were public and 
36 PCUs were private. They were provided by 21 public hospitals, 61 BMA health centres, 2 
Red Cross health centres, 8 health centres of the Signal Department, Ministry of Defense, 30 
private hospitals, 5 private policlinics and a private clinic. Private hospitals acting as main 
contractor received a budget of 1,052 Baht per capita per year. The budget for public providers 
in Bangkok was a supplement to government salaries and allocated as a capitation payment 
including inpatient-care cost (salary exclusion and inclusive capitation). Therefore, all public 
hospitals acting as main contractors received a budget of 578.6 Baht per capita per year (55% of 
total capitation cost, 1,052 Baht) to allocate money for inpatient care, ambulatory care, 
preventive care and health promotion, and drugs in the National Essential Drugs List. A 
beneficiary could access a hospital directly and a health centre or a private clinic indicated on 
the health card with only a 30 Baht co-payment. The public health centres were reimbursed 
from the main contractors at the rate of 100 Baht per visit, excluding labour costs (this rate is 
about the unit cost of health centres but much less than the unit cost of hospitals) because health 
centre staff received government salaries. Private clinics were reimbursed at the rate of 150 
Baht per visit (Interview K25). Referral rates to higher level care used the same criteria as the 
national agreement, which was the differentiated rate according to the sophistication of the level 
of care. 
For public hospitals in Bangkok, this budget was an additional budget supplement to their salary 
budgets, logistic budgets, and capital budgets in the previous system. There was little change in 
the financing system and low negative impact on their hospital finances. No hospital requested 
money from the Contingency Fund. 
As seen from the above, the complexity and changes were greater in the later phases. 
5.2.1.3 Organisation and management 
UC needed the National Health Security Office (NHSO) to be established by law to legitimise 
implementation, but the legislative process was not as fast as the MoPII implementation. 
Although implementation started rapidly, it was not underpinned by legislation until November 
2002. It was only in May 2002 that the House of Representatives passed the National Health 
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Security Act, with 376 votes out of 500. During the consultative process public hearings were 
made four times in four geographical areas of Thailand (Northern, Eastern, Southern, and 
Central). The bill had four main principles: 
  The NHSO, the health care purchaser, should be an autonomous body separated 
from the MoPH, congruent with the concept of the purchaser-provider split. 
  The right for health care protected by this law is for the whole population, not just 
for any particular group. 
  People have rights of access to health care, choice to register with a provider, rights 
to participate in the insurance management, rights to be compensated under defined 
circumstances, and rights to be protected from the health care cost of accidents and 
emergency illness. 
  All health care providers of private, public and other sectors are eligible to register 
to provide services under the National Health Security Scheme. 
The principles of the Bill were widely accepted but some points were debated: 
  Incorporation of the management of health care expenses of the CSMBS and SSS; 
  Transferring the indemnity from private health insurers or the compensation from 
responsible agencies to the National Health Security Fund; 
  Whether to establish a Compensation fund for people who suffered due to health 
services and reimbursement from mal-practitioners; and 
  The authority of the committee on standards and quality control. 
The Senate agreed in August 2001 to remove NHSO authority over indemnity and 
compensation claims against private agencies, and the dissemination of information on 
malpractice cases to the public. However, the House of Representatives finally agreed to 
remove only the latter issue and the law was promulgated in November 2002. Both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate, with influence from the government, seemed to pass this Bill 
as a matter of urgency, despite lack of consensus on a lot of points. 
As the legislative process behind the implementation (the National Social Security Bill got into 
the Parliamentary process in November 2001), the MoPH executed the implementation. The 
organisation and management in 2001-2 was briefly described in Chapter 4 (see section 4.4.2.1). 
It was not static. There were at least three aspects of transition: from inside to outside the 
MoPH, narrow to wide participation, and from informal to formal appointees. The organisation 
and management was composed of three parts: policy design and planning committees, 
management authorities, and the technical and management preparation within the MoPH. 
Figures 5.3-6 illustrate the wider participation of organisations in the UC policy from phase Ito 
Phase IV. Figure 5.7 ilustrates the organisation and management structure intended in the 
National Health Security Act (2002). 
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At the beginning, the MoPH was solely in charge of UC management. Two taskforces within 
the MoPH were constituted to oversee separately the general implementation of the 30 Baht 
Scheme and the specific implementation in the six pilot provinces. The management was 
carried out under MoPH regulations. The management authorities included the Insurance 
Committee and the UC Budget Management Committee. However, the structure of these 
managerial committees was composed of several ministries' representatives, chaired by the 
MoPH Permanent Secretary and with the Director of the HIO as committee secretary - the same 
committee structure as the MWS. 
In the full-blown implementation, the roles of policy design and planning were transferred from 
inner MoPH committees to multi-ministerial committees. The former MoPH committee for 
guideline development was changed to the Operational Centre Committee dealing with 
problems occurring during implementation. The National Health Security Policy Committee 
was commissioned to oversee the whole system preparations for the national Health Security 
Office under the new law. The National Executive/Administrative Committee was 
commissioned to co-ordinate and to involve top civil servants from other ministries in the UC 
policy execution. However, the MoPH had a dominant role in the 30 Baht Scheme execution 
and this committee played a minor role. The Health Insurance Committee and the Health 
Budget Management Committee (also named the Health Insurance Revolving Fund Committee) 
continued as the main management authorities. (See the lists of important committees in 
Chapter 4, section 4.3.1). 
The main responsible organisations in the MoPH dealing with provinces included the Health 
Insurance Office (HIO), the Rural Hospitals Division and the Rural Health Division (the latter 
two offices merged into the Bureau of Health Care Network Development in the second phase). 
The HIO developed the information technology system for registration and was responsible for 
budget transfer. The Rural Hospitals Division and the Rural Health Division were responsible 
for skill support. The Bureau of Health Policy and Planning (BHPP) and the Health Care 
Reform Office (HCRO) facilitated technical support as members of taskforces. The Inspector 
General Office was involved in the second phase. Each Regional Inspector General Office 
(from 12 Regional Offices) was assigned to support and monitor the implementation in their 
region. 
In April 2002, a set of arrangements for Bangkok was established (see in Figure 5.6). The 
Medical Services Department was stripped of its purchasing power and only coordinated the 
implementation. There was wide involvement from all stakeholders from providers but none 
from consumers. The National Health Security Policy Community appointed a Committee for 
Implementation in Bangkok in August 2001. In October 2001, this committee appointed two 
subcommittees: a committee for provider network development, chaired by the Deputy 
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Governor of Bangkok, and a committee for implementation coordination, chaired by the 
Director General of the Medical Services Department. The latter committee was labelled `the 
Bangkok War Room', and its meetings were political arenas for negotiation and participation. 
Figure 5.3 Organisation and management in phase I 
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Figure 5.5 Organisation and management in phase III 
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Figure 5.7 Organisation and management structure intended in the National Health Security Act 
(2002) 
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Figure 5.7 shows the organisation and management structure in the National Health Security 
Act (2002), which should be in full operation in December 2005, three years after the Act's 
promulgation. The National Health Security Board (NHSB) was constituted to steer the design 
of the UC program, giving policy directions to the UC scheme manager and ensuring a single 
standard of health care for all Thais in the future, and the National Health Security Office 
(NHSO) was established as the secretariat for the NHSB and will take charge the 30 Baht 
Scheme in 2006. The NHSB would appoint several sub-committees for technical advices. 
Provincial Purchaser Offices are being established in provinces to play the purchaser role by 
contracting with providers. The National Committee for Quality Accreditation was constituted 
to deal with the quality assurance, under which several inspector committees would be 
established to investigate the grievances. While these organisations and committees are being 
developed, the MoPH is responsible for the management of the 30 Baht Scheme (2001-2005). 
For policy communication and provincial management preparation, the Health Minister had met 
MoPH provincial staff at four meetings in April and May 2001, one for each geographical area 
(Northern, North Eastern, Southern, and Central Regions of Thailand). Senior MoPH officers 
(the Permanent Secretary and Deputies, and the Director General of MoPH Departments) were 
divided into 7 teams to support and supervise the implementation in the 12 administrative areas 
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and Bangkok. These senior officers worked with the Inspector Generals in the 12 areas and 
visited the target provinces at least twice before June 2001. At this time, the role of the 
Inspector General was prominent. It seemed that each implementation team competed in their 
positive responses (Interview K16). 
5.2.1.4 Enrolment 
The 30 Baht Scheme expanded the coverage of the newly registered population from 1.4 million 
people in six provinces in the first phase (April 2001) to 4.9 million people in 15 provinces in 
the second phase (June 2001) and to 21.3 million people of the population nationwide in the last 
two phases (April 2002). The third and fourth phases achieved the target of 45 million people, 
of which 24 million people were from the MWS. Thus the total health insurance coverage (of 
all schemes) had risen to 91.9% of the whole population in the Kingdom (Table 5.1). The 
uninsured made up about 8.1% of the population. Some of the uninsured were unreachable by 
either health insurance or any other social welfare because they could not show their 
identification numbers (13 digits). These people included the elderly, the handicapped, 
prisoners, hill tribes, beggars, and orphans. However, the social welfare system in public 
hospitals could still be used to exempt them from the 30 Baht fee, but the burden fell on 
providers as the exemption was not counted for in the capitation budget. Hospitals complained 
and requested extra budget to cover this group. 
In the developing phases, migrant workers had been excluded from the program until October 
2001 and there might have been some people covered by multiple insurance schemes. This was 
because of the incomplete information system. The CSMBS did not have the beneficiary lists 
and the MoPH had not linked the data with the SSS and the house registration database. Before 
the registration database of the Ministry of Interior was able to be used as reference, the MoPH 
had to set up the database receiving data from provinces. The MoPH electronic database was 
only up and running in March 2002 (Srithamrongsawat 2002). 
At provinces, since the budget for the second phase was to be determined by the size of 
registered population, the provinces had to establish the database of health registration within a 
few months. Officials from health centres, hospitals and Provincial Health Offices were 
allocated to carry out household surveys for individual records. House registration was used as 
a reference. There were many mistakes in data entry and data validity. Problems with hardware 
availability, software errors and computer using skills were reported (The evaluation committee 
of the UC implementation in the transition period in fifteen provinces 2001). Provinces starting 
in October 2001 had the same problems as the forerunners. The weakness of the information 
system caused conflict between beneficiaries and providers, and between providers and 
Provincial Health Offices (Interview S2). 
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Table 5.1 Populations covered by the UC Policy in the transition phases until September 2002 
6 provinces* 15 province* Whole country 
Insurance types Millions % Millions % Millions % 
30 Baht Scheme 1.39 38.31 4.92 35.06 21.30 34.8 
Medical Welfare Scheme (incorporated in the 
UC Scheme after October 2001) 
1.52 41.85 5.99 42.69 24.03 39.3 
Voluntary Health Card Scheme 0.03 0.81 0.24 1.72 0.01 0.0 
Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme & Public 
enterprises 
0.06 1.78 0.25 1.80 3.93 6.4 
Social Security Scheme 0.40 11.07 1.42 10.11 6.94 11.3 
Total insured 3.40 
- 
93.83 12.82 91.39 56.19 91.9 
Population 77 
tT; 
3777_ 100.00 14.03 100.00 61.2 100 
source: 
*1. Total population was used data in December 2000. Registration Division, Administration Department, Ministry 
of Interior 
*2. Registered population in the 30 Baht Scheme was in September 2001. Health Insurance Office (2002) 
*3. Populations in other scheme were in March 2002 from the electronic database of the Health Insurance Office 
http: //203.157.2.238/workxeon/NumberCardHospProvinceR. jsp 
** Health Insurance Office (in September 2002), http: //203.157.2.238/workxeon/NumberCardilospProvinceR. jsp 
5.2.2 Implementation of health care reform 
5.2.2.1 Public-private mix in providing services 
Private providers, including hospitals and private clinics, had played roles in public schemes 
since the instigation of the Social Security Scheme (SSS) in 1991. At the initial stage, the 
proportion of employees registered with private providers was low but it increased and became 
higher than the proportion of employees registered with public providers, illustrating the 
competitive edge of private providers. Though the 30 Baht Scheme allowed private providers to 
provide any service in the benefit package, thus private provider function depended on how 
many private Contracting Units for Primary Care (CUPs) had registered. The MoPH has the 
biggest market share and de facto it protects MoPH hospitals from competition by managed 
collaboration with private providers. Because of the incomplete information given to private 
providers and the limited number of allocated population, only 96 private hospitals joined the 30 
Baht Scheme in September 2002 (with a small number of private clinics joining the program), 
comparing to that 132 hospitals joined the SSS (Social Security Office 2002), out of 456 private 
hospitals in Thailand. In addition, the quota of registered population for a private CUP outside 
Bangkok was only about 10,000 population per hospital. As a result, the proportion of 
population registered with private providers was only 3% while the proportion of private 
providers acting as CUPs was about 9% of total CUPs (see Table 5.2 for number of health 
facilities and registered population in the program). While there are many problems with public 
hospitals' incomes in provinces outside Bangkok, development of the public-private mix in 
117 
CHAPTER 5- POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: NATIONAL LEVEL 
these provinces was a low priority. At the same time, public-private mix development in 
Bangkok has just started. 
Table 5.2 Number of health facilities and registered population by type of providers in 2002 
Type of providers Health facilities (main contractors) Registered populations 
MoPH facilities 840 (83%) 52,264,637 (93%) 
Non-MoPH public facilities 76 (8%) 2,134,651 (4%) 
Private hospitals 96 (9%) 1,822,196 (3%) 
Total 1,012 (100%) 56,221,484 100% 
Source: Health Insurance Office, September 2UU2, searched from http: //www. hinso. MoFH. go. ttvcgi- 
bin/Hospitalmain/ CountHtype. asp 
5.2.2.2 Autonomous hospitals 
Hospital autonomy was a proposed strategy at the initial stage of the UC implementation 
planning to increase MoPH hospitals' efficiency. Experience from the first autonomous 
hospital convinced policy makers of the feasibility of this reform. However, there was limited 
interest among MoPH hospitals (Interview 20). Resistance within MoPH civil servants has 
been high, as the transformation would change their working status. 
5.2.2.3 Primary medical care 
Primary care was identified as a key mechanism for providing health care in UC policy, with the 
slogan "Kral Ban Krai Jar' (literally `close to the home, close to the heart') (Interview K11), 
and to increase quality of care (Interview K20). 
During the last decade, there had been continuous efforts to strengthen primary care in Thailand. 
In 1992, the first demonstration model of primary care was established in Ayutthaya province 
(Pongsuparb 1996) and it became a successful model (Interview K5) (Jongudomsuk 2002). The 
concept and management of primary medical care had gradually expanded in many provinces 
with the introduction of Primary Care Units (PCU), coordinated by the Office of Health Care 
Reform. The Consortium of the Deans of Medical Schools organized a national conference on 
medical education in April 2001 and reached a consensus that changing medical curriculum to 
serve primary care was a priority issue (Jongudomsuk 2002). 
Primary medical care was defined as a holistic, continuous, and comprehensive care using the 
family medicine concept. Due to the UC policy, a set of standards for Primary Care Units 
(PCUs) was developed and the primary medical care providers are designated as: 
  main contractors holding funds for primary medical care services for the registered 
population, and 
" gatekeepers to provide primary medical care and refer patients to hospitals. 
However, the number of qualified primary care providers was small. This allowed any hospital 
that could arrange primary medical care services to make contracts as a Contracting Unit for 
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Primary Care (CUP). Therefore, any provider with at least a medical doctor and a PCU is 
eligible to be a CUP. Consequently, many hospitals established PCUs inside and outside the 
hospital. Health centres were improved to reach the PCU standard, but the PCU standard was 
criticized as being impossible to achieve given the limited number of doctors. Later, the MoPH 
graded PCUs according to three development levels, to increase flexibility and allow 
opportunities for development. 
5.2.2.4 Hospital care 
The focus for investment in hospital care changed from the number of hospital beds to the 
establishment of centres of excellence - high technology treatment in regions, for example, 
cardiac surgery, organ transplant, emergency service and cancer treatment. Moreover, more 
attention was paid to the quality of hospital care, resulting from the capitation payment system. 
The procedure of accreditation was implemented from 2002 in all public and private hospitals in 
the 30 Baht Scheme and is ongoing. 
5.2.2.5 Resource redistribution 
Budgets for material expenses and salaries were redistributed to match the population. One 
quarter of hospitals were expected to have a negative balance of finance (Na Ranong and Na 
Ranong 2002a). The MoPH used the Contingency Fund to subsidise these hospitals using a set 
of criteria; therefore, no hospital was bankrupted, although some suffered from increased 
insecurity. Some providers, however, had a budget surplus because of the redistribution. This 
imbalance was caused by the poor distribution of health facilities and personnel, especially 
medical doctors. There had been resistance to including salaries within the redistribution 
budget, and there were attempts to separate provincial hospitals from the redistribution, but they 
did not succeed. In October 2002, attention shifted to the separation of total salaries from the 
reallocated budget, and this succeeded in fiscal year 2003. 
5.2.2.6 Human resource redistribution 
Budget reallocation was expected to initiate a more equal human resource reallocation. 
However, this did not happen because of several factors. Firstly, implementation documents 
rarely addressed the issues of human resources; therefore, MoPH staff were not sure whether 
they would be forced to move and felt panic for a while until the MoPH recommended that 
movement should be voluntary (in August 2001). Secondly, there was unclear authority 
regarding manpower within the MoPH, since there was no main organisation responsible for 
overseeing the whole process of human resource development. The Bureau of Health Policy 
and Planning was responsible for planning manpower size, the Bureau of Health Care Network 
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(BHCN) was responsible for distributing new personnel, and the Institute of Manpower 
Development took responsibility for undergraduate education, producing community health 
officers, dental nurses, community pharmaceutical officers, and technical nurses. These were 
fragmented and under the separate control of Deputy Permanent Secretaries. When the BHCN 
proposed a plan for medical doctor redistribution to the War Room, the plan was put to one side 
and referred to a Deputy PS who was from the provincial hospital faction and did not support 
the human resource reform (Interview K7). Consequently there was no master plan in human 
resource mobilisation. Thirdly, there was a fight for leadership between two groups of 
bureaucrats: reformists and conservative bureaucrats. When the new PS of fiscal year 2002 
started, the BHCN changed hands. 
The distribution of new personnel in April 2002 followed the old pattern. However, many 
provinces refused to accept new graduates. It is clear that the MoPH passed the responsibility 
for decision on manpower to provinces by changing the financial incentive rules to be more 
flexible and generous, and letting provinces decide on their own requirements. Moreover, there 
was a commitment on salary security for all civil servants. This meant that some hospitals that 
had high numbers of health personnel had less incentive to reduce salary costs. Consequently, 
big city hospitals could continually attract medical doctors, causing congestion in the cities at 
the expense of rural areas. 
5.2.2.7 Payment methods for doctors 
The 30 Baht Scheme did not define payment methods for doctors. Public facilities normally 
pay doctors by salary plus some payment for out-of-hours work or surgical operations. The 
MoPH tried to increase flexibility by using hospital budgets as incentives for doctors and staff 
according to workloads. However, some hospitals with budget constraints could not pay more, 
even though some staff had higher workloads than previously. For private hospitals, a low 
salary rate was offered to medical doctors practising in the PCU; therefore, only new graduates 
with little experience accepted this job, while other experienced doctors worked in the normal 
OPD. This seemed to encourage a two-tier standard of quality of services. 
5.2.2.8 Financing of the health care system 
The UC policy also aimed to control national health expenditure and reduce household health 
expenditure. The implementation of the UC policy could have replaced household out-of- 
pocket spending with the expenditure of the prepayment risk-pooling public scheme. Empirical 
data shows an increase of about 20% in public spending in 2002 (the MoPH was the biggest 
share with 13.5 Billion) but there was no evidence to show any decrease in household out-of- 
pocket spending (from the report of the Socio-Economic Survey (SES), likely to be 
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disseminated in 2003). However, Tangcharoensathien et al estimated a reduction in household 
out-of-pocket spending from 55 Billion Baht to 47 Billion Baht (14% reduction). This 
estimation was based on the latest 2001 SES figure by assuming that the 30 Baht scheme would 
affect only the 30% previously uninsured, with the compliance rate for ambulatory and inpatient 
care as reported by Pannarunothai et al, namely 59% and 69% respectively (Pannarunothai et al. 
2002). Consequently, private health spending in 2002, which includes private insurance 
premiums and out-of-pocket spending, decreased 12% from 2001. Table 5.3 shows the health 
system expenditure and financing in Thailand during 2001 to 2002. 
Table 5.3 Health System Expenditure & Financing in Thailand, 2001-2002 (Millions Baht) 
Measured Financing Agents 2001 2002 Sources 
1. Public spending on health 83,487 100,266 
The 30 Baht Scheme 36,866 50,464 BHPP, MoPH 
... of which MoPH 
33,402 47,000 BHPP, MoPH 
... of which other ministries 
3,464 *3,464 BHPP, MoPH 
CSMBS 19,131 *20,635 Comptroller's General Department, 
Ministry of Finance 
SSS 9,810 * 11,480 Social Security Office 
Non personal care (MoPH only) 17,681 17,687 BHPP, MoPH 
2. Private expenditure on health 65,699 57,872 
... of which private 
health insurance premiums 10,475 10,475 Department of Insurance, Ministry 
of Commerce 
... of which out-of-pocket spending on health 55,224 
*47,397 National Statistic Office 
3. Total health expenditure 149,187 158,138 
4. Public expenditure on health (%) 56 63 
5. public expenditure increase (%) 20 
6. private expenditure change (%) -12 
7. General Government budget on health (%) 
8. Total expenditure on health % GDP 2.93 2.94 
GDP (Bil. Baht/year) 5,091 5,371 NESDB 
Total government spending (Bil. Baht/year) 910 1,023 BOB, Prime Minister Office 
Source: Several sources excluded public health spending in other ministries and traffic accident insurance 
* Data estimated based on assumptions by Tangcharoendathien, Vasavit, Pitayarangsarit (2002) 
The proportion of the public expenditure increased from 56% to 63% and was expected to 
gradually increase after 2002. However, household spending on health depends very much on 
how healthcare providers behave. Tangcharoensathien et al (2002) suggest that if a decent 
quality of care is provided with a strong referral backup, there is no reason why households 
would not comply with services at designated providers. This would accelerate compliance to 
the 30 Baht Scheme. In contrast, a lack of MoPH leadership could send a wrong signal about 
the reform, and lead to MoPH healthcare providers offering bad and discriminatory services, 
resulting in low compliance. This would result in the failure to implement good policy and 
intentions (Tangcharoensathien, Vasavit, and Pitayarangsarit 2002). One discouraging factor 
would be budget constraint, if the government pays providers less than the actual cost, resulting 
in public providers fulfilling a lower compliance rate and not improving the quality of services. 
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5.2.2.9 Hospital financing 
The UC policy altered hospitals' income, hospitals' expenditure and the financing patterns of 
hospitals. Hospitals that are contracting units for primary care (CUPs) received health care 
budgets according to the registered population and were responsible for the expenses of their 
network PCUs and referred patients based on contracts. Their income from out-of-pocket 
spending should be replaced by the 30 Baht Scheme budget. Table 5.4 shows possible patterns 
of financial flows of the MoPH hospitals. 
Table 5.4 Possible financial patterns of MoPH hospitals after the 30 Baht Scheme 
implementation 
Types Situations 
Income types Permanent salaries Same as previous 
UC budget (after 
subtracted salaries) 
Changed from MWS and VHCS 
- increase if salaries budget is less than 50% of capitation budget 
- decrease if salaries budget is more than 50% of capitation budget 
SSS Same as previous 
CSMBS Same as previous 
Out-of-pocket Decrease or little decrease 
Referral cases (in) Increase if capable to receive import cases 
Total income increase 
Net revenue Decrease if low efficiency, increase if high efficiency 
Expense types Permanent salaries Same as previous 
Temporary wages Increase or decrease depends on workloads 
Medicine Likely to decrease 
Materials and other 
expenses 
Likely to decrease 
Subcontractor Increase as new type of expenditure 
Referral cases (out) Increase if incapable to provide complicated care 
Total expenses increase 
Total net revenue Decrease 
Source: analysed from the guideline for hospital financial assessment and management improvement, MoPI1,2001 
Twenty-four percent of community hospitals and 46% of general/regional hospital were 
expected to have financial problems (Na Ranong and Na Ranong 2002a). Some hospitals coped 
with the reform by establishing the new cost accounting system and some provinces improved 
the payment for referred cases based on cost per DRGs. 
5.2.2.10 Patients'rights 
The rights of patients were extended by the Medical Council's statement21. The 30 Baht scheme 
also paid attention to grievance procedures by establishing a hotline telephone number to 
receive complaints, and at the same time introducing systems to deal with complainants. 
Patient rights were incorporated into the National Health Security Act (2002). 
21 Issued on 16 April 1998, joint signed by the Council for Registration of Medical Practice, Ministry of Public 
Health, 
the Medical Council, the Nursing Council, the Pharmacy Council, and the Dental Council (The Medical Council of 
Thailand 2000). 
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5.2.2.11 Organisation of the health care system 
The Thai Bureaucracy Reform Act was launched on 2 October 2002 in order to change the Thai 
bureaucracy structure to one of more horizontal hierarchy. This also increased the facility for 
ministers by establishing the Minister Office. All Departments report directly to the Minister 
and also to the PS. Changes in the MoPH created two new departments: the Department of 
Health Care Promotion and the Department of Traditional and Alternative Medicine. The 
National Health Security Office (NHSO) will be established according to the National Health 
Security Act. Health care providers will be transferred to the authority of local government 
according to the Decentralization Plan Act. Area Health Boards will belong to local 
government with multi-segmented participation. Please see Figures 5.8 and 5.9. 
Comparing the new and the old organisation pattern of the MoPH, it is clear that the old vertical, 
centralised structure under the control of the Permanent Secretary was charged to become flatter 
with the increasing direct authority of the elected officials to command departments outside the 
Permanent Secretary Office. The Minister Office became a more helpful assistant for the 
elected officials' activities. 
Figure 5.8 Organisation structure of the MoPH before reform (September 2002) 
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Figure 5.9 The new organisation structure of the MoPH after reform (October 2002) 
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5.2.2.12 Quality assurance and accreditation system 
The Institute of Hospital Quality Improvement and Accreditation was established under the 
HSRI in 1998. This institution is expected to be an autonomous organisation under law in the 
near future. Until 2002, only 23 hospitals had been accredited. At the initial stages of the 
hospital accreditation program, the institution had to encourage hospitals to join the program. 
The number of hospitals joining the program was slow, and only increased with capacity 
building of the institution. Under the 30 Baht Scheme criteria, all hospitals should be accredited, 
increasing the demands for accreditation. There were some problems arising from the rapid 
increase in demand; for example, hospital directors pushed staff without building bottom-up 
agreement, resulting in unsustainable development. In contrast, some hospitals directors did not 
allocate enough resources for their staffs activities. 
5.2.3 Summary: gaps between policy Intent and implementation in reality 
Compared to the policy intent discussed in Chapter Four, implementation was in line with the 
policy intent, but many goals had to be realised. Three main goals were assessed: universal 
coverage, equitable benefits and care, and sustainable system (see section 4.2 in Chapter 4). 
The expansion of insurance coverage was very fast. It increased from about 69% to 92% of the 
total population within one year; however, about 8% of the population were left uninsured. 
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Coverage of this uninsured population was difficult to increase, as there were other factors 
involved, for example, migration and deprivation. The development of information and 
technology mainly contributed to the development of the health registration models, and the 
delay in their development led to problems in the transition period. 
Equity in health benefit and care was improved through policy implementation, but a large gap 
remained. Three groups of people in the previous system, namely the Voluntary Health Card 
holders, the Medical Welfare Scheme beneficiaries, and the uninsured, became able to access 
the same quality and variety of health services. They were about 74% of the total population. 
The attempt to adjust the benefit package and cost subsidization of the other schemes for formal 
sector employment has been postponed for more than three years. Moreover, the actual benefit 
distribution between urban and rural areas was still questionable, as there was no a long-term 
human resource re-allocation plan. Only the promotion of the use of primary care was in 
progress. 
Institutional change has been implemented and will be sustained under the National Health 
Security Act. However, financial sustainability cannot be ensured as the adequacy and the 
stability of the government budget was questionable. Moreover, the system will not move to be 
more effective if resource allocation does not continue improving. 
5.3 Actors: their roles, position and power in the UC implementation 
In Chapter Four, the actors influencing in the UC policy formulation process were shown to 
have had a significant role in shaping the policy. This section describes the key actors 
influencing the implementation process and assesses their roles, positions and powers. The 
information in this section is mainly derived from in-depth interviews of key informants, direct 
observation, public documents and newspapers. Actors involved in the UC policy 
implementation can be divided by roles: service providers, regulators, and consumers. Health 
services were provided by agencies in two sectors: the government sector, and the non- 
governmental and private sector. Regulators were government authorities and professional 
councils. Some agencies in the government sector played both provider roles and regulator 
roles. Consumers included consumer representatives and NGOs. There were several issues 
involved in the UC policy implementation as described in the previous section. This assessment 
attempts to specifically address actors' positions in relation to the three significant changes: the 
health financing reform, the changing role of the MoPH, and the establishment of the NHSO 
granted by legislation. 
125 
CHAPTER 5- POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: NATIONAL LEVEL 
5.3.1 The government sector 
5.3.1.1 Thaksin regime 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had a high stake in government performance, which would 
have an effect on the next election. The early phase of the government was the best time to 
implement a good policy, and he strongly supported UC policy, which was in line with the 
TRTP policy. Furthermore, the UC policy had shown itself to be highly popular, more so than 
all other policies. He had a very high level of power in this era since the TRTP captured the 
majority of seats in Parliament. 
5.3.1.2 Ministry of Public Health 
The Ministry of Public Health was the sole responsible agent for UC implementation in the 
transitional period. The MoPH performed purchaser / regulator and provider roles, and this led 
to conflicts of interest in performing these roles (Jongudomsuk 2002). However, the purchaser 
role will be transferred to a quasi-governmental body, the NHSO, three years after the Law has 
been promulgated. The lag period of three years was a result of the negotiation by the MoPH, 
as some civil servant leaders had resisted the transfer of the power to the new NHSO (Interview 
K 10). 
The Health Minister, Sudarat Kayuraphan, clearly stated the MoPH's mission as achieving 
universal coverage of health care and establishing the NHSO by law. She also strongly 
supported the financing reform changing the historically based budgeting to population based 
budgeting. She is a core TRTP administrative committee member and highly trusted by the 
Prime Minister. She graduated from the Faculty of Commerce and holds a Master's degree in 
Business Management from Chulalongkorn University. She is good at strategic management 
but has less technical knowledge in health sciences (Interview K16). However, the medical 
doctor who formulated the UC policy for the TRTP, Dr. Suraphong Suebwonglee, was 
appointed as the Deputy Health Minister. He steered the changes in the transition period 
ensuring progress of the reform. His strong attempt to reform the health financing system 
successfully raised the 2002 per capital allocations including the salary budget. His leaving to 
be the Minister of the Ministry of Information and Technology in October 2002 was a 
significant factor, resulting in a step back of the budget allocation reform to the `per capita 
allocations excluding salary budget'. The new Deputy Health Minister was a police general. 
His main health interest was in drug addiction prevention and care, and he had not been 
involved in the UC policy. 
The positive response of the first Permanent Secretary (PS), Mongkol NaSongkhla, led to rapid 
UC implementation initiation in April 2001. He successfully merged the Rural Hospital and the 
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Rural Health Division, which had separately monitored and supported provincial hospitals and 
community hospitals respectively, into the Bureau of Health Care Network, aiming to bring 
equitable support to and unity among MoPH hospitals. He strongly supported the per capita 
allocation including salary budget, which was a radical financing reform, and which will affect 
the balance of many inefficient hospitals. However, he retired in September 2001, only a few 
months after UC was introduced. The next Permanent Secretary did not support the financing 
reform. This second PS suggested that hospitals should keep quality of services without 
excessive concern with medical costs. He agreed with the idea to protect provincial hospitals 
from the capitation system and to provide sufficient budget for these hospitals. The third PS, 
who came to the position in October 2002, also did not support the financing reform and 
succeeded in protecting salaries from the per capita allocations in fiscal year 2003. 
The Health Insurance Office, which acted as fund manager of the 30 Baht Scheme, prepared 
itself to be transformed into an autonomous organisation (Interview K10). This office 
responded positively to the UC policy. 
The Bureau of Health Care Network had a close relationship with providers in the provinces 
with regard to resource distribution. It had been responsible for the allocation of health 
personnel, capital investment, and contingency fund during implementation in the transition 
period. The first director of this Bureau supported the reform but the second PS appointed 
another doctor to replace him. The personnel allocation under the control of the new director in 
2001-2002 was conservative, following the old pattern, not that of the reform. This Bureau 
became the Department of Health Care Promotion and was proposed to oversee autonomous 
providers according to the government's changes to the bureaucratic structure. In fact, its new 
role is one of technical support to hospitals without allocation powers, as a result of the internal 
politics in the MoPH. The Permanent Secretary's Office, with the PS in charge, still maintains 
the power to oversee provincial health offices, district health offices, provincial hospitals, 
community hospitals, and health centres. 
Provincial Health Offices (PHO) were assigned to perform as purchasers in the transition period; 
however, they could only be passive purchasers because of inadequate preparation. Some 
Provincial Chief Medical Officers felt they were losing the power to manipulate the budget 
because funds were assigned directly to health care providers. They shared their experience in 
their assembly and came up with a proposal (date 17 September 2001) asking for more 
flexibility in the insurance model, and to allow provinces to select an appropriate system to fit 
the local situation. 
MoPH staff can be characterised on a continuum from reform activists to conservative 
bureaucrats. All agreed to extend the insurance coverage but some disagreed with some 
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elements of system reforms that affected their lives. Medical doctors represent the most 
powerful professional group in the MoPH from both provincial hospitals and community 
hospitals. The community hospital group supported the financing reform while the provincial 
hospital group seemed to resist the reform. Both groups competed for influence in the MoPH. 
Many MoPH staff played independent professional roles as representatives of their professional 
societies and some also worked in the private sector. This also led to various conflicts of 
interest. 
5.3.1.3 Other government departments and ministries 
Other than MoPH hospitals, there are some public hospitals operated by universities, the 
Ministry of Defence, and local administrations. The UC program intended to include these 
hospitals to complete the referral system. Moreover, the participation of the educational sector 
is essential in relation to the review of the medical education system. All of them received a UC 
budget as a supplement to their own budget, so they gained from the reform. 
Other ministries involved in the policy, including the ministries of Finance, Labour and Welfare, 
and Commerce, did not play major roles in implementation in 2001-2. 
5.3.2 Non-governmental and private sector 
Physicians represent the most powerful professional group in the health sector. Doctors and 
other health professionals are permitted to work simultaneously for government and private 
sectors. The MoPH has encouraged non-private practice by giving an incentive 10,000 Baht per 
month for doctors and dentists, and 5,000 Baht per month for pharmacists who work full-time in 
the public sector. However, this strategy is effective only in areas of low private demand. In 
urban areas, most medical doctors in provincial hospitals and university hospitals run private 
practices. Full-time private practitioners open private clinics or work in private hospitals. In 
rural areas, most medical doctors work in community hospitals only and receive the 
compensation for foregoing private practice. 
At the initial stage of UC implementation, private practitioners safeguarded their position 
because they could maintain their patients in their clinics. When the National Health Security 
Bill came to Parliament some private practitioners and hospital owners joined together to 
oppose the Bill, especially the section regarding liability. A medical doctors' club, `Phate phur 
wichacheep Phate' (literally `Doctors for the medical professional'), protested the bill, 
reasoning that the law would increase litigation in medicine. However, Parliament passed the 
Bill establishing the authority of the NHSO. The Health Minister met the worries of the private 
sector by promising to change the content of the liability section whenever possible. 
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Some private hospital owners saw the UC policy as an opportunity to increase bed occupancy. 
However, many private hospital owners saw the policy as competing with the private market. 
The latter group labelled the 30 Baht Scheme services as low quality with an inadequate budget. 
Most private providers opposed the National Health Security Bill because it will authorise the 
NHSO to regulate and control the quality of health services. 
In favourable economic and business environment it is likely that the UC scheme will have little 
impact on private insurance companies (Interview K20). The UC scheme was not attractive to 
the customers of private insurance. Data from the Department of Insurance shows that the 
health premiums during January to June 2002 compared to the same period of the previous year 
saw 11.88% growth (Department of Insurance 2002), illustrating that private health insurance 
growth is elastic to income (Pitayarangsarit and Tangcharoensathien 2002). 
The Pharmaceutical Producers Association (PPA) represents multi- or trans-national drug 
companies. As the UC policy limits drug use to the National Essential Drugs List, this affects 
drugs outside the National Essential Drugs List. The PPA has exerted influence through 
physicians to extend the benefit package beyond the National Essential Drugs List, but this has 
not been successful (Interview K4). 
5.3.3 Professional councils 
Professional councils had a low profile in UC, except for the Medical Council. The Medical 
Council is a regulator for market entry and ethical control of the medical profession. The 
Medical Council of Thailand has been criticised as non-transparent and unreliable in solving 
grievances (from a circular letter in 2002 of a network of people suffering from health services). 
In this regard, the Health Ministry appointed two committees from the Medical Council and the 
Health Registration Division, MoPH to clear all remaining grievances and develop the 
grievance system. The Council announced its disagreement with the National Health Security 
Bill regarding the NHSO's authority on consumer protection, which the Council felt that the 
NHSO could undermine the authority of the Medical Council. However, this concern was 
overlook. 
5.3.4 Consumer representatives and committees 
Consumer representatives played a part in the health commissions of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate to review the content of the National Health Security Bill, but 
they were not involved in implementation in 2001-2002. The mass media played major roles in 
reflecting people's satisfaction and problems with the implementation. 
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5.3.5 International Donor Community 
International donors or organisations, for example, the WHO, ILO and the World Bank, did not 
influence the UC implementation, but where they were involved - for example the Health 
Minister requested the WHO and the ILO to run a technical seminar - they gave positive 
support. 
5.4 Assessment of change management 
Two levels of managing change regarding UC implementation are considered in this section: 
national and the MoPH. 
5.4.1 Change management at national level: action outside the MoPH 
UC policy was supported very widely outside the MOPH. How well was this support managed? 
5.4.1.1 Understanding the culture and values of Thai people towards health and health 
services 
Passive values around ill health had been typical of the Thai health system for a long time. 
Many people have suffered from illness and also the cost of care. Some Thais perceive sickness 
is "Khroa Krum" (laterally `Karma' or `unlucky') so everyone risks ill health. The subsidy for 
health care costs for those unable to afford care had been constructed in public facilities as 
`welfare' and perceived by patients as giving with kindness, based on a patron-client 
relationship. Few grievances were brought to court because of low expectations. 
Changing the Thai political system to democracy generally was reflected in the 1997 
Constitution. The public were empowered to participate and move on political issues. Health 
care was legitimated as a human right, and people had rights to propose laws and demote 
ministers. Politicians are more responsive to their voters and public issues affect their interest, 
and people, through networks, have gradually become more demanding. 
5.4.1.2 Action in mobilising support 
The arrival of the UC issue onto the national policy agenda reflected a successful step in 
mobilising political support. Health issues are of public concern; i. e. benefits from the policy 
can be dispersed to the whole population. UC had great legitimacy, and therefore, gained votes 
for the government party. Research results on feasibility in terms of affordability, technical 
knowledge, and resources available supplemented political support. Implementation at a time 
of high political support and leadership was seen as a major opportunity. 
Mobilisation of public support occurred in many ways. The process of the `National Health 
System Reform Movement' was one platform for communication about health issues. Another 
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route, encouraged by the Health Care Reform Office, was through beneficiaries and NGO 
groups over a few years. These groups of beneficiaries declared their support for the Universal 
Coverage concept. Their 2000 campaign presented explicit support, through for example, the 
slogan `Health rights are for all, not only for the poor'. The dispersion of the benefits to a wide 
population, raised public interest and the negotiation powers of beneficiaries. 
Slogans to capture the interest and attention of the public were important in getting support for 
UC. For example, instead of `financing according to pay', the motto "Dee chouy puey Ruey 
chouy joun" (literally `the healthy help the sick and the rich help the poor') was an active 
symbol reflecting the quality of solidarity in the Thai culture. 
The slogan `30 Baht treats all diseases', though it was successful in the election campaign, was 
criticised, as it mentions disease rather than health and could increase health care expenses. The 
new value "Sang (sukkaparp) Nam Som (sukkaparp)" (literally `build health prior to repairing 
health') was used to communicate to both providers and people as an inherent goal of UC. 
For other stakeholders, private employees and university hospitals, for instance, the initial 
attempt to create new arenas of decision-making to enable participation was not a success. The 
National Health Security Policy Committee and the National Administrative Committee were 
constituted later in August 2001, so the implementation in the transition period was led by the 
MoPH. Much of this was because UC was highly technical and therefore depended on 
competence and support in the bureaucracy (Grindle and Thomas 1989). 
5.4.2 Managing change in the MoPH: changing organisational culture 
5.4.2.1 Understanding the culture and values of the organisation and staff 
The MoPH of Thailand is a hierarchical and centralised top-down decision-making government 
organisation. However, staff at each level have some autonomy in thinking, problem solving, 
and managing their own authorised resources. MoPH staff are highly competent as the Ministry 
has recruited well-educated medical professionals. Medical doctors dominate the organisation 
and have considerable power. Health staff still listened to their boss rather than to patients, 
although customer-orientation was increasingly respected after UC introduction. Nevertheless, 
the criteria of rewards and promotions are not clear so staff often feel they have to satisfy their 
boss in order to be promoted. Most MoPH officials were civil servants, with secure permanent 
salaries, and therefore, there was little incentive to change the status quo. Above all, health 
officials had a strong public service ethic which stressed the value of helping people and 
alleviating suffering. Many of them cooperated in setting and achieving the MoPH goals, 
displayed high loyalty and willingness to go beyond what was officially set. 
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A long history of `culture clash' (Whiteley 1995) divides medical doctors into two groupings: 
medical services and community health services. The medical doctors who concentrate on 
medical services usually work in general/regional hospitals and often in the private sector. The 
medical doctors who concentrate on community health services usually work in community 
hospitals and rise to become community hospital directors and then provincial medical chief 
officers. They have separate interests and support systems. Health care reform was proactively 
supported by the group in the stream of community health services. Reformers tended to ignore 
(intentionally or not) the other group's values. 
5.4.2.2 Action for change 
UC implementation started rapidly because of the strong support and leadership from the 
Permanent Secretary. It was a quick decision with limited consultation. In addition there was 
no explicit disagreement when the leader consulted about 60 MoPH senior staff in a workshop 
held in March 2001. The decision-making process sought consensus (in the formal meeting) 
based on evidence. However, some argued that the core group listened to whom they wanted to 
and did not hear the oppositions' ideas. Some argued that the core group could pursue the 
decision as they had better evidence but it did not mean they were right. That was not a real 
consensus. When the new PS replaced the retired PS, reform was supported inconsistently. 
At the initial implementation stages, communication of the UC policy to health staff was 
explicitly directed through broadcasting of the Tele-medicine network22. As the information 
was dynamic, health staff were confused by the rapidly changing decisions, a result of the `do 
and correct' approach. However, they had learnt the expectations of the PS. For example, 
`Sang nam Som' [building prior to repairing health] was the symbolic message they widely 
accepted. 
Pilot testing was a good learning process to shape the policy for implementation, and also build 
up staff capacity. The War Room was established to keep abreast of implementation. It was a 
new way of enabling implementers to participate in decision-making, so that changes could be 
made iteratively. 
UC implementation was rigid at the beginning, but allowed some degree of flexibility later with 
policy-makers adjusting to reality. For example, the capitation budget was fixed at a flat rate 
and hospitals financial constraints were met from the contingency fund. This strategy labelled 
many hospitals as `inefficient' and needing improvement. Money from the contingency fund 
could solve hospitals' financial problems but could not wipe out the stigma of inefficiency. 
22 Tele-medicine network was the tele-communication network established in 17 general/regional hospitals for 
medical training. 
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Another example was the adjustments to the standard of the Primary Care Units, which turned 
out to be unfeasible. Three levels of PCU standard were therefore set, to facilitate primary care 
development. 
The period after the termination of the War Room (August 2002) led to a vacuum in decision 
making. The MoPH led by the Health Minister and the new PS maintained the status quo, but 
there was little progress. This may have been because after such radical reform, a period of 
consolidation was necessary to ensure UC was implemented effectively. 
5.5 Chapter summary 
Five key themes emerged. Firstly, UC implementation in Thailand was characterised by rapid, 
radical, and top-down change, creating some consequences such as administrative problems. 
However, introducing it so rapidly means that opposition did not have time to consolidate and 
grow. 
Secondly, this rapid implementation encouraged a `do and correct' approach, which provided 
some flexibility into what otherwise appeared to be a top-down process. Flexibility allowed 
easier implementation. Policy implementation was top-down in a hierarchical institution 
(MoPH) and was mainly dominated by MoPH actors; other influencing factors for MoPH 
responses were capacity and the bureaucratic culture. Consensus was achieved only part of the 
time, and a lot of conflicts occurred. The `do and correct' approach led to a balance in the 
policy continuum which was dominated by the policy elites. 
Thirdly, the 30 Baht Scheme induced a radical change in health care finance, one of several 
other proposed health reforms. In October 2001, the scheme shifted the historically based 
finance to population-based finance. It was radical, and found resonance with a small group 
within the MoPH, but was essentially from outside. In contrast, health reforms came from 
within the MoPH and were contested within, by different groups - because those reforms 
directly affected people involved in the health sector at all levels. The change was not linear. 
Reform directions were subject to push-and-pull by different stakeholders. 
Fourthly, factors enabling the easy implementation of UC were: clear policy goals with strong 
leadership, strong institutional capacity and skilful implementers, and flexibility and discretion 
level of implementers. 
Fifthly, factors hindering the introduction of the UC were: resistance of bureaucrats and medical 
professionals and budget constraints. 
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Chapter 6- Implementation: Provincial arrangements 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the UC implementation at provincial level connecting to the management at 
central level. Implementation at provincial level is a crucial management stage affecting operations 
and outcome results. To understand the processes of management and interactions of actors in the 
implementation of UC policy at provincial level, this study employed qualitative data collection in a 
province, Saraburi. Data were retrieved using key informant Interview, document analysis, and 
participatory observation during February to April 2002. The province was selected for three 
reasons: 
0 both private and public providers in the province have joined the program, 
" the province faced budget constraint and requested extra money from the 
Contingency Fund, and 
"- data and health personnel were accessible. 
The chapter starts by introducing the Saraburi context and then goes on to the UC implementation 
in Saraburi, exploring the organisation and management, policy communications and perceptions of 
implementers at provincial level. Next, it goes on to analyse the decision-making process on 
particular issues: the enrolment process and population coverage. It assesses the impact of the 
policy on implementers and highlights their responses. 
6.2 Profile of Saraburi Province 
Figure 6.1 The slogan of the Saraburi 
Saraburi Province's slogan 
Invaluable Buddha's footprints, the Pasak Chonlasit Dam, industrial production bases, agricultural majority, 
plenty of tourist places, unique Curry Puff Cakes and good milks, the tradition ofpresentingfoods and flowers to 
priests, yellowness sunflowerfield, and famous junction city 
Source: Translated from the Department of Local Administration: http: //www. dola. go. th/ 
134 
CHAPTER 6- POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: PROVINCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Saraburi is a province in Central Thailand, 107 kilometres from Bangkok. It has the reputation of 
being rich in natural resources and culture (see the province's slogan above). It is composed of 13 
districts with a total population of 607,600 in 168,979 households in December 2000 (Department 
of Local Administration 2000). Table 6.1 shows general information on Saraburi compared to 
national figures. The household size and income characteristics of Saraburi are similar to other 
provinces in the Central Region, although per capita Gross Provincial Product is higher than the 
average. In other respects, the province is fairly average, although a little smaller in household size 
and more densely populated than average. 
Table 6.1. General Information on Saraburi Province 
Saraburi (December 2000) Average province (December 2000) 
Area (Sq. km2) 3,576 6,752 
Districts 13 12 
Households 168,979 217,320 
Populations 607,600 814,194 
Household size 3.6 3.7 
Pop. density (persons/Sq. km2) 169.89 120.59 
Per capita GPP. (Baht) 1999 ** 115,539 74,675 
Source: Department of Local Administration: http: //www. dola. go. th/ 
'" NESDB. Gross Provincial Product of Thailand 1999 edition: www. NESDB. go. th (National Economic and Social 
Development Board 2000) 
Table 6.2 Health resources per 10,000 population in 1999 
Saraburi Province Whole Kingdom Compared to Kingdom average (times) 
Public beds 23.1 16.9 1.4 
Private beds 8.8 5.1 1.7 
Doctors 3.7 2.9 1.3 
Dentists 0.7 0.7 1.0 
Pharmacists 1.1 1.0 1.2 
Nurses 24.4 16.2 1.5 
Health workers 4.1 1.7 2.4 
Source: Bureau of Health Policy and Planning, MOPH. Health Resource Survey 1999 
In 1999, Saraburi had more health resources per person than the country average except in number 
of dentists (see in Table 6.2). On comparison with national figures, the greatest difference is in the 
ratio of health workers, followed by the difference in the ratio of private beds, nurses, public beds, 
doctors, and pharmacists respectively. Resources have been invested in Saraburi because it is the 
centre of the patient referral system in the second zone of the Central Region. There are two big 
public hospitals, a general hospital (400 beds) in Phabudhabaht District and a regional hospital (634 
beds) in Muang District (Saraburi City). In addition, there is also a college of nursing in this 
province. Furthermore, two big private hospitals (200 beds or more) are located along the main 
road in this province as a result of the demand in health care arising from both geographic and 
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economic factors (Saraburi is at a junction of the roads from the Northeast and North to Bangkok). 
There are also three small private hospitals which are located outside Saraburi city. 
Figure 6.2 Illness and hospital utilisation rates in Saraburi Province in 1996, rank out of 75 
provinces from lowest to highest rates 
Proportion of ackniamions to provincial hospitals 
Proportion of a kniusions to district he 
Ilneee rate 
admission rate 
Source: National Statistics Office, Thailand. The 1996 Health Welfare Survey. 
The average illness rate of Saraburi residents was 3.975 episodes per capita per year in 1996 
(National Statistics Office 1996), close to the national average figure (3.978). Despite the large 
number of health resources, the hospital admission rate was only 0.05 admissions per capita per 
year in 1996, rather low with a ranking of 20 among 75 provinces when ranked from lowest to 
highest (see the ranks in Figure 6.2). Of all admissions, 46% were to regional hospitals and general 
hospitals, 38% to private hospitals, and 17% to community hospitals. Saraburi residents used 
private hospitals more than the national average, with a ranking of 68 from 75 provinces when 
ranked from lowest to highest, perhaps because of their greater income and therefore their greater 
ability to pay. Data in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 imply that the health resources in Saraburi were not 
totally consumed by Saraburians. This is supported by a study of the net inpatient flow ratio in 
2000 by Pannarunothai (2002). He found that 2,564 Saraburian patients were admitted in hospitals 
in other provinces, while 13,596 patients from other provinces were admitted in hospitals in 
Saraburi (Pannarunothai 2002). Thus, the population-based budget reform worried public providers 
in Saraburi because the allocated budget would be less than their historical incremental budget and 
the revenues from reimbursable referral cases might be uncertain. 
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Table 6.3 Distribution of health resources in Saraburi Province, June 2001 
District Populations Hospitals 
Resources per 10,000 populations 
Public beds Private beds Doctors Dentists Pharmacists Nurses 
Saraburi City and 143,355 5 50.5 33.5 7.3 0.9 2.0 44.8 
Chalermprakiat 
Gaeng Khoy 87,180 2 6.9 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 6.1 
Nong Kae 84,617 2 7.1 5.9 0.7 0.2 0.5 7.7 
Wiharndang 36,677 1 8.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 9.8 
Nongsang 15,858 1 6.3 0.0 1.3 0.6 0.6 18.3 
Ban Mo 42,401 2 28.3 0.0 1.4 0.5 0.5 14.4 
Don Phud 7,535 1 39.8 0.0 2.7 1.3 1.3 38.5 
Nong Don 14686 1 6.8 0.0 1.4 0.7 1.4 12.9 
PraBudhabaht 76568 1 52.2 0.0 3.7 0.8 1.8 43.9 
Sao-hai 29032 1 3.4 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.7 9.3 
Muag-leg 49865 1 6.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 7.4 
Wang-muong 21473 1 14.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.5 14.4 
Total 609,247 19 24.2 8.9 2.7 0.6 1.0 22.4 
Source: Saraburi Provincial Health Office Annual Report, 2001 
Table 6.3 shows the unequal distribution of health resources amongst districts in 2001. The 
distribution of health personnel was not proportional to population size. The boundary setting of 
districts is under the Ministry of Interior, which is out of MoPH control. In Saraburi, every district 
has at least one hospital, except the new district created from a division of the city of Saraburi, 
Chalermprakiat, population 27,961. Community hospitals start from 10 beds and rise to 30,60,90 
and 120 beds according to the district's population size and the incremental investment plan of the 
MoPH. However, political factors can also lead to upgrading a hospital from 10 to 30 beds. For 
example, in Don Phud, a very small district which has about 7,500 people, the previous 10-bed 
hospital was upgraded to a 30-bed hospital due to political lobbying of local politicians. Once the 
number of beds increased, other resources such as doctors, nurses, budget, and equipment followed. 
That is a characteristic of supply-side budgeting. Other highly resourced districts, such as Ban Mo, 
Phabudhabaht, and Saraburi City, have specific backgrounds to their extra high numbers of beds. 
Ban Mo has a community hospital (30 beds) and a Mother and Child Hospital (60 beds) which is 
mainly for technical purposes. Phabudhabaht has a general hospital of 400 beds - Phabudhabaht 
Hospital. This hospital was first established in 1954 (100 beds at that time), a year after the 
establishment of the Saraburi Hospital in Saraburi City, with a commitment of the Prime Minister in 
that era, General Por Phibulsongkram. Saraburi City has a regional hospital (the Saraburi Hospital, 
634 beds), a military hospital (90 beds) and three private hospitals (250 beds, 200 beds, and 30 
beds). 
In sum, Saraburi is a province rich in resources. It is a centre for referral of patients and can be 
labelled as a patient-importing province. The study of Saraburi province cannot therefore perfectly 
represent all provinces but it helps to explain the system. The characteristics of Saraburi clearly 
reflect the design of the infrastructure of the Thai health system and the influence of the health care 
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market. These are contextual factors that facilitated the implementation of the UC policy but which 
also limited system change in some aspects. 
6.3 Implementation of the UC policy in Saraburi Province 
Saraburi is one of the 15 provinces which came into UC implementation in the second phase in June 
2001. At the initial stage the communication from central level confused the provincial staff 
(Interview S2 and unpublished report). The MoPH Permanent Secretary selected the province and 
communicated directly via telephone with the Saraburi Provincial Chief Medical Officer (PCMO) 
in March 2001. Then, the Saraburi staff requested the support of the Health Insurance Office (HIO) 
for household databases and guidelines, but the HIO refused to support the province because the 
province was not on its list. Therefore, the province started the preparation without HIO support; 
however, the HIO subsequently changed its decision within a few weeks and supported the province. 
It seems that implementation in the province started relatively chaotically. This section starts with 
the organisation and management of the Provincial Health Office, the policy communication and 
the perceptions of the health staff on the UC policy content and process. 
6.3.1 Organisation and implementing management 
Saraburi PHO managed seven functions of the UC implementation through the Provincial Health 
Insurance Office. These functions were health registration, financial management and accounting, 
information and technology system development, provider regulation and network development, 
management of grievances, public relations, and evaluation. In order to invite collaboration, an 
administrative committee was appointed in April 2001 (Saraburi Provincial Health Office 2001). 
Later, participation expanded to cover five committees to include other government sectors and 
MPs (elected from Saraburi) (Health Minister's Secretariat Office 2001). Figure 6.3 demonstrates 
the relationship between organisations and committees. 
The five committees were the Advisory Committee, the Steering Committee, the Administrative 
Committee, the Service Delivery System Committee, and Public Relations Committee. In respect 
of the insurance system, the five committees and the PHO were the purchasers in the province. 
However, the decision-making and management processes were concentrated in the Administrative 
Committee and an existing committee - the Provincial Health Planning and Evaluation Committee. 
Sections in the PHO were responsible for monitoring and evaluating the program. An Area Health 
Board acted in an advisory capacity. This Board was appointed in September 2001 according to a 
suggestion from the MoPH in response to the Decentralisation Act. However, the Board's actual 
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role was unclear, and it was never activated. The roles, capacities, and relationships of organisations 
in the province are discussed below. 
Figure 6.3 Organisation and management structure in Saraburi, 2001-2002 
I Steering Area Health Board - Committee -- Advisory Committee 
I Saraburi Governor 
Members of Parliament 
Saraburi Provincial Health Insurance Committee for Public 
Health Committee for (Administrative)Committee Service Relation 
tannin and Evaluation Provincial Chief Medical Officer Delivery stem Committee 
FCJ1O (KMO) PCMO PCJNO 
it I 
Director v/ ý 
Health Finance and Information General Rovider Grievance Public 
Registration Accounting & Administration Regulation Receiving Relation 
Section Section Technolociv Section Betdon Section Section 
MOPH Pubic Providers Adisorn Kasemratch 
Regional hospitals Military Camp Private 
Command line 
<> General hospitals Hospital Provider Contract "Community hospitals 
Technical advice ----> -Health centres 
Monitor -Primary care units 
Financial flow. 
Source: The 2001 Saraburi PHO Annual Health Report 
6.3.1.1 Provincial committees for the implementation of the UC Policy in Saraburi 
The five committees appointed by the Saraburi governor were broadly participative, and included 
MPs and village volunteers. The wide participation led to public support and smooth 
implementation. The committees' members, roles, and relationships to others were as follows 
(Saraburi Governor Office 2001). 
The Advisory Committee included two senators and four Members of Parliament. This committee 
advised other committees on the implementation of the policy. 
The Steering Committee chaired by the Saraburi Governor, with the PCMO acting as secretary, 
included 29 members from the Governor's Office, local administrative offices at all levels, 
Provincial Social Welfare Office, Provincial Social Security Office, Provincial Insurance Office, 
five MoPH hospitals, two private hospitals, two District Health Offices and two health centres. The 
committee was responsible for health-care purchasing. 
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The Administrative Committee was chaired by the Saraburi PCMO, had a deputy PCMO (a medical 
doctor) as secretary, and included 17 members. The committee members were composed of five 
PHO officials, five Saraburi hospital officials, three officials from Phabudhabaht Hospital, a 
community hospital director, a District Health Officer, a health centre head, and a private hospital 
director. The committee was responsible as a coordination committee and providing technical 
support to the Steering committee. 
The Service Delivery System Committee was chaired by the PCMO and had the deputy PCMO as 
secretary (the same person as the above committee). It included representatives from all providers 
in the 30 Baht Scheme in Saraburi (13 public hospital directors, a private hospital director, 13 
District Health Officers, and four Municipal Councillors). In addition, the committee members 
included a director from a private hospital who had qualified to join the program but finally did not. 
This committee was responsible for providing services and communication to the public and 
communities. 
The Public Relations Committee was chaired by the Saraburi PCMO and its secretary was the head 
of the Health Education and Public Relations Section. This committee was composed of 
representatives from several public institutions and all mass media in Saraburi, both public and 
private. Members in the public sector were the Director of the Adisom Military Camp Radio 
Broadcast Station, the Provincial Agricultural Officer, the Provincial Public Relations Officer, the 
President and members of the Saraburi Administrative Organisation, District Officers, Presidents of 
Municipal Councillors, and Chairmen of Sub-district Administrative Organisations. Members in the 
private sector were all media representatives from television channels, local newspapers, national 
newspapers, village radio stations, village volunteers for public relations, and village health 
volunteers. This committee was responsible for public relations. 
The last four committees took actions concerned with implementation and all were led by the 
PCMO. 
Provincial Structure 
6.3.1.2 The Provincial Health Committee for Planning and Evaluation 
Like other provinces, the Saraburi PHO had a Provincial Health Planning and Evaluation 
Committee. This committee was responsible for regular management of health care in the province. 
It was composed of staff heads of all sections in the PHO, directors of all community hospitals, the 
Director of the Saraburi Hospital, the Director of the Phabudhabaht Hospital, and all District Health 
Officers in Saraburi. They held monthly meetings to coordinate the health plan and to monitor 
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outcomes of public health activities. All health issues were discussed in the meeting including the 
health insurance issue. This committee was a core structure affecting any public health program 
implemented in Saraburi. 
6.3.1.3 The Saraburi Provincial Health Insurance Office and other sections in the PHO 
The Health Insurance Section in any provincial health office is an informal unit without an official 
structure certified by the Civil Service Commission or the Bureaucratic Structure law. In Saraburi 
as well as in some other provinces, jobs regarding health insurance issues are separated from jobs of 
the Health Planning Section and allocated to a new small unit, the Health Insurance Section. The 
Health Insurance Section in Saraburi was established in the PHO and headed by a nurse under 
supervision of a deputy PCMO before the UC policy was launched, to take responsibility for the 
MWS, VHCS, and other health insurance schemes. 
Incidentally, the then PCMO restructured the PHO in order to improve performance in April 2001; 
he adopted a matrix organisation to prepare for the reform of Bureaucratic Structure, the law 
subsequently enacted in October 2002 (see PHO structure in Table 6.4). The former organisation of 
the PHO included eleven sections with a staff head in each section, two deputy PCMOs (a medical 
doctor and a nurse), and the PCMO, the provincial health authority. The new grouping was based 
on five duties: administration support for public health, health insurance, provider regulation, 
disease control and risk factor control, and health promotion including consumer protection. In 
response to the UC policy, the PCMO appointed a medical doctor from the Saraburi Hospital, who 
was keen on the Social Security Fund management, to direct the Provincial Health Insurance Office; 
consequently the office moved into and used facilities of the Saraburi Hospital. 
Table 6.4 Matrix organisation in transition to the new PHO structure 
New PHO's structure according to duty grouping 
Former Sections for 
Office for 
Administrativ 
e Support for 
Public Health 
Provincial 
Health 
Insurance 
Office 
Office to 
regulate 
providers 
Office to 
control 
diseases and 
risk factors 
Office for 
Health 
Promotion and 
Consumer 
Protection 
1. Administration 
2. Planning 
3. Human resource and primary health 
care development 
4. Community pharmacy 
5. Dental health 
6. Health promotion and health care 
7. Communicable disease control 
8. AIDS control and prevention 
9. Sanitation and environment 
10. Public relations 
11. Health insurance 
irk colour means some degree of involvement) 
It 
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The Saraburi Provincial Health Insurance Office (2001) had seven sections responsible for seven 
roles and coordinated all health insurance schemes in Saraburi. There were only ten people in this 
office. The director and two officers were from the Saraburi Hospital. The director had experience 
in the management of the SSS fund of the Saraburi Hospital. Two officers were from the Public 
Relations Section of the PHO and the rest were from the former Health Insurance Office in the PHO, 
which had years of experience in the bill clearing system. The office had a good reputation for its 
performance. 
There was a good relationship between the Health Insurance Office and the hospital; the first 
worked as a purchaser and the latter acted as a provider (Interview S2). However, this close 
relationship was seen as negative because the office might have conflicts of interest between its 
roles of regulator and regulatee, and therefore the office was removed in July 2002 and relocated at 
the PHO under supervision of a deputy PCMO. The director of the Saraburi Health Insurance 
Office then resigned and moved to oversee a community hospital in the network of the Saraburi 
Hospital. 
From July 2002, a deputy PCMO was in charge of the Health Insurance Office and transferred some 
of its tasks to other sections in the PHO. For example, the provider regulation and licensing roles 
were transferred to the Pharmaceutical and Consumer Protection Section. The Human 
Development and Primary Health Care Development Section was responsible for the health care 
network development and primary care unit development. The UC policy then became the whole 
PHO's responsibility rather than a responsibility of only the Health Insurance Office. 
As can be seen from the above, the PHO structure in 2001 and 2002 was in transition. In October 
2002, the PHO regrouped sections and divided the organisation into five sections due to the new 
Bureaucratic Structure Act (BE 2545). The new sections were: 1) General Administration, 2) 
Strategy Development, 3) Technical Support, 4) Consumer Protection, and 5) Health Insurance. 
These new five sections were close to the five sections in the matrix organisation proposed by the 
former PCMO with which the PHO staff was familiar. 
In summary, the implementation of the UC policy in Saraburi had wide participation. The PCMO 
provided a strong leadership to start off the program. The program management in this province 
was flexible and adjusted according to new situations. Health officers had skills and experience in 
insurance management. All health officers had experience of several past reforms and could adjust 
themselves well to the new situation. 
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6.3.2 Policy communication and perceptions of the implementers 
6.3.2.1 Policy communication 
Figure 6.4 Communications in implementing the UC policy: Saraburi 
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Figure 6.4 is a summary of the communication flows. The information on the UC policy came to 
the province from several sources, and affected staff perceptions in various degrees. This 
discussion divides the communication pathways into three groups; first is the pathway of 
information inflow, second is the internal communication within the P110, and third is the 
communication between the PHO and operational implementers. 
Communication from the MoPH to the province 
The PCMO received informal messages when the province was consulted about joining the second 
phase in direct communication with the PS (Interview Si, S2, S4.1). Province staff learned about 
the UC policy from informal sources such as mass media before the PHO received formal messages, 
i. e. through letters, circular guideline manuals and documents or MoPH electronic sources. Other 
sources of information were from broadcast tele-conferences and from the Inspector General from 
the 2nd administrative zone health office, who was charged with supervision and monitoring in 
Saraburi. 
The mass media, i. e. newspapers, played major roles in transferring messages from the central 
MoPH to staff in Saraburi. It was a fast messenger but included a lot of rumours. Newspapers 
delivered messages the next day while the tele-medicine conference system helped to present on- 
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line broadcast (only 17 big hospitals had a tele-medicine system). With the tele-conference 
broadcast, people in various provinces participated in MoPH meetings; therefore, they could clearly 
perceive the desires of the MoPH leaders. For example, providers in Saraburi had an initial 
agreement to divide providers into two networks, but they changed the decision to choose the 
inclusive capitation system (13 networks) due to the PS's position supporting inclusive capitation in 
a meeting broadcast via tele-conference (Interview S2, S3). 
The communication from central level to the provinces was rather one-way. Policy content was 
decided with some choices at central level and then distributed to provinces for implementation 
with a time lag following guidelines. The participation in meetings seemed to encourage two-way 
communication; however, there was little space for voices from local level. For example, several 
provincial representatives were invited to join a meeting - the coordination meeting with 15 
provinces - but were given no opportunity to voice their opinions. "They invited us to join the 
meeting to listen to them, not to listen to us", a hospital director said (Interview S3). 
Another source of information linking the central MoPH and provinces was Inspector Generals. 
The Inspector General in charge of zone II visited staff in Saraburi and influenced the decision on 
the salary subtraction (Interview S2). The warning of hospital bankruptcies and negative impact of 
salary-including budgets had led to rumours that worried health officials who worked in health 
facilities, and caused a loss of morale (Interview S1, S2). However, the Inspector General played 
an important role in countering anxieties, and encouraging the progress of policy implementation in 
Saraburi. 
A source of formal information was the book of guidelines for implementing the UC policy. It was 
published twice, with the second version in January 2002 (Ministry of Public Health 2002a) being a 
bit different from the first version in May 2001 (Ministry of Public Health 2001b). It focused on 
the concepts of solidarity, equity and sustainability. Most of the principles in the first version were 
retained; i. e. people's participation, strengthening of primary care, decentralisation and purchaser- 
provider split, cost containment system and performance-related payment, consumer protection and 
choices, and single fund. However, some issues were deleted due to low urgency and priority, for 
example, hospital accreditation, provider networks and public-private mixes, and gatekeepers. The 
change in the principles in the documents had little effect on provincial staff because they were not 
relevant to provincial actions. 
The real impact on actions was from the resolutions of the War Room, released twice a month. 
While the resolutions could solve problems in implementing the policy, they led to a vacillation in 
the rules between providers and the purchaser in the province (Interview S2, S13). Another impact 
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was from the sub-programs of many divisions in the MoPH. Each division had its own program to 
support the policy but there was little coordination between divisions; therefore, the province was 
invaded with similar orders, different targets and no cohesion. For example, the Bureau of Health 
Care Network allocated money to support the model development of primary health care, which the 
provinces agreed to develop in 13 selected PCUs depending on staff capacities and locations. 
However, the Nursing Division instructed the province to select only big health centres called 
"Chalermprakiat" (means royal honour commemoration) (Interview S4.1). 
The most important message from central level to get the system started was from the position of 
the Permanent Secretary in 2001. He expressed a strong commitment to implement the policy in 
several meetings broadcast via telemedicine and was perceived to have a radical reform mind 
(Interview S2), and he got along well with the Deputy Minister. This facilitated the implementation. 
The information from central level had been interpreted in Saraburi in several brainstorming 
meetings (Interview S1, S2, S4.1) and communication processes within the PHO. 
Internal communication within PHO 
The internal communication within Saraburi PHO was unique during the early phases as it set up 
the Health Insurance Section outside the PHO and this office was a focal point of the UC policy 
information. As the office's location was at Saraburi Hospital, two kilometres from the PI10, staff 
participation in the policy implementation was concentrated amongst the staff of the Health 
Insurance Section and its executive officers; i. e. PCMO and his deputies. However, other sections 
were finally included according to the related tasks. Internal communication within the PI1O 
included meetings of head of sections twice a month, circular letters, and the monthly meeting of 
the Health Planning and Monitoring Committee (participated in by hospital directors, district health 
officers, and head of PHO sections). 
Communication between PI1O and other operational implementers 
The communications between the PHO and other operational implementers were similar to other 
provinces, with official letters and circulars, guideline manuals and documents, meetings, and 
supervision. In order to clarify the policy with operational staff, preparation in the province started 
with a brainstorming discussion with wide participation of about 80 health staff from all levels of 
the province in April 2001. It was followed by two rounds of visits from the PHO. Other 
consultations were held in the monthly meeting of the Health Planning and Monitoring Committee. 
In summary, the communication within the province was more two-way communication than was 
the communication from the central level to the province. Messages from the central level were 
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perceived as `commands'; the PHO had to transfer the messages and facilitate collaboration in 
implementing the policy. The statement "it is a policy, we must do it" usually followed the 
information (Interview S1, S3, S4.1, S17). The communication within the PHO was initially 
concentrated in one section and finally spread to other sections, resulting in more participation in 
regulation and consumer protection roles. The quasi-autonomous authority of the Provincial Health 
Insurance Office was able to respond very well as a focal point of the policy communication and 
management. 
6.3.2.2 Perceptions of implementers in Saraburi 
In this section, perceptions of implementers are divided into perceptions about the policy goals, and 
perceptions about change management and impact of the policy. 
Perceptions towards the policy goals 
In general, the PCMO (Interview in April 2002) and his staff agreed with the concepts of the UC 
policy. The general goal that everyone perceived was to improve equity of access for health care. 
However, there were multiple perceptions of other goals. One PHO officer summarised the goals of 
the UC policy as good health for all in order to decrease curative expenditures as the health care 
costs have been increasing; therefore, health promotion must be implemented. The policy would 
change the service delivery approach from 'walk in patients' to 'home visits' (Interview S2). The 
following are opinions on each issue. 
" Equity in rights to health care - Although health staff agreed with this objective, 
one key informant said: "it is very difficult to find the rest of the people who are 
uninsured. Why should we invest a lot of resources to register them when the 
province would get just a small additional budget? "(Interview S 17). 
" Tax subsidisation for all - Some providers perceived the similarity between the 30 
Baht Scheme and the MWS. A hospital director said: "why don't we just extend the 
Medical Welfare Scheme without system reform? " (Interview S3). Others asked: 
"why does the government give free care to those who are able to pay? They used 
to pay without complaint" (Interview S2). 
" Thirty Baht Co-payment - "This deduction at the point of service aims to prevent 
unnecessary seeking of care and brings co-responsibility in self-care" (Interview 
SI). 
" Health promotion - "This objective is congruent to what I was taught in school" 
(Interview S2). 
" Primary care development - "To promote primary care is a good policy; however, 
general practitioners in tertiary care hospitals are scarce and specialists would have 
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to be forced to practice in PCUs. This is not an efficient way of human resource 
management. " (Interview S4.1) 
Decentralisation - "As the money follows people, the money then was directly paid 
to CUPs [Contracting Units for Primary Care]. Therefore, the management power 
was delegated from the PHO to CUPs" (Interview S4.1). "Much information was 
passed over PHO to providers and now district level operations do not listen to the 
PHO" (Interview S 17). "The inclusive capitation let community hospitals 
independently hold money; therefore, it is difficult to bring unity in management in 
our province" (Interview S3). 
In summary, the existing values of health civil servants dominated their perceptions. These values 
were built up by their experience and education. Equity in health care, health promotion and the 
primary care approach were widely accepted as a good direction of reform. Nevertheless, other 
changes in the health system were debated. 
Perceptions towards change management and impact of the policy on them 
According to one PHO staff member, there was no voice from health civil servants in Saraburi 
because the then PCMO showed a strong commitment to implement the policy; therefore, all staff 
kept quiet and acted as "Lai Tarm Nam" (means all staff acted according to the leaders' wishes). 
According to a key informant, the then PCMO announced that: "you should follow the policy to 
survive in the system" (Interview Si). The change within the PHO included the restructuring of the 
organisation and roles. The change in hospitals included establishment of PCUs and the structure of 
hospital finance. The change in health centres included primary care service strengthening and the 
relationship to community hospitals and District Health Office. The latter change also affected the 
roles of the District Health Office. However, there was little staff movement. These changes were 
facilitated by several factors, as a PHO staff member said: "we cannot say the 30 Baht Policy solely 
made the PHO change. The changes in Saraburi PHO were caused by the leadership of the PCMO 
and other changes in the government's bureaucracy. Health officials were aware that they needed 
to improve their performance to survive, because the plan aimed to reduce staff numbers in the 
PHO" (Interview S I). 
The issue of rapid implementation was perceived differently by different staff. Many people felt the 
policy implementation was too rushed. Health registration had to be done within a few months, 
causing many errors and conflicts. However, some argued that no matter whether they started in 
June or October the staff would still not be ready as bureaucrats were perceived to usually wait until 
the due time (Interview SI). Though the extension of the health insurance coverage could be 
implemented immediately, some felt salaries should not be included instantly in the per capita 
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budget (Interview S2, S3). However, the change in hospital payment was perceived as unavoidable 
because the system was needed to cope with the limited resources (Interview S 1). 
The PHO staff member also pointed out that government showed only positive results and did not 
mention the problems in service providers (Interview Si). Providers worried about salary inclusion; 
they perceived that the numbers of staff were a big burden on the hospital budget. They were 
concerned about the adequacy of the budget, and did only the necessary jobs such as curative 
services. However, some staff felt that the government would not let any public hospital go 
bankrupt (Interview S2). 
The inclusion of salary at Contracting Units for Primary Care (CUPs) showed an impact on 
physician's retention in Saraburi. Tertiary care hospitals had to calculate staff efficiency, and in 
Saraburi it became clear that no more specialists were needed. Many young physicians who were 
waiting for the opportunity for specialized training resigned. Therefore the tertiary hospital 
requested new graduates to replace the positions and some community hospitals were left without a 
physician. 
In summary, the perception of health officials at local level clearly reflected the bureaucratic culture 
with an awareness of hierarchy, top-down obligation, and some reluctance to change. The 
consultation process did not seek consensus but assumed implementation would occur. Resisters 
were hidden and only slowly responded to the policy. However, leadership of the top-level civil 
servant of each organisation was crucial in ensuring decisions and changes. 
6.3.3 Saraburi insurance system and decision-making process 
The decision-making processes were concentrated in the Administrative Committee. Their 
decisions were based on the existing Saraburi situation and the negotiations amongst them. Some 
decisions were decided at central level and some were influenced by the Inspector General. The 
characteristics of the insurance system and service delivery system in Saraburi from June 2001 to 
October 2002 were as presented below. 
6.3.3.1 Eligible beneficiaries 
Residents with a certificate of house registration in Saraburi were eligible to register at health 
providers in Saraburi in June 2001. In 2002, registration was more flexible, covering all residents 
who could provide evidence of a living place in Saraburi, i. e. letters from house owners in Saraburi 
to certify their present dwellings. The decision to extend the criteria of the beneficiaries came from 
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the central level, and it delayed as it waited for the information technology support from the Central 
Health Insurance Office. 
6.3.3.2 Provider networks 
There were only two public provider networks (Saraburi Hospital Network, Phabudhabaht Hospital 
Network) in the first few months. Then the providers were split into 13 networks of Contracting 
Units for Primary Care (CUP) following suggestions from central level. A private provider - the 
Kasemratch Hospital - joined the Scheme from October 2001. Therefore, there were 14 CUPs 
including 12 MoPH provider networks (hospitals as main contractors), a military hospital (the 
Adisorn Hospital), and a private hospital. 
The two provider networks at the beginning were similar to the provider networks under the SSS in 
Saraburi. Public hospitals in Saraburi were used to the SSS system, in which two big hospitals were 
the main contractors since the SSS indicated that the main contractors should have more than 100 
beds. The two big hospitals did not only hold the SSS fund but also provided services without a 
gatekeeper. As community hospitals and health centres were subcontractors of the Saraburi 
Hospital and the Phabudhabaht Hospital, they could provide services to the SSS beneficiaries and 
get reimbursement from these two big hospitals at a negotiated rate per visit. 
This existing experience led the Administrative Committee to opt to follow the SSS. In fact, the 
SSS concept was different to the concept of the UC policy, which aimed to strengthen primary care. 
The UC Scheme allowed any providers (no limitation on the number of hospital beds) to be a 
Contracting Unit for Primary Care (CUP) and used direct financial incentive payments to CUPs. 
The change of the provider network model in Saraburi was a consequence of the changing of the 
payment method. from `capitation excluding budget for inpatient care' to `capitation including 
budget for inpatient care'. 
6.3.3.3 Registration choices and population size allocation 
In 2001 and 2002, there was no choice of provider in health registration, but a pilot model of 
choices of registered providers in municipal areas in Saraburi City will start in fiscal year 200323. 
People had to register at the allocated primary care providers in their district; i. e. people in a tambon 
could go to the health centre in their tambon and the community hospital in their district to gain the 
23 The fiscal year 2003 began 1 October 2002. 
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benefits from the 30 Baht Scheme. Exceptionally, people in villages close to borderlines between 
districts had the choice to register with a closer hospital. 
The size of the registered population of each CUP related to the population in the district in which 
the CUP was located, except for the CUPs in Saraburi City. The district population size range from 
9,000 to 150,000 people. In rural districts, only one public CUP was located in a district, while 
there were three CUPs in Muang District (Saraburi City) - Saraburi Hospital, Adisorn Military 
Hospital, and Kasemratch Private Hospital. The Saraburi Hospital held the biggest share of about 
90,000 people, followed by 9,000 registered people at Kasemratch Hospital and 2,300 at Adisorn 
Hospital (2001 figures). The size of population allocated to the private hospital and the non-MoPH 
hospital was rather small, resulting from the low negotiation power of the private hospital and the 
non-MoPH hospital (Interview S4.2, S2). 
In summary, registration choice was expected to encourage competition, but public hospitals and 
the PHO were reluctant to compete and used their authority to protect the hospitals' income. The 
higher the number of population allocated to the private sector, the less budget there was for public 
health providers. The conflict between public sector and private sector did not last long because 
they were the same professionals and their relationship was of collaboration rather than competition. 
Moreover, arguments in Thai culture usually end up with compromise. 
6.3.3.4 Service delivery system with primary care units as gatekeepers 
Figure 6.5 The distribution of the primary care units in Saraburi, March 2002 
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The MoPH suggested that Contracting Units for Primary Care provide primary care through PCUs 
or health care networks which were able to provide comprehensive care, from preventive to curative 
care and rehabilitation. A PCU should have a medical doctor and the doctor to population ratio 
should not be more than 10,000 people per doctor. The PHO authorised the CUPs to develop health 
centres to be PCUs with their own capacities. In March 2002, there were 29 PCUs within 14 CUPs. 
Twenty-three PCUs were developed from health centres and six PCUs were located in hospitals 
(Sirisomboon, Wongsathit, and Pitayarangsarit 2002). There was a five-year plan to upgrade health 
centres to be PCUs in the province. However, in the first year establishment of the PCUs was 
poorly distributed, as can be seen in Figure 6.5. The establishment of the PCUs depended on the 
location and capacities of hospitals rather than the size of population. This did not contribute to the 
equity objective. 
6.3.3.5 Preventive care and health promotion 
The personal care of disease prevention and health promotion was in the benefit package and should 
be provided by the CUPs or PCUs. However, there is no clear difference between the effectiveness 
of community care and personal care regarding disease prevention and health promotion. Therefore, 
the Saraburi PHO set disease prevention and health promotion in both community care and personal 
care as priorities for all health centres to achieve people's good health and to save costs of treatment. 
The incentive of this strategy was to spend less money on curative care and then secure staff 
salaries. 
Overall, activities were still the same as previously; i. e. antenatal care, well baby care, school-based 
health care, and the campaign for larva elimination, for example. Some models of proactive home 
health care were developed and were still in their infancy. The aim to achieve holistic care was 
largely unreached in 2002 as the health officers in the province were only trained in the holistic 
approach in 2001/2. It seemed that health centres in Saraburi had long been neglected. Two 
explanations were, firstly, people had easy access to hospitals, as there were few geographic 
barriers, and secondly, many health centre officers did private practice either in private hospital or 
private business (Interview S2), and therefore had little incentive in performing proactively at health 
centres. 
6.3.3.6 Salary subtraction 
In 2001, all staff received salaries as previously and the capitation budget excluded salaries. 
Salaries were subtracted from the UC budget in fiscal year 2002. In 2002, the total health care 
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budget was per capita health care cost multiplied by the registered population (1,052 Baht x 
403,000 people = 424 million Baht). Since the province received its budget for salaries directly 
from the Ministry of Finance, the 30 Baht Scheme would pay only the difference between the 
budget for salaries and the total cost of health care. Unfortunately, the budget for salaries was about 
463.4 million Baht and was higher than the calculated capitation. This meant the province might 
not receive any money from the 30 Baht Scheme. This shocked many staff and demonstrated the 
necessity to request extra money from the Contingency Fund. 
In order to highlight the financial problem, the Administrative Committee chose to subtract salaries 
at CUP level following the suggestion of the Inspector General. A criterion for extra support was 
that the estimated hospital revenue in 2002 was less than 1.5 times labour cost. The average 
hospital revenue of the province was 1.4 times labour cost, which was close to the cut-off point. 
With the salary subtraction at CUP level, the province could show the obviously low score of some 
CUPs from 0.9 to 1.4 (see Table A6.1 in appendix6), and therefore requested an extra 215.3 million 
Baht for six CUPs from the MoPH. However, the Contingency Fund Committee, with its criteria, 
approved an additional budget of only 85.5 million Baht for five CUPs in the first round of its 
considerations in December 2001. 
The salary-inclusive budget troubled Saraburi's providers. Consequently, the providers sought 
ways to survive by selecting the salary subtraction at the CUP level. Community hospitals agreed 
with this decision because they felt this kind of budget allocation would mobilise resources from 
big hospitals to small hospitals; i. e. community hospitals would have money to purchase medical 
equipment and attract health personnel. However, this was not totally true. In fact, only 40% of the 
total budget of the province was distributed to community hospitals because 60% of the total budget 
was salaries, of which most belonged to Saraburi Hospital staff and the Phabudhabaht Hospital staff. 
The debit accounts were established as the big hospitals borrowed the community hospitals' money. 
Therefore, community hospitals did not have enough money to develop. Moreover, after clearing 
the referred patient costs, there was no money returned to community hospitals as the costs of 
referred patients were high. This decision to subtract salary at CUP level was a condition leading to 
the selection of the inclusive capitation payment methods. 
6.3.3.7 Provider payment methods 
The payment methods for private providers and non-MoPH providers were inclusive capitation with 
direct payment from the HIO. For their own hospitals, the MoPH suggested two choices: inclusive 
capitation and exclusive capitation. In the fiscal year 2001, the Administrative Committee of 
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Saraburi selected exclusive capitation with three inpatient-care fundholders before the two choices 
were addressed in Saraburi. After receiving clear messages from the central level, the committee 
changed to inclusive capitation a few months later and continued with the inclusive capitation in the 
fiscal year 2002. However, in the last quarter of fiscal year 2002, the committee proposed a new 
model to the MoPH and requested permission to test the model in two public networks, each with 
inpatient-care budget pooling. 
In the discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems, the Inspector General of 
Zone II had a critical role in influencing the selection of inclusive capitation. His reason was that 
the province would have a budget deficit; therefore, the province should request extra money from 
the Contingency Fund. In order to get the fund, the province should subtract salaries at CUP level 
and the budget deficit could be emphasised under the inclusive capitation system. Therefore, the 
Administrative Committee selected the inclusive capitation although the relationship between the 
big hospitals and the small hospitals would change from financial and management support to only 
technical support and referral support (Interview S2, S3). 
6.3.3.8 Payment systems within CUPS and payment for referred patients 
Payment systems within a CUP and payment for referred patients included payments for preventive 
care and health promotion, payments for outpatient care, and payments for inpatient care. Saraburi 
models of payment mechanisms can be divided into four models (see Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5 Four models of financing and payment systems in Saraburi, 2001 to 2002 
First model in 2001 Final model in 2001 Official model in 2002 Proposed model for pilot 
(1) Il 111 study in late 2002 (IV) 
1. Salary At national level At national level At CUP level At network level: 
subtraction Saraburi and 
level (only Phabudhabaht Hospital 
MOPH networks 
hospitals) 
2. Allocated -For MOPH providers: Same as I -For MOPH providers: Same as III 
budget from 261 Baht per capita for 4 1,052 Baht per capita 
MOPH months (not included per year (Including 
salary cost) Salary) 
-For private and non- -For private hospitals: MOPH public hospitals: 1,052 Baht per capita 
350 Baht per capita for 4 year 
months -For non-MOPII public 
hospitals: 578.6 Baht 
per capita per year on 
top salary (55% of 
1,052) 
3. Payment Inclusive capitation (350 Same as I Inclusive capitation Same as 111 
method for Baht) for Kasemratch (1,052Baht) for 
private Hospital Kasemratch Hospital 
hospitals 
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First model in 2001 Final model in 2001 Official model in 2002 Proposed model for pilot 
1 II 11I study in late 2002 (IV) 
4. Payment Inclusive capitation (350 Same as I Inclusive capitation Same as III 
method for Baht) for Adisorn (578.6 Baht) on top 
non-MOPH Military Camp Hospital. salary budget for 
public 
The hospital was a Adisorn Military Camp 
hospitals member of the Saraburi Hospital Hospital Network 
4. Payment Exclusive capitation Inclusive capitation for Inclusive capitation for Exclusive capitation 
methods for with two networks 12 CUPs 12 CUPs (1,052 baht per with two networks 
MOPH (Budgets for outpatient capita), subtraction salary (inpatient care budget 
provider care 
budgets, preventive at CUP level pooled at two main 
networks care, and 
health providers for two 
promotion were paid to networks), subtraction 
12 main contractors salary at network level 
according to the size of 
registered population. 
The budgets for inpatient 
care were pooled at two 
main providers. 
5. Payment From 43 Baht per Same as I Per capita budget for Same as III 
system capita (17% of total preventive care and 
inner capitation budget), 40% health promotion was 
cups: was paid to health centres 175 Baht (17% of total 
Preventive and PCU on capitation capitation budget). The basis, 40% was paid on difference between this 
and workload basis, and 20% amount and the budget 
promotion was paid as bonus. for salaries of staff at 
care budget health centre was 
allocated with the same 
methods In I. 
6. Payment From 142 Bahl per capita Same as 1 From 574 Baht per Same as Ill 
system (55% of total capitation capita (55% of total 
inner budget), hospitals held capitation budget), 
cups. the fund and responsible hospitals held the fund 
Outpatient to support medicine to and responsible to health centres and paid support medicine and budget 12 Bahl per visit to health staffto health centres and 
centres on top the paid 12 Baht per visit to 
medicines (sub- health centres on top the 
contractors). medicines. Another 
Hospitals paid to supra payment system was 
contractor for referred based on workloads 
patients based on fee- with the rate 45 
for-service at the price Baht/visit and 120 Bahl/ 
rate of Saraburi visit in the case 
Hospital. provided by physicians. 
Hospitals paid to supra 
contractor for referred 
patients based on fee- 
for-service at the price 
rate of Health 
Insurance Office with 
ceilings. 
7. Payment From 75 Baht per capita The main contractor held The main contractor held Similar to 1. 
system (29% of total capitation the IP budgets and paid the IP budgets (303 Baht From 303 Baht per 
inner budget), two big other hospitals based on as 29% of total capitation capita (29% of total 
cups. providers, Saraburi DRG weight of the budget) and paid other capitation budget), two 
Inpatient Hospital and referred cases. The hospitals based on DRG big providers, Saraburl 
budget 
Phabudhabaht Hospital referred-patient charge weight of the referred Hospital and 
held the funds of their rate within public cases. The referred- Phabudhabaht Hospital 
members and allocated to providers In the patient charge rate was held the funds of their 
their members with province was 4,000 10,000 Bahl per one members and allocated 
DRGs weight. Baht per DRG weight unit of DRG weight. to their members with 
The referred-patient and the rate for private case-mix basis (DRGs 
charge rate within public hospitals and public weight). 
providers in the province providers in other The referred-patient 
was 4,000 Baht per DRG provinces was 10,000 charge rate across 
weight and the rate for Bahl per DRG weight. networks was 10,000 
private hospitals and Bahl er one unit of 
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First model in 2001 
(1) 
Final model in 2001 
(11) 
Official model in 2002 
(ITT) 
Proposed model for pilot 
study in late 2002 (IV) 
public providers in other DRG weight. 
provinces was 10,000 
Baht er DRG weight. 
8. -Reimburse from the Same as I Same as I Same as I 
reimburse- MOPH Health Insurance 
ment for Office 
for expenses in 
first 72 hours or insurers emergency according to the Traffic 
and Accident Victim 
accidental Protection Act 
cases - The registered provider 
of the patient is 
responsible for the 
expenses after first 72 
hours. 
Source: Sarauun t'rovmciat ttealIn uttice, zuut-zuuz 
Model I from 'Health Insurance Report during 1 June to 31 July 2001 in Saraburi' (August 2001) 
Model II from 'the 2001 Saraburi Annual Health Report' (24 September 2001) 
Model III from 'the Saraburi PHO performance' paper presented to the Inspector General of zone II (March 2002) 
Model IV from Interviews 
The first model originated from the agreement amongst providers at the initial stage in 2001. The 
second model was the final model in 2001 influenced by suggestions from the central level, 
changing the exclusive capitation payment of two public networks to inclusive capitation payment 
of 12 MoPH CUPs. The third model was the model implemented in 2002, similar to the second 
model as the payment model continued from 2001. The last model was a model proposed for a 
pilot study in late 2002, which changed the inclusive capitation back to the two-network exclusive 
capitation. 
In summary, the changing back and forth of the provider payment models in Saraburi showed the 
low effectiveness of decisions that were influenced by the central level messages. However, it can 
be argued that the decision-making and the system in Saraburi had high flexibility and authority as 
they followed the `do and correct' approach. The two choices were limited to fit the situation in 
Saraburi; therefore, the province needed its own model. The messages from central level were 
restricted to means rather than concept. The concept of primary care strengthening was not 
recognised as the aim of the health registration and the capitation payment. 
6.3.4 Enrolment and insurance coverage 
This province had experience and capacity to develop its own information system with support from 
IT expertise in community hospitals and the Saraburi regional hospital. Staff at health facilities 
made household surveys and validated the data, using the information of the MWS as a reference. 
Then data were transferred to the PHO. The individual records, of those who were uninsured or 
were not covered by other public health insurance schemes, were printed on the 30 Baht Scheme 
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cards and distributed to health facilities to deliver to people nearby. The PHO was able to distribute 
the first card five days before the program launched. 
Until August 2001, the Central HIO was able to validate the data from Saraburi and changed the 
amount of the budget to Saraburi arising from the change of the population size. There were several 
mistakes, for example, many people had wrong identification numbers, some people did not have 
house registration in Saraburi province, and some had other insurance schemes. The delayed 
response of the HIO created conflicts between cardholders and hospitals since some cards had to be 
cancelled and the hospitals called the cards back while the cardholders claimed for their rights. The 
province had addressed this problem by putting up the announcement of the card cancellation in 
public places and hospitals. However, there still were many conflicts between providers and 
cardholders. 
Another problem arose over the deficiencies in the database in municipal areas. The Saraburi 
Municipality Administration could not present data of people in areas which were allocated to 
private hospitals. That caused entry data errors and delayed card production. 
Despite many technical problems, insurance coverage in the province increased from 69% in 2000 
to 92% in 2001 and 94% in 2002 (see Figure 6.6 and details in Table A6.2 in Appendix6). This was 
higher than the national average (92% in September 2002; see Chapter 5). 
Figure 6.6 Health Insurance Coverage in Saraburi: Before and After the UC Scheme 
Implementation 
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6.3.5 Impact of the policy on implementers and their responses 
The impact of the policy on implementers in Saraburi was mainly on hospital finances and PCU 
management. The issue of hospital finance is discussed below and the issue of PCU management 
will be discussed in the next chapter on the operational arrangements. 
The UC policy changed the pattern of hospital revenues and hospital expenses. The main sources 
of hospital revenues were from patients' out-of-pocket payments, insurers, the reimbursement of 
import-cases, and government budget. Expenses were in-house expenses and export-case expenses. 
The UC policy intended to replace the hospital income from patients' out-of-pocket payments with 
the government tax revenues. However, it was recognised that this might lead to hospitals having 
budget deficits. This was caused by several factors. The leading factor was the change of MoPH 
budget from an historical-expense base to a population base; i. e. changing from the budget for 
salaries plus other costs to a capitation including salaries. In this respect, the hospitals with a high 
proportion of total budget taken by salaries might have had a budget deficit. Therefore, the MoPH 
used the proportion of the total budget spent on salaries as a criterion to support extra moneys from 
the Contingency Fund. However, looking in detail, any factor causing high in-house expenses 
(including salaries), high export-case expenses, low import-case revenues, or low out-of-pocket 
revenues would have affected deficit financing. The financial data of the public provider networks 
between October 2001 and March 2002 suggested that ten out of twelve provider networks in 
Saraburi needed a budget of more than 1,052 Baht per capita (see Table A6.3 in Appendix6). 
However, only six networks were approved for extra moneys from the Contingency Fund in 2002. 
The Don Phud, the Nong Saeng, the Sao Hai, the PraBudhabaht, and the Saraburi networks were 
approved in the first round of the consideration in December 2001. The Ban Mo network applied 
and was approved for the fund in the third round. 
Provider networks in Saraburi, judged by factors concerning financial status, can be divided into 
five categories. The first group was the provider networks that had a small population - less than 
the economy of scale would have required. The second group was the provider network that 
covered enough population and performed at an average cost of about 1,052 Baht per beneficiary. 
The third group was the provider networks that were inefficient due to lack of capacity to provide 
services despite resources being available. The fourth group was the provider network that had 
greater supply than demand. The fifth group was the provider network that had rich resources and 
capability to import patients. The next section looks at how the system coped with these situations. 
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6.3.5.1 The first group: smaller population size than the scale of economy 
"The capitation budget for the Nong Don District (population of 10,000 people) was 3 million baht (about 30%) 
lower than the hospital expenses. ... The 10-bed hospital was over supplied 
for the 10,000 population and it 
was not necessary to be located here as people could seek secondary care in another hospital within 10- 
kilometre distance.... Though the hospital was donated by villagers, the maintainance and operating costs 
burdened the government budget. ... We have cut the public utility expenses and generated revenues 
from 
other services, for example, Thai traditional massages to survive" (Interview: Director of the Nong Don 
Hospital). 
Three hospitals were located in the districts that had populations of less than 20,000 (see Table 6.3). 
They were the Don Phud Hospital, Nong Don Hospital, and Nong Saeng Hospital. No matter how 
efficiently they performed; they had to face a budget deficiency due to the flat rate capitation. In 
the relationship between hospitals' costs and population sizes, Figure 6.7 shows that hospitals had 
average fixed costs of 7.4 million Baht and an average marginal cost of 843.3 Baht per capita. 
Therefore, hospitals with a small population had high average unit costs of services and certainly 
were not able to cope with the flat-rate capitation. All requested extra moneys from the 
Contingency Fund. 
Figure 6.7 Expenses of the community hospitals in Saraburi in 2002 
UC budgets and expenses of the community hospitals in Saraburi by UC population size 
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Source: The Saraburi's letter of intent to request support from the Contingency Fund, second round (March 2002) 
Note: Expenses were deducted by hospital revenues from sources other than UC budget. Data from provider networks 
expenses during October 2001 to March 2002 were multiplied by two to represent for a year and showed in the graph as 
spots. 
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The Contingency Fund Committee approved the budget for the Don Phud Hospital and the Nong 
Saeng Hospital but not for the Nong Don Hospital. The Nong Don Hospital had requested an extra 
2 million Baht and had revenues 1.4 times salaries. The taskforce of the Contingency Fund 
Committee suggested that this hospital did not need extra money if it could reduce its expenses by 
10% (Interview: Director of the Nong Don Hospital). Therefore, this hospital did not get support 
from the Contingency Fund. 
In 2002, the Committee suggested criteria for the budget allocation in 2003 that the hospitals with 
these two criteria should receive more allocated budget even without a formal request to the 
Contingency Fund. These criteria were: 1) population coverage of less than 25,000 people, and 2) 
far from other hospitals (more than 15 kilometres) or in the frontier or remote areas. Small-scale 
hospitals that are close to other hospitals should be incorporated into a bigger hospital. Therefore, 
the Saraburi PHO had to find another resolution for the Nong Don Hospital's deficit. In the fiscal 
year 2003, the Nong Don Hospital and another two community hospitals were incorporated as 
members of the Phabudhabaht Provider Network, and the other seven community hospitals were 
incorporated as members of the Saraburi Provider Network. This solution should eliminate the 
problem of lack of economy of scale, but other inefficiency problems might still occur. 
The other case of a hospital with a small population was Sao Hai. This hospital is located in a 
district of 29,000 people but the number of UC beneficiaries registered was only 16,000. The rest 
of the population were civil servants and employees in the formal sector. Since this district is only 
13 kilometres from Saraburi City, it had high levels of health personnel. The Sao Hai Hospital 
network had salaries of about 16.6 million Baht per year, close to the salaries of Nong Khae 
Hospital which had 90 beds but Sao Hai had only 30 beds. The Sao Hai Hospital network was 
supported by the Contingency Fund for about 5.7 million Baht because of the high proportion of 
revenue spent on salaries. However, the Sao Hai Hospital produced more revenue from other 
sources, and performed well to keep its costs under the province average. Therefore, it had a 
surplus and was expected to increase the hospital's reserves by about 2.1 million Baht. As this 
hospital would not get support in the fiscal year 2003, it had to decrease the burden of staff salaries, 
or compete in the market to gain more revenue from the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme and 
the Social Security Scheme. 
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6.3.5.2 The second group: sufficient population and efficient performance 
"The new budget allocation was based on the population size. ... There were only 4-5 districts 
in this province 
(of which the population sizes were bigger than 20,000 people) that had enough budget to run the hospitals and 
there were 4-5 districts that had budget deficit after deducting the salary budget" (Interview: Deputy Provincial 
Chief Medical Officer). 
All the other hospitals had enough population to share the hospitals' fixed costs. Among these 
hospitals, four seemed to have no financial problems. They were Wang Muang, Ban Mo, Muag 
Leck and Gaeng Khoy, of which the number of beneficiaries were 22.7,27.8,32.0, and 53.18 
million people respectively. They had lower unit costs than the provincial average (the average cost 
of community hospital networks was 256 Baht per OP visit). Muag Leck and Wang Muang 
hospital networks had the lowest cost, caused by low in-house expenses and a high number of 
services provided at health centres (see Table A6.4 in Appendix 6). The Gaeng Khoy Hospital 
network earned a lot of money from the UC Scheme as it covered 50 million people. It was enough 
to run a 60-bed hospital and its networks. The Ban Mo Hospital network was also able to survive 
during the first half of fiscal year 2002. However, the Ban Mo Hospital reached a zero-doctor 
situation in April 2002. Young doctors moved to other provinces, where specialist training 
opportunities were available. Although the PCMO asked the Phabudhabaht Hospital to send 
rotating doctors to cover at the Ban Mo Hospital, there was still a shortage of medical doctors, 
causing the director of the Ban Mo hospital to eventually resign. Ban Mo Hospital network rapidly 
deteriorated in its performance, and increased the number of referred patients, incurring costs to the 
network. This network applied for, and was approved, extra money from the Contingency Fund in 
the third round. This network thus later fell into the third category - networks which were 
inefficient due to a lack of capacity to provide proper services. 
6.3.5.3 The third group: inefficiency due to lack of capacity 
"The adequate size of the population in Vihandaen District (about 30,000 people) resulted in a sufficient budget 
for a 30-bed hospital to survive ... but the referral expenses charged from the provincial hospital were about 20 
millions (about 60% of total budget).... If the Vihandaeng Hospital pays out the referral charges, the hospital's 
reserved money has to be run out. ... After the Vihandaeng Hospital was incorporated into the Saraburi 
Hospital, it has been supported for both human resources and moneys by the Saraburi Hospital" (Interview: 
Director of Vihandaeng Hospital). 
There were another two hospital networks clearly incapable of providing proper services, evidenced 
by the high numbers of referrals. They were the Wihandaeng Hospital Network and the Nong Khae 
Hospital Network. Referrals made up about 53 and 31% of the in-house expenses, respectively. 
This was caused by the low proportion of doctors. Despite resources being available for operations 
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and hospital admission, there were not enough doctors to undertake those services. The doctor- 
nurse ratio was a good proxy to present the poor proportion. The Wihandaeng Hospital Network 
and the Nong Khae Hospital Network had two and three doctors respectively, while they had 19 and 
28 registered nurses respectively. The doctor-nurse ratios were 9.5 and 9.3 nurses per doctor. This 
was higher than those of other hospital networks (see in Table A6.5 in appendix6). While the 
average number of nurses per doctor in the province was 5.7, doctors concentrated in the Saraburi 
Hospital Network with a doctor-nurse ratio of 4.6 nurses per doctor. 
The poor-distribution of physicians in Saraburi had long existed and some were improved by 
support from the Saraburi Hospital and the Phabudhabaht Hospital. For example, in 2001, the 
Saraburi Hospital supported the Wihan Deang Hospital by sending its deputy director to direct the 
Hospital. The Saraburi Hospital Director planned to use the Wihandaeng as its training centre for 
medical students in 2003. "This could be achieved only if we direct the Wihandaeng Hospital", the 
Saraburi Hospital's director said. However, collaboration or negotiation between hospitals was not 
sufficient to deal with the resource problem. "There was no trust between the big and small 
hospitals; therefore, the Saraburi Hospital had to control small hospitals to manage the system more 
efficiently", the director said. It seemed that the small hospital could not resolve its own problems. 
The case of Nong Khae Hospital was still unsolved by September 2002. This hospital increased its 
bed numbers from 60 to 90 beds through donations but was unable to increase the number of 
personnel. With high workloads in this hospital, physicians resigned or moved elsewhere. In April 
2002, the director of the Nong Khae hospital threatened the PCMO to get more support of 
physicians or he would resign. There was no positive response from the PCMO (this PCMO was in 
charge since October 2001). Data from Interviews suggested that the PCMO was hoping that if the 
director resigned, the Nong Khae would be merged into the Saraburi Hospital Network. However, 
the director of the Nong Khae Hospital did not carry out his threat, and at the end of this research 
(September 2002) the situation continued. Actually, the costs of referred patients did not burden 
these two hospitals - the Wihandaeng and the Nong Khae - specifically because the Saraburi 
Hospital and the Phabudhabaht Hospital could not get real reimbursement from all the community 
hospitals in Saraburi. It was a debit-credit account with ceilings. In other words, the Saraburi 
Hospital and the Phabudhabaht Hospital borrowed the money from community hospitals for staff 
salaries and repaid by clearing the debts with charges for referrals. However, the community 
hospital would not pay if the referral charges were higher than the borrowed money. Many 
complained that this was unfair to other community hospitals, which had good performance and put 
effort into treating their patients before sending them to other hospitals. Moreover, community 
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hospitals needed money to improve their services rather than to deposit the money with the big 
hospitals. This argument was unsupported. 
In fiscal year 2003, there will be only two big networks - the Saraburi Hospital Network and the 
Phabudhabaht Hospital Network. The burden of salaries will be shared within each network. All 
hospitals within a network will receive budget for inpatient care by cases with DRG weights. 
Therefore, they have to compete for the budget on top of their salaries. It is not clear that this 
solution will be able to improve these hospitals' efficiency. 
Another example of collaboration was impressive and should be mentioned, between the Saraburi 
Hospital and the Gaeng Khoy Hospital. The Saraburi Hospital sent doctors in four specialised areas 
to rotate in the Gaeng Khoy Hospital in order to increase the Gaeng Khoy Hospital's reputation, and 
to decrease the congestion in the outpatient department of the Saraburi Hospital (Interview S3). 
However, at the time of research there was no data to show how congestion in the OPD in Saraburi 
Hospital decreased. The resource mobilisation occurred because of the trust and good relationship 
between two hospital directors (Interview S3). The relationship between hospitals in this example 
may improve service system and community hospital efficiency. 
6.3.5.4 The fourth group: inefficiency due to higher supply over demand 
"The money allocation should have been adjusted. ... It should have depended on the 
level of care provided by 
the hospital. For example, there should have been additional budget for the hospital which provided special 
treatments by specialists or teaching facility to medical students. ... This 
hospital is a general hospital but is 
located in a district. ... The financing system 
in the 30 Baht Scheme limited the number of refer-in patients 
from other neighbour provinces, although there was an abundant supply of specialised treatments in this 
hospital. ... Meanwhile, this hospital froze the number of medical specialists" (Interview: Director of the 
Phabudhabaht Hospital). 
One hospital which had greater supply than demand was the Phabudhabaht Hospital. With a 
population of about 76,000 people, a 400-bed hospital was in excess of the population's demand. 
This general hospital is supposed to serve tertiary health care to imported patients from community 
hospitals and should earn money from the referral system. However, it was difficult for the 
Phabudhabaht Hospital in the new referral system because the community hospitals had a choice of 
sending patients to the Saraburi hospital, which could deliver more sophisticated services, or to 
private hospitals which had lower costs. While the resources were available but less used, the 
hospital's unit cost was increasing, and therefore it was inefficient. This hospital got support from 
the Contingency Fund but could not improve its efficiency. The new territory network of the 
Saraburi system in the fiscal year 2003 allocated three community hospitals as members of the 
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Phabudhabaht Hospital Network. These hospitals have to refer their patients to the Phabudhabaht 
Hospital before sending patients to a specialist hospital. However, it seemed that this solution could 
not cure the Phabudhabaht Hospital's problems because the whole network was inefficient due to 
over-supply and community hospitals could not pay for referral cases. This network includes the 
Ban Mo Hospital, Nong Don Hospital, and Don Put Hospital. The MoPH needs a long-term plan 
for these kinds of hospitals which are located in many provinces. The MoPH has not decided any 
solution for this kind of problem because it dares not touch on issues which may arouse personnel 
resistance. 
6.3.5.5 The fifth group: rich resources and capability to import patients 
"In the finance account, the hospital could survive if we got money from all referral charges. In fact, not all 
referral charges were paid. For example, the municipality authority refused to pay for two referral cases of 
about 100,000 Baht each. ... The hospital reported to the MoPH that there were no-income cases of about 100 
million Baht provided by the hospital in the last year. ... We requested money from the Contingency Fund" 
(Interview: Director of the Saraburi Hospital). 
The one hospital able to import many patients was Saraburi Hospital. Initially, this hospital was 
expected to have a budget deficit because of a high number of health personnel. The calculation in 
the request for extra moneys from the Contingency Fund suggested that the hospital had revenues of 
1.4 times salaries and needed an extra 117.6 million Baht. The committee of the Contingency Fund 
approved an extra budget of 56.4 million Baht. 
Actually, this hospital did not perform badly. Its unit cost was lower than the Phabudhabaht 
Hospital, it provided sophisticated services, and should have received charges for imported patient 
of about 105 millions Baht during October 2001 to March 2002, but there were few actual payments. 
If the referral system works well, this hospital might not need any more money from the 
Contingency Fund. 
In summary, there were five situations which needed different solutions. The MoPH had some 
remedies but left provinces alone to deal with the problems of hospital networks which might not be 
effective in the long run. Several hospitals with financial problems had coping strategies including 
cutting the hospital expenses, generating incomes from other services, incorporating into a big 
hospital to share risk, and requesting for Contingency Fund. 
6.4 Chapter summary 
The chapter concludes that the implementation was rapid, complex, and top-down, with little 
consultation from the central level to the province, but more consultation within the provincial level. 
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Leadership was important in policy implementation, as well as staff capacity. Medical 
professionals were dominant actors in the managerial process at provincial level. The financing 
reform clearly affects hospitals' finance and staff morale. Nevertheless, health officials had a 
positive response to increasing the health insurance coverage to achieve the policy goal. 
Provincial level authorities had some degree of autonomy in decisions and implementation. In 
Saraburi, the then Provincial Chief Medical Officer integrated all reforms, both in the UC policy 
and other aspects of the government sector reform, into the PHO plan. This province also had 
capacity in IT systems and management, which was able to cope with change better than the central 
level. These were results of social capital investment in the rural development plan, which 
distributed medical doctors to all provinces and developed capacity in health systems in each 
province. 
The policy transfer process between central level and local level was largely top-down. There was 
little consultation but allowance was made for flexibility, and it was given to the province to 
manage the process. At provincial level, the decision-making process was more interactive and it 
seemed to manage conflict partly due to the Thai culture, which resulted in compromises. The 
health authorities exercised their power on some issues, such as hospital income protection from the 
private sector, and sought consultation on financing models. The latter strongly affected hospitals' 
finance and staff morale. Because the Contingency Fund helped to deal with the problem, low staff 
morale was alleviated by guaranteeing staff salaries. The Inspector General played an important 
brokerage role between central and provincial level. 
The implementation in Saraburi was as rapid as in other provinces, but changed continuously. It 
can be characterised as having high adaptive capacity for survival. 
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Chapter 7- Implementation: Operational arrangements 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on operational arrangements at district level dealing with health enrolment, 
service delivery and quality of services. The 30 Baht Scheme introduced four main changes which 
affected districts, and meant they had to change their organisation and management of services. 
First, the budget for health services was allocated to the Contracting Units for Primary Care (CUPs) 
which were usually community hospitals. This meant the role of the District Health Office in 
service support was diminished and replaced by the role of monitoring and regulation. Second, 
district population size would affect providers' budgets - i. e. the more people who registered in the 
district, the greater the providers' budget. In the districts where the budget lowered their resources, 
they had to rearrange their services. Third, what they offered as part of the primary health services 
had to expand, as part of the 30 Baht Scheme. This meant hospitals and health centres had to 
extend their ranges of services to include home visits and medical consultation. Fourth, because of 
the way networks were established, the referral system had to be re-organised. This chapter 
illustrates variations in the perceptions and responses of health professionals and health workers in 
four districts. 
Data were mainly retrieved by qualitative methods including document review, interview of health 
staff and villagers' focus group discussion, in four districts in Saraburi. Two districts, Gaeng Khoy 
and Wihandaeng were selected because they had providers in the network of the Saraburi Hospital 
(634 beds). The other districts, Nong Don and Ban Mo, were selected because they had providers 
in the network of the Phabudhabaht Hospital (400 beds)24. The information was complemented by 
the views of the directors of the Saraburi Hospital and the Phabudhabaht Hospital. 
7.2 Responding to the 30 Baht Scheme: perceptions of health 
professionals and health workers involved in the implementation 
The Ministry of Public Health of Thailand had long played both health financing management and 
service provision roles. Although private providers had increased in the economic boom era, they 
were concentrated in big cities, and were uncommon at district level. The national management 
structure of the MOPH was represented by sub-national, provincial and district health offices. 
24 Provider networks of Saraburi Hospital included public providers in 8 districts and led by a regional hospital. Provider 
networks of Phabudhabaht Hospital included public providers in 5 districts and led by a general hospital. 
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Services were like a pyramid, consisting of regional hospitals, general hospitals, community 
hospitals in all districts, and health centres in all sub-districts, with referral relationships and loose 
supervisory relationships. The relationships amongst providers was characterised by peer groups, 
with no top-down relationship; i. e. the provincial doctors did not have greater status than their 
`peers' in districts because district hospitals received budget and equipment support directly from 
the MoPH through the Provincial Health Offices. Authority for regional/general and community 
hospitals was delegated from the Provincial Chief Medical Officers to the hospitals themselves; 
therefore, they had certain levels of autonomy: for example, they were able to provide financial 
incentives for their own personnel, and set their own priorities in health spending. In contrast, 
health centres were closely controlled by District Health Officers in terms of financial management 
and position promotion. The 30 Baht Scheme led to four main changes: 
" separating the role of regulation from service provision, 
" changes to the budgetary system and provider payment mechanisms, 
" expanding the range of services for the frontier providers, and 
" reorganising the provider network and referral systems. 
The perceptions in this section were derived from health professionals and health workers in four 
districts which have particular contexts. Given the different contexts, health staff might perceive 
and respond in different ways. Therefore, Table 7.1 gives a summary of the important features of 
the providers in the four districts to help to explain their perceptions and responses. 
There are four main differences between the districts. First, the size of population varies from less 
than 30,000 in Nong Don District to three times that in Gaeng Khoy District. Second, human 
resources (medical doctors) and infrastructures (beds) were distributed unequally, health centres 
being the exception. Third, the proportion of 30 Baht Scheme beneficiaries was about three- 
quarters of the total population in each district, but the proportion of those exempted from co- 
payment dropped in Wihandaeng District. This was likely due to the perceptions of the health 
workers in this district, who limited the number of exemptions (see more details in section 7.4.2). 
Fourth, these four districts had diverse primary care development and financing arrangements and 
two districts suffered budget constraints. 
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Table 7.1 General information and descriptions of providers in four districts in Saraburi 
Districts 1. Gaeng Khoy 2. Wihandaeng 3. Nong Don 4. Ban Mo 
Contexts 
Number of population 83,000 36,000 15,000 42,000 
Health Providers located in the -Gaeng Khoy -Wihandaeng -Nong Don -Ban Mo Hospital 
District Hospital (60 Hospital (30 Hospital (10 (30 beds) 
beds) beds) beds) 
-Mother and 
-20 Health -7 Health centres -4 Health centres 
Child Hospital 
centres 
-1 private clinic -8 Health centres 
-1 private -3 private clinic hospital (12 beds) 
-9 private clinics 
Beds per 10000 pops (only 6.9 8.2 6.8 7.1 
community hospitals) 
Doctor per 10000 pops (only in 0.6 0.3 1.4 0.7 
community hospital) 
Health centre per 10000 pops 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.7 
Responses 
Enrolment of 30 Baht Scheme 75% (54%) 76% (48%) 71% (59%) 71% (53%) 
beneficiaries 
(and % of those who were 
exempted from the 30 Baht co- 
payment) 
Features of developed PCU in At 2 health At the hospital At a health centre At the hospital 
2002 centres and a health and a health 
centre centre 
Budget allocated to health Salaries plus Salaries plus Salaries plus Salaries plus 
centres in the Contracting Units medical supplies budget for budget for medical supplies for Primary Care (CUPs) as needed and workloads workloads as needed and 3,000 Baht per 
month 3,000 Baht per 
month 
Additional A capitation A capitation 
budget for health budget for health budget for health 
promotion and promotion and promotion and 
disease disease disease 
prevention prevention 
(3- prevention 
according to 
5,000 Baht per 
month) 
(a minimum 
proposed guarantee at 3000 
activities Baht per month) 
Proposal to the Contingency No No Yes. but was Yes. Accepted in 
Fund rejected the 3rd round 
Note: Situations as of March 2002 
7.2.1 Separating the role of regulation from service provision 
In law, the District Health Office was in overall charge of all health centres and the management of 
public health activities. The District Health Officer (DHO) was the top health authority responsible 
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for all health centre workers. However, the UC policy shifted the budget flow for health care from 
the District Health Office to the Contracting Units for Primary Care, which were usually hospitals, 
and hence reduced the budget allocation function of the DHOs. Some DHOs accepted this change 
passively but others were active in establishing new collaborations with other local authorities, such 
as the Tambon Local Administration Office, to secure funds for public health functions. 
DHOs felt that the shift of the budget reduced their financial authority (Interview: Gaeng Khoy 
DHO, Wihandaeng DHO). Although all DHOs sat on the District Health Coordination Committee, 
and had a voice equal to that of hospital representatives, they had little information (interview: 
Wihandaeng DHO), so hospital directors dominated the decisions in budget allocation (Interview: 
Wihandaeng DHO, Director of Nong Don Hospital): 
`Though, there were debates about the Wihandaeng Hospital's proposal on budget allocation criteria (e. g. the 
rate of budget allocation per case - 29 Baht including medical supplies), the Director of the Wihandaeng 
Hospital did not allow any change to the proposal. ... it was the style of the director, who 
had more 
information than other members and therefore influenced the committee decision (Wihandaeng DITO). " 
DHOs found themselves with limited resources for public health activities as most of the MOPH 
budget was mobilised for health care. The Ban Mo District Health Officer managed this situation 
by coordinating local authorities to fund some health activities, for example the larva reduction 
campaign. However, he expressed disappointed in his career: 
"The district health office has a limited budget. There are some jobs which the district health office needs to 
coordinate, for example, in an outbreak of disease, health centres need support for disease investigations. ... 
The district health office looks after the whole community ... but there is little support 
for equipment, personnel, 
budgets, and other instruments. ... The budget for non-UC activities was about 58,000 Baht per year. It was 
inadequate and just enough for gasoline. ... The development of the health centres needs a coordinator to 
negotiate with local government. ... In Saraburi, I do not see any 
hospital that focuses on community health 
(Interview: Ban Mo DHO). " 
It is clear that the budgets were concentrated with the service providers and district health 
authorities (regulators) were kept at a distance from the financial management of the services. 
Consequently, it reduced the power of the districts in favour of the providers. It is still questionable 
as to how these district agencies will be able to exercise their regulatory role, in view of financial 
constraints, and indeed whether they will be capable of doing this job. At the time of interview, 
there was no instrument to strengthen the regulatory role of the DHOs. 
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7.2.2 Changes of budgetary system and provider payment mechanisms 
As the budget for health services allocated from the centre to provinces depended on population 
size, this also effected the budget allocated to districts. Some districts had budget constraints and 
negative consequences. On the other hand, the capitation approach created flexibility in priority 
setting of health spending at local level. 
Nong Don, a very small district with 15,000 people and 10 kilometres from a general hospital (the 
Phabudhabaht Hospital), expected a very small budget from the 30 Baht Scheme. The provider in 
this district faced financial constraints. Although, it could survive for a short period while the 
MOPH guaranteed all staff salaries, this could not last because the hospital's request for an 
additional budget from the MOPH Contingency Fund was rejected. Therefore, the Phabudhabaht 
Hospital, finally, took charge of the 10-bed Nong Don hospital, and sustained the hospital activities 
under its support. The problem of the Nong Don hospital was caused by the absence of economy of 
scale. The hospital director observed: 
"It is possible to reduce the inpatient wards of any small community hospital but the hospital should keep the 
emergency department and the observation ward. The reduction of cost would be outweighed by many 
disadvantages. For example, the people around there might be inconvenienced, reducing their rights. Secondly, 
it will reduce the development of hospital capacities. Thirdly, the donors of these hospitals will wonder why the 
hospitals are reducing their services and fourthly, the economy of these districts would turn down" (the Director 
of the Nong Don Hospital). 
Financial constraints did not only affect the pattern of services, it affected staff motivation. The 
Nong Do District Health Officer said: 
"There were some rumours of problems. For example, how the inadequate budget would affect the quality of 
services, quality of medicines would be low, and some health offices might be abolished. These worried the 
public and also our staff. ... The messages about the budgets alarmed us. 
The message was that the budget for 
this year (2002) would be one third of the last year. It made our staff frightened. The payments for staff 
allowances were delayed because there was not enough money to pay. Health officers including me felt 
oppressed. ... I think the policy would not 
be sustained. The program will end when there is no more money. 
This is because the implementation guidelines are not comprehensive. If the government wants to continue the 
program, there should be no impact on staff and citizens. The policy should not touch on salaries, fringe 
benefits, positions, roles and authorities of health staff (Interview: Nong Don District Health Officer). 
Another negative consequence was from the way providers allocated the registered population. Ban 
Mo district had to allocate a number of the registered population in a suburban tambon (Sangsok 
Tambon) to register at the Mother and Child Hospital, as this hospital needed revenue from the 30 
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Baht Scheme. Sangsok was selected because it is close to the hospital. However, the transportation 
from Sangsok to the Mother and Child Hospital was inconvenient. The Mother and Child Hospital 
was established a few years ago for academic purposes and located in the same municipal area as 
the Ban Mo Hospital. However, the Ban Mo Hospital protected its revenues by registering all 
people in the municipality. 
In a larger district, such as Gaeng Khoy, the providers would have a large portion of the 30 Baht 
Scheme budget. They did not have financial problems; therefore, they responded to the needs of 
consumers. The allocation of registered population was based on consumers' convenience. For 
example, people in some villages were allocated to register at Saraburi Hospital (638 beds) and 
Phabudhabaht Hospital (400 beds), according to their location. Though this allocation of the 
population already existed, it was formalised because of the financing system of the 30 Baht 
Scheme, which indicated that the money follow the registered population. It can be seen that 
districts were affected in different ways. 
A clearly positive impact from the per capita allocation method was that it increased the flexibility 
of health centres to prioritise health promotion programmes. Together, the guaranteed salaries and 
the collection of 30 Baht co-payment allowed health centres sufficient funds for health centre 
expenses and staff allowances (Interview: Health centre workers in Wihandaeng), and it allowed 
flexibility to the health workers to implement many community programs based on local problems. 
7.2.3 Expanding the range of services of frontier providers 
The UC policy suggested that providers should provide a PCU, where patients could consult a 
medical doctor, for every 10,000 residents, and start with a model development. Therefore the 
Saraburi Provincial Health Office suggested each district should develop a PCU model in a hospital, 
and a PCU model in a health centre in 2002. To respond to the policy, Gaeng Khoy District started 
with two health centres as Primary Care Units (PCU), whereas Wihandaeng and Ban Mo Districts 
developed a PCU at a health centre and a PCU at the hospital. Nong Don District developed a PCU 
at a health centre, although as it is a small district, the hospital could have been an effective PCU 
for the whole population. It did not allocate its PCU to the hospital because the director thought 
that the MOPH preferred a PCU developed outside. He explained: 
"This district does not have to invest in a PCU outside the hospital; however, the MOPH ordered us to do so. 
Moreover, patients would get benefit from a shorter travel distance" (The Director of the Nong Don Hospital). 
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Services provided by health centres already included mother and child care - ante-natal care (ANC) 
and post-natal care - and minor illness treatments. Community programmes 
by health centres 
included health promotion, health education, and disease prevention. There were three main 
professionals working interchangeably in health centres. They were midwives, MOPH trained 
health workers25, and nurses. After the introduction of the PCU initiative, health centres still 
continued routine services and some designated PCUs were expected to provide a wider range of 
services and service loads. 
Services provided in PCUs in hospitals (both in Wihandaeng and Ban Mo District) were basically 
provided by nurses with a holistic care approach derived from the family medicine concept. 
Doctors were on standby in the Outpatient Department (OPD) and came to the PCU on request for 
consultations. The PCU team usually included the staff from the Health Promotion Section and the 
Sanitation and Disease Control Section. They provided physical examinations and consultations 
mainly for mothers and children in the morning, and visited chronic patients at home in the 
afternoon. In Wihandaeng, there seemed to be little change. In contrast, the PCU in Ban Mo 
Hospital was highly active. The former director of the Ban Mo Hospital fully supported the family 
medicine approach. He refurbished a small building beside the OPD as an office of the PCU. Nine 
people - three nurses, three sanitation officers, and three health promotion officers - were recruited 
from several departments in hospitals. The staff were divided into three teams responsible for 
continuous care at home in three areas. They worked actively and had presented their findings from 
communities in several meetings. For example, they said they could provide mental support for 
chronically ill patients who were hospital-phobic and encouraged them to accept medical treatment 
at hospital. 
Services provided in health centres designated as PCUs included routine physical examinations and 
consultations (including drug dispensing) by nurses (usually working permanently at health centres). 
If not available, a nurse from the hospital came to the PCU health centre. An average number of 
permanent staff in a PCU health centre was five, including a nurse (and a dental nurse in some 
PCUs). A hospital team of about five people, including a physician and a pharmacist, came to each 
PCU once a week (except in Ban Mo District there was no visit from a hospital team) and staff from 
other health centres came to assist in healthcare provision on appointed days (especially in 
Wihandaeng). The number of patients on such days was double that (60-80) on normal days (30-40 
patients). After UC was introduced, the health centre services in the PCUs (except in Ban Mo 
25 The health worker trained by MoPH is a type of medical auxiliaries. The present curriculum of MoPFI health worker 
combined the curriculums of sanitarians and midwives. 
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District) included chronic illness follow-up with support from hospitals. Staff claimed this caused a 
greater workload as they had to fill in medical records in family folders (Interview: health workers 
in Wihandaeng District, Nong Don District). In Ban Mo District, the PCU health centre did not 
emphasise illness care, but strengthened its computerised health information system. 
Apart from the health care which was concentrated in the PCU health centre, every health centre 
was encouraged to create health promotion programmes, through flexible budget allocated by 
capitation that was not fixed to a specific program. For example, the PCU in Wihandaeng 
introduced many programs: Pap smear screening for cancer, malnutrition surveillance, hygiene 
education in communities and schools, haemorrhagic fever prevention and larvae control, handicap 
rehabilitation, and Thalasemia control and prevention in pregnant women. In health centres in 
Gaeng Khoy District, the programmes included exercise promotion, larvae control, and drug addict 
prevention. In Ban Mo District, some community programmes had been continued even though 
there was no budget indicated. Only in Nong Don, community programmes were not emphasised 
because the budget deficit was so serious. The head of the PCU health centre said that the CUP 
focused on illness; the health centre workers had too high a workload and were not able to allocate 
time for home visits or community programmes for disease prevention (Interview: Head of Ban 
Krab Health Centre, Nong Don District). 
7.2.4 Provider network and referral system 
Services provided by the hospital did not improve as a result of reforms, and possibly decreased in 
quality in some districts because of increased patient loads. Providers adapted themselves in 
responding to the service loads and financial constraints by grouping into two networks where some 
small hospitals were merged into two large hospitals. 
Before the introduction of the 30 Baht Scheme, the provider network in Saraburi had been divided 
into two loose networks in response to the Social Security Scheme. In the initial response to the 30 
Baht Scheme, all district hospitals acted as Contracting Units for Primary Care (CUPs) and 
independently managed their capitation budget. However, there were many constraints, both in 
service capacity and financing, and finally, the province grouped hospitals into two networks at the 
end of 2002. It was expected this would decrease financial risk and increase efficiency of resources 
used within each network. 
The Gaeng Khoy Hospital was an example of a community hospital that had a good relationship 
with the Saraburi Hospital. It received support from the Saraburi Hospital, through specialist 
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doctors visiting Gaeng Khoy Hospital once a week. This hospital had been in the process of 
hospital accreditation and had no financial constraints. 
The Wihandaeng Hospital had a problem of high turnover of physicians and was perceived to be 
decreasing in quality. In 2002 the resident doctor at the Wihandaeng Hospital felt himself to be 
overloaded, and therefore moved to another community hospital in April 2002 (Interview: 
Wihandaeng DHO). Although the Saraburi Hospital had sent a doctor to take charge as hospital 
director from October 2001, he came only in the evening to run the administration and service loads 
were not decreased. Another doctor came part-time for the morning clinic. This situation could not 
last as the services could not be provided properly. The Saraburi Hospital finally took over the 
Wihandaeng Hospital and sent a team to take charge permanently. 
The Nong Don Hospital faced two big problems; financial constraints and a deficiency of doctors. 
To cope with the financial constraints, the hospital made a plan to increase hospital revenues, to 
decrease expenses, and to increase efficiency. However, it could not solve the problem of doctor 
deficiency. The Nong Don Hospital had a high turnover of physicians because it was small and 
could offer no financial incentive to stay. The hospital director said: 
"The problem of discontinuous working of doctors at primary care level, I think comes from the lack of 
incentives. Many doctors at community hospitals have private clinics. Therefore, doctors will not stay long in 
districts where they cannot generate income from their private clinics. The government incentive at the present 
is not enough" (The Director of the Nong Don Hospital). 
As the hospital could not provide services at full capacity, it needed strong support from the 
supervisory hospital. This hospital director requested the improvement of the referral system. He 
suggested that: 
"I agree with the policy to develop a provider network; however, there are problems in the network management. 
The big hospital must cooperate. They should provide both information transfer and staff mobilisation. For 
example, the staff in the big hospital should send back the information from the laboratory investigation of a 
referred patient; then, I can further treat the patient. Without the information, how can I act? For the staff 
mobilization, it will be very helpful to villagers if specialists come to this community hospital once a week" 
(The Director of the Nong Don Hospital). 
He expressed the conflict between the small and the large hospital as follows: 
"Though the MOPH system is changing, the separation between the community hospitals and the group of 
general hospitals and regional hospitals still exists. The backgrounds of the directors of the community 
hospitals are different from the backgrounds of the directors of the big hospitals; therefore, their status is 
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different. The director of a big hospital must have prestige and standing with his colleagues. While the director 
of a community hospital does not necessarily have prestige amongst colleagues but he would be accepted by 
villagers. The problem of the difference between the directors of the small hospitals and the directors of the big 
hospitals has long existed. ... The big hospitals emphasise secondary care while the community 
hospitals 
emphasise community health. ... If the directors of community 
hospitals are asked to approach the big 
hospitals, they will agree to do so. In contrast, the big hospitals will be reluctant. In other words, the big 
hospitals do not have a unit which is responsible for community health. Most of physicians are specialists and 
specialised doctors usually are disinterested in primary care" (the Director of the Nong Don Hospital). 
However, the Director of the large hospital did not agree with this viewpoint: 
"Previously, I could not send any staff to community hospitals. Each hospital had it own director. The directors 
of community hospitals have their clans. The big hospitals do not want resources from the smaller hospitals but 
we do need cooperation to refer patients in good condition, not too late. There have been many arguments 
between nurses regarding the conditions of referred patients" (Director of the Phabudhabaht Hospital). 
In May 2002, the Nong Don Hospital director left for specialist training. As with the experience of 
the Wihandaeng Hospital, a large hospital - the Phabudhabaht Hospital - took it over and sent a 
senior doctor to direct. 
The Ban Mo Hospital had a high turnover rate of physicians, as with other community hospitals. 
As a result, patients were transferred to other big hospitals, increasing expenditures. The 
inadequate support of the Provincial Health Office and the Phabudhabaht Hospital led to a crisis 
situation, and the former director of the Ban Mo Hospital resigned from the hospital. He said that 
"it was risky if you are the only doctor who is responsible for all patients of the 30-bed hospital. 
Mistakes might occur and the government might not protect you. Moreover, the UC policy raised 
people's expectations. Patients might sue doctors any time. The new insurance bill is going to 
impose the liability on doctors". The overall quality of services of the Ban Mo Hospital had been 
developing as the hospital was in the process of hospital accreditation. After the former director 
resigned, the Phabudhabaht Hospital sent a senior doctor to direct the Ban Mo Hospital. As the Ban 
Mo Hospital team was strong and could maintain the primary care model development, the quality 
of hospital services, and its reputation did not diminish as it did in the case of Wihandaeng. 
7.3 Villagers' perceptions of the 30 Baht Scheme 
Villagers' perceptions reflect health sector performance in policy implementation. The study 
selected each tambon (sub-district) in the four study districts to connect the story of the 
implementation of the 30 Baht Scheme. The study investigated the difference between urban areas 
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and rural areas by selecting two municipal and two rural tambons. Coordinators at health centres 
selected participants using two criteria: the participants should be key respondents with opinions 
about the 30 Baht Scheme and be available on the appointment date. Table 7.2 shows the dates and 
the characteristics of the study sites and participants in the focus group discussions. Each focus 
group discussion took about 60 minutes. 
Table 7.2 Participants in the focus group interviews in four districts in Saraburi, 3-10 April 2002 
Group 1. Ban Mo 2. Wihandaeng 3. Nong Don 4. Gaeng Khoy 
Places Ban Krua Tambon, 
Ban Mo District 
Nongsuang Tambon, 
Wihandaeng District 
Ban Klub Tambon, 
Nong Don District 
Huay Haeng Tambon, 
Gaeng Khoy District 
Area Municipal area Municipal area Rural area Rural area 
Dates 3 April 2002 5 April 2002 9 April 2002 10 April 2002 
Participants Five people: two 
males and three 
females. 
Six people: four 
males and two 
females. 
Six people: five 
males and a female. 
Seven people: two 
males and five 
females. 
The number of participants in the four groups was 24 people, 13 males and 11 females, including a 
village leader, an officer of a local administration, a member of a sub-district council, and eleven 
health volunteers, and ten lay people. Within these groups, three and two people were CSMBS and 
SSS beneficiaries respectively. Nineteen people were covered by the 30-Baht Scheme, of which 14 
people were exempted from the 30 Baht co-payment (an elderly person and others who were 
members of health volunteers' families). 
Four main points of people's perceptions were investigated during the discussions: 
" Who gained and who lost through the introduction of the 30 Baht Scheme; 
0 Participation and communication; 
" Enrolment; and 
" Service delivery system. 
7.3.1 Who gained and who lost 
7.3.1.1 The gainers: Rural people and the poor 
The Scheme ensured that people could seek care when they needed, and could alleviate catastrophic 
illness. According to a village leader (in Wihandaeng): 
"Lay people get benefits from this scheme. It is very useful for poor families because they used to be in debt 
when they got sick, but not any more with the 30 Baht card. " 
Besides the elderly and children, the beneficiaries of the 30 Baht Scheme in these four tambons 
included farmers, unskilled labourers, and shopkeepers. These people were the majority in the rural 
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areas and the minority in the municipal areas. Therefore, the scheme benefited more people in the 
rural than in the urban areas. 
The 30 Baht Scheme should have benefited farmers, unskilled labourers or daily waged labours. 
Some of them had not been able to afford the 500 Baht for the Voluntary Health Card, and were not 
poor enough to meet the criteria of the means test of the MWS. However, some were identified as 
poor by the focus group participants because "they had no land and lived from hand to mouth with 
big families" (Nong Don group). The participants suggested that the cost of 30 Baht was less than 
the daily wage (140 Baht per day); therefore, the daily-wage workers could afford the cost of 30 
Baht (Ban Mo group, Wihandaeng group, and Kaeng Khoy group). 
The shopkeepers in the focus groups used private facilities rather than public facilities. The reason 
they gave for refusing public facilities was the long waiting time (the Ban Mo group). Therefore, 
they had little benefit from the 30 Baht Scheme. However, the scheme protected them when they 
needed services in cases of emergency and severity. A health volunteer described the population in 
his municipality, showing the low importance of the 30 Baht Scheme in his particular municipality, 
as follows: 
"Most of people in this area are the employees of the Thai Cement Public Enterprise. They and their families 
access a health facility inside the factory and the health facility refers the severe cases to a private hospital 
(which contracts to provide services for the public enterprise's employees). Others are private sector employees 
who have Social Security Scheme cards. There are not many farmers and merchants in this tambon. " 
Though the scheme could protect patients from health care costs, some families were in debt from 
transportation costs. However, the loans from the Village Fund Program26, which had just been 
introduced by the government, was perceived as helpful in protecting villagers from the high 
interest rates. This was observed by villagers in two rural groups (Nong Don group and Kaeng 
Khoy group). In the case of the poor elderly living alone, they could receive a pension fund of 300 
Baht per month from government welfare. The criteria to receive this welfare included poverty, 
disability, and no support from their families. Though the 300 Baht was very little, it seemed that 
the society had its safety nets. The following is a conversation in the group of Nong Don District 
about the Village Fund. 
26 The Village Fund Program was introduced by the Thaksin regime. The government allocated a million Baht to every 
village as a revolving fund for loans in each village. 
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Researcher: "Did anybody borrow money from others to seek care when they were sick? 
Villager2: "Yes, there were some families. " 
Researcher: "What were the expenses for? " 
Health volunteerl1: "They borrowed money from others for the transportation costs of the 
patients and their families to look after the patients at the hospital". 
Health volunteerlO: "However, the number of borrowers decreased because families could request 
money from the Village Fund to invest to earn a living. Therefore, they should 
have cash available. Moreover, there are many earners in a family; hence, they 
can help each other in the family. " 
In summary, the uninsured non-skilled labourers should have got the highest benefit from the 
scheme because they suffered from more poverty than others, following by other uninsured. In 
addition, the scheme benefited people in rural areas more than those in the urban areas as informal 
sector workforces were the majority in rural areas. 
7.3.1.2 The losers: some MWS cardholders, chronic illness patients and people with minor 
sickness 
The issue of the taxpayers' burdens was raised with regard to fee exemption. The conversations 
were as follows: 
Researcher: What do you think if everybody is exempted for the charge of 30 Baht? 
Health volunteer8: "It will be very good but I wonder where the doctors could earn money from? 
Health volunteer9: "Thus, how the government can afford the cost? The government just gets income 
from taxpayers. " 
According to the focus group participants' perceptions, the SSS and the CSMBS beneficiaries were 
not affected by the 30 Baht Scheme. They perceived that these people had the advantage of choice. 
The SSS beneficiaries could go to private clinics and hospitals, and villagers believed the private 
facilities were better than the public facilities, at least in respect of waiting time. The CSMBS 
beneficiaries could go to a general hospital, bypassing a small community hospital. In the 
participants' views, both the SSS and CSMBS beneficiaries were not losers. 
Three population groups were mentioned during the discussions as potential losers because they got 
fewer benefits than previously. The first group was the MWS cardholders who received the card of 
the 30 Baht co-payment instead of the exemption card. In theory, the MWS beneficiaries should 
have received the 30-Baht exemption card with a clear statement `exemption of the nominal fee' 
and the rest should have received the 30 Baht co-payment card. However, it was evident in three 
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groups (see below) that the cards with the 30 Baht co-payment replaced the MWS cards instead of 
the card exempting them from co-payment (Ban Mo group, Wihandaeng group, and Gaeng Khoy 
group). 
Therefore, some poor families might have actually lost from the introduction of the policy. The 
conversation of the Wihandaeng: 
Health volunteer8: "Before the 30 Baht card was issued, there had been no support to 14 million 
people but they had paid very little at health centres and the 'Free' cardholders 
(MWS cardholders) had never paid. Presently, all of them have to pay a charge of 
30 Baht for a visit. 
Researcher: "Are the Free cardholders exempted for the charge of 30 Baht? " 
Health volunteer8: "No. Everybody has to pay the charge of 30 Baht". 
Health volunteer7: "No one can be exempted now. " 
Another case was given by a villager in the Gaeng Khoy group. She said "The 30 Baht Scheme was 
bad because I had to pay the charge of 30 Baht. I was a MWS cardholder and had never paid for 
health care costs. Perhaps, people think I am rich now, although they thought before I was poor. " 
Health volunteers in the Wihandaeng group argued that people could afford the 30 Baht co-payment. 
They felt uncomfortable distinguishing those eligible for exemption from those who were not, in 
spite of the fact that they could recognize some villagers as `the poor'. Their discussion was: 
Researcher. "Is there anybody particularly poor and exempted? " 
Village leader: "Though they are poor, they still do not receive the exemption. " 
Researcher: "How many people are particularly poor? " 
Village leader: "There are at least 10 to 20 poor families in a village. A village has 100 families. 
Some villages may have about 200 families. " 
Researcher: "So, the poor are about ten percent of the population. They might not be able to 
afford the charge of 30 Baht. " 
Village leader: "They might not be able to afford but they have to pay because the cards had been 
launched. " 
Health volunteer6: "Most of them are unskilled labourers living from hand to mouth. However, if 
they can afford a tonic, they must be able to afford 30 Baht. " 
Researcher: "Besides elderly and children, should anybody be exempted for the charge of 30 
Baht? " 
Village leader: "Yes. Some people need the exemption but we do not know where they are. " 
Health volunteer6: "I think some people should be exempted. " 
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Health volunteer8: "If you (researcher) account in this way, then, many people want to be the poor 
asking for the exemption. " 
Village leader: "It should be accounted by the family's status, people do know who are actually 
poor. " 
Health volunteer6: "Thus, the people who are responsible to issue the card must be in trouble. " 
The second group who lost were patients with chronic conditions, as they paid the charge of 30 
Baht many times. The third group was those with minor illness, as they paid higher than the actual 
cost. Comments were as follows: 
"People use the 30 Baht Scheme in the case of diabetes and bone diseases. Both the 500 Baht card in the past 
government and the 30 Baht card in this government are good for the poor. However, the chronic illness 
patients have to pay 30 Baht many times, which is different from the previous 500 Baht card scheme which had 
no payment at the time of service" (Ban Mo group). 
"When I had the MWS card, I used to receive headache relieving drugs at this health centre. After the 30 Baht 
card replaced my expired MWS card, I had to pay the charge of 30 Baht. Therefore, I bought the drugs from a 
drugstore where costs were only 5 Baht for a dose. So, I could buy a box of that drugs and it cost me only 15 
Baht" (a villager in Gaeng Khoy group). 
In summary, participants in the focus group discussions noted a change in cost sharing with the 
introduction of the 30 Baht co-payment, which was disadvantageous for some groups but others 
gained. 
7.3.2 Participation and communication 
Participants in the focus group discussions had different experiences in the process of registration, 
card delivery, and communication. Health volunteers were an important group who conveyed 
messages about the health services and health events to communities. Health volunteers also took 
part in the household survey for health registration as they were allocated responsibility for 10 
families. Village leaders did not have any role in the registration process of the 30 Baht Scheme, 
although they had been involved in identifying the poor for the MWS. For the 30 Baht Scheme, the 
lists of the poor came from health volunteers and health workers. Local administrative 
organisations also had no role in the 30 Baht Scheme. Posters and press releases giving information 
on the 30 Baht Scheme were on the noticeboard at health centres but not disseminated to villages. 
The following are points made in the group discussions. 
"In the survey for card registration, health workers came to health volunteers' houses for the information of 
villagers" (Villager4 of the Nong Don group). 
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Health volunteer5: "Health workers asked health volunteers to make a survey first. A health volunteer 
was responsible for 10 households. ... We often explain 
how to use the card and 
sometimes we delivered the 30 Baht card to villagers. " 
Researcher: "Was the process of enrolment complicated? " 
Villager9: "No. It was not complicated. The health workers had villager lists from the family 
records. They completed everything by October (2001). Health volunteers helped 
them. The village leader was not involved in the registration process in this time. 
Health workers did a survey by themselves". 
Local administrative officer: "The local government also had no role in the registration process of the 
30 Baht Scheme. The health workers had named who are the poor" (Gaeng Khoy 
group). 
However, during the discussions, it could be observed that villagers still had many questions about 
the 30 Baht Scheme: 
Villager9: "Are the services for the 30 Baht cardholders separate from the services for patients paying 
by cash? ... If we 
have severe illness, will the hospital reject us? " 
Villager8: "There should be lists of services saying whether the services are included in the benefit 
package or not. " 
Villager6: "What does it mean? If we have an accident and go to a hospital, do we have to pay total 
costs? Or should we pay only 30 Baht? " 
Villager8: "Does the package include all diseases? Is there any exception? " (Gaeng Khoy group) 
Because of inadequate communication, some villagers faced problems when they went to hospitals, 
as this example shows: 
"The big hospital did not give information on the drugs outside the benefit package before giving drugs and bills; 
then, I had to pay a lot" (Wihandaeng group). 
7.3.3 Enrolment 
As described in the previous section, health providers managed the registration of the 30 Baht 
Scheme based on family records with the assistance of health volunteers. However, a few remained 
un-enrolled because they could not show evidence of Thai citizenship27. The data at national level 
supports that 8% of the total population in 2002 were uninsured (Chapter 5). The following were 
the characteristics of the uninsured observed by participants of the focus group discussions: 
27 Evidence of Thai citizenship includes the identification card and the house registration documents which indicated 
identification number of each citizen. 
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"There is an elderly person having registered as a citizen at a district outside this province but he has no copy (of 
the household registration documents) with him; therefore, we (health volunteers) could not help him to register 
with a health provider" (Hong Don group). 
"There is a blind elderly person. She does not have a copy of the household registration documents. I (health 
volunteer) went to find her name in the family records at this district office but I failed. She has forgotten in 
which district she registered. I have reported to the district office for years but nothing progresses. She also 
failed to get a pension from the social welfare" (Ban Mo group). 
"Yes. A man aged more than 40 and a man aged nearly 100 years have never been registered as Thai citizens 
and have no identification card. Although there were witnesses to prove their ethnic origin, the district officer 
did not dare to register them. This was because he feared to be fired if there was a mistake as there was a deputy 
officer who was fired after making a mistake in registering a foreigner" (Nong Don group). 
"Yes. An 80-year-old female divorced from her husband many years ago and her ex-husband has held the house 
registration. She has no copy of the household registration documents. Another lady aged more than 60, she 
does not have a copy of her household registration documents" (Gaeng Khoy group). 
During a visit to the blind elderly person, the researcher found a girl, aged 11, who was reported to 
have no birth certificate and therefore, her name was not registered in her family records. In this 
case, it was easier to register her because there were documents proving her origin at her primary 
school and also people as witnesses. Unfortunately, her father had made insufficient effort to deal 
with the district office. His excuse was the income loss from being absent from work and, he had 
failed to deal with this matter many times. 
In summary, there was a loophole in the whole social system, the root of which was poverty. 
7.3.4 Service delivery system 
The discussions regarding the service delivery system under the 30 Baht Scheme included four 
aspects; access roles, care delivery, quality of care and people's self-care. The following were 
people's perceptions derived from the focus group discussions. 
7.3.4.1 Access roles: Troublesome rules of the gatekeeper function and the referral system 
There were some changes in the access rules when the MWS's beneficiaries and the VHHCS's 
beneficiaries became the beneficiaries of the 30 Baht Scheme. Criticism was voiced about some 
aspects: 
"The 30 Baht card is worse than the MWS card. For example, one of my neighbours was in an accident in 
Nonthaburi Province and was able to use the MWS card in a nearby hospital. When the 30 Baht card was 
launched, replacing the MWS card, that hospital denied the 30 Baht card. In my case, if I am moving to 
Bangkok, I have to register for the 30 Baht card in Bangkok. Why doesn't the government make a card that is 
eligible for using health services anywhere in the country? " (Wihandaeng group). 
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"I wonder why a patient had to come back to the registered hospital when the patient went for a hospital 
admission at the Saraburi Hospital despite the patient being nearly dead" (Wihandaeng group). 
"Have you ever heard nurses asked why did you come to this hospital after official hours? (Wihandaeng group)" 
"People have to start at a health centre before going to a hospital. It seems a weakness of the 30 Baht Scheme' 
(Ban Mo group). 
The reason why people did not comply with the gatekeeper rule was because of perceived quality. 
They perceived that the service quality of their registered hospitals was lower than at other larger 
hospitals. Moreover, they said the 30 Baht card was meant to be for use at any hospital in case of 
emergency, but this was not always complied with, and there was no explicit definition of an 
emergency case. Therefore, there were a lot of misinterpretations and quarrels between providers 
and patients: 
"If not severe, we agree to start at the registered hospital. If severe, we disagree. For example in the case of an 
accident, we went directly to a bigger hospital though a community hospital is closer. That was because doctors, 
who were in charge of the on-call services at the community hospital, were not in the hospital but they were at 
their private clinics in the market nearby. In that case, the hospital would provide an ambulance but it might not 
be in time and the patient might be dead before arriving at a bigger hospital. The 30 Baht program does not 
encourage the hospital to improve the services at all. This hospital has a bad reputation for quality of services" 
(Wihandaeng group). 
7.3.4.2 Care deliveries: New services reaching homes 
Villagers noticed new services at some health centres provided by health team from hospitals, 
especially services by doctors. They noted that chronic disease patients could receive drugs and 
follow-up for symptoms at several health centres; sometimes health teams visited elderly and 
chronic disease patients at home: 
"The number of health personnel in this health centre increased. The hospital sent a health team to provide 
services at the health centre three times a week. People have more confidence in the services at this health 
centre" (Ban Mo group). 
"Home health care is good for elderly" (Wihandaeng group). 
"Health promotion activities are the same as previous, for example, vaccination and pregnant care" 
(Wihandaeng group). 
It was clear that demands in health care increased, as these examples indicate: 
"Doctors should come to provide services here at this health centre" (Gaeng Khoy group). 
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"We need dental services provided at this health centre. The queue at the hospital is too long. If we go there a 
bit late, we will not get a service" (Gaeng Khoy group). 
7.3.4.3 Quality of care: in doubt due to systems' uncertainties 
Quality improvement could not be observed because the UC system was in a transition period. 
Indeed, people expressed concern that the quality had not improved: 
"There was no change. People do not express opinions on the service because the program is just launched and 
still not stable" (Nong Don group). 
"The news about the resignation of the hospital director made people concerned about the quality of hospital 
services" (Ban Mo group). 
"This community hospital has new doctors every three months, just like a training period. ... This hospital 
should have permanent doctors, we do not want new doctors all the time. " ... "This hospital has long waiting 
times for services and few doctors. " ... " Waiting for a long time was so disappointing" (Nong Don group). 
"If the case is severe, we might go to a private hospital. Even in the public hospital, doctors send patients to 
have x-ray checks at this private hospital" (Nong Don group). 
"After the economic crisis, people saved their money and went to public hospitals. Therefore, the public 
hospitals have more patients than previously. I think the problems are the limitations of the hospital budget and 
human resources" (Ban Mo group). 
"Long queue, there were more than 100 patients while there were only two doctors. That is why people want to 
bypass this community hospital" (Wihandaeng group). 
In addition, there were concerns about the differences in quality of services received according to 
the different payment schemes or social status: 
"There were many complaints that the drugs of the 30 Baht Scheme were different from the drugs for patients 
who paid from their pockets. The hospital should improve this problem" (Wihandaeng group). 
"Someone can get special services if doctors recognise them; however, this was true before the 30 IIaht Scheme 
was launched. For example, lay people might not be able to get access to a private room. In contrast, when you 
know someone working inside the hospital, you can book the room with a short time of waiting" (Wihandaeng 
group). 
"I (health volunteer) think that the policy of this government is to provide equally health care services and 
hospitality to all because these are our rights. Therefore, civil service officers should not exploit us. Though, as 
a tradition, civil servants are respected as our bosses, indeed, they are our employees earning from our taxes 
through government tax revenues" (Wihandaeng group). 
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7.3.4.4 People's self-care: Seeking care from drugstores and village drug fund 
For minor illness, villagers avoided paying 30 Baht at health centres. They had many choices for 
self-care, for example, going to drugstores and going to villages' drug funds: 
"Only the poor (who have MWS card) and the elderly (who have MWS card) come to this health centre. The 30 
Baht cardholders go to drugstores instead (Ban Mo group). " 
"People still buy drugs from drugstores. They still use the combination drug sets, which are cheaper than 30 
Baht. There is a new pharmacy, which provides advice free of charge. I (villager) did not pay at all in a case 
where the symptoms do not need any drug (Ban Mo group). " 
"There is a drug fund project. The health centre provides medicines for the village health centres at cheap prices. 
Therefore, people have choices to buy medicines, which cost lower than 30 Baht at these village health centres 
(Wihandaeng group). " 
7.4 Performance in reform implementation and capacity strengthening 
strategies 
This section analyses the Thai health system performance in the reform implementation in four 
aspects of change at operational level. The assessment of performance in this chapter is not linked 
to outcomes but rather focuses on the process of management and service delivery by using skills, 
incentives, and motivations to help explain performance in the implementation of the 30 Baht 
Scheme. 
In brief, the Thai health system suffered from inappropriate staff distribution, which was a structural 
problem limiting the system from providing more equitable access to health care. The introduction 
of the 30 Baht Scheme urged system changes at operational level in four aspects: 1) increasing 
accountability and responsiveness by paying providers directly and separating the roles of 
regulation from service provision, 2) increasing equity in health care access by enrolling all citizens 
and changing budgetary and financing systems, 3) expanding the range of services in primary care 
provision, and 4) strengthening the provider network and referral system. However, problems 
associated with implementation existed and are still challenging the system. The following section 
explores strategies and incentives of the system and how these factors affected policy responses. 
7.4.1 Increasing accountability and responsiveness 
Separating the regulation role from the service provision role was expected to lead to greater 
accountability of the health providers. However, at the beginning of the UC policy, the Health 
Insurance Office at the central MOPH was dominant in the purchaser role, and centralised decision- 
making. It was too overwhelmed by operational management and fire fighting for it to fulfil its 
strategic role as regulator effectively. Some decisions such as provider payment methods were 
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delegated to Provincial Health Offices but no task was delegated to District Health Offices. This 
meant that the sub-national bodies at district level were not trusted to make decisions, and were not 
encouraged to take on the regulator tasks. This also reflected the sub-national bodies at provincial 
level - the provincial health offices or Area Health Boards. No sanction was provided by the DHOs 
for non-compliance in practice. This was also because the Thai culture prefers giving incentives 
more than punishments. Therefore, a regulator which does not have authority to control resources 
has little power in regulation. However, the District Health Offices still had authority for deciding 
on staff promotion, and were co-chairs with the hospital directors in the District Health 
Coordinating Committees. 
For DHOs, there was no incentive or specific training for skills in regulation tasks. For the 
committees, members were limited to bureaucrats and there was no place for private providers, 
representatives of consumers or local communities. Responsiveness was therefore limited. 
7.4.2 Increasing equity in health care access and management of budget reallocation 
There are several points discussed in this section. First, the health staff at operational level had 
strong data management and data analysis skills, resulting in high coverage of health enrolment in 
Saraburi (as well as in other provinces). Health workers were capable of making surveys and using 
existing information to enrol people in districts, though there were some difficulties during the 
initial period. 
Second, the skills were developed from past experience in the former scheme management and with 
support from the MOPH and the Saraburi Provincial Health Office by technology transfer, i. e. 
training and software distributions. However, the information system was still incomplete as a 
result of a limitation of the information technology for online access and identifying patients, which 
was developed at national level. This prevented flexibility for health care access across borders. 
Third, the revenue according to the number of registered population was an incentive to enrol as 
many people as possible. In Thailand, health providers enjoyed relative financial autonomy, which 
stemmed from their control over revenues, for example, to pay for staff workload. The higher the 
registered population, the more allowances they could receive. Moreover, they had an incentive to 
charge the 30 Baht co-payment since health providers saw the user charge as a source of revenues. 
This incentive may have led the health workers to refuse the exemption card to some. From 
observation by the researcher in the field, it seemed that there was no particular effort to protect the 
poor, with little participation from other third parties (or communities) to prevent any health 
workers' bias. 
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Fourth, financial data management depended on the existing capacity of each provider network. 
The Saraburi hospital had developed a computerised financial management system and provided 
training of computer skills to accountants from community hospitals in its networks. The 
accounting development was optional; therefore, the other hospital network, the Phabudhabaht 
network with fewer resources, had limited incentives to change the accounting system. 
Fifth, the capitation budgeting system allowed the local level greater power in prioritising resource 
allocation. Hence, providers increased autonomy and could respond better to local problems. It 
was expected that this might lead to more participation for local communities or consumers in 
priority setting. At the stage of this research, customers could express their views only through 
hospital directors, central MOPH, and their local politicians - there was no direct channel for their 
voices in decision-making. 
7.4.3 Expanding the range of services in primary care provision 
The Primary Care Unit development aimed to expand the range of services and improve quality of 
care for peripheral providers. However, there were limitations in the number of physicians who 
were willing to work at small community hospitals and at PCUs. In practice, people in rural 
tambons had a low probability of a consultation with a doctor, with services provided by nurses. 
The MOPH gave time to develop the PCU and test systems, train staff and generate experience. 
Resource mobilisation to primary care was optional. Some hospitals supported both manpower 
(nurses) and training (of medical skills) to health centres which were designated as PCUs. For 
example, the Gaeng Khoy Hospital offered health centre workers a rotation at the Emergency 
Department or child-delivery room. Although the idea was not new, it was activated in order to 
respond to the policy which aimed to strengthen provider networks. 
The MOPH gave incentives to staff by increasing the allowance rate (Interview: Health centre 
workers). Moreover, the Saraburi Provincial Health Office suggested all districts allocate at least 
3,000 Baht per month for public utilities and other expenses to each health centre. That suggestion 
was intended to force the CUPs to find resources for health centres (Gaeng Khoy Hospital Director). 
In some health centres which had high workloads and could generate revenues, the increase of 
resources was an incentive. However, some small health centres, which could not generate revenue 
to pay all staff allowances, closed the evening clinics and moved to working part-time (Interview: 
DHO). It seemed they managed this way, but people in the small tambons lost the opportunity to 
attend clinics in the evening. 
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7.4.4 Strengthening the provider network and referral system 
It was capacity and financial constraints that pushed providers to rearrange their networks. The UC 
policy to strengthen primary care at PCUs made slow progress because of the scarcity of physicians. 
The burden of case loads was on community hospitals, the smallest unit where patients could meet 
physicians regardless of an appointment. The 30 Baht Scheme brought patients back to the district 
level. An incentive to develop the provider network was to share resources between health centres, 
community hospitals, and general/regional hospitals. However, until the present time there has 
been no concrete strategy from the MOPH to reallocate health personnel, especially physicians, 
equitably. 
In sum, the system introduced by the 30 Baht Scheme was relatively adaptive. The new scheme 
tackled issues such as the mal-distribution of beds and physicians between cities and districts, and 
low pay for government physicians working in primary care in some rural areas, where they were 
not able to earn from private clinics. The situation was much improved as the MOPH adjusted 
additional payments many times, but the high turnover of physicians continues. The effect of 
economy of scale of small hospitals was explicit when districts chose to manage capitation budget 
inclusively. However, the inclusive capitation benefited those community hospitals which had 
optimal size of registered population, and was detrimental to others. 
Although the Thai health system is hierarchical, there was considerable flexibility for local levels to 
adapt the system according to constraints. The system at district level faced high workload volumes 
and financial constraints, and the reforms tried to meet this by: 
" greater autonomy of budget management in priority setting, 
" increased budget at peripheral level, 
" increasing allowance rates and flexibility management such as paying by workload, 
" logistic support from larger providers, 
" manpower support from larger providers (mobilisation from hospitals), 
" training support in computer skills and medical care skills. 
The extent to which there was a gap between core policy and implementation was questionable, 
however. The policy did not establish a reward system for compliance and good performance, and 
rather many providers suffered from the policy change. The cultural clash between the community 
hospitals (good health approach) and regional/general hospitals (illness approach) was still a 
constraint for primary care development. Community participation did not appear to increase. 
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7.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter is based on key informants' views of the 30 Baht Scheme, which provides fascinating 
insights into the process of implementation; but is clearly limited because of potential bias of 
responses in a small study. 
It suggests that people involved in the implementation at local level observed four main changes: 
separating the role of regulations from service provisions, changes of budgetary system and 
provider payment mechanisms, expanding ranges of services at the frontier providers, and 
reorganising the provider network and referral system. The UC policy brought a high volume of 
work and financial constraints. However, many expressed positive responses as there was also 
pressure from the public. There were also incentives such as higher rates of allowance, payment 
according to workloads, and resource mobilisation to support primary care services. However, 
many constraints acted as disincentives - such as uncertainty of salary income (at the initial stage) 
and scarcity of health personnel. 
In the views of villagers, they accepted that this program was useful, especially for the poor. It was 
largely people who had chronic diseases or minor illnesses who were perceived to lose. The new 
rules implemented under the 30 Baht Scheme were a bit different from the previous practices of the 
VHCS and the MWS, and people were confused about these rules. There were a small number of 
poor people who were unregistered as they could not prove their citizenship; however, they could 
be exempted from any health fees in practice as they were known to be underprivileged. 
With regard to quality of services, villagers saw not much change as the program had been 
implemented for less than a year. They felt that the health facilities which used to be good, were 
still good, and the health facilities which used to be bad, were still bad. Complaints were about 
long waiting times, the few doctors in community hospitals, and discrimination due to patronage. 
They appreciated two new services. Firstly, doctors came to provide services at health centres and 
chronic patients could receive medicines at health centres instead of at hospitals. Secondly, health 
workers came to see people at home, which was helpful for elderly and chronic patients. The 
strengths and weaknesses of care provided in the 30 Baht Scheme in the consumer perspectives are 
summarised below. 
Strength: 
-Majority of the population get more equal benefits than ever as the 30 Baht Scheme covers 
everyone except people who already have health insurance under the formal sector employment 
(about 20% of the population). 
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-Medical services are available at health centres which are located in every sub-district and special 
cares for the elderly and handicapped were delivered at home. 
-The scheme expands range of services provided at health centres (for example, chronic care, dental 
services). 
Weakness: 
-A small number of chronic patients have to pay more i. e. paying 30 Baht many times more than the 
previous scheme- Voluntary Health Card Scheme. 
-There are troublesome rules of gate keeper function i. e. paying full costs when a patient visits a 
hospital without any referral note from the registered Primary Care Units either a community 
hospital or a health centre. 
-Some hospitals limit the service opening hours for outpatient care for those who are the 30 Baht 
card holders to discourage people to visit the hospitals in the first place. 
-The 30 Baht copayment may discourage patients to visit health providers at an early stage of illness. 
-There is no incentive to improve quality of hospitals' services (sometimes longer waiting time and 
lack of physicians). 
-The process of health registration depends strictly on citizenship documents that are likely to rule 
out underprivileged. 
The implementation was top-down and rapid; however, there was a lot of space for local 
implementers to manoeuvre. Providers at the district level had autonomy in financial management 
and could adapt themselves to secure their staff income and service provision. As there was less 
participation in the direction of adaptation from communities, it was questionable whether the 
system became more responsive. 
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Chapter 8- Discussion and conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, the aims of this thesis were established: (1) to analyse the process of the UC policy in 
agenda setting, policy formulation, and implementation; (2) to explore how the process influenced 
the design of the policy and how far the design affected implementation; and (3) to explore the 
extent to which the policy is likely to achieve its goals. To meet these aims, the specific objectives 
of this thesis were: 
1. to analyse the design and characteristics of the UC policy; 
2. to analyse the extent to which contextual factors facilitated or delayed the UC policy; 
3. to explore the influence, roles and powers of particular actors in the UC policy; 
4. to explain how and why the notion of UC came onto the policy agenda, and was formulated into 
policy; 
5. to explain how the policy was executed and to analyse how far this policy is likely to be 
implemented as intended, by looking at characteristics of the UC policy, policy responses, and 
strategies. 
This chapter synthesizes what has been presented in the preceding seven chapters and compares the 
findings with the lessons from theoretical and empirical information in other studies and other 
countries. 
The analysis proceeds according to the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2. This 
framework was elaborated by drawing on a review of literature relating to the policy process: 
agenda setting, policy formulation and decision-making, and implementation. Models explaining 
the policy process draw on many theoretical disciplines, including political science, sociology, 
economics, and organisational management. Political theory provides decision-making models, to 
which power is central. Sociology focuses on the relationship of members in society, in which the 
concepts of policy community and policy network are central. Economic theory provides concepts 
of welfare and equity. In financing reforms, allocation of resources is central to economics. 
Management theories focus on capacity and management in implementation. This thesis drew on 
approaches from all these disciplines. The justification for this combination is that policy in 
practice is complex and involves interaction of actors influenced by the social, political, economic, 
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and historical context in which policy is shaped and implemented. Policy analysis thus uses 
concepts from the different disciplines to help to understand highly complex interactions. But 
policy analysis is not only a retrospective tool for understanding the constraining and facilitating 
factors in a particular policy; it can also be used prospectively, as a tool for policy-makers to 
improve and change policy for more effective decision-making. 
This chapter follows the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2 in Table 2.2. It looks at 
content, context, actors and process, along the continuum of agenda setting, policy formulation, and 
implementation, recognizing that boundaries between these concepts are not clear, and that such 
divisions are to some extent merely a heuristic device to help in untangling complexity. 
8.2 UC policy design and characteristics of the policy 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, reform proposals in most developing countries were driven by neo- 
liberal ideology and attempted to achieve better health care systems by increasing the contribution 
of private sources of finance. Thailand, by contrast, introduced a tax-based finance scheme to 
achieve universal coverage. Factors which affected the outcome of the policy-making process and 
will determine the success of the implementation included: the ideology which drove the UC debate; 
the design which affected the financial sustainability and technical complexity, implementation and 
support for the policy. 
8.2.1 Ideology 
Most developed countries achieved universal coverage before the world economic crisis in the 
1980s. UC policies in these countries were driven by diverse factors, including the ideology of 
human rights and challenges from the working class (Chapter 1). In Thailand, the ideology of 
human rights in health care, together with the concept of primary care for all and reforms emanating 
from neo-liberal concerns, drove UC policy. This mix of ideas came from national and 
international experience, although this study suggests that international institutions did not directly 
influence policy development in Thailand. Reform ideas were transferred by interaction between 
policy communities in training programmes, workshops, and through international collaboration 
(Chapter 4). It seems that UC was a strongly felt Thai initiative, and indeed in some ways flew in 
the face of international health reforms which emphasised the growth of the private sector; UC 
focused on improving coverage and co-opting the private sector. 
UC policy development was unique, as it was continuously pursued by a group of researchers, of 
which one particular member played an entrepreneurial role (Chapter 3). This study suggests that 
UC policy development had been occurring over a long period, supported by a national policy 
191 
ýýý, 
ý 
CHAPTER 8- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
community of researchers and bureaucrats in the MoPH, already involved in health reforms. They 
had been garnering information and doing research which was important in helping to define the 
design and content of policy. In particular, one of the members of this policy community acted as a 
policy entrepreneur, going between the political party (both before it was in office and when it came 
to office) and members in the research community and MoPH. The idea of UC transferred to 
politicians and civil societies by processes of policy advocacy (Chapter 3). 
UC was simply adopted by both politicians and civil societies because the issue of rights in health 
care access was in line with the new Thai constitution, established in 1997. The study shows that 
the Thai Rak Thai Party recognized the legitimacy of the UC policy, picked it up as a priority to 
gain public support before the election, and so were confident to implement it before legitimizing it 
by law (see Figure 8.1 of the timeline). Universal coverage policy in Taiwan was also introduced 
by the government to gain popularity to maintain political power (Cheng 2003). The commitment 
of the Thaksin government to universal coverage was a key factor in bringing the issue onto the 
political agenda, and then to rapid implementation. Moreover, the government enacted the National 
Health Security Act in 2002 to ensure policy sustainability. In contrast, the `Health System Reform 
Bill'28 was formulated by the previous government, did not have support of the new Prime Minister 
and failed to go to Parliament. This might have been due to the broad aspects of the `health system 
reform', which brought too few obvious short-term benefits, so public support was lacking. It 
might also be partly because the ideology of this bill attempted to control the for-profit private 
health care market, which would have been extremely unpopular with many business and political 
groups. 
Figure 8.1 Timeline of the UC policy implementation and the enactment of the national Health 
Security Act 
Enactment of National Health Security Act 
New Government Draft bill came to parliament National Health Security Act was launched 
lip 
Jan 2001 Apr Jun Oct Apr 2002 Nov2002 
6 provinces 1 
15 provinces 
Whole country (72 provinces) 
Achieved UC 
FExpansion 
of insurance coverage 
28 It was part of the process of thinking about health sector reforms, which aimed to reform the whole health system in 
Thailand including other aspects outside the health service sector by law. Although it generated the 'health system reform 
movement' to mobilise support for a 'Health System Reform Bill', the bill was suspended, and never went through the 
parliament process. 
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8.2.2 System design: technical aspects 
International experts suggested developing countries should establish social health insurance, but 
there was little evidence in the literature to show how to extend such insurance to the large informal 
employment sector (Chapterl). 
In Thailand, several schemes had been established incrementally so that about 69% out of a 
population of 62 million was insured by 2000. These schemes included the Civil Servant Medical 
Benefit Scheme, CSMBS (1955), the Medical Welfare Scheme for the poor and socially 
disadvantaged, MWS (1975), the Voluntary Health Card Scheme, VHCS (1983), and the Social 
Security Scheme, SSS (1991), but universal coverage was not achieved. Hence, a new attempt to 
entitle all citizens by law was seen as reasonable and feasible, but there had been no political 
support for this until 2001. The introduction in 2001 of the 30 Baht Scheme (merged scheme) was 
thus based on incremental experience in managing insurance schemes of about 25 years (1975-2000) 
of the Ministry of Public Health initiatives and many operational research projects during 1991- 
2000. 
The UC policy created a big change in terms of timing -a rapid increase of coverage (extending 
coverage to the 18.5 million people who were previously uninsured) - and a radical shift in funding 
away from major city hospitals to rural provinces and district hospitals in order to build up primary 
care. This also involved changes in budgeting, regulation, and management rules and systems, 
resulting from the adoption of the contract model. Other aspects of the new system were developed 
incrementally from the existing system. These included the benefit package, the use of primary 
care services, the patient-referral system, the quality assurance system, and private provider 
collaboration. The most challenging aspects of the UC system design were the shift towards a tax- 
based financing system, attempts to standardize the benefit package and payment method between 
several schemes, splitting purchasers from providers, and decentralizing of fund management. 
As the main source of finance of the 30 Baht Scheme was from the government budget, the 
government budget allocation to the scheme had to prevent any rapid increase of financial burden, 
but at the same time avoid underpaying. Thus the technical expertise for cost calculations was 
extremely important. This study suggests that information from research was crucial in persuading 
political and bureaucratic leaders that the amounts needed from general taxation were not excessive, 
and that UC was feasible (Chapter 3&4). However, informants also pointed to the fragility of the 
calculations, and that there were differences in opinion about the amounts needed. It seems that 
government acted opportunistically, using. the numbers that best supported its position (Chapter 4). 
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The attempt to standardize the benefit package and provider payment was impeded, partly due to 
the uncertainty of evidence to support what was considered to be the affordable cost in the long run 
for the comprehensive benefit package, and the different views of the effectiveness of the provider 
payment methods; the payment designs were always contested. Nonetheless, the main factor that 
made it impossible to merge all three insurance schemes into a new system at the beginning was the 
strong resistance from other government departments which acted as fund-holders - the Social 
Security Office and the Comptroller General's Office, Ministry of Finance - and from civil servants 
and trade unionists benefiting from the two employment-based schemes. This conflict was reflected 
in the amendment process of the draft law during 2002, and when it was finally passed, it 
compromised on merging by allowing negotiations every year to merge all schemes if it became 
politically acceptable to these fund-holders and these schemes' beneficiaries. 
Splitting purchasers from providers involved a power shift from central MoPH bureaucrats to a 
decentralised network of independent organisations in which, at least in theory, consumers, 
managers and professionals participated, now the National Health Security Office. This was highly 
resisted by the MoPH bureaucrats, and although legally there should be a split between purchasers 
and providers, MoPH bureaucrats have successfully negotiated for at least a three-year phasing out 
period (the split should be effective in 2006). 
The establishment of a single purchaser for the 30 Baht Scheme unified the main system design and 
moved implementation forward rapidly. The attempt to decentralise the management to the 
provincial level was slowed and in the first two years (2001-2) the management was centralised 
through the MoPH and the Health Insurance Office. As this study showed, in Saraburi there was no 
clear plan to decentralise and no training support. These activities were strengthened after the 
establishment of the National Health Security Office in 2003, and the operational function of 
purchasers should be decentralised over the next few years. However, Thai policy makers will no 
doubt be looking closely at neighbouring countries' experience in devolving or decentralising 
management of health services. Where Vietnam has reported positive experiences in the centralised 
policy but decentralised management, the Philippines found its devolved structure could not support 
the implementation of universal coverage (Phua and Chew 2002). 
It is clear that major attention was on the financing system and structures, and one of the great gaps 
in system design was the apparent neglect of human resource issues. This study found little 
evidence that the UC policy paid attention to human resource re-allocation. This may have been 
because if it did, it would induce resistance from bureaucrats to the manpower mobilisation, but 
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manpower is important in distributing primary care services and strengthening capacity for the 
design and implementation of policy change. 
As seen from the above, UC policy design was very complex, and was resisted by some groups, 
which managed to delay or amend the policy. Moreover, the UC was not just a vertical program; it 
incorporated many innovative features which related to and supported health system development. 
In this complex system, there was no one blueprint to fit all. It required the insiders who 
understood the whole functioning of the health system to adjust the design during the course of 
implementation, and also it required legal power to regulate change. Even then, lags in 
implementation occurred, and some issues, such as human resource planning, were neglected 
because of a lack of political leadership to confront them. 
8.2.3 Policy design: factors influencing the outcome of implementation 
Content of UC policy was also influenced by the concentration of cost, the dispersion of benefit, 
short and long-term impact, and the size and pace of change. These factors, according to Grindle 
and Thomas (1991), were likely to influence both the content of the policy and how well it fared in 
implementation. 
This study found that MoPH providers bore the cost of policy change, arousing opposition in the 
bureaucratic ranks. However, UC had benefits that could be seen in both the long and the short 
term. The benefits of system reform, i. e. resource reallocation and the separation of providers and 
purchasers, for example, would become visible only in the long term and would not induce public 
appreciation for the UC policy, although it had a lot of support from key policy communities in 
health. But the extension of the insurance coverage in the earlier stage could effectively bring 
visible benefits to the poor and general population, so UC policy generated a lot of general support 
from the public. The government recognised this, so it wanted to get the 30 Baht Scheme 
implemented as quickly as possible, to carry out its promise to the electorate and also possibly to 
head off resistance. Because of public pressure, the MoPH bureaucrats' responses avoided any 
negative impact on consumers. However, they attempted to maintain power through financial 
management, and to delay the reform by switching the salary-inclusive per capita allocations in 
fiscal year 2002 to the salary-exclusive per capita allocations in fiscal year 2003. Outside the 
MoPH, medical professionals influenced the law amendment by lobbying senators, but failed to 
secure the deletion of some articles regarding malpractice liability, and subsequently negotiated 
with the Health Minister to amend the law when feasible. An explicit strategy the government used 
was to maintain political leadership, but there was no other explicit strategy to manage the 
cooperation. 
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In other countries, such as South Korea (Kwon 2003), professionals displayed strong powers to stop 
the separation between prescribing and dispensing, and delay the introduction of the prospective 
payment system based on DRGs (Diagnostic Related Groups). In Thailand, the law regarding the 
separation is not yet launched because of the strong resistance of medical professionals, although it 
has been drafted since 1999-2000. The content of this law was again contested and largely 
protested by medical professionals during the new government thinking to create this law in 2003. 
The response of medical professionals to UC policy was a bit different because UC policy did not 
directly affect the income generation of medical doctors and the implementation in 2001-2002 was 
prior to the build-up of resistance; therefore, there was no obvious strong opposition to UC policy. 
Moreover, the Thai medical professionals were represented by the Medical Council of Thailand, 
and at that time (2001-2) the Council board members were balanced by MoPH doctors, university 
doctors, and private doctors. Increasing public demand for the greater responsibility (duties) of 
medical doctors, such as in autopsies, and together with the rise of the law attempting to separate 
drug prescribing and dispensing, created an alliance amongst medical doctors led by a group of 
private medical doctors and this group won to have more seats on the board of the Medical Council 
(an ex member of the Medical Council - personal communication). It is likely that the Medical 
Council will increase its role in protecting the benefits of medical professionals, especially in the 
private sector, and will have strong power in resisting regulations which affect its members. 
8.3 Contextual factors facilitating or delaying UC policy 
How far did contextual factors - situational, structural, cultural, and environmental - influence the 
perceptions of the policy makers? Situational factors - such as the economic crisis and political 
regime change - facilitated policy change (Chapter 3). Structural factors affected policy 
formulation and the capacity for implementation (Chapters 4-7). Cultural and environmental 
factors were important in the shaping of the ideology (section 8.2.1). 
8.3.1 Situational factors 
Situational factors - transient, impermanent conditions - played a part in facilitating the UC policy, 
providing new opportunities for reform. The findings of this study showed that the new political 
setting was an important factor in policy change and situational factors are important in at least 
three aspects. Firstly, an event, the general election, provided the opportunity for policy 
entrepreneurs to push their ideas (Kingdon 1995). Secondly, a crisis - the economic crisis - was `a 
focusing event' forcing the change of government. And thirdly, political change created demands to 
speed the implementation of new policies at the beginning of the regime. 
196 
CHAPTER 8- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Political transition: political windows opened for ideas 
Several approaches looking at agenda setting and policy formulation suggest the importance of 
timing. Hall (1994) suggests legitimacy, feasibility and support all play a part in agenda setting. 
This research showed that UC was perceived as a legitimate policy for government to consider, and 
that it was congruent with the Thai Constitution and the Thai Rak Thai Party. Researchers had 
offered evidence to suggest UC was feasible and there was lots of support from civil society. 
Kingdon's three stream model is also useful in explaining what happen in Thailand. The problem 
stream deepened the perception of difficulties for the public in health care access, especially severe 
after the economic crisis. The policy stream had developed alternative solutions which had been 
studied by researchers over years, and several financial protection programmes had been scaled up. 
The political stream pushed for political change and opened the opportunity for UC to reach the 
political agenda. If the Thai Rak Thai Party had not picked the UC issue in its electoral campaign, 
UC policy might not have become a government priority. Importantly, it was a 'hidden' policy 
entrepreneur, who was also a high-level MoPH civil servant and had built his knowledge as a 
researcher, who advocated UC policy, and tried to sell it to many political parties, but only the Thai 
Rak Thai Party adopted it. This policy entrepreneur convinced the Party of the feasibility of the 
policy, of its ideological benefits, pursuing equity and efficiency, and challenged the Party to take it 
up. As the policy distributed benefits to all social classes, the Party recognized it would gain wide 
public support. Experience from other countries also suggests that political transition can provide 
opportunities for reforms (Cheng 2003; Gilson et al. 2003; Reich 1995). 
Time of crisis: economic crisis activated demands for government change 
Thailand is an emerging democratic polity. The 2001 election reflected the strong demand of 
people for change because people were suffering from the recession. The Thai Rak Thai Party won 
the election because of its many popular policies tackling the economic crisis. From media analysis 
undertaken as part of this study (Chapter 3), many opinion polls confirmed the popularity of poverty 
remedying programmes such as the suspension of debtfor farmers, the village revolving fund, and 
the 30 Baht health programme. The impact of the crisis was both positive and negative because it 
created policy debate (Horowitz 1989 in Reich 1995). On the one hand, the economic crisis 
activated people's demand for a change in government and health reformists saw the situation as an 
opportunity to strengthen hospital efficiency among other things. On the other hand, medical 
professionals saw this change instigating resource constraints to the health services. 
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Timing: political change created a demand for rapid implementation 
The UC policy was implemented rapidly in the first year, when the general public mood was 
optimistic and when coalitions were strong and supportive of good policy. The government had a 
reasonable majority in parliament. But the Prime Minister wanted to demonstrate results, and so 
did not delay pushing the Party's intended policy onto the government agenda, to demonstrate that 
the party would accomplish what it intended to do and so gain support. The implementation of the 
UC policy was seen as politically symbolic, similar to other health policies in many countries, for 
example in South Africa (Gilson et al. 2003). However, rapid implementation had its weaknesses. 
Experience from many countries indicated negative unanticipated impacts from too rapid 
implementation. For example, the implementation of the resource re-allocation formula and of free 
health care for mother and child under 6 years in South Africa, and the implementation of the 
resource allocation formula in Zambia, were not preceded by relevant preparation; therefore, many 
administrative problems occurred (Gilson et al. 2003). The rapid implementation of national health 
insurance in Taiwan led to chaos and confusion (Cheng 2003). This study shows that this also 
occurred to some extent in Thailand. One economist described UC implementation as `do and 
correct' without a proper plan (Siamwalla 2002). In fact, interviews and document review suggests 
that the plan was seriously discussed among high-level civil servants within the MoPI!, and it was 
this discussion that convinced the Permanent Secretary of the MoPI! to support and indeed 
implement the policy, ahead of the expectations of the Health Minister. To avoid unwanted effects, 
the MoPH tried to anticipate problems, and introduced many strategies to ease obstacles such as 
phasing the implementation, increasing participation, and prompt feedback. It was for this reason 
that the 'War Room' was established. Rapid implementation had its merits because it mobilised 
public support before resistance built up. Other countries, for example, the Bangladesh national 
drug policy introduced in 1982 (Reich 1995), also went for rapid execution to avoid contestation. 
8.3.2 Structural factors 
Structural factors played a part in policy formulation and facilitated implementation. The political 
context, especially the relationship between the state and society, explains the success of reform 
policy in many studies (Walt and Gilson, 1994). In Thailand, Ford et al (2004) suggest that civil 
society groups are strong and have an important role in establishing human rights to health by 
challenging the practices of the multinational pharmaceutical industry (Ford et at. 2004). This 
thesis also found an increasing role of civil society in establishing human rights to health. This was 
a result of the political transition after 1992. The study suggests that UC policy was introduced into 
a relatively open political context, in which state-society relationships were shifting towards greater 
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democracy and participation. Health policies became a "high politics issue" with direct public 
support and pressure on the UC policy (Chapter 3). 
The study found that the rapid implementation of the UC policy was supported by the previous 
investment in health care and the capacity of the MoPH bureaucrats, including strong researchers 
who were capable of providing evidence and analysis to support decision-making. However, the 
inequitable previous investments in terms of health facilities and human resources allocation were 
constraints to the establishment of the per-capita allocations, resulting in hospital deficits in some 
provinces. 
8.3.3 Cultural and environmental factors 
Cultural factors not only shaped ideologies, but also influenced the rapid action and conflict 
management in implementation. The political commitment hastened the UC policy introduction 
and bureaucrats within the hierarchy also responded promptly, not only because the policy was a 
political directive but also because they perceived the positive notions of UC. Most conflicts could 
be easily solved through compromise and opposition was not explicitly against the policy itself. 
However, bureaucrats used delaying tactics to impede the policy while waiting for a change of 
government and therefore policy. The `culture clash' between groups of MoPH medical doctors 
was reflected by the conflict between reform supporters and reform resisters. 
This study indicated that environmental factors - external pressures - did not directly influence the 
UC policy. 
Leichter's framework of contextual factors is useful to explain the UC policy and to help 
understand how contextual factors influenced it. While situational factors activated policy change, 
structural and cultural factors both facilitated and limited the policy formulation and the 
implementation. 
8.4 Actors: positions and capacities to influence the policy 
This study explored the UC at three levels: macro level - the relationship of the actors within 
political systems; meso level - the relationship between different actors through the lens of policy 
networks; and micro level - the positions, perceptions, and capacity of individuals in influencing 
the policy. 
The study suggests that decision-making in Thailand was dominated by the state. However, the 
decision-making was not limited to policy elites; it was more open and participative (as described in 
section 8.3.2). Looking at the actors through the lens of policy networks, this study showed that 
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there were several policy networks supporting UC. However, these networks were dynamic and 
changed at different stages of the policy process (Table 8.1 summarizes dominant actors in the 
policy process). One network was the policy community - with close relationships - made up of 
bureaucrats, researchers, academics, and politicians, who all supported UC at the beginning. This 
policy community continued taking part in policy formulation and some of them were involved in 
policy implementation. Within this policy community was a core group of researchers, some of 
whom were of very high status, had significant power and position, formed part of an elite and 
could influence decisions. The relationships of policy-makers and research communities were 
dynamic; consensus building sometimes occurred but was inconsistent. 
Table 8.1 Dominant actors in policy networks in different stages of policy processes: UC policy, 
Thailand 
Policy processes Actors involved in policy network Dominant actors 
Agenda setting process PM (political party leader) and his PM and his staff 
staff, researchers, NGOs 
Formulation of policy design before Political party, politicians, Political party and reformists 
election reformists, researchers 
Formulation of policy design after Researchers, MOPH top civil MOPII top civil servants and 
the issue adopted and during servants, elected officials researchers 
implementation 
Law enactment Legislature authorities: members of Government's politicians and I lealth 
I louse of Representatives from commissions 
government's political parties and 
oppositions, Senators, and Health 
Commissions; 
Other interest groups; MOPII 
bureaucrats, other government 
departments, NGOs, and medical 
professionals 
Implementation Minister of the MoPII, Health MOP11 top civil servants, MOPI I 
Minister, Deputy Minister of I lealth, bureaucrats at central, provincial and 
top level MOPH bureaucrats, district level and MoPI I providers 
departments in MOPI!, provincial 
and district health authorities, health 
providers from both public and 
private sectors 
An early visible catalyst was the new Prime Minister, who was a powerful agenda setter. The PM 
pronounced that the UC policy was one of the important policies (part of the campaign promise) of 
the new government, both before and after he won the election. The hidden allies of the TRT Party 
were the researchers (reformists) and academics who supported the idea of UC. The researchers not 
only proposed alternative options for solving problems but also played an active part in getting 
attention for problems, keeping closely in touch with NGOs as well as with politicians. In this 
event, a politician who is a medical doctor played an important role in linking the researchers and 
the PM. 
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Medical professionals, including medical associations and executives in the MoPH, were still in 
dominant, exclusive, monopolistic positions within the health sector, with considerable control over 
the training and regulation of their own members and with the ability to subordinate other health 
professionals to their influence. Some of them opposed some articles of the National Health 
Security Act, as the law moved the central position of medical professions to a more marginalized 
position by appointing a commission, composed of consumers, bureaucrats and medical 
professionals, to regulate health care providers under the contract model. However, in spite of the 
substantial power of medical professionals, they did not resist UC implementation in 2001, but later 
tried to influence the law enactment in 2002 through lobbying senators and negotiating with the 
Health Minister to change the articles that would affect their profession - for example, the issues 
related to the liability for malpractice. 
Bureaucrats in the MoPH included managers and service providers, and could be divided into 
reform supporters and reform resisters. The core reformers had had experience of community 
hospitals and many had trained abroad. Their concepts and perceptions were influenced by 
globalising reform trends. Other reform supporters were the rural doctors in hospitals and many in 
the provinces, as they gained from the resource reallocation under capitation. The reform resisters 
were doctors from some general hospitals and regional hospitals, some of whom lost benefits from 
the resource reallocation. However, most MoPH bureaucrats followed the commands of the Health 
Minister and the Permanent Secretary of the MoPH. Although some medical doctors and hospital 
directors resisted the reform, there was little impact on consumers because they disagreed on the 
way the program was executed, but not on the services provided to the people. Some health 
administrators, who were used to enjoying hospital income from well-off patients, opposed the 
inclusion of the well-off because the hospitals would lose this income. 
Many academics and researchers agreed with the reform in terms of its general trend, although 
some expressed concerns about timing because the `Health System Reform Dill', which would set 
financing priorities, was not finalised. Others were concerned about the tax-finance which would 
impose a burden on public expenditure. 
Consumers also supported the policy, as it extended health protection. The NGOs who pursued 
consumers' rights supported the policy, as they hoped the health care system would become more 
equitable. The private sector, including private hospitals, private clinics and private practitioners, 
pharmaceutical industries, private insurance companies, might have been expected to be negative 
about UC policy as it did not promote full competition and capitation sent strong signals for rational 
use of resources. However, many small private hospitals welcomed the policy, because it helped 
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them survive during the economic recession. Most of the established larger private hospitals 
perceived that UC members were not their clients and still believed that UC would not affect their 
business. Some proposed regulations would control private practitioners, and these were contested, 
as in other countries such as Korea (Kwon 2003). In the end, the Health Minister negotiated for a 
compromise, so there was no strong private sector reaction to the UC reforms. 
The media played more of an information role to inform the public, evaluate government 
performance, and reflect the mood of the public. For example, in 1999, the problems of access to 
health care studied by a group of researchers, including members of NGOs (Ong-somwang, 
Rojanapaiwong, and Tantawee 1999), were disseminated by the mass media, giving the issue a high 
degree of visibility. Severe cases were occasionally reported in newspapers. In the UC policy, the 
media were a source of information on the problems of the system and reflected people's values. 
The media coverage of citizens' polls and problem cases made the Health Minister look closely at 
the quality of services. This suggests that the media basically mirrored the views and values of the 
state and the major interests in it (Herman and Chomsky 1988 in Walt 1994). 
In sum, different groups had reservations about different aspects of UC, but overall the vast 
majority were sympathetic to reform. 
8.5 Policy as process 
This study analysed and described how UC got onto the political agenda (Chapter 3), how UC 
policy was formulated (Chapter 4), and how UC policy was implemented (Chapters 5-7). It 
showed that there was no clear boundary at each stage of policy process. Agenda setting 
overlapped with policy formulation and policy formulation largely overlapped with implementation. 
These processes were iterative and shaped by actors who were influenced by their contextual 
environment. 
The agenda-setting process of UC policy was well explained by Kingdon's three-stream model 
(Chapter 3 and section 8.3.1 in this chapter). Decision-making was the result of interactions of 
several actors, although dominated by policy elites. Walt (1994) suggests that where reforms are 
high politics, policies may well be formulated and imposed by narrow elites or a ruling class. This 
study confirmed that the high politics part of the UC policy - the economic changes, for example 
the financing sources and payment methods of the health scheme - was imposed by a small group 
of elites. However, other parts of UC policy fell into the 'low politics' category; for example, the 
resource allocation formula, provider payment methods, primary health care services and the timing 
of private providers entering the UC scheme. These aspects of the policy were influenced by many 
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groups, and the MoPH allowed flexibility in local decisions. Interest groups influenced the policy 
from outside; however, the changes in the political system permitted them to become part of the 
institutional process of government decision-making. For example, many medical doctors from 
both public and private sectors became senators, as did NGO representatives. The Health Security 
Act was influenced by NGOs and medical professional representations on consumer protection and 
provider regulation committees. 
In spite of considerable interaction between groups at various levels of the policy process, this study 
suggests UC policy was largely top-down, although implementers had a level of discretion. The 
government generated the UC policy, formulated its details at central level, and implemented it 
countrywide. As not all details could be identified before the implementation, the MoPH executed 
the do-and-correct approach, in spite of criticisms for having no `proper' plan. In fact, the `do and 
correct' strategy was deliberate, leaving considerable flexibility for provincial authorities, at least 
for the 'low politics' issues. On the other hand, it would be said that the MoPH left some difficult 
issues to the provinces, rather than taking responsibility for them. For example, provinces had to 
choose between inclusive and exclusive capitation payment methods, which created some conflicts 
in the provinces. 
Policy styles varied at different stages of the policy process, policy elites, e. g. the Prime Minister, 
the Health Minister and the Permanent Secretary of the MoPH, had a dominant role in decision- 
making, but were not able to impose their decisions all the time. For example, the policy makers 
decided on the timing to start the program but consultations on how to implement followed. The 
source of finance was decided by the top policy politicians; however, considerable consultation with 
the research community was allowed in decisions on budget amounts and payment methods. 
8.6 Important factors for reform implementation 
8.6.1 Policy characteristics 
Policy implementation is not always perfect and whether it can be implemented with ease or with 
difficulty depends on its characteristics (Cleaves 1980). This study suggests UC implementation 
was not easy (see Table 8.2). 
For example, the budget allocation formula was highly complex, the research and evidence was 
mixed, so policy choice was uncertain. There was insufficient time for analysts to provide viable 
alternatives. So, the formula was not completed and was unused. The flat rate capitation 
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introduced in the first year was also not widely accepted, and consequently, the budget allocation in 
the fiscal year 2003 returned to separating salary budget from the per capita budget. 
Table 8.2 UC policy characteristics 
Characteristics which make implementation easier (Cleaves 1980) UC policy (2001) 
Simple technical features Hi hI features 
Marginal change Radical change 
Implemented by one actor Implementation by one actor at the beginning 
Clearly policy goals Clearly policy goals 
One major objective Many objectives 
Short duration Short duration 
The rapid and radical nature of the change meant there was no time to build consensus among the 
different interests, and led to many facets of resisters. General hospitals and regional hospitals 
opposed the reallocation of resources. The MoPH civil servants were reluctant to transfer the 
purchaser role to a new institution. Medical professionals opposed some articles in the National 
Health Security Act which increased their liabilities in practice. However, the strong political 
support and the flexibility in the implementation made change possible. This contrasts to the 
experience from Greece where interest groups prevented radical change and only incremental 
change was possible (Tragakes and Polyzos 1998). 
Lastly, the UC policy had more than one objective. The two main objectives, extension of health 
insurance and control of costs, were in conflict, because as more patients had access to health 
services, then expenditure increased. 
Looking at policy characteristics helps to explain difficulties in implementation; however, some 
constraints were unavoidable, although they could be relieved by implementation strategies. 
8.6.2 Strategies in the policy implementation 
This study found that at least six strategies were utilized to execute the UC policy (Chapter 5-7): 
0 `Learning by testing' - to fit the policy to the local context, 
0 Creating space for bargaining and negotiation, 
" Prompt problem solving and inviting participation, 
" Maintaining leadership, 
0 Legitimising a stable policy by law, and 
0 Introducing a grievance process. 
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`Learning by testing' 
UC policy focused on insurance coverage and financing reform. Some partial designs had been 
tested in pilot provinces before the policy was launched. However, the experience of those designs 
led policy-makers to expect different responses in different situations. Therefore, the MoPII 
decided to implement the policy in several phases to learn how particular designs fitted the 
provincial context and to adapt the designs in the next phases. The extension of insurance coverage 
started in six provinces in April 2001, was extended to 15 provinces in June 2001 and to the rest in 
October 2001. The exception was Bangkok, where extension was accomplished in April 2002. 
Similarly, changes in the financing system went through several stages. The advantage of phasing 
was to allow the program management to execute easier issues before facing more difficult 
problems, e. g. strengthening the beneficiary registration and information system in phases I and II 
before changing to the new financing system in phase III. Program managers learnt from 
experience in the forerunner provinces, for example, the problems of clearing payments between 
providers and the errors in beneficiary registration. 
However, the benefits of learning from the phasing were not maximized because the knowledge 
from evaluations was not widely disseminated before the MoPH moved to the new phases. In other 
words, the researchers worked more slowly than the politicians driving the change. For example, 
the MoPH's evaluation in 15 provinces, started in June 2001, suggested (in August 2001) that there 
were no clear guidelines on how provinces could use financial incentives to promote activities in 
disease prevention, although these should be available before the nationwide implementation (The 
evaluation committee of the UC implementation in the transition period in fifteen provinces 2001). 
But there were no such guidelines in 2001-2003. Other evaluations by researchers outside MoPI! 
took longer and were released in 2002 (Jariyalertsak 2002; Na Ranong and Na Ranong 2002a; 
Pannarunothai et al. 2002). 
Creating a space for bargaining 
Changes in some aspects of health care were emphasised but only partially implemented in the first 
year. These desired changes were equitable resource allocation, primary care units as gatekeepers, 
empowering patients' rights, the single administrative insurance system, and the purchaser-provider 
split. The policy details from the formulation process indicated mainly the desired outcomes and 
desired system in the transition, but less the means to achieve these desired outcomes. This allowed 
flexibility, and striking a balance in bargaining with all stakeholders. 
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To pursue equitable resource allocation is extremely complicated and has both political and 
technical difficulties. The management of the health care finance for the insurance benefit package 
was not sufficient to mobilise human resources and health assets. Therefore, reform which 
strengthened just the role of the purchaser and left the MoPH management behind delayed 
achievement of the equity goal. In practice, the MoPH suffered from the radical shift of resource 
allocation, so it tried to protect its hospitals from purchasers' rules. This calls for a long-term 
collaboration between the MoPH and the NHSO, i. e. the providers and the purchasers, not only for 
balancing power but also for a good cooperation in mobilising resources, both money and clinical 
staff. It is likely that MoPH bureaucrats will attempt to influence the Board of the National Health 
Security Office to protect budgets of MoPH providers and compromise between the per capita 
allocations and the historically based allocations. 
Similarly, primary care development needed greater technical preparation. The MoPH at central 
level formulated guidelines and a set of standards for primary care services with progressive targets 
over five years. However, the guidelines did not show clearly how the MoPH could achieve this 
goal, and so the MoPH transferred the responsibility for the management of primary care to 
provinces. As a result, there were several trial models in provinces, varying from the extended 
outpatient care unit to the holistic care approach, depending on the staff availability and the 
understanding of the concept of primary care. However, there was little support from the MoPII to 
mobilise physicians to support primary care both between and inside provinces. The central level 
let the internal forces push and pull resources within each province. In the province in this study, 
specialists from regional hospitals were forced to provide services at primary care units, an 
approach which is unlikely to be sustainable. 
The attempt to empower patients was opposed by physicians. This issue was seriously debated in 
the parliament in the debate on the National Health Security Bill. Finally, both lower and upper 
houses passed the Bill with the approval of the two articles indicating the liability of malpractice29. 
The medical professionals subsequently pressured the Minister of Public Health to promise to alter 
the law when possible. This issue involved politics more than technical issues. In this case, the 
Minister may need to clearly state the desired outcome and seek support from interest groups. 
29 Section 4 article 41 of the National Health Security Act indicates that a victim of iatrogenic error or malpractice will 
receive initial compensation money from the National Health Security Office. Article 42 indicates that if the case in 
article 41 is a malpractice, the National Health Security Office has a right to claim a liability from the health provider who 
is responsible for the case. 
206 
CHAPTER 8- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The intention to merge health insurance funds was postponed until the trade unions and the civil 
servant commission agree to join it. However, the Act allowed the National Health Security Board 
to re-visit the situation and hold consultations once a year. It is likely that civil servants and private 
employees will never join. It may take another crisis to force this change. 
The purchaser-provider split was also postponed, although the law was passed in 2002. The 
Permanent Secretary of the MoPH successfully negotiated for a three-year time lag to allow the 
Permanent Secretary to continue to be in charge of the budget allocation for MoPH providers. This 
released pressure from MoPH civil servants. From 2006, the National Health Security Office 
(NHSO) will be responsible for the purchaser role and will reallocate resources. That should be 
enough time for the NHSO to have a proper incremental plan to encourage cooperation with MoPH 
bureaucrats by increasing consultation and participation. 
Prompt problem solving and inviting participation 
Unexpected problems occurred and needed to be resolved. The MoPH appointed the Operational 
Committee known as `the War Room Committee' to respond to problems promptly. This 
committee held meetings every week at the beginning, and later, twice a month, over the period 
between September 2000 and August 2001, to respond quickly to questions from implementers, and 
adjusted rules as problems arose. There were several advantages to this strategy. Firstly, if any 
problem could not be solved easily, it was at least recognized and transferred to other sub- 
committees to think about it. Secondly, the committee was open to many, and widened 
participation. Representatives from all public health providers were invited to be members, and 
they participated actively. They complained, fed information back, suggested solutions, and 
negotiated for particular solutions. However, the committee had limited information and was 
pressured to decide quickly. Therefore, its decisions were sometime influenced more by the power 
of interest groups than evidence from researchers. For example, the committee approved a proposal 
from a university hospital to include specialized care in the UC high-cost benefit package without a 
technical consultation. The weak point of these urgent decisions was that it led provinces to 
perceive that the policy was changeable and uncertain. 
Maintain leadership of the effort 
To exercise and maintain Ministry of Health leadership of the reform effort would be expected to be 
essential for successful implementation (Leighton and Wouters, 1995). Thailand has so far 
sustained the impetus to reform the health care system, though there have been some changes in 
leadership. Four groups of leaders were important; the first was the government and political party; 
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the second was political leadership in the Health Ministry; the third was the MoPH civil servants 
and the fourth was the technical experts. Fortunately, the government was stable. Its first term was 
four years and it looked as if it would retain sufficient popularity for the next election, with Thaksin 
Shinawatra as Prime Minister. The Health Minister, Sudarat Gayuraphan, has been in the position 
from the beginning (2001-2003), while the deputy minister, Suraphong Seubwonglee, a medical 
doctor, was replaced in October 2002 by a TRTP member who was a police general. However, 
while the politicians maintained their leadership, the bureaucrats changed every year. Most of the 
MoPH Permanent Secretaries (PS) came to the position in their last working years, as this position 
is perceived as the highest honour for civil servant careers and the Thai culture values seniority. 
However, changing PS, meant changing the priorities and focus of the health care reform. For 
example, the 2000/2001 PS focused on insurance coverage and budget reallocation. The 2001/2002 
PS devalued the financial reform and concentrated on health promotion and ethics. The 2002/2003 
PS turned the method of the budget reallocation back to the supply side adjustment. These changes 
discouraged reform efforts; however, they decreased stress among bureaucrats by recovering their 
salary security. However, the Minister of Health maintained a technical expert, who pursued the 
UC and the reform ideas, at a high level position - the Deputy Permanent Secretary from October 
2001 to 2003, who was appointed as the Secretary General of the National Health Security Office in 
2003. Therefore, the reform direction was kept under political control. 
Toward a stable policy: legitimising organisation: development by law 
The implementation of the 30 Baht Program in 2001-2003 was under the regulation of the Ministry 
of Public Health and was in transition. Organisational and structural change was needed, and had to 
be legislated through law. The legislation of the 2002 National Health Security Act shows clearly 
the political support, the reform direction, and the foreseen organisation that will be active as health 
purchaser in the three coming years. This may facilitate the process of long-term planning, 
technocratic problem solving and management of change (Tragakes and Polyzos 1998). 
Grievance process 
UC policy established a hot-line telephone number to receive grievances and answer questions from 
consumers and operational officers. This two-way communication increased understanding about 
the program, ratcheted down people's expectations, and provided information to improve 
weaknesses at service points. However, it increased the anxieties of the provincial managers as the 
problems from their provinces might be reported. The MoPH ordered provinces to keep conflicts 
with patients to a minimum. All hospitals set up grievance reception counters and tried to 
adjudicate all arguments within the hospital. According to interviewees, most solutions involved 
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breaking some rules to satisfy patients. For example, the hospital payment system aimed to 
strengthen patient referral rules. Patients who registered at a community hospital needed a referral 
card from the registered hospital before going to a general hospital; otherwise they had to pay for 
the services. In several cases reported to the researchers, patients argued that they should pay 
nothing and threatened to report cases to the minister. Finally, the hospital gave the services 
without charge but at the expense of the hospital. 
Summary 
The UC policy has several characteristics which make its implementation complex. These 
characteristics involve highly technical features with professional involvement, and service 
orientation with customer involvement. Several strategies were implemented to ease both the 
technical and political difficulties, but there was sometimes trade-off between efficiency and 
political pressure, as in the examples above, and sometimes the MoPH avoided conflict by making 
the provinces take difficult decisions. 
8.6.3 Staff capacity and ability to shape the outcomes 
This research suggests that the initial capacity to implement the UC policy was based on existing 
resources and infrastructure. Towse et al (2004) also support the findings from this thesis (Towse, 
Mills, and Tangcharoensathien 2004). This thesis found that three important aspects of the Thai 
health system facilitated the rapid implementation to achieve universal coverage within a short 
period. Firstly, the grooming of public health researchers within the MoPH and institutions over a 
couple of decades yielded "accumulative expertise" in policy analysis in Thailand. Problems were 
identified, the public was informed, and alternative solutions were sought, though final consensus 
was not always made. The strength of the researchers within the MoPli was that they proposed 
pragmatic solutions rather than simply being committed to ideal designs (Chapter 4). 
Secondly, the development of the public infrastructure and insurance coverage guaranteed policy 
feasibility, leading the system to adopt challenges. The strength of public investment is its 
sustainability, while private investment is much more unstable, and affected by economic change. 
The public infrastructure, therefore, was a fundamental enabling feature to reform of the Thai health 
system (Chapter 1). Thirdly, while the MoPH is hierarchical, the provincial health offices and 
district health offices nevertheless had considerable autonomy over micro-level decisions. 
Moreover, hospitals and health centres had authority to manage their revenue. This was an 
incentive for them to register population, improve their performance, satisfy patients, and solve 
their local problems (Chapter 7). 
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The MoPH responded to UC policy by developing its staff capacity in three ways. The first was by 
changing the organisational structure; i. e. the Health Insurance Office was empowered by 
separation from the MoPH and transformed into an autonomous body, the National Health Security 
Board, from November 2002. The new Health Security Office has the power to employ staff, buy 
high technology equipment, and to contract out services. The second way was to create closer 
linkages between hospitals and health centres, anticipating greater technical support from hospitals 
to health centres. The third way was by training and exchanging experiences. There were many 
training courses in 2001-2002, with provinces learning from other provinces, and providers from 
other providers. The improvement of staff capacity eased implementation. 
However, the Thai system still suffered from inequitable staff distribution and there was no 
evidence that the government had clear plans to cure this problem, constraining one of the UC goals 
-a more equitable system. 
Data in the study province suggest that many factors influenced the successful implementation, the 
main factors being leadership by the Provincial Chief Medical Officers, the capacity of the officers 
at the Provincial Health Offices, the relationship among providers within the provinces, and the 
operational officers' responsiveness at the service points. 
8.7 Conclusion 
By meeting the aims set out in Chapter 1, this thesis has added to general understanding of policy 
analysis in developing countries and increases knowledge of health services and financing reform 
policy in the setting of a developing country. The review in Chapter 1 of the contextual 
environment of the international health care reform, and specifically the issue of universal coverage, 
provides understanding of the notion of ideology in the international arena, and how such ideology 
may influence others. The review in Chapter 2 of the conceptual literature on policy analysis 
identifies actors, context, and policy processes, e. g. agenda setting, formulation and implementation, 
as key elements in a deliberately simplified framework. Using this framework, the results in 
Chapters 3-7 provide thick description of the policy process in relation to UC policy in Thailand. 
The main contribution this thesis made was to focus not only on content, context, actors, and 
process, but to look carefully at the design of the policy and to show how design affected policy 
implementation. The process was affected because the design of UC policy was technically 
complicated. This thesis also showed that process was fluid, changeable, and adaptive. 
The overall conclusion of this major policy change in Thailand is that within a democratizing 
context, health policy became a `high politics' issue, with strong political commitment supporting 
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implementation. The extent of research and analysis, and the well-developed infrastructure of the 
health system, facilitated the ease of the implementation, but these were effective only when there 
was strong leadership. However, there are a lot of areas which need to be considered if the policy is 
to survive. Major missing strategies requiring government attention include planning for human 
resource development and distribution, especially providing adequate staff for primary care; design 
of the role of the tertiary hospitals in supporting primary care; strategic plans to decentralise 
purchaser functions to provinces; planning for a greater patient choice; expanding the sources of 
finance beyond general taxation; understanding of the politics in the National Health Security Board; 
and understanding of the governance and accountability of the National Health Security Office. 
Other findings from this case study are useful for research communities and policy-makers. For 
research communities, recognizing the window of opportunity to advocate a particular policy 
solution is crucial. But in order to take advantage of coming or rare opportunities, the research 
solutions and evidence need to be available to get policy-makers' attention - this requires an 
institutional umbrella for researchers in health systems and policy to work on a full-time basis to 
ensure relevance and continuity. Secondly, values, position, and the impact of the policy on 
particular actors is important. Public health advocators up to senior levels of bureaucracy were able 
to take the political initiative and push UC into action. Other senior levels of bureaucracy were 
active in translating policy into effective action. This means that an issue could have stronger 
support when research communities allied with top level bureaucrats or highly placed policy elites. 
The policy was also supported by the general public. This suggests that coalitions between research 
communities and NGOs are also important. Thirdly, a body of work, which had built up over a 
decade by several independent research institutions, supported by government, provided 
considerable authority in problem identifying and resolution. There was also a lively discourse 
among researchers over what solutions were best. Many contributed in providing evidence for 
policy decisions and formulation, some contributed in evaluating the processes and outcomes for 
tuning the reform. However, these groups were small. Building research capacity and linkages still 
needs considerable support from the Government. 
For policy makers, this study showed that it is extremely difficult to implement policies even when 
the will and leadership is there. For one thing, getting the technical aspects right is problematic, and 
may be contested. A great deal of negotiation has to go on, and even where a 'big bang' approach 
is taken, change may be quite incremental. Also the study suggests it is not possible to implement 
everything at once - even where the infrastructure and capacity is good - because of lack of time, 
energy and resources. The success of implementation was partly due to the technical and political 
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feasibility but it required participation from implementers to constantly adjust aspects of the policy. 
The level of discretion and authority given to provincial and operational implementers encouraged a 
highly adaptable system, and left implementers to solve unpredictable problems. Incentives and 
motivations were important to encourage the willingness of implementers and were able to shape 
operational behaviour in service provision. The impact on the income security and positions of 
bureaucrats, which was a point of resistance, was managed through strategic and careful negotiation, 
and helped to sustain the policy. An important lesson is that actors influenced the policy according 
to the impact of the policy on them; hence, through being able to evaluate their positions and to 
negotiate and bargain, they were able to compromise and sustain the policy. 
UC policy has attracted a great deal of interest worldwide - not only in Thailand. There is a 
growing analysis of different aspects of the UC policy. For example, Pannarunothai et al (2002) 
focus on the equity impact of UC; Na Ranong and Na Ranong (2002) focus on implementation at 
the initial stage; Srithamrongsawat, Prakongsai, and Pokpermdee are focusing on specific technical 
issues; and Tantives is focusing on the policy process of a specific benefit, anti-retro viral drugs. 
This study reviewed the whole policy process, from the very first thoughts about UC, and the 
implementation in one province. It explored the inter-relationship between actors, process and 
context, and showed how the design of the policy affected implementation. No other study has yet 
provided such a comprehensive policy analysis. Nevertheless, much yet needs to be done. There 
are a number of areas that still need research, including policy analysis to understand reform 
implementation such as: what kinds of effective incentives and motivations are used in change 
execution; planning for human resource development and distribution, especially providing 
adequate staff for primary care; design of the role of the tertiary hospitals in supporting primary 
care; expanding the sources of finance beyond general taxation; strategic plans to decentralise 
purchaser functions to provinces; how decentralisation improves the performance; and exploring 
deeply the decisions and implementation at provincial level, which should be strengthened shortly. 
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APPENDIX2 
Appendix 2 Interview schedules 
Using research questions in Appendixl, interview schedules were constructed separately for 1) 
key informants involved in policy making or policy elite - senior officers, researchers and 
reformers, and 2) implementers at national level and provincial level. Below is an example of 
the interview schedule for policy elites. Other interview schedules were similar but focused on 
different aspects. 
Appendix 2.1 Interview checklist: Policy elites Categories coding 
1. Name / position of respondent ID 
2. Age (approximate), school / batch / level of education Characteristics 
3. Place / Date of interview /1 ength / no. of meetings No. of interview 
4. What were your roles in the policy process regarding UC? / level of Stakeholders' 
involvement involvement 
" Agenda setting 
" Policy formulation 
" Implementation 
5. What are the goals / objectives of UC? Content, policy 
" Were they stated clearly? Where and when? characteristics: 
single objective, 
" Do you think that other MOPH staff perceived the same goals / stated clearly, 
objectives as you? Why? communication 
" How did they receive the information of the policy intent? 
6. Do people think this policy is the right direction of reform? Why? Policy 
" Public characteristics: 
legitimacy 
" You 
" MOPH staff 
" Other health providers 
7. Did people see UC as a major / incremental change? Policy 
" Public characteristics: size 
of change 
" You 
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Appendix 2.1 Interview checklist: Policy elites Categories coding 
" MOPH staff 
" Other health providers 
8. Did implementation take place quickly? Why? Was there any Policy 
resistance? characteristics: 
rapid change 
9. How far does UC aim to change the institutional arrangements of Content, context: 
public health insurance schemes in the following aspects? What has political regime 
been changed? How has the new political regime affected UC? 
Which content was different from the MOPH's previous proposals? 
" Sources of funds 
" Allocation from sources to allocating institutions 
" Allocating institutions 
" Allocation from insurers to providers 
" Service providers 
10. Did the MOPH change any regulation and standard setting to support Content 
UC? What? Are they different from the general rules? How? 
" Was the Essential Drug List changed? How? 
" Were prescribing and other treatment protocol determined? How were 
the details of these protocols? 
" How were providers eligible to join the scheme? Did MOPH 
strengthen licensing and accreditation of providers? How? 
" Did MOPH perform technology assessment? How? For what 
purpose? 
11. What are the benefit packages of the UC scheme? Content 
" How were they financed? 
" What were the payment systems? 
" Which services were not included in the benefit packages? 
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Appendix 2.1 Interview checklist: Policy elites Categories coding 
" How are service lists different from other schemes? 
12. Who were involved in UC proposal in the political party's campaign? Agenda setting: 
What were their roles and influence? What was the negotiation style political stream, 
between reformer and politician? (Consultation or bargaining etc. ) context: political 
regime 
13. Which factors made UC acceptable to the political party? Agenda setting: 
" Technical feasibility? 
Policy 
characteristics, 
" Legitimacy? problem stream, 
" Reformer commitment? political stream, 
" Empirical research on problem and solution? 
policy stream 
" Economic crisis? Public interest? etc. 
14. Was the election involved in policy agenda setting? Agenda setting: 
" Did it serve to focus attention on problems; induce public interest? 
problem stream 
15. How did the problem of health care access come to attention? Agenda setting: 
" Was there any measurement of health problems regarding UC policy problem stream,, 
in the system? What? Who conducted the measurement of context 
indicators? 
" Was the information available in annual reports? Were the problems 
they stated clearly? Which reports did mention these problems? 
" How did the mechanisms serve to bring problems to the attention of 
policy makers? Was there any mechanism of the system to feedback 
the failure of government performance, such as of the Health Welfare 
Scheme? 
" Was there any event that served to focus attention on problems? - 
economic recession? 
16. What was public opinion on this policy? Did the public support UC? Agenda setting: 
What factors made UC acceptable to the public? political stream, 
" Family financial constraints? context, policy 
characteristics 
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Appendix 2.1 Interview checklist: Policy elites Categories coding 
" Legitimacy? 
" Health care needs 
" Health insurance needs 
" Problem evidence in media? 
" etc. 
17. Who are likely to lose? Who are likely to gain? Did they ask to Agenda setting: 
influence the process, how? Political stream 
" What were the roles of civil society organisations, private health 
providers, private health insurers, university hospitals and other 
NGOs in the agenda setting process? 
" Were they involved in other stages - policy formulation, 
implementation? How? 
18. What are the positions of interest groups - SSO, Ministry of Finance, 
Political steam 
Ministry of Commerce, Bureau of Budget, provincial health offices, 
provincial hospitals, community hospitals, media? 
19. Who were involved in the policy formulation? What were their roles Policy formulation: 
and influence? policy style, 
" How far was decision-making in the hands of policy elites? How 
political stream 
many times were consultations made during January 2001 to 
September 2001? When? 
" Planning or problem solving? Consultation or imposed? 
" What were the negotiation styles amongst policy elites? 
" How much evidence was used for decision-making? 
" Was it consensual? 
" Was there a time that policy was imposed with non-agreement among 
policy elites? What was that issue about? 
20. Was the policy formulation process widely consultative and Policy formulation: 
participative? political stream 
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Appendix 2.1 Interview checklist: Policy elites Categories coding 
" Who were asked to participate? 
" How did stakeholders suggest their ideas? 
" Did others ask to participate in the policy formulation process? Who 
was not accepted to join? 
" Was there any consultation with providers? Was there any 
negotiation between providers? How was it undertaken? 
21. Did MOPH's senior officers support UC? What factors made UC Policy formulation: 
acceptable or unacceptable to the MOPH's high-level staff? political stream, 
policy stream, 
" Legitimacy 
policy 
" Technical feasibility characteristics 
" Congruence with existing values 
" Anticipation of future constraints 
" Public acceptability 
22. Which situations made the policy formulation difficult? Did the 
Policy formulation: 
decision-making take these issues into account? Were remedy context, policy 
strategies set up? stream-technical 
feasibility, 
" Did economic recession lead to health budget constraints? 
Implementation: 
" What changes in budget have resulted from UC policy? How many characteristics and 
health budgets increased from 2000 to 2001 and 2002? strategies 
" Is the government budget enough to implement this policy? Did the 
provincial hospitals survive? What were the remedy strategies? 
" Where did the incremental budget come from? How did the Bureau 
of Budget prepare money for UC? 
Were knowledge bases on cost and effectiveness of services sufficient? 
What were MOPH plans in this regard? 
Were the distributions of health personnel and infrastructure appropriate 
to support UC? If not, what did the MOPH do to solve these problems? 
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Appendix 2.1 Interview checklist: Policy elites Categories coding 
What criteria were used to measure the doctor-population proportion? 
What were the strategies in the area of personnel insufficient? 
" Which areas did not have enough health providers to support UC? 
What did the MOPH do in this regard? 
" Did the MOPH change health personnel employing and logistic 
procurement regulations? How? 
" What did the MOPH do to strengthen the patient-referral system? 
" What did the main contractors do when they didn't have some 
services in the benefit packages? Were referral networks set up? Was 
there negotiation within and between referral networks? 
Was there an information technology constraint? 
" Did the information system exist? 
" Did the programme need a new information system? Did it set one 
up? Why? 
Were there constraints in relation to know-how and manpower capability 
on managerial skills? 
" Do the provincial health officers have new tasks (such as registration, 
contracting, incentive and penalty procedure to regulate providers, 
quality assurance process)? Do the hospital staff have new tasks? 
" Have they trained for the new tasks? Are they capable to implement 
in them? Do they feel these are difficult? 
23. Which selected alternatives will lead to constraints in future? 
Policy 
" Amount of per capita budget? Will this policy cause health care cost characteristics 
escalation? 
" Rate of co-payment? 
" Provider payment system? 
" People registration system? 
" Will there be new technologies that cause difficulties? 
24. What were other sector or institutional reform support/obstruct UC? context 
25. Will UC be sustainable? Will the government be stable for years? Strategies 
Will the MOPH be in charge of the new health insurance office? 
How will the MOPH maintain the effort? 
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Appendix 2.1 Interview checklist: Policy elites Categories coding 
26. What is your opinion about UC? (support / neutral / resist) Why? Stakeholders' 
position 
27. What were the issues or comments that you suggested during the Stakeholders' 
policy process? What were the impacts of your comments? interest 
Do you have anything that you want to suggest but don't have the 
opportunity to share your ideas? What? 
28. Researcher's observation and comments 
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Appendix 3 Observation coding form 
Observation note: MOPH Contingency Fund Committee meeting 
1. Name of organizer 
The Contingency Fund Committee, Permanent Secretary Office, MOPH 
2. Place and date / length 
U-thai Sudsuk Room, 5`h Floor, 5`h PSO Building, MOPH, 2 Nov. 2001: 9.00-12.30 
3. Types and number of participants 
" Chair by Deputy Permanent Secretary 
" Hospital Financing Expert, Chief Financing Officer of a company, United State of America 
" Deputy Chief Medical Officers, Ratchaburi Provincial Health Office 
" Hospital officers (Directors and staff), 7 hospitals from Ratchaburi province including 
Mathereal and Child Hospital 20-30 persons 
" Senior officers, MOPH 5 persons 
" Technical officers, PSO 10-20 persons 
" Technical officers/researchers, HSRI 5 persons 
" Technical officers, Budget Bureau, Finance Ministry 10 persons 
" Other observers 
4. Topic and objectives of the meeting 
Stakeholders in Ratchaburi provinces including PHO, Regional Hospital, General Hospitals, 
Community Hospitals present their financing information for declaration of financial status and 
2002 estimation. Hospitals in Ratchaburi province requested money from contingency fund. 
5. Activities (who does what? ) 
Hospitals present financial status and reform strategy for hospital survival. Senior officers and 
technical officers asked questions and suggested some strategies to reduced hospital cost. Senior 
officer proposed criteria for budget releasing and plan of the next step. 
6. Influence and position of participants 
The PHO has dominant role in coordination between hospitals and introducing overall provincial 
strategies but in this meeting the PHO didn't show its plan of reform strategies, just the hospitals' 
plan, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer will show his plan next time. Provincial (Regional) 
hospital was very compromised and kind to community hospitals and PHO. Some community 
hospitals have potential of bankrupcy. The Mathemal and Child Hospital has several roles and 
has felt reluctant to participate in the UC program. The Chair intervened in the meeting by 
suggesting the criteria of budget releasing. 
7. Who dominate the discussion? - Counting statements by particular participants 
Senior officers and PHO. 
8. Outcome of the meeting 
" Discussion on data validity of the province 
" Consensus in criteria of budget releasing (suggested by the Deputy Permanent Secretary) 
" Discussion on the reform strategy and let the province to rethink and replan. 
9. The meeting will be follow up by an advisory group to supervise the province for data validation 
and strategy plan. Next meeting will be the issue of another province which need contingency 
fund. 
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Appendix 4 List of interviewees 
No. Id Job title Roles in the UC policy Date of interview Professions 
1 K02 Director of the Bureau of Policy formulation and 11 January 2002 MD 
Health Policy and Planning implementation: strategic 
(BHPP) (October 2000-January planning 
2002) 
2 K01 Officer at a provincial health Implementer at provincial 15 January 2001 Nurse 
insurance office level 
3 K03 MoPH Researcher Policy formulation: technical 17 January 2002 MD 
support 
4 K04 MoPH Researcher Policy formulation: technical 25 January2002 MD 
support 
5 K05 Deputy Permanent Secretary Policy formulation and 21 January 2002 MD 
implementation: secretary of 
the UC Operational 
Committee 
6 K06 Deputy Director of the Health Policy formulation and 22 January 2002 MD 
Care Reform Office implementation: assistant of 
the Secretary of the UC 
Operational Committee 
7 K07 Deputy Permanent Secretary Policy formulation and 26 January 2002 MD 
implementation: chair of 
several sub-committees 
regarding to financing 
8 K08 Head of the Political Policy Policy formulation: 15 January 2002 Others 
Division of BHPP coordination and being 
responsible for publishing 
policy statement 
9 K10 Senior officer of the Health Implementer at national level 5 February 2002 MD 
Insurance Office, MoPH regarding health registration 
and budget allocation 
10 K11 Director of HCRO Policy formulation regarding 8 February 2002 MD 
Primary Health Care and 
Primary Care Units 
Ti K12 Deputy Director of the Policy formulation 12 February 2002 MD 
Department of Mental Health 
12 K13 Director of the Mental Health Policy formulation and 13 February 2002 MD 
Development Division, implementation: strategic 
Department of Mental Health, planning 
subsequently being the director 
of BHPP from Oct 2001-2002 
13 K14 Academic from the Naresuan Policy formulation: technical 14 February 2002 MD 
University support 
14 K15 Consultant of the Department of Policy formulation: technical 19 February 2002 MD 
Health support and strategic planning 
15 K16 Deputy Director of the Office of Implementer at national level 19 February 2002 MD 
Health Provider Network regarding coordination 
Development (2001) between central MoPII and 
community hospitals. 
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16 K17 Director of Health Systems Policy formulation: technical 4 March 2002 MD 
Research Institute support 
17 K20 Deputy Health Minister Policy formulation and 10 June 2002 MD 
implementation: agenda setter 
and executive manager 
18 K21 Advisor of Health Minister Policy formulation and 3 September 2002 MD 
implementation: technical 
support 
19 K22 Secretary General of the Food Policy formulation and 12 September 2002 MD 
and Drug Administration implementation 
20 K23 Officer at the Consumer Civil society movements 4 October 2002 Others 
Protection Foundation 
21 K24 Coordinator of the Universal Civil society movements 4 October 2002 Others 
Coverage of Health Care 
Campaign (NGOs) 
22 K25 Medical doctor Secretary of the Bangkok War 11 November 2002 MD 
Room 
23 SI Head of Planning section, Implementer at provincial 6 February 2002 Nurse 
Saraburi Provincial Health level 
Office (SPHO) 
24 S2 Officer , Health Insurance Implementer at provincial 
6 February 2002 Nurse 
Section, SPHO level 
25 S3 Director, Saraburi Hospital Provider 20 February 2002 MD 
26 S4.2 Director, Adisom Military Provider 22 February 2002 MD 
Camp Hospital 
27 S4.1 Head of the Human Resource Implementer at provincial 22 February 2002 Nurse 
Development and Primary level 
Health Care Development 
Section, SPHO 
28 S4.3 Head of Dental Health Section, Implementer at provincial 22 February 2002 DDS 
SPHO level 
29 S5 Deputy Provincial Chief Implementer at provincial 18 February 2002 MD 
Medical Officer, SPHO level 
30 S6 Nong Don District Health Implementer at district level 25 March 2002 Community 
Officer, Saraburi Province I lealth 
Officer 
31 S7 Health Centre Officer, Tambon Provider and front line service 25 March 2002 Community 
Ban Krab, Nong Don District, off icer Health 
Saraburi Province Officer 
32 S8 Ban Mor District Health Implementer at district level 25 March 2002 Community 
Officer, Saraburi Province I lealth 
Officer 
33 S9 Director, Buddhabath Hospital Provider 26 March 2002 MD 
34 SIO Director, Nong Don Hospital Provider 26 March 2002 MD 
35 S11 Director, Vihandaeng Hospital Provider 28 March 2002 MD 
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No. Id Job title Roles in the UC policy Date of interview Professions 
36 S12 Director, Mitraphap Memorial Provider 7 March 2002 MD 
Hospital (private hospital) 
37 S13.1 Director, Kasemratch Hospital Provider 8 March 2002 MD 
38 S13.2 Deputy Director, Kasemratch Provider 8 March 2002 DDS 
Hospital 
39 S14 Vihandaeng District Health Implementer at district level 4 April 2002 Community 
Officer Health 
Officer 
40 S15 Gangkhoy District Health Implementer at district level 4 April 2002 Community 
Officer Health 
Officer 
41 S16 Director, Gangkhoy Hospital Provider 4 April 2002 MD 
42 S17 Provincial Chief Medical Implementer at provincial 10 April 2002 MD 
Officer, Saraburi Province level 
43 S18 Charoentham Health Centre Provider and front-line 4 April 2002 Health 
Officer, Vihandaeng District service officer worker 
44 S19 Nong Mu Health Centre Provider and front-line 4 April 2002 Health 
Officer, Vihandaeng District service officer worker 
45 S20 Tab Guang Health Centre Provider and front-line 4 April 2002 Health 
Officer, Gangkhoy District service officer worker 
46 S21 Cha-om Health Centre Officer, Provider and front-line 4 April 2002 1 lealth 
Gaengkhoy District service officer worker 
47 Cl Ammar Siamwala, Senior External thinker and chair of 15 July 2002 Economist 
economist a sub-committee regarding 
the capitation rate 
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Appendix 5 Analysis of policy community regarding UC in Thailand 
This section analyses the policy communities in Thailand by investigating participants in four 
workshop relating to UC and in HSRI's Taskforce on UC. The Table A5 shows names, 
positions and organisations, sectors, and frequency in participation. 
Table A5 List of participants in four workshops, in 1986', 19932,19963, and 19984 and 
Committee members in the HSRI's taskforce on Universal Coverage (2000-1)S 
No Sectors Name of participants Positions / Organisations 1 2 3 4 5 
1 MoPH Dr. Sanguan Primary Health Care Committee Office, 1 2 3 4 5 
Nitayarumphong MoPH (1986), Director of Health Policy and 
Planning Office, MoPH (1993), Assistant of 
PS of MoPH (1996), Office of Health Care 
reform Project, MoPH (1998-2000) 
2 MoPH Dr. Viroj Director of the Puchtrakarn Hospital, MoPH 1 2 4 5 
Tangcharoensathien (1986), Policy and Planning Analyst 8, 
MoPH (1993), Health Systems Research 
Institute (1998-) 
3 MoPH Dr. Paichit Pawabut Permanent Secretary , MoPH (1993), Office 1 2 4 
of Health Care reform Project, MoPH (1998) 
4 University Assoc. Prof. Supasit Policy and Planning Analyst 8, MoPH(1993), 2 3 4 5 
Pannarunothai Pisanulok Hospital (1996), Faculty of 
Medicine, Narasuan University (1998-) 
5 MoPH Dr. Somsak Chunharas Director, Health System Research Institute 2 3 4 5 
(1993-1998), PS's advisor Classl0 (2000-1) 
6 MoPH Dr. Anuwatra Supachutikul HSRI 2 3 4 
7 SSS Dr. Somkiat Chayasriwong Director of Medical coordination Division, 2 4 5 
Social Security Office, Ministry of Labour 
and Welfare (1993), Deputy Director 
General of Social Security Office (1996-) 
8 SSO Dr. Suradej Walee-itthikul Head of Medical Audit Section, Medical 2 5 
coordination Division, SSO (1993), Director 
of Medical coordination Division (2000-), 
9 MoPH Dr. Amorn Nonthasut Permanent Secretary of the MoPH 1 
10 MoPH Dr. Amnuoy Utthangkorn Second Regional Health Office, Chonburi 1 
11 MoPH Dr. Damrong Bunyeun Director of the Health Planning Division, 1 
MoPH 
12 MoPH Dr. Dilok Teewthong Health Card Project Coordination Center, 1 
MoPH 
13 MoPH Dr. Komart Jurng-sathiensup Chumphuang Hospital 1 
I Workshop'Health Insurance System for Thailand'. Grand Palace Hotel, Pattaya. Chonbun Province, on 10-12 Juno 1986. Source: 1. Boonyuen, D. and Singhksew, S. 
(1986) 
2 Workshop 'Health Financing in Thailand'. 11-13 November 1993 at Dusit resort and Polo Club, Petchaburi province, Thailand. Source: Nitayarumphong at al (1993) 
3 Workshop 'Health Care Reform: At the Frontier of research and Policy Decisions on 22-24 January 1996 in Nakomrsjaima Province. Thailand. Source: 
Niteyarumphong (1997) 
4 Workshop 'Achieving Universal Coverage of Health Care: Experiences from Middle and Upper Income Countries' on 15.17 March 1998 in Bangkok, Thailand. 
Source: Nitayarumphong and Mills ed. (1998) 
5 HSRI taskforce member on the Univernal Coverage, October 2000-March 2001. Source: Siamwale el &1(2001) 
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No Sectors Name of participants Positions / Organisations 1 2 3 4 5 
14 MoPH Dr. Niwat Thepmanee Director of the Office of Community 
Financing Fund Project, MoPH 
1 
15 MoPH Dr. Pairoj Ningsanond Director General of the Health Department, 
MoPH 
1 
16 MoPH Dr. Panya 
Keeratikatathayakom 
Director of the Panusnikhom Hospital 1 
17 MoPH Dr. Panya Sonkom Director of the Chonburi Hospital 1 
18 MoPH Dr. Prasert Jittiwatanapong Director of the Banglamung Hospital 1 
19 MoPH Dr. Samroeng Yaeng-kratok Coordination Office of the Quality of Live 
Year Campaign 
1 
20 MoPH Dr. Sermsak 
Siriwechsunthorn 
Director of the Rural Health Division, MoPH 1 
21 MoPH Dr. Shin-o-sod Hasbamrur Director of the Occupational Health Division, 
Health Department, MoPH 
1 
22 MoPH Dr. Srinond Ha-wanond Medical Department, MoPH 1 
23 MoPH Dr. Surasak 
Boonyaprapasorn 
Director of the Rural Hospital Division, 
MoPH 
1 
24 MoPH Mr. Chatchai triratanapirom Health Policy and Planning Division, MoPH 1 
25 MoPH Ms. Orasa Kowinta Health Policy and Planning Division, MoPH 1 
26 MoPH Ms. Atchara Netchsiri Health Policy and Planning Division, MoPH 1 
27 MoPH Ms. Molrudee Sawatdecha Office of Technical and Health Man Power 
Coordination 
1 
28 MoPH Ms. Pattamawadee Kasigam Primary Health Care Committee Office, 
MoPH 
1 
29 MoPH Ms. Sukanya Patarawimol Health Policy and Planning Division, MoPH 1 
30 MoPH Ms. Uthai Siriwattthanand Health Card Project Coordination Center, 
MoPH 
1 
1 MoPH Dr. Songpan Singh-kaew Policy and Planning Analyst, Health Policy 
and Planning Division, MoPH 
1 2 
32 MoPH Dr. Banpot Tontheerawong Director of Health Policy and Planning 
Bureau 
2 
33 MoPH Dr. Amom Rodklai Hadyai Hospital 3 
34 MoPH Dr. Boosaba Sanguanprasit Institute of Health Manpower Development, 
MoPH 
3 
35 MoPH Dr. Daorirk Sinthuvanich Director of Samutprakarn Hospital 3 
36 MoPH Dr. Jessada 
Chungpaibulpata 
Hadyai Hospital 
37 MoPH Dr. Khwanchai Visthanon Institute of Health Manpower Development, 
MoPH 
3 
38 MoPH Dr. Mingkwan 
Suphannaphong 
Institute of Dermatalogy, Department of 
Medical Services, MoPH 
3 
39 MoPH Dr. Payom Buranasis Nakornratchasima Provincial Health Office, 
MoPH 
3 
40 MoPH Dr. Petchsri Sirinirund Phayao Provincial Health Office, MoPH 3 
41 MoPH Dr. Pathom Sawanpunyalert Department of Medical Services, MoPH 3 4 
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42 MoPH Dr. Pongpisuthi 
Chongudomsuk 
Ubonratchatani Provincial Health Office, 
MoPH (1993), Office of Health Care Reform 
(1998) 
3 5 
43 MoPH Dr. Samrit 
Srithamrongsawat 
Phuket Provincial Health Office, MoPH 
(1993), Office of Health Insurance, MoPH 
(1996-) 
3 4 5 
44 MoPH Dr. Somchai Leetongin Office of Health Insurance, MoPH 3 4 
45 MoPH Dr. Tawekiat 
Boonyapisarncha 
Ayuttaya Provincial Health Office, MoPH 3 
46 MoPH Dr. Vichai Kuttiyawithaykoon Nakhon Ratchasima Provincial Health 
Office, MoPH 
3 
47 MoPH Dr. Weerawat Phankrut Kalasin Provincial Health Office, MoPH 3 
48 MoPH Dr. Wicharn Girdwichai Director of Sena Hospital, Ayuttaya 3 
49 MoPH Ms. Sopee Chusaeng Health Policy and Plan Bureau, Thailand 3 
50 MoPH Dr. Narumol Silarug Department of Medical Services, MoPH 4 
51 MoPH Dr. Preeda Tae-arak Pitsanulok Provincial Health Office 4 
52 MoPH Dr. Suwit Wibulpolprasert Office of Permanent Secretary, MoPH 4 
53 MoPH Dr. Yaowarat Porapakham Office of Health Care Reform Project, MoPH 4 
54 MoPH Dr. Yongyuth Pongsupap Health Care Reform Project Office 4 
55 MoPH Dr. Chadej Thammatat-aree Bangkruay Hospital 5 
56 MoPH Dr. Supakorn Buasai Health Systems Research Institute (HSRI) 5 
57 MoPH Dr. Thaworn Sakulpanich Office of Health Insurance, MoPH 5 
58 MoPH Dr. Wiput Pulcharoen Health Systems Research Institute 5 
59 SSO Prof. Nikom Chantarawitoon The President of the National Council of 
Labour Development (1986), Senior Advisor 
of the Social Security Board (1993) 
1 
60 SSO Tipaporn Weerapat Workmen Compensation Fund, Ministry of 
Labour 
1 
61 SSO Ms. Chantana Boon-arch Foreign Relation Officer, Technical and 
Planning Division, SSO 
2 
62 SSO Ms. Chongjt Premlumlert Head of Policy and Planning Section, 
Technical and Planning Division, SSO 
2 
63 SSO Ms. Jitraporn Kestasuwan Director of Technical and Planning Division, 
SSO 
2 
64 SSO Mr. Narong Payungphong Deputy DG of the SSO 2 
65 NESDB Mr. Komol Chobchunchom Social Program Division National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
1 
66 NESDB Mr. Thammarak Karnpisit Director of the Social Program Division, 
NESDB 
1 
67 NESDB Mr. Visut Karnchanasuk Social Program Division, NESDB 1 
68 NESDB Ms. Orathai Tansakul Director of Planning Division, NESDB 1 
69 NESDB Mr. Boonyong 
Vechmaneesri 
Director of the Social Program Division, 
NESDB (1993) 
1 2 
70 NESDB Dr. Yaowaluck 
Ratchapattayakom 
Director of the Human Resources Planning 
Division, NESDB 
2 
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71 NESDB Mr. Araya Ma-inn Policy and Planning Analyst 6, NESDB 2 
72 NESDB Mr. Narong Nittayaporn Assistant of the DG of NESDB 2 
73 NESDB Mr. Som Phromros Policy and Planning Analyst 6, NESDB 2 
74 NESDB Mr. Sukasem Wongsuwan Planning Specialist, NESDB 2 
75 NESDB Mr. Thammarak Kampisit Deputy Director General of NESDB 2 
76 NESDB Ms. Chumruthai 
Karnchanachitra 
Head of Health Program and Planning 
Section, NESDB 
2 
77 NESDB Ms. Orthip Archwiboon- 
yobol 
Planning Specialist, NESDB 2 
78 NESDB Ms. Warranya Teao-kul Policy and Planning Analyst 6, NESDB 2 
79 NESDB Ms. Dangkamon Vimonkit NESDB, Thailand 4 
80 NESDB Ms. Naiyana Kong sarai NESDB, Thailand 4 
81 NESDB Ms. Suwannee Kham-man NESDB, Thailand 4 
82 Other 
Ministries 
Mr. Poolsub Piyaanand Budget of the Bureau, Ministry of Finance 1 
83 Other 
Ministries 
Mr. Cha-ood Ngeun-thai Deputy Director of Financial Office, BMA 2 
84 Other 
Ministries 
Mr. Niwat Wachirawarakarn Advisor of Bureaucratic system, CSO 2 
85 Other 
Ministries 
Mr. Sanong Teanmanee Expert in law and financial regulation 
Comptroller General's Department, 
2 
86 Other 
Ministries 
Ms. Kamol Srinives Director of Health Budget Division, BOB 2 
87 Other 
Ministries 
Ms. Nattaya Losuwachai Director of Life Insurance Division, Insurance 
Department, Ministry of Commerce 
2 
88 Other 
Ministries 
Mr. Chawalit Ung-phakorn Budget Analysis Officer 7, BOB 2 
89 Other 
Ministries 
Mr. Cherdchal Meecome Head of Financial Regulation Section, Law 
and Financial Regulation Division 
Comptroller General's Department, 
2 
90 Other 
Ministries 
Ms. Nongluck Charernsuk Budget Analysis Officer 7, BOB 2 
91 Other 
Ministries 
Ms. Dhipavadee Meksawan Office of Civil Servant Commission, Bangkok 4 
92 Research 
Institution 
Dr. Korp Kittayakeerana TDRI 1 
93 Research 
Institution 
Mr. Wanna Pataraplapiboon TDRI 1 
94 Research 
Institution 
Dr. Matthana Pananiramai TDRI 2 
95 Research 
Institution 
Prof. Aree Valyasevi National Health Foundation, Bangkok 4 
96 Research 
Institution 
Prof. Ammar Siamwala Thailand Development Research Institute 5 
97 University Assist. Prof. Chanpen Wiwat Faculty of Pharmacy, MU 1 
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98 University Assist. Prof. Plernpit Faculty of Economics, TU 1 
Satsanguan 
99 University Assist. Prof. Prapatsorn Faculty of Economics, TU 1 
Leawpairoj 
100 University Assoc. Prof. Methee Thai Study Institution, Thammasart 1 
Krongkaew University (TU) 
101 University Assoc. Prof. Narong Faculty of Economics, CU 1 
Petchprasert 
102 University Assoc. Prof. Saksri Faculty of Social Welfare, TU 1 
Boribalbanpotket 
103 University Assoc. Prof. Taweethong Public Health Policy Study Center, MU 1 
Hongwiwat 
104 University Assoc. Prof. Yupa Wongchai Faculty of Social Welfare, TU 1 
105 University Dr. Lurchai Sri-nguean- Public Health Policy Study Center, MU 
yuang 
106 University Dr. Worwich Charoenlert Faculty of Economics, CU 1 
107 University Mr. Kusol Sunthonthada Population and Social Research Institute, 1 
MU 
108 University Mr. Sampan Hunpayon Faculty of Economics and Management, 1 
Kasetsart University 
109 University Ms. Anong Rojwanij Faculty of Economics, TU 1 
110 University Ms. Petchsri Bamrungcheep Assamchan Business and Administrative 1 
College 
111 University Prof. Dr. Pravech Wa-see Medical Coordination Center, Mahidol 1 
University (MU) 
112 University Prof. Dr. Teanchy Keeranund Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn 1 2 
University (CU) 
113 University Asso. Prof. Anong Rojwanich Faculty of Economics, TU 2 
114 University Asso. Prof. Dow Faculty of Economics, Thammasart 2 5 
Mongkolsamai University (TU) 
115 University Dr. Khamethong Intarat Deputy Director of Health Economics 2 4 
Centre, Chulalongkorn University (1993), 
Faculty of Health Economics, CU (1998) 
116 University Dr. Nuntawan Public Health College, CU 2 
Wichitwatakarn 
117 University Prof. Dr. Chitra Sitthi-amorn Dean of the Public Health College, CU 2 
118 University Assoc. Prof. Dr. Virasakdi Prince of Songkla University, Thailand 3 4 
Chongsuvivatwong 
119 University Dr. Phisanes Jessadachatr Faculty of Economics, CU 3 
120 University Dr. Suraklat Archananuparp Faculty of Medicine, Ramathibodi Hospital, 3 4 
Mahidol University, 
121 University Assist. Prof. Weerasak Faculty of Public Health, Khon Kaen 4 
Chaipah University 
122 University Assoc. Prof. Pornpan Faculty of Public Health, MU 4 
Bunyaratapan 
123 University Dr. Chanuanthong Faculty of Public Health, MU 4 
tanasugarn 
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124 University Dr. Mathana Phananiramai Faculty of Economics, TU 4 
125 University Dr. Paibul National Health Foundation, Bangkok 4 
Suruyawongpaisal 
126 University Dr. Sirilaksana Khoman Faculty of Economics, MU 4 
127 University Dr. Somchai Suksiriserekul Faculty of Economics, TU 4 
128 University Dr. Suwat Chariyalertsak Faculty of Medical Sciences, Chiang Mai 4 
University 
129 University Assist. Prof. Jirut Faculty of Medicince, Chulalongkorn 5 
Sriratanabun University 
130 University Assist. Prof. Saowakhon Faculty of Pharmacy, Chulalongkom 5 
Ratanavijitrasil University 
131 University Assist. Prof. Wutthisarn Faculty of Social Welfare, Thammasart 5 
Tanchai University 
132 University Assoc. Prof. Direk Faculty of Humanity and Social Sciences, 5 
Pattamasiriwat Narasuan University 
133 University Assoc. Prof. Khattiya Postgraduate College, Huachiew 5 
Gannasut Chalermprakiat University 
134 University Dr. Suchart Soranasataporn Faculty of Medicine, Ramathibodi Hospital, 5 
Mahidol University 
135 University Dr. Tipaporn Potavil Faculty of Social Welfare, Huachiew 5 
Chalermprakiat University 
136 Private Dr. Prapa Wongpatch Secretary General of the Private Hospital 1 
Association 
137 Private Ms. Praneet Weerakul Thai Health Insurance Company 1 
138 Private Dr. Anun Prasarnsuk President of Private Hospital Association 2 
139 Poltical Dr. Buranach Samutharak Democrat party 5 
Party 
140 NGOs Ms. Karawin Center for Study and Development of 5 
Leechanawanichapan Working at Home 
141 NGOs Ms. Sureerat Treemakka Universal Coverage Campaign Project 5 
(NGO) 
142 NGOs Ms. Yuppadee Sirisinsuk Universal Coverage Campaign Project 5 
(NGO) 
143 Media Mr. Wisut The Ban-rao newspaper 1 
Charoenwuttiwongsa 
144 Media Mr. Manoch Phothaporn Editorial Department, The Nation newspaper 2 
145 Intemation Dr. Godfrey Walker WHO, Thailand 2 3 
al agency 
- 146 Int. agency 6r. Jo -Martins Senior Public Health Specialist, Population 2 
and Human Resources Operation Division, 
WB 
147 Int. agency Dr. Tanaporn Posayananda Economist, The World Bank Regional 2 
Mission in Bankok 
148 Int. agency Prof. William C. Hsiao Harvard University 2 
149 Int. agency Dr. Abdelhay Mechbal WHO Office Eastern Mediterranean Region, 3 4 
Beirout, Lebanon 
150 Int. agency Dr. Aviva Ron ILO 3 
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151 Int. agency Dr. Benjamin Ariel marte Ministry of Health, Manila, Philippines 3 
152 Int. agency Dr. Dick Stockford Director of Commissioning, Sheffield 3 
153 Int. agency Dr. EL Abass! Abdelwahed UNICEF 3 4 
154 Int. agency Dr. Goran Tomson Karolinska Institute, Sweden 3 4 
155 Int. agency Dr. Guy Kegels Prince Leopold Institute of Tropical 
Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium 
3 4 
156 Int. agency Dr. Jaime Galvez Tan UNICEF, Bangkok (1996) 3 4 
157 Int. agency Dr. Jean Louis Lamboray UNAIDS Coordinator, SEA HIV/AIDS Project 
in Bangkok 
3 4 
158 Int. agency Dr. Katsuhiro Yoshitake JICA 3 
159 Int. agency Dr. Marc De Bruycker EUROPEAN COMMISION 3 4 
160 Int. agency Dr. OK-Kyun Bang Deputy Director, Division of Health 
Insurance Policy, Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, Korea 
3 
161 Int. agency Dr. Paulo Ferrinho Institute de Higiene e Meficina Tropical, 
Portugal 
3 
162 Int. agency Dr. Pierre Daveloose Antwerp / Health Care Reform Office, MoPH 3 4 
163 Int. agency Dr. Shahidah BT. Addul 
Manaff 
Ministry of health, Malaysia 3 
164 
I 
Int. agency Dr. Toshihiko Hasegawa National Institute of Health Services 
Management, Japan 
3 4 
165 Int. agency Miss Oatricia Moser ADB, Philippines 3 
166 Int. agency Mr. Tsutomu Kitajima JICA 3 
167 Int. agency Prof. Anne Mills LSHTM 3 4 
168 Int. agency Prof. David J Hunter Nuffield Institute of Health, UK 3 
169 Int. agency Prof. Dr. Bruno Gryseels Prince Leopold Institute of tropical Medicine 
(Antwerp) 
3 
170 Int. agency Prof. Dr. Detlef Schwefel Philipines-German Cooperations In Health 
Systems Management, Department of 
Health, Philippines 
3 
171 Int. agency Prof. Dr. Goran Sterky Karolinska Institute, Sweden 3 4 
172 Int. agency Prof. Dr. Rainer Sauerborn Harvard Institute for International 
Development (1996) Tropical Hygiene 
Institute, Ruprecht Karls University, 
Germany (1998) 
3 4 
173 Int. agency Prof. Marui Eiji School of International Health, Faculty of 
Medicine, Japan 
3 
174 Int. agency Prof. Wim Van Lerberghe Antwerp 3 4 
175 Int. agency Dr. Agnes Soucat UNAIDS Health Care Reform and HIV 
project, Bangkok 
4 
176 Int. agency Dr. Ahmet Muderrisoglu Ministry of Health, Turkey 4 
177 Int. agency Dr. Alex Preker The World Bank 4 
178 Int. agency Dr. Andrew Creese WHO, Geneva 4 
179 Int. agency Dr. Charlotte Leighton Partnership for Health Sector Reform, 
U. S. A. 
4 
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180 Int. agency Dr. Daneil Lopez Acuna WHO-AMRO/PAHO, U. S. A. 4 
181 Int. agency Dr. E. B. Doberstyn WHO-Office, Thailand 4 
182 Int. agency Dr. Fidencio G. Aurelia William Villegas Memorial Hospital, 
Philippines 
4 
183 Int. agency Dr. Joseph Kutzin WHO, Geneva 4 
184 Int. agency Dr. Maria Dugolecka Lothian Health Board, UK 4 
185 Int. agency Dr. Ok Ryun Moon School of Public Health, Seoul National 
University, Korea 
4 
186 Int. agency Dr. Peter Iloyd-Sherlock Health Policy Unit, LSHTM, UK 4 
187 Int. agency Dr. Phua Kai Hong Institute of Policy studies, Singapore 4 
188 Int. agency Dr. Schulti-Sasse Hiemann AOK, Germany 4 
189 Int. agency Dr. Shambhu Acharya WHO-SEARO 4 
190 Int. agency Dr. Somchai Peerapakorn WHO-Thailand 4 
191 Int. agency Dr. Than Sein WHO-SEARO, India 4 
192 Int. agency Mr. David Dror ILO, Geneve 4 
193 Int. agency Mr. Franz Knieps AOK, Germany 4 
194 Int. agency Mr. Jergen Hohman AOK, Germany 
-_ 
4 
195 Int. agency Prof. Yoshinori Hiroi Faculty of Law and Economics, University of 
Chiba, Japan F 
, 
4 
Note: 
1. Workshop 'Health Insurance System for Thailand', Grand Palace Hotel, Pattaya, Chonburi Province, on 10-12 
June 1986. Source: 1. Boonyuen, D. and Singhkaew, S. (1986) 
2. Workshop 'Health Financing in Thailand', 11-13 November 1993 at Dusit resort and Polo Club, Petchaburi 
province, Thailand. Source: Nitayarumphong et al (1993) 
3. Workshop 'Health Care Reform: At the Frontier of research and Policy Decisions on 22-24 January 1996 in 
Nakornrajsima Province, Thailand. Source: Nitayarumphong (1997) 
4. Workshop 'Achieving Universal Coverage of Health Care: Experiences from Middle and Upper Income Countries' 
on 15-17 March 1998 in Bangkok, Thailand. Source: Nitayarumphong and Mills ed. (1998) 
5. HSRI taskforce members on the Universal Coverage, October 2000-March 2001. Source: Siamwala et al (2001) 
The results indicate that UC was widely discussed. However, key people (number 1 to 8) were 
involved participated in several workshops. Five of them were in the MoPH. They have 
published many papers regarding Thai health system. They had long time relationship and 
sometimes they had conflicts. This core group had their networks and all networks were linked. 
This relationship supported the knowledge for UC policy decision. Authors of twenty eight 
papers related to UC are listed below. 
Charoenparij, S., Chunharas, S., Donaldson, D., et al. 1999. Health Financing in Thailand: 
Final Integrated Report. Boston: Management Sciences for Health. 
Kachondham, Y., and Chunharas, S. 1993. At the crossroads: challenges for Thailand's health 
development. Health Policy and Planning 8 (3): 208-216. 
248 
APPENDIX5 
Na Songkhla, M., Suksirisereekul, S., Chunharas, S., et al. 1997. Equity in Health and Health 
Care in Thailand, Ministry of Public Health, Nonthaburi 
Nitayarumphong, S. 1995. Toward Universal Coverage of Health Insurance for Thai People. 
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Appendix 6 Quantitative data of Saraburi 
Table A6.1 Saraburi proposal for additional budget from the Contingency Fund, December 
2001 
ID Network Beds Health PCUs UC Total UC Total Salaries of Total Total Proportion Requested Approved 
centres beneficiaries Insured capitation revenues permanent Labour expenses of revenues budget budget 
budget staff cost divided by from CF 
labour cost 
Mil Baht Mil Baht Mil Baht Mil Baht Mil Baht Mil Baht 
I Ban Mo 30 7 2 27,850 37,080 29.3 IT 15.9 21.3 50.3 , 1.6 0.0 0.0 
2 Gaeng Khoy 60 16 3 53 178 70 932 55.9 67.2 19.9 25.6 1 57.3 1 2.6 0.0 0.0 
3 Don Phud 
} 
30 6 2 7,568 8,634 8.0 9.6 9.1 111 21.5 0.9 10.0 
.. 
5.3 
4 Muag Leck ........... 30 t ........... 10 ........... 3I ........... 
r 32,320 ...... 36,583 
f 
34 0 .. 37 6 14 5 19 0i 39.9 2.0 0.0 0.0 
5 Wong Muang; 
} 
30 10 2 22703 24,743 . 239 273 . 107 142 377 19 
t 00 00 
6 Wthandaený ........ 30 .... 7 2 ..... 28,003 33087 29.5 32 9 11.9 16.3 37 1 2.0 0.0 0.0 
7 Nong Saeng 10 7 2 13 688 17 187 14.4 17.4 13.1 15.7 31 0 1.1 6.2 3.6 
8 Non Don t 10 3f 1 ... 10,378 ......... 13,384 10.9 14.5 7.6 t 10 6 23 014 20 00 
9 Nong Khae 90 10 3 32 324 49 155 34 0 44.7 17.4 t 23.9 51.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 
10 Sao Hai 30 13 2 .. 16,305 t 235 23 17.2 22 4 16.0 20.0 39.4 1.1 60 
C43 
11 Pha 400 12 4 62,745 85,329 66.0 189.1 121.2 160.7 262.6 1.0 73.5 
1 15.9 
Budhabaht 
12 Saraburi 680 26 6 95,949 132,661 100.9 403.3 206.2 292.5 578.8 14 117.6 56.4 
Hospital 
All MOPH 1,430 127 1 32 403,011 532,298 424.0 903.6 463.4 1 631.0 1,230.0 1.4 215.3 85.5 
providers 
13 Adisom 60 0 I 2,484 2,484 2.6 Not applicable 
Hospital 
14 Kasemratch 200 0 1 19,391 19,391 20.4 
Hospital I 
........ .................................. ............ .......... ....... ......... ........... ............... ................................. _ Total 1,690 127 34 424,886 554,173 447.0 i 
Saraburi 
Source: Adapted from Saraburi PHO (2001) ten tables proposed for additional budget from the 
Contingency Fund (First Round in December 2001) 
Table A6.2 Health insurance coverage in Saraburi: before and after the UC Scheme 
implementation 
Insurance schemes Jul 00* Jul 01 ** Feb 02*** 
Uninsured and private insured 188,555 31% 48,961 8% 39,694 6% 
UC Scheme (copay 30 Baht) 0 0% 210,987 35% 217,732 35% 
UC Scheme (exempt 30 Baht) 0 0% 41,238 7% 224,415 37% 
Medical Welfare Scheme 220,103 37% 173,599 28% 0 0% 
Voluntary Health Card 78,385 13% 13,176 2% 0 0% 
Social Security Scheme 81,282 14% 87,244 14% 100,870 16% 
Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme 
and private enterprises 
33,362 6% 34,042 6% 31,556 5% 
Population number **** 601,687 100% 609,247 100% 614,267 100% 
Note: the Universal Coverage Scheme launched in Saraburi from June 2001. 
Source: * Saraburi Provincial Health Office. Public Health Performance Report in Saraburi: 9 Months of Fiscal 
Year 2000 
**Saraburi Provincial Health Office. The Universal Coverage of Health Care Program in Saraburi: Performance Report June to July 2001 
*** Saraburi Provincial Health Office. Public Health Performance Report in the First Half Year 2002 in Saraburi. A 
paper presented to the supervision team from the Second Regional Health Office on 13-15 March 2002 at Saraburi Provincial Health Office. 
**** The Bureau of Registration Administration Mid Year 2000 and 2001, and December 2001 
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Table A6.3 Estimations of the required budget for public providers based on 6 months 
expected revenues and expenses in fiscal year 2002 (October 2001 to March 2002) ........................ 
Expenses Revenues from several sources Required budget 
Provider UC In-house Export-case Import-case Out-of- Other public Other Six Per 
networks beneficiari expenses expenses revenues pocket insurance incomes months person 
es schemes per year 
(Thousand (Million (Million (Million (Million (Million (Million (Million (Bahtl 
persons) Baht) Baht) Baht) Baht) Baht) Baht) Baht) capita/ 
year) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Don Phud 7.57 7.67 0.79 0.09 0.74 0.31 0.16 7.17 1,894 
2. Nong Don 10.38 8.61 2.33 0.00 0.45 1.52 0.38 8.59 1,655 
3. Nong Saeng 13.69 11.24 4.13 0.00 0.49 1.51 0.20 13.17 1,925 
4. Sao Hai 16.31 13.45 1.20 0.07 0.30 3.81 0.25 10.22 1,254 
5. Wang Muang 22.70 12.32 3.32 0.57 1.50 1.91 0.33 11.32 998 
6. Ban Mo 27.85 14.63 4.25 0.58 0.20 1.39 0.38 16.33 1,173 
7. Wihandaeng 28.00 13.90 7.67 0.26 1.88 0.64 0.30 18.48 1,320 
8. Muag Leck 32.32 9.41 1.29 0.55 1.76 0.40 1.89 6.09 377 
9. Nong Khae 32.32 22.33 7.19 0.27 2.99 3.22 0.61 22.43 1,388 
10. Gaeng Khoy 53.18 27.34 8.27 0.00 2.46 4.32 0.37 28.46 1,070 
11. PraBudhabaht 62.75 146.22 0.64 9.71 16.84 28.16 3.46 88.69 2,827 
12. Muang 95.95 265.74 0.18 39.81 54.58 74.10 17.50 79.94 1,666 
Saraburi 
Total 403.01 552.86 41.24 117.55 81.91 121.29 25.82 247.54 1,228 
Source: Saraburi Provincial Health Office (2002). Financial Status of Health Provider Networks: liata for tvatuauon 
of the Universal Coverage of Health Care Program 
Note: 
Actual numbers of beneficiaries registered at network of providers under the 30 Baht Scheme in September 2002. 
In-house expenses included labour costs and material costs incurred by providers in each network. 
Export-case expenses were the expected expenses incurred from the refer-out patients (charges from other providers) 
Import-case revenues were expected revenues from refer-in patients (reimbursable from other providers but might not be paid). 
Out-of-pocket revenues were incomes from patients at the counter of services. 
Other public insurance schemes were the CSMBS, the SSS, and the Traffic Accident Protection Fund (TAP). 
Other incomes included 1) budget from other health programs, the High-Cost &Accident &Emergency Fund, and local authorities, 
2) 
income from private health insurers and contracted companies, and 3) donors, fees, and bank interests. 
Required budget was an amount of incurred expenses plus export-case expenses and minus import-case revenues, out-of-pocket revenues, revenues from other public insurance scheme, and other incomes. 
Required budget per capita was calculated from the amount of required budget divided by the number of beneficiaries and multiplied by 2 to enlarge from 6 months to 12 months. Please note that the per capita budget rate allocated to provinces in fiscal year 2002 was 1,052 Baht per capita per year. 
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Table A6.4 Unit costs of provider networks in Saraburi during October 2001 to March 2002 
Health 
Centre 
care 
(Visits) 
Outpatient 
care 
(Visits) 
Inpatient 
care 
(Cases) 
Length 
of Stay 
(Days) 
Weight 
units 
(Equivalent 
to OP visits 
In-house 
expenses 
(Baht) 
Unit cost 
(Bahl per 
OP visit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ban Mo 14,045 32,478 1,431 2.83 56,726 13,780,733 243 
Gaeng Khoy 30,471 63,087 2,977 4.35 113,906 27,292,395 240 
Don Phud 9,485 10,860 579 3.32 21,812 8,055,284 369 
Muag Leck 24,729 21,750 1,264 2.23 46,865 9,419,763 201 
Won Muan 26,668 25,797 1,609 1.85 56,323 11,199,849 199 
Wihandaeng 27,151 21,822 1,494 2.69 50,883 14,154,315 278 
Non Saen 11,229 22,221 689 3.58 35,236 10,603,477 301 
Nong Don 6,074 19,961 756 3.41 32,367 8,483,766 262 
Non Khae 22,063 28,964 2,311 3.58 67,937 20,842,648 307 
Sao Hai 34,974 29,033 841 4.57 51,299 12,495,950 244 
Total community 
hospitals 
206,889 275,973 13,951 3.29 533,354 136,328,180 256 
PraBudhabaht 31,958 137,473 8,875 6.92 303,615 146,247,341 482 
Muang Saraburi 79,467 239,014 17,222 7.44 560,930 264,944,748 472 
Source: Saraburi Provincial Health Office (2002). Financial Status of Health Provider Networks: Data for tvaiuatton 
of the Universal Coverage of Health Care Program 
Note: Weight units are the sum of visits of health centre care, visits of OP care, and visits of IP care of which are 
multiplied by times equivalent to OP visits 
-Assumption I for community hospital networks: the average unit cost of health centre care was 
0.3 times outpatient 
care cost and the cost of Inpatient care was 14 times outpatient care cost. 
-Assumption2 for Phabudhabaht hospital network: the average unit cost of health centre care was 
0.2 times outpatient 
care cost and the cost of Inpatient care was 18 times outpatient care cost. 
-Assumption3 for Saraburi hospital networks: the average unit cost of health centre care was 0.15 times outpatient 
care cost and the cost of Inpatient care was 18 times outpatient care cost. 
Table A6.5 The Hospital networks' revenues (or loss) from the referral system and the nurse- 
doctor ratio 
Provider 
networks 
In-house 
expenses 
Export-case 
expenses 
Import-case 
revenues 
Revenues 
gain/loss 
from the 
referal 
s stem 
Referral 
revenue or 
expenses 
Medical 
doctors 
Registered 
nurses 
RN %II) 
(Baht) (Baht) (Baht) (Baht) (percentage of 
in-house 
expenses) 
(Persons) (persons) Nurses per 
doctor 
1 (2) (3) (4)=(3)-(2)1 5=4/1 (6) (7) (8)7)! 6) 
1 Ban Mo 14.63 4.25 0.58 -3.67 -25% 
3 20 6.7 
2 Gaen Kho 27.34 8.27 0.00 -8.27 -30% 4 
34 8.5 
3 Don Phud 7.67 0.79 0.09 -0.70 -9% 2 13 
6.5 
4 Mua Leck 9.41 1.29 0.55 -0.73 -8% 3 15 
5.0 
5 Won' Muan g 12.32 3.32 0.57 -2.75 -22% 2 15 
7.5 
6 Wihandaen 13.90 7.67 0.26 -7.41 -53% 2 19 
9.5 
7 Non g Saen = 11.24 4.13 0.00 -4.12 -37'%o 2 16 9,0 
8 Non g Don 8.61 2.33 0.00 -2.33 -27% 2 12 60 
9 Non Khae 22.33 7.19 0.27 -6.91 -31% 3 28 
9.3 
10 Sao Hai 13.45 1.20 0.07 -1.13 -8% 
2 15 7.5 
lI PraBudhabaht 146.22 0.64 9.71 9.07 6% 28 197 7.0 
12 Muang 
Saraburi 
265.74 0.18 39.81 39.63 15% 75 346 4.6 
Total 552.86 41.24 51.93 10.68 2% 128 730 5.7 
Source: Saraburi Provincial Health Office (2002). Financial Status of Health Provider Networks: wawa 1ui 
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